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THE IDEOLOGICAL BASE OF RADICALISATION OF YOUNG MUSLIMS

Abstract:

A radical Salafist ideology is attractive to people, especially young people, looking for simple solutions to solve the serious socio-economic problems with which they cannot cope. Salafism is characterized by a Manichean division of the world on what is good, because it comes from God and what is bad. This in turn implies providing simple answers to complex questions. Actually, the simplest answer to the questions: why the people on Earth live badly? It is the statement "because mankind rejects the law of God revealed in the Qur'an and Sunnah." Therefore, the restoration of these foundations is the only one and the simplest way to solve all problems of mankind. The road to this seems to be simple: total war against "infidels and apostates". The Salafi mullahs as the custodians of "true Faith" have only right to decide who is "infidel of apostate"... Young people undergo indoctrination via the Internet, or in different "Islamic Centres" using freedom of religion (which is something fundamental

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for the West), are deprived of the ability to take a critical look at the content transmitted. Other are radicalized in prisons. Such circumstances stimulate reflection on the current life of their own, but also may lead to religious radicalism. The question arises: how much we still have to deal with religion as such or if it is a totalitarian political ideology? Of course, Salafism is the offshoot of Islam, but goes far than relations between men and Absolut. From the above reasons can be deduced its totalitarian character. Comparing the proposed by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl Friedrich definition of totalitarianism, we can substantiate such thesis. Guiding ideology is here Salafi interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah. Mass party is Salafi movement, which can take the form of a movement or the classic political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamic State tries to have a monopoly on weapons as much as possible, militarizing male part of the population. The Islamic State monopolizes the mass media, reaching new media as a means of attracting new adepts, and where the Salafists tend to power, contests existing media as "godless" encouraging the use of the Internet and underground publications. An example is the so-called Islamic State (the Daesh). It uses legitimate violence against any actual or alleged opponents of the ruling group, such as not only Christians, or Jews, but also people arbitrarily considered as non-Muslims. For this purpose, they create formations that can be called religious-moral police, and used traditional security institutions as well. Salafi vision of the World

resembles a totalitarian concepts which Hannah Arendt writes about, as this interpretation of Islam vividly explains both past, present and forecast the future, and also presents a seemingly logical model of the state of God, which wants to put into practice. If we consider Salafi ideology as totalitarian, then we will need to apply the same methods to combat the Salafi preachers as those used to fight the followers of totalitarian regimes after World War II. Declarations of similar firmness in the fight against "Jihadism" appear at various levels of government of countries such as Germany for many years. However, there is lack of sufficient firmness and consistency in their effectiveness.

Key words: islam, salafism, fundamentalism, ideology, islamic state.

Salafi fundamentalism is undoubtedly a social phenomenon. Without paying attention to this dimension we cannot understand the spectacular success of this political entity. In general, Islamic fundamentalism is not a particularly new phenomenon, but it is not as old as Islam. Its origins should be sought in the nineteenth century, when the European powers successively took control over Arab lands of the former Ottoman Empire. It was therefore a response to colonialism. An attempt to explain the weakness of the Islamic world against the Western world and the departure from religious principles. Organizations like e.g. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jamaat-e-

Islami in India (now Pakistan) formed ideologically the next generation of young radicals. In the years after World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood became a major opposition organization against the military rule based on Arab socialism in Egypt and Syria. They became also the natural enemies of all secularist governments in the Islamic world. This resulted, that in a Cold War environment, they were treated by the West as an ally, although the radicals saw it as an enemy equal to the Soviets. It was one of the reasons of engagement of radicals in so called Afghan Jihad in 80s. One of the reasons that attract young people today join the ranks of fundamentalist organizations is the economic crisis that has affected Muslim countries. One of its reasons is population explosion and overpopulation. Radicals, contesting the existing political system and social order creates impression of the last hope for the young and ambitious, but the unemployed men. The West gave up on this occasion caught in a trap of ideology. Reaching the work of Francis Fukuyama's belief in the inevitable victory of liberal democracy not only in Europe but also beyond caused the a priori assumption that the military regimes in Libya, Egypt, Iraq or Syria will be replaced in the process of democratization sooner or later. The thing is that people with such political views in the Muslim world consist just a small margin, in contrast to the well-organized and seasoned in the fight against dictators fundamentalists. In the struggle for the hearts and minds the liberals/modernists had no chance with the radicals. An

example would be promotion by the West for the president of Egypt former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed El Baradei. He was unpopular at home, unlike supported by the Muslim Brotherhood Mohamed Mursi. So we can say that the fundamentalist movement have surprisingly much in common with ... Western Left. In this context, ISIS can be compared to the Bolsheviks under Lenin. In addition to specific universalism (the concept is addressed not to one nation, but to all humanity), you can see it has great revolutionary potential: the desire to destroy existing social structures and the removal from power of existing elites. From this perspective, the choice of targets of terrorist attacks in countries such as Egypt or Tunisia is clear: to deter tourists from visiting these countries and undermine its economies. This in turn leads to the impoverishment of society and the deepening of the serious problems, such as unemployment. We are therefore faced with the classic Bolshevik method of operation according to the principle "the worse the better."

Islamic fundamentalism proposes simple solutions to complicated problems: the introduction of Sharia to be a panacea for all the pathologies. Fundamentalist propaganda blames the West and the secular governments for the economic impact of its activities. The revolutionary nature of organizations such as the so-called. "Islamic State" can testify that it works most actively in those countries where state is failing with the redistribution of income from the crude oil and

not buying the social peace for the "petrodollars" (Wilczyński 2016). Overthrown dictators have not been replaced by efficient civil government, which led to the collapse of these countries. Fundamentalism fill this political vacuum, or at least tried to do so. For young people who cannot get through traditional society, often well-educated and with ambitions, participation in the Islamic Revolution is the only chance to pierce the glass ceiling.

What Salafist interpretation of Islam can offer to his followers, which attracts young people to renounce the comforts offered by life in the Western world? What can push some of them to sacrifice their lives in the name of "cause"?

The basis of modern Salafi movement is built in the eighteenth century in the areas of the Arabian Peninsula is Wahhabism. The name of this trend in Islam is derived from the name of its founder Muhammad Ibn Abdul al-Wahhab (1703-1792). His concept is based on demand to return to a literal interpretation of the Koran, and aversion to non-Muslims living in the then Ottoman Empire. The key event in the history of Islamic radicalism was the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The country relied on Wahhabi ideology (Wilczyński 2015). It was a peculiar alliance of "the throne and the altar". Saud family did not have family roots leading to the prophet Muhammad, traditionally required for the rulers of Muslim. Wahhabi clerics and Islamic judges legitimize the Sauds right to rule on the Arabian Peninsula (and therefore the care of the holy mosques in

Mecca and Medina). Saudi Salafi missionaries became the carriers of Islamic radicalism in Europe as well. The growing importance of Saudi Arabia as a major exporter of crude oil meant that it obtained funding for conducting missionary activities in other Muslim countries and in the Muslim diaspora in Western Europe. Particularly important both in propaganda and in fact was the involvement of Saudi Arabia in financing the mujahedeen who fought against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Along with the money the Salafi missionaries and radicals reached the area bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan. The most famous of them was Osama bin Laden, who along with his spiritual leader Abdullah Yusuf Azzam set up a military organization later known as Al Qaeda. Originally it dealt with recruiting Arab radicals to fight in Afghanistan, and created logistics for military operations. More important, however is the charity and political activity on the Af-Pak Frontier: the construction and financing of Koranic schools (Madrassas), which served also as the educational centers and orphanages and military schools which prepared students to fight. Among the students were not only Afghan refugees, but also children from poor Pashtun families, for which this kind of education was only available because the Pakistani state didn't provide elementary education then. Saudi sponsored schools provides free service and housing. In this way, the petrodollars created centers to promote the Salafist interpretation of Islam, where until now it was unknown. After the withdrawal of Soviet/Russian troops from Afghanistan, the

unemployed *mujahedeen* joined the ranks of the various armed organizations fighting in the name of Islam in many parts of the world, e.g. In Yemen and Tajikistan, or Chechnya. Everywhere they preach his radical version of Islam. Another event that gives prominence of Salafi interpretation of Islam, were the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. In the eyes of young radicals it was a spectacular success: for the first time they managed to make such an act on the US territory. This contributed to propaganda of global Jihad. In this way it became the slogan uniting the Muslim enemies of the West. Both al-Qaeda as he later so called Islamic State used the tools of globalization, such as the Internet mainly to promote them as symbols of resistance of Muslims towards the West and particularly the United States. The names of these terrorist organizations have become a kind of terrorist franchise, which is used by the perpetrator further attacks mimicking Osama bin Laden and his first subordinates. It is hard to distinguish which plot has been committed by the cell of existing organization or was it an effect of "lonely wolf", just "corroborated" by the formal leaders of the organization as a success. Such behavior is an element of public relation campaign of such groups as so called Daesh.

It is worth to analyze of these ideological elements Salafism, which may contribute to the ideological formation of European Muslims. Because they constitute the relationship between them and

the people of the West, who do not intend to accept their system of values.

The basis of Salafi concept of society, and at the same time one of the tools of the ideological struggle, which use its supporters is the concept of takfir. This term means the exclusion of individuals or groups from the Muslim community. It is a tool used by Salafists to recognize people who identify with them as (true) Muslims. The problem becomes serious when we ask ourselves the question: who exactly is competent to judge whether a person or group was the "apostate" and "heretic", which can / should be excluded from the community? Since the liquidation of the Caliphate in Turkey, there is no commonly accepted Islamic institution that would have such a right. Salafists as a conservative-reformist movement self-declared legal and moral authorities in this regard, but do not hold formal powers to do so. 29 June 2014 the leader of the so-called Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself the Caliph (leader of the whole Muslim world) (Stach, Kura 2015). He did not have any rights to this, but was recognized as one by some of the leaders of the Salafis outside Syria and Iraq. Along with the title of Caliph he has usurped an authority to issue decrees, which determine who is Muslim and who is not, referring to the principle of takfir. This principle is also useful where the Salafists are waging struggle against the dictatorship, even if that power is based on Islam. Indeed they usurp the right to assess whether / which actions of power are consistent with the principles of

Sharia law. With the use of takfir Muslim Brotherhood contested the legitimacy of successive military dictators, calling for their overthrow. Inspired by Salafism Lieutenant Khalid Ahmed Showky Al-Islambouli assassinated Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat accusing him of betraying Islam by signing an agreement with Israel (Fogaš, Verba 2016). From the security point of view of the European countries it is essential to know another understanding of the concept of takfir. It is the recognition of supporting of inadmissible tyranny (Arab. Taghut). Salafists use to recognize "tyrants" and other "unpleasant" governments as apostates and the infidels, and so the Western governments. Supporting tyranny can take a variety of ways, such as the protection of these governments, participation in, or "any other form" of helping it. This may mean a practical ban on participation in state institutions, service in the military, the police of the Western states. This may explain the aggression of the radicals against Arab police officer during the attacks on the editors of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris (Wilczyński, Kropska 2015). This also has an impact on relations between the Muslim community in European countries and security forces. The Muslims who sharing Salafi ideology are not ready to cooperate with them against their "brethren-Muslims" in criminal or terrorist investigations. Without it effective anti-terrorist prevention will be impossible: there will be no informants who warn against suspicious behavior, the preparations for

the attacks, and even the activities of radical preachers (Wilczyńska 2015).

The second fundamental principle which constitutes the Salafi community and their relationship with the outside world is al-wala wa-l-bara (from Arabic loyalty and disavowal). It is linked to the general foundation of Muslim ethics: do good and reject doing wrong. From the principle of al-wala wa-l-bara Salafis derive an obligation to actively oppose the government, which acts incorrectly, particularly when breaking the orders and prohibitions of Sharia. Moreover, the "real" Muslims should avoid any cooperation with "infidels" and "apostates". An example of this approach was criticism from the aforementioned Mohammad Azzam on assistance of the US in the fight against the Soviet army in Afghanistan, and later the final break of Osama bin Laden's cooperation with Saudi Arabia after its ruler asked the US military to protect the territory of the Kingdom during the war in the Persian Gulf. The principle of al-wala wa-l-bara had been also recalled by the Taliban "government" of Afghanistan, when it refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States after the unveiling of its masterminding of attacks in New York and Washington. Salafis relying on the principle of al-wala wa-l-bara apply a kind of moral blackmail against their moderate brethren. According to them one has a duty to support radicals as al-Qaeda or Daesh even if one do not supports its demands. Otherwise they will be supporters of the

"Jews and Crusaders," and so - the disbelievers, which is the violation of the aforesaid rules.

Salafis treat instrumentally even so fundamental principle that for every Muslim is Tawhid - the monotheism. The belief in Allah (and public confession of the Faith) it is not the only condition for recognition of being a Muslim. It is essential to follow literally the teachings of the Qur'an and the observance of Islamic law. From this principle is derived total critique of secular governments in the Islamic world as godless. It is also used as an argument against the selective use of Islam as a mobilizing factor. E.g. Osama bin Laden criticized the Saudis for not fighting Yemeni Communists.

The successor to bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri explicitly stated that only the renewal of tawhid can save Muslims from a life on the margins of the New World Order. This "renewal" in his opinion means the rejection of any cooperation with the infidels, on the other hand - the unification of all Muslims around the world around an idea of "clean" (purified) Islam, free of any foreign accretions, and unlawful interpretations. The ideology of Salafism concept of tawhid is considered as the most radical, because it demands from the witness of the faith, full sacrifice of his/her life. Radicals consider that among many forms of martyrdom death in battle is the most important. This turn is connected with perhaps the most controversial concept in Islam - Jihad. The first ideologue of al-Qaeda's Muhammad Azzam indicated that the sacrifice of life on the road of jihad is proof of faith,

a denial of it proves weakness, and in extreme cases, its apparent character, which makes the particular person essentially infidel (Arab. Kufir). With the above assumptions Azzam also led the appreciation of suicide attacks as a weapon. He argued that this is not a "suicide" forbidden in the Quran, but "death during the Jihad." This is due to Islam characterized by belief in strict predestination: it depends only on Allah, when a fight ends with the death of a mujahidin (and he/she will be Shahid- the Martyr) or will he survives. So in theory even the pilot of a plane poking in a New York skyscraper could survive if Allah wished so. If he died, it was not a suicide, but death in battle in accordance with the will of Allah. This is a direct reference to the Qur'an, which requires conducting of this jihad:

Let those (believers) who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter fight in the Cause of Allah, and whoso fights in the Cause of Allah, and is killed or gets victory, We shall bestow on him a great reward. (...)He will forgive for you your sins and admit you to gardens beneath which rivers flow and pleasant dwellings in gardens of perpetual residence. That is the great attainment. (...)Think not of those who are killed in the Way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are alive, with their Lord, and they have provision².

²<http://www.comp.leeds.ac.uk/nora/html/4-74.html>,
<http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=61&verse=12>,<http://www.comp.leeds.ac.uk/nora/html/3-169.html> (10.01.2017)

To this concept refers directly Osama bin Laden in the document with the revealing title: Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Statement of the World Islamic Front:

The killing of Americans and their allies, civilians and military, it is the duty of every Muslim. They should do so in every country wherever possible. This will help the fight for the salvation of al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque in Mecca from the clutches of the enemy and causes it to withdraw their armies from the lands of Islam, defeated so badly that never able to threaten any Muslim. So do, because it is Allah commands us to fight with the Gentiles, until the pressure is not removed and there will be justice, and faith in the One God (Alexander, Swetnam 2001, p. 108).

The above quotation indicates the two enemies "of the Islamic world" according to bin Laden: on the one hand the United States, as "godless power" and Israel (as evidenced by recall Jerusalem Mosque of al-Aqsa), and on the other - cooperating with them Saudi Arabia (which proves to recall the Holy Mosque in Mecca).

Islamic State, is Salafic organization which is also called "Salafi Jihadism". Even Syed Abul A'la Maududi, a Pakistani theologian regarded as one of the "spiritual fathers" of modern Islamic fundamentalism, clearly distinguished between the great Jihad and small Jihad. He pointed out that Jihad is a part of this overall defense of Islam. Jihad means struggle to the utmost of one's capacity. A man who exerts himself physically or mentally or spends his wealth in the

way of Allah is indeed engaged in Jihad. But in the language of the Sharia this word is used particularly for the war that is waged solely in the name of Allah and against those who perpetrate oppression as enemies of Islam. This supreme sacrifice of lives devolves on all Muslims. If, however, a section of the Muslims offer themselves for participating in the Jihad, the whole community is absolved of its responsibility. But if none comes forward, everybody is guilty. This concession vanishes for the citizens of an Islamic State when it is attacked by a non-Muslim power. In that case everybody must come forward for the Jihad. If the country attacked has not strength enough to fight back, then it is the religious duty of the neighboring Muslim countries to help her; if even they fail, then the Muslims of the whole world must fight the common enemy. In all these cases, Jihad is as much a primary duty of the Muslims concerned as are the daily prayers or fasting. One who shirks it is a sinner. His very claim to being Muslim is doubtful. He is plainly a hypocrite who fails in the test of sincerity and all his Ibadat and prayers are a sham a worthless hollow show of devotion (Maududi 2001, pp. 140-141).

A comparison of these texts shows radicalization of defining Jihad by armed supporters of Salafism in relation to the understanding adopted back in the 40s., when Maududi wrote his fundamental work, which is then very radical interpretation of the foundations of faith. Another element used by the Salafi Islamic ideology is the principle hakimiyya. It means providing a political reign of God on earth. It

stems from a reflection on how they see the ideal state. Of course, this kind of agonizing are the subject of discussion of many philosophers from the earliest times to the present, but for our discussion is interesting to see how this problem is seen by the Salafis. The concept of "state of God on earth" was introduced to Islam by aforementioned Maududi. For him it was obvious that such a state should rely entirely on Sharia law - Rights conferred by the revelation to man, and written in the Quran, and further specified in the Sunnah (Hadith describing the life and work of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate surroundings).

Sharia is the law of God, and provides guidance on how to regulate life in the best interests of man. Its objective is to show the best way to man and provide him with the ways and means to fulfill his needs in the most successful and most beneficial way. The law of God is out and out for your benefit. There is nothing in it which tends to waste your powers, or to suppress urges and emotions. It does not plead for ascetism. (...) God does not want to destroy his creation. He did not give the man any power or ability that would be unnecessary or useless. He did not create the heavens and the earth, nothing that was not useful to man. (...) The law prohibits a man everything what could harm him and orders and allows for everything man useful and beneficial (ibidem, pp. 150-151)

With this and similar reasons Maududi concludes that Sharia law is perfect, because it comes from God, and hence man needs no

other law than the sharia and God, you should be based on sharia - to pursue the teaching of Islam. Even easier is expressed in the motto of the organization:

Allah is our goal, the Prophet is our leader, the Koran is our law, jihad is our way and death in the way of Allah is our highest hope³

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