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Olawale O. AKINRINDE

Osun State Univ., Osogbo, Nigeria

Usman A. TAR

Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria

David A. BABALOLA

Oye-Ekiti Federal Univ., Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria

HUMAN INSECURITIES IN AFRICA, THE POLITICS OF NON-REFOULMENT AND THE PLIGHTS OF THE AFRICAN REFUGEES ALONG MEXICAN-AMERICAN BORDERS

Abstract:

The rise of refugee problems worldwide, particularly the African refugee crisis, inherently underlines the preponderance of the spiking degree of human insecurity in Africa and the definitional and operational shortcomings of the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951, which was designed to protect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers to safety and express access to neighboring states. This article attempts to unpack how the spiking rate of human insecurity in Africa and the definitive and organizational shortcomings of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention have led to the troubling spate of the Mexico-American border African refugee crisis, amongst several unabating large scale migrations to developed world including the European countries. From a case-study methodological standpoint, this study utilizes the advantages of rigorous qualitative data and analysis techniques. Despite the development of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and other international regimes, the increasing numbers of African refugees along the Mexican-American border and around the world remain alarmingly worrying. The African refugee crisis now poses unprecedented dangers to global human security, with over five million people internally displaced and thousands of African refugees seeking asylum along the Mexican-American border. A thorough human based security approach is recommended to address the ravaging human security challenges precipitating the influx of African migrants along the Mexico-American borders.

Key words:

Human Insecurities in Africa, Politics of Non-Refoulement, African Refugee Crisis, Mexico-American Border, Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951

INTRODUCTION

As expected, any intellectual exposure relating to the refugee or non-refoulement and refugee crisis should start with a reference to the right of all peoples against forced return in the event of an emergency, war or natural disaster that is endemic and detrimental to the safety and life of the population. This concept, otherwise known as Non-Refoulement, enshrined in the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951, serves as the only global regime regulating the right of all nations, in the face of threats of man-made and natural disasters, to seek their protection and safe havens. Since 1951, to various degrees, states have continued to subscribe to the spirit and letters of this convention (Akinrinde, 2018a). Nevertheless, for example, only minorities of the neighboring states surrounding Syria are either signatories of the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol to the Convention, or have implemented national asylum or refugee legislation incorporating non-refoulement provisions of the Convention. Even if States are parties to one of the refugee security treaties, the commitment remains either unimplemented or, in the majority of cases, ineffective for the protection of refugees, given that the applicable domestic legislation has been adopted (Sanderson 2013: 780). Aside the unabating large scale migrations of Africans to European counties, an increasing number of African refugees are now making their way to the United States by taking the same roads that the Central Americans and Mexicans used to follow. The journey of most African refugees to the United States typically takes months. Via visas to countries such as Ecuador and Brazil, which have very loose visa requirements, African refugees typically enter the Western hemisphere. The African refugees would later

travel to Colombia from there to make the trek to Mexico-U.S through Central America border. The journey through Latin America has always been strenuous, risky and costly. The Darien Gap, the most remote jungle area in the world, is the most treacherous part, accessible only by foot or canoe. There are rodents, poisonous insects and wild animals populating the jungle. Many migrants die or drown in the river from fatigue. While fleeing ethnic cleansing, political volatility and other types of human insecurity in their respective countries, such as Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Ghana, Benin Republic, Togo and Angola, these refugees typically threatened not only their own stability, but also the protection of their desired destinations. Officially, there were 2,700 estimates released by Mexican authorities in 2019 with respect to detained African refugees along the Mexico-U.S. borders (Salvadore 2019). The migrants were apprehended near the U.S.-Mexico border and at various checkpoints across the country. The first eight months of between October 2018 to May 2019, Mexican authorities have already apprehended 3,500 individuals that also included African refugees (Salvadore 2019).

HUMAN INSECURITIES IN AFRICA AND THE INCREASING SPIKE IN AFRICAN REFUGEES ALONG MEXICO-US BORDERS: ANY CASUAL OR THEORETICAL RELATIONS

The spike in African refugees seeking asylum in the United States across the Mexico-U.S. borders has been related to different causes. The preponderance and prevalence of much human insecurity, however, is ravaging the continent of Africa. In the social configuration of the African continent, human insecurities such as diseases, political uprisings, food insecurity, environmental destruction, extremism and insurgency, hunger, unemployment and the contemporary Covid-19 have remained normal. According to the UNHCR for instance, political upheavals in the Democratic Republic of Congo alone has, earlier in year 2019, displaced approximately 4.5 million people (Salvadore 2019). For decades, tension between the French-speaking majority and the Anglophone

South has been simmering in Cameroon. Finally, it has boiled over, leading to the deaths of thousands and torture and rape allegations, causing millions to flee. LGBTQI individuals fearing repression are among those seeking refuge from Africa and student activists/organizers fleeing government retaliation from countries such as Congo and Cameroon.

Similarly, as demonstrated by the poverty line coupled with the growing frustrations of the citizens, the inability of almost half of the entire population of the nation to have their economic needs met, especially the youth to be free from fear and want, has further aggravated the inglorious and incessant illegal migrations of African refugees to the Western world. The Human Security approach will provide a theoretical logic for the study here to understand how the multifaceted and different human insecurities ravaging the African continent lead to mass illegal migrations of Africans to Western countries, particularly the US, as refugees.

First, the Human security approach, following the end of the Cold War and the end of certainty that came with it, became the bedrock of security discourses; strategy and even a security paradigm that seeks to extol the primacy of human basic need as security measures itself, to forestalling insecurities (Hough, 2004). The failure of governments to, through the usual traditional security paradigm, address the emerging human insecurities that threatened the existence of humanity led to the emergence of an alternative approach, that is, the Human security paradigm to approaching and understanding the rising profile of human-related insecurity issues. More recently, analysts, following the United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report and their notion of security as "freedom from fear and want" (Hough, 2004), have settled on the phrase "human security" to emphasize the people-centered aspect of security efforts, strategies and paradigms. Human Security thus takes the individual as the primary guide, and also focuses on how best to protect them. Therefore, focus is on the search to actualize the well-being of individuals and respond to the needs of people in coping with sources of threats. In addition, the paradigm of human protection attempts to find ways to protect people from external violence and also to protect them from a

variety of challenges, such as environmental contamination, infectious diseases and economic deprivation. The degradation of the environment, hunger, famine and disease are tremendous threats to the lives of millions of people all over the world, and indeed in Africa (Akinrinde, 2020: 120).

Prominent amongst these insecurities Africans have however accepted very long ago as the new normal is poverty. Poverty is often regarded as a significant threat to life and human security. Through famine and hunger, poverty has heightened the vulnerability to other threats by creating unfavorable structural economic conditions. Therefore, poverty can kill directly in huge numbers when people are unable to secure sufficient food, as well as precipitate and motivate the poor into taking up terrorism, banditry and monstrous herdsman killings as a means to surviving economically. Poverty therefore, as it were, does not simply mean a lack of material possessions, but, more generally, the deprivation of the three basic economic needs: Food, Water and Shelter (Akinrinde, 2020: 121; Akinrinde, 2018a; Akinrinde, 2018b). Many of the African refugees that had fled the African continent did so with the aims of finding greener pastures where they would be able to at least have their three square meals, clothing and basic security. This has been the case and experiences of many African countries. Africans are willing to go through the deserts between the Central America and the North just to make it to the American border.

Again, the role of food insecurity in the rising numbers of African refugee migrations to the Americas cannot be downplayed. Basically, the immediate economic threat to food security in Africa, over time, has always been famine. Famines chiefly occur due to the combination of both natural and economic factors. Since, it is manmade phenomenon, they are sometimes economically motivated (Hough, 2004). A critical problem has also been an insufficient political response by governments to the challenge of food insecurity. However, the overall accessibility of food does not seem to be the problem, but rather the poor distribution and lack of economic means or access to affordable food. The effects of food shortage or malnutrition are multifold. The desperate effort to resort to lucrative illegal activity by victims of food insecurity in order to

fulfill their food needs (Akinrinde, 2020: 122). It clarifies why most Africans are willing to sacrifice anything to make it to the Americas as refugees.

Environmental insecurities and unsustainability is another human security concern that is partly responsible to the continued migrations of African refugees to the Americas, especially the Mexico-American border. Though, some of the threats caused by environmental degradation seems less clear-cut and direct than most other dangers to human life. Thus, the potential threat of global warming and ozone depletion appears far-off, when compared to more imminent threats, such as natural disasters and military attacks (Hough, 2004). Negative changes in environmental factors, however, have increased the vulnerability of populations to other threats, such as diseases, and are thus primarily an indirect threat to human protection. Therefore, some studies have shown that nearly a third of disease-related deaths worldwide have some environmental causes, such as air or water contamination (Hough, 2004), which indirectly support the ongoing migration of African refugees (those who have been badly affected by the harsh effects of emerging environmental challenges) to the Americas, especially the Mexico-American border. Furthermore, human induced environmental degradation, and the resulting scarcity of resources also, has been one of the motivators of insecurity and insurrections in Nigeria, and most parts of the globe (Akinrinde, 2020: 123; Terriff, 1999).

Similarly, air pollution, caused by cars, factories and power plants, which can seriously harm people's health, is one of the main challenges. On the other hand, developed countries mostly face the risk of insufficient water supplies, as well as water pollution. A recent research, for example, has shown that nearly 2 million children die from diarrhea each year, largely due to the pollution of their drinking water and the lack of sanitation in developing countries, particularly Africa (The Economist, 2006). Water scarcity is also increasingly becoming a factor that is causing increasing levels of human insecurity in ethnic conflicts and political friction. The harsh realities of human insecurity do not shield Africa. In reality, these human insecurities have thus put people at the hands of desperate and survivalist acts and behaviors that may, in most cases,

precipitate the decision of young people and adolescents to migrate to the Americas illegally. Environmental problems, coupled with poverty and underdevelopment, which are both serious threats to the welfare of the person, have become ready-made drivers of the increase in African refugee migrations to the Mexico-American border (Akinrinde, 2020; 124).

THE DEFINITIONAL/OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCIES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON REFUGEES

One prominent definitional itch associated with the Geneva Convention on Refugee or the principle of non-refoulement was the issue of admission of refugees or persons seeking asylum on grounds of persecution, disasters, civil wars and other emergencies. The Geneva Convention has not been able to clear the dust as regards the controversies surrounding the admission or otherwise of persons seeking refuge during emergencies or persecution. The provisions and the concept of non-refoulement found in the 1951 Geneva Convention did not catch the need and right to be accepted into any neighboring state by individuals seeking asylum from persecution or emergencies. The forceful removal of already accepted refugees or citizens escaping persecution was more of an issue. To that reason, the non-refoulement of the Geneva Convention only frowns on the forceful expulsion of refugees and not on their rights of entry, even though they are threatened by emergencies or periods of persecution. The meaning of the Geneva Convention has been put at the hands of states by this conclusive deficit. This definitional deficit has placed the essence of the Geneva Convention at the mercy of states. The meaning of the Geneva Convention has been put at the hands of states by this conclusive deficit. In neighboring states, they decide who to admit and who to not admit during emergency times. Therefore, this creates a loophole in the whole convention and, as a result, reduces the strength of the non-refoulement principle. With this vulnerability, the definition of non-refoulement is of no benefit and meaningless. This is

because in times of crises, civil wars, disasters and humanitarian violations, without adequate arrangements and assurances for the admission of refugees or persons escaping persecution from their parent nations into neighboring states, the purpose and nature of the non-refoulement principle may continue to be a mirage as the refugee crisis continues to multiply in alarming proportions.

Further, the principle of non-refoulement of the Geneva Convention exists with another definitional ambiguity. This principle frowns at forceful ejection of refugees or victims of persecution and others; it is surprisingly silent on ejections on grounds of national security. A signatory state to the convention could decide to eject a refugee or persons if he or she is purportedly considered to be of threat to the corporate survival or security of the host state. This excuse could be put forward as a strong case for violating or inhibiting the principle of non-refoulement especially in this contemporary period where terrorism holds sway. United States and a few other Western countries have been holding firm against admission of refugees with radical Islamic background especially those affiliated to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, from the Syrian crisis. Further, the Geneva Convention of non-refoulement remains operationally deficient because it is yet to amass the needed mechanism for implementation.

THE POLITICS OF NON-REFOULEMENT AND THE SPIKING SPATE OF AFRICAN REFUGEE CRISIS ALONG THE MEXICO-US BORDER

It is evidently clear that only a number of countries across the world that are signatories to either the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol to the Convention or has passed or domesticated asylum/refugee laws (Sanderson 2013: 780). Even where States are parties to one of the treaties, the obligation to implement has always been a subject of politics. Nevertheless, reference to both general international human rights and humanitarian law discloses an extensive set of legal norms which, if used effectively, will support a very comprehensive right of non-refoulement for individuals

displaced from countries that are experiencing political crisis and other forms of human insecurities (Sanderson 2013: 780).

As an injunction, the concept of non-refoulement does not, under all circumstances as such; grant an outright right of entry to refugees. Where admission is harmful and detrimental to the national security of an asylum country, the country has a legal ability to weaken its legal adherence to the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951, even though that country is a signatory to that international law. However, as long as entry to the territory of an asylum state is, in practice, the only realistic step in preventing the deportation of an asylum seeker or refugee to the borders of territories where his life or freedom will be threatened, this will sometimes be a forceful or de facto right of admission (Hathaway, 2012).

First, although the US acceded to the Protocol of 1967, it continues to limit its security obligations to those citizens escaping repression in their home states and not necessarily those fleeing as a result of dehumanizing human insecurities. This limitation was expressed in the executive order of President Donald Trump, which excludes those fleeing African and Moslem countries as a result of co-operation. The Executive Order signed on January 27, 2017 by President Donald Trump, which temporarily bars the majority of refugees from coming to the US and suspends visas for those from seven nations, predominantly Muslim, underscores the politics of non-refoulement. The US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) dealing with the admission of refugees referred by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the United States Embassy or any other assigned Non-Governmental Body, such as the Red Cross or the United States Selective Direct Application System, has been suspended by the United States. It is usually open to persons who already have (or are likely to apply for) refugee status who are resident outside the United States, but may want the United States to regard them as a resettled refugee for entry. In 2017, the US was due to take in 110,000 refugees under USRAP, but the US president states in the executive order that he wants this figure to be more than halved to the intake of 50,000 refugees. The executive order mandates that the United States Refugee Resettlement Program be paused for a period of

120 days for all refugee applicants (Salvadore, 2019). The justification for the suspension that Trump gives for this suspension is to improve the already complicated vetting procedures. Such executive orders, however, cannot supersede or override the international legal obligations of the United States and its adherence to the 1967 Protocol to the Geneva Convention. So those who manage to enter the US, with much difficulty, will have to have their asylum claims checked. Under the Geneva Convention on Refugees and Against Torture of the United Nations, the obligation not to return a person to a state where they may face torture or other serious harm is still absolute (The Conversation, 2017).

Again, whilst the Geneva Convention on refugee is "legally binding", there is no institutional mechanism that monitors and enforces compliance. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), take for instance, has only supervisory responsibilities and cannot in any way enforce the Convention. There is therefore no formal mechanism for individuals to file complaints when the provisions of the Convention are breached. Although, the Convention specifies that complaints should be referred to the International Court of Justice, nonetheless, it appears that country has ever perused this legal route. In praxis, the only real consequences of violation currently are; public shaming in the press, and; verbal condemnation of the violator by the UN and by other nations. To date, these practices have not really proven to be significant deterrents.

The problem of persecution of refugees is another definitional uncertainty connected with the Geneva Convention on which many of the treaty's signatories have depended to keep their borders closed to the influx of refugees. Whereas the Convention provided that a "well-founded fear of persecution" must have been established in order to qualify for refugee status under the definition of Article 1(A) 2 "for reasons of race, religion, and nationality, as well as membership of a particular social group or political opinion." The persecution faced must be causally linked to one of the reasons listed in Article 1(A) 2 (Hathaway, 2002). "While some African refugees have certainly fled their countries for reasons of religion or political opinion or crisis due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as in the case

of DR Congo, Somalia and others, in accordance with Article 1(A) 2 of the Refugee Convention, many will have fled because of their fear of generalized violence and civil disorder" (Hathaway, 2002). Therefore, the position here is, can this "causal nexus" be formed as a result of generalized violence or chaos? However, this is not to say that there is a duty to demonstrate a differential effect on those fleeing civil situations of large-scale civil disorder violence, or that such a finding is confined to any unique number of persons. The text of the 1951 Convention offers no justification for placing a higher or differential burden on applicants seeking to claim refugee status in the form of armed conflicts. Moreover, while the foundation of the Convention must make a substantial contribution to the cause of the oppression that has been feared, it does not need to be the main or primary cause. The importance of a specific ground is to be subjectively measured by reference to the prosecutor's viewpoint (rather than the refugee). This view forms the center of the reasoning behind the development of a causal link between the view of the prosecutor and that of the refugee. This is evident from the language of Article 1(A) 2, which demands that persecution be the basis of the Convention 'for reasons'. For the purposes of forming the nexus, it is meaningless if the specific ground is valid or merely imputed (rightly or wrongly) to the refugee or, indeed, if the ground of persecution is known to the refugee at all (1951 Geneva Convention). Should a persecutor act on a belief related to an enumerated Convention's ground, it automatically establishes the causal nexus regardless of whether that belief is mistaken or, indeed, implausible, presumably.

Finally, it should be noted here that the principles applicable to the establishment of the causal nexus are general and, thus, no unique or special criteria apply where refugees come from a country in which conflict or civil disorder is prevalent. Although asylum seekers from a country in that place are not automatically refugees, they are entitled, on the same terms, to recognition as any asylum seeker, given that they comply with the criteria of Article 1(A) 2. In the view of Article 1(A) 2, it is probable that the majority of African refugees seeking international protection do not fulfill the

criteria of the definition of refugee set out in Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, since they are fleeing their home countries not as a result of political or religious persecution, but because of political upheavals that are life-threatening.

Furthermore, the States that are signatories to the Geneva Convention have continuously found another subtle way and loophole in the provisions of the Geneva Convention relating to the admission of refugees. Although the Convention does not provide for the rights of refugees to be recognized by signatory states, it does not provide for the protection of refugees against forced expulsion or deportation in any of the signatory countries. What the Convention does not take into account are conditions of need and national security that may outweigh the Convention's position in any signatory state against the forced eviction of refugees. On many occasions, several signatory states such as the US have refused and even expunged refugees deemed to be threats to their domestic securities. This explains why countries such as Turkey and, as predicted, the US have chosen to shut their borders away from the borders of Syrian and African refugees.

Finally, if one takes the subjectivity inherent in the grounds of the Convention seriously, we can still agree that it was inappropriate to impute specific grounds sweepingly and even erratically to large parts of the Convention. The question is not whether such charges are correct or even probable, but whether they help to motivate the persecutors' conduct (Akinrinde, 2018a). "As UNHCR explains in reference to African refugees along the Mexico-American borders, parties to the conflict allegedly use broad interpretations that they may consider to be associated with the other party, including based on the family connections, religious or ethnic background of an individual or mere presence in an area considered to be "Pro" or "Anti-American. This would certainly include the reasons given by the UNHCR for "family connections, religious or ethnic or political background, or mere presence in an area." In any case, there is not yet a settled body of case law in respect of their refugee status. As such, any conclusions as to the correct application of the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the

African refugee crisis at the American border remains somewhat speculative.

CONCLUSION

The attempt was made here to empirically evaluate how the spiking level of human insecurity in Africa and the operational cum definitional lapses in the Geneva Refugee Convention have contributed significantly to the crisis of African refugees along the borders of Mexico and the Americas. The paper was also able to unpack the intersections between problems of human security such as poverty, unemployment, social injustice, inequality, political upheavals, terrorism, ecological conditions, corruption, food insecurity, and diseases and, most recently, the ravaging of the African continent and the steady rise of African refugees along the Mexican-American borders. Although proactive strategy, determination and concerted efforts remain paramount in addressing the growing spate of refugees at the United States' Mexico-American border, African states must step up efforts to respond to the seemingly endless human insecurities in which they have been knee-deep. The city of poverty, unfortunately, is now on the African continent. This is a serious concern, as many of the fleeing African refugees have reported that their decisions to seek refuge and greener pastures abroad have been precipitated by the need for them to be able to meet basic economic needs such as food, shelter and housing. Most significantly, for a pragmatic and unambiguous examination, the organizational shortcomings and definitional loose ends of the Geneva Convention found in the preceding study must be revisited. This will encourage the United Nations and the signatories to the Convention, while making it applicable to the demands of the 21st century, to tighten the loose ends and grey areas in the Convention.

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Jakub SZYDELSKI
Warsaw Univ., Warsaw, Poland

TERRORISTS' ACTIVITIES ON-LINE DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC - THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Abstract:

This essay presents the overview of the terrorists' activities online during the CoViD-19 pandemic. It points out the key trends in cyber-security and terrorism threat in 2020 and 2021. These trends are illustrated with major violent incidents and cyber-attacks. Research focuses mainly on the European perspective. EU agencies' reports are frequently cited and the Europol findings are often referred to. During 2020 terrorists used various online platforms. These included Dark Web markets, hidden discussion groups, as well as social media platforms like TikTok. Global lockdown and health crisis affected online propaganda. This research focuses on the narrative of jihadists, far-right activists and the conspiracy theories believers. The impact of CoViD-19 pandemic on extremist propaganda is examined. European states' democratic institutions were vulnerable due to CoViD-19 pandemic. There were major cyber-attacks on the European states' local and central governments. The attacks on the German and American legislature are discussed and compared. The key finding is the terrorists' usage of online platforms and apps during 2020. Dark Web was used primarily for logistics. Social media and hidden discussion groups were employed for sharing propaganda and disinformation. Encrypted communicators were used for confident chat. This essay does not exhaust the topic of terrorists' activities, it rather serves as a general overview. Still more data is needed to assess full threat level of online terrorism.

Key words:

CoViD-19, terrorism, on-line media, conspiracy theories, jihadists, EU

INTRODUCTION

Due to CoViD-19 global pandemic the Internet usage in Europe increased¹. National lockdowns introduced by many European states changed the ways people communicate, meet and work on-line.

There were notable terrorism attacks in 2020 and at the beginning of 2021. Europe was struggling with Hanau shootings in February (Germany) and the Vienna shooting in November (Austria). The United States were shaken by the attack on the Capitol Building on 6th of January 2021.

At the time of writing this essay (January 2021) there was not enough data to compare the scale of terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020. All major international reports covering this topics are updated annually. This is the case of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), as well as the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT), to name a few.

Considering the above, I decided to address the issue of terrorists' Internet activity during the CoViD-19 pandemic. My goal was to outline a few of the key trends in daily operation of terrorist organizations nowadays. I focused mainly on the European perspective.

DEFINITION, METHODOLOGY & SOURCES

Terrorism has been described by many definitions, but European Union did not create their own. Instead, the European Commission agreed on the definition provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in its publication "Glossary on Migration".

IOM defines **terrorism** as "intentional and systematic use of actions designed to provoke terror in the public as a means to certain ends. (...) "². This definition also states, that only "civil population" could be treated as terrorism victims.

It is also worth adding, that cyberterrorism is beyond the main scope of this research. Elizabeth Minei & Jonathan

¹ Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1110864/online-media-use-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic-europe/>

² European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/terrorism_en

Matusitz (2012) define **cyberterrorism** as “a method of attack designed to damage, tamper with, or destroy critical points of national infrastructure by controlling and manipulating computer networks”.

Following these definitions I focused on the online activities of terrorist organizations, mainly propaganda, communication and recruitment.

During my research I relied heavily on the Europol statistics. Official Europol reports were covering the problem of organized crime from the European perspective, what corresponded with the topic of this essay.

Selected reports of EU agencies' offered valuable insight into terrorism and cybersecurity. I referred to the research of ENISA, which is European Union Agency for Cybersecurity. The other useful source was CT MORSE, which is EU project on counter-terrorism (CT).

Other sources consisted of respected European scientific institutes and think-tanks. Among these were: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET).

Only few sources had non-European heritage, mainly the UNITAR documents, but I opted not to exclude these reports, as they presented high professional level.

TARGET GROUPS

With nearly 90% of European citizens being active online,³ the terrorist groups are likely to exploit social media for their propaganda as well as recruitment. It is therefore appropriate to point out distinct social groups, that could be targeted.

These target groups were mostly derived from publication by Gary Ackerman and Hayley Paterson (2020). Authors defined key impacts of COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism.

First of all, **conspiracy theories believers**. They are likely to be attracted by an original content. Such materials

³ European Union Internet Users, Population and Facebook Statistics.
<https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm>

may support their beliefs, such as the “Coronavirus hoax”. These groups typically follow alternative media channels (e.g. QAnon). They are more susceptible to extremists propaganda and may react accordingly to the hostile narrative encouraging violence.

Secondly, **far-right and far-left sympathizers/activists**. CoViD-19 pandemic may have resulted in radicalization of European citizens. Ackerman and Paterson are describing situations of scapegoating the “others” for the virus. These actions fuel strong anti-immigrant resentment.

Thirdly, **anti-government protesters**. They could be connected with the previous group, but it is not always the case. Hard lockdowns imposed in many countries raised levels of frustration among the population. Mishandling of the health crisis by the state bodies in many cases resulted in social unrests (Henley 2020).

Fourthly, **victims of epidemic**. It could be any European, who suffered a loss of a loved one, or is currently facing financial problems. Global recession and lockdowns affected millions and many could feel sense of injustice. With limited access to the critical opinion of other people, the isolated internet users may become more susceptible to propaganda and conspiracy theories.

INFODEMIC

As governments were trying to flatten the epidemic curve, there was second obstacle emerging. “Information pandemic” or “Infodemic” is believed to represent the current negative trend. Term was further popularized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations when he mentioned it in his tweet from March 2020.⁴

Infodemic is a “blend of “information” and “epidemic” that typically refers to a rapid and far-reaching spread of both accurate and inaccurate information”⁵. During crisis situation news channels could be “flooded” by rumours, as well as

⁴ Twitter. <https://twitter.com/antonioguterres/status/1243748397019992065>

⁵ Merriam Webster. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/words-were-watching-infodemic-meaning>

disinformation, what makes it difficult to gain proper knowledge on current affairs.

Before May 2020 Europol⁶ noted an increase in online propaganda materials. Simultaneously there was growing number of conspiracy theories online. The prediction is that due to unstable and polarized media climate more and more extremists would be pushed to their ideological fringes. This in turn may result in spiral of radicalization in 2021.

DARK WEB USAGE BY TERRORISTS

Dark Web (or Darknet) is the part of the internet, “that is encrypted and that cannot be found using ordinary search engines”⁷. It could be used for criminal activity, notably for trade in illegal goods and services. These goods could vary from drugs, to fake passports and firearms.

Dark Web is associated with anonymity, as most of its users protect their sensitive data, such as IP addresses. This could be achieved through VPN (Virtual Private Network) or TOR System. Both tools enable its users to hide or mask their original IP address. During the pandemic usage of these systems increased. Accordingly, Tor Project Inc. adjusted its marketing strategy and created up-to-date slogan: “Resist the surveillance pandemic”.

Throughout the 2020 there was an increase in Dark Web business trade, according to latest Europol report on the Internet organized crime.⁸ The surge was observed in multiple areas. The most important change, related to terrorism, could be the shift from the legitimate-looking counterfeit passports to “registered” e-passports” as well as e-IDs. Such documents might allow easier access to transportation and accommodation in foreign countries and could be used by point man, liaison officer or even suicide bomber. Fake IDs

⁶ Europol. How CoViD-19-related crime infected Europe during 2020.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/how-covid-19-related-crime-infected-europe-during-2020>

⁷ Cambridge Dictionary. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/dark-web>

⁸ Europol. Internet organised crime threat assessment 2020.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2020>

enable terrorists to create safe bank accounts, as the real owner remains in the shadow.

Dark Market was called the world's largest Dark Web marketplace. It was used by nearly 500 000 online customers and facilitated over 320 000 transactions. Vendors traded in illegal products like drugs, anonymous SIM cards and malware. Dark Market site was taken offline by the Europol on 12th of January 2021⁹. Officers seized the servers located in Moldova and Ukraine. German police arrested an Australian who was the alleged operator of the site.

Europol officers also took part in the takedown of the hosting service used by the criminals.¹⁰ Investigation showed, that three domains – INSORG.ORG; SAFE-INET.COM and SAFE-INET.NET. – offered “bullet proof hosting services”¹¹. This involved concealing true identity of cybercriminals responsible for ransomware, E-skimming breaches (infecting checkout pages), phishing (stealing user data by infected mail) and account takeovers.

Shutdowns of illegal Darknet sites are essential for online safety. Equally important is constant tracking of Dark Web market. Analysing illegal business trade helps to predict means of potential terrorist attacks, including cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. On the other hand Darknet could not be as easily used for determining terrorists targets. Ghadah Alrasheed & Brandon Rigato argue (2019), that modern terrorists are not using Dark Web for communication and propaganda. The primary reason is limited reach in comparison to Twitter of Facebook.

ONLINE JIHADIST PROPAGANDA

With the downfall of Deash in 2017 its primary agitation platform – Al Hayat Media – went silent in the main stream. Nevertheless the jihadist propaganda prevails in social media.

⁹ Europol. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/darkmarket-worlds-largest-illegal-dark-web-marketplace-taken-down>

¹⁰ Europol. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/cybercriminals%E2%80%99-favourite-vpn-taken-down-in-global-action>

¹¹ US Department of Justice. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/us-law-enforcement-joins-international-partners-disrupt-vpn-service-used-facilitate>

Cyber jihadists are still exceptionally active on Instagram and Twitter. Jihadist movement didn't confine itself to well-established, main channels of communication. They were also experimenting with the relatively new social media app – TikTok. In October 2019 the Wall Street Journal informed about the videos produced by the Islamic State supporters. Footage depicted corpses, as well as fighters with guns. Chinese media outlet decided to remove accounts responsible for ISIS propaganda (Taylor 2020).

Despite TikTok intervention, extremists still use the applications for radicalization and propaganda. Throughout September 2020 a Pakistani imam, Luqman Haider, posted videos praising Charlie Hebdo attacker. Before becoming influencer he taught Qur'anic lessons to kids and teenagers.

Jihadists are targeting youth with appropriate channels. They are constantly adapting new social media apps, as they are following the trends. Apart from TikTok IS fighters were using video game forums and dating apps.

Dr. Hugo Micheron (2020) implies, that Jihadists succeeded in reaching to young audience. Chechen, who beheaded Samuel Paty in front of high school was 18 years old. Vienna attacker, who shot four people and wounded twenty three was only two years older.

Jihadists used multiple narrations concerning pandemic. One of the most well-known was "COVID-19 as God's 'smallest soldier". Pierre Boussel (2020) observes, that the message could be "God sends a message for the faithful". It could be retribution on the rich countries, because lockdowns affected mostly their economy. Likewise COVID-19 could be seen as a punishment to world leaders, who fought against ISIS.

ON-LINE RECRUITMENT OF JIHADISTS

One of the key impacts of CoViD-19 pandemic may have been increased recruitment online. It was listed as one the key negative trends in the UNITAR report for 2020.¹²

¹² UNITAR. Impact of COVID-19 on violent Extremism and terrorism.
<https://unitar.org/learning-solutions/publications/impact-covid-19-violent-extremism-and-terrorism>

The ground-breaking study of Anne Speckhard and Molly Ellenberg (2020) demonstrates a vast potential of online recruitment. The study concentrated on foreign terrorist fighters of ISIS Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Out of 236 fighters, 49% of men and 52.6% of women were recruited digitally. During the recruitment candidates were contacted online by ISIS recruiter.

Even more surprisingly, 17.7% (42 people) departed for Syria only after watching propaganda online. Other mean of communication was messaging local facilitator. What is important, is that a face-to-face meeting was not necessary.

Interviewees of this study included many ISIS fighters, who came from Europe. They were of many nationalities – Irish, British, Swiss, Dutch. This study shows great extent to which European citizens are susceptible to terrorism recruitment online.

Although the research of Anne Speckhard and Molly Ellenberg was conducted in 2015 – 2019 timeframe, it still points out the global trend. Present excessive use of internet communicators and social media could have only intensified this process.

USE OF AN ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION BY TERRORISTS

End-to-end encryption communication (E2EE) is thought as one of the safest and most secure way of contacting online. Messaging apps like WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram classify chat content. Sender app encrypts the message. Only the receiver app can decipher it. As third parties don't have access to the recipient decryption key, they can't spy on the conversation.

Encrypted communication has been employed by the terrorists in the past. It ensured, that their schemes remained confidential, as law enforcement agencies were unable to break messaging security system.

Encrypted messaging was used by many prominent ISIS fighters, including Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who orchestrated November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris (Kean, Hamilton

2018). He used True Crypt for hard drive encryption, as well as communicators like Telegram and WhatsApp.

So far there was no evidence of encrypted messaging apps usage before the Vienna terrorist attack in November, or other terrorist attacks, that took place in Europe during 2020. Nevertheless European Commission pointed to the problem of encrypted information in its update¹³ of Counter-Terrorism Agenda in December. It proposed financial investigations to help follow the money trail and identify those involved.

Update comes around the same time of the European Council's resolution on encryption.¹⁴ Council stresses the need of lawful access to digital evidence of encrypted communicators. Decryption platform is now under construction, which will enable Europol officers to access encrypted information on devices, that were seized during investigation.

Recent changes in EU strategy have been criticized by some journalist and human rights activists on the basis of users' privacy concerns. EDRi (European Digital Rights association) observes¹⁵, that there are better ways to decipher message without breaking the encryption system. EDRi states, that this method poses potential threat of excessive state surveillance.

CONSPIRACY THEORISTS RADICALIZATION

Three of the main disinformation factions during CoViD-19 pandemic were 5G oppositionists, QAnon supporters and anti-vaccination activists. Although many supporters of the conspiracy theories limit their actions to online activity and demonstration, radicalization of their views could lead to violent actions.

In 2019 researchers from Sydney analysed online activities of the right-wing extremists (Waldek, Ballsun-

¹³ European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2326

¹⁴ European Commission. First Progress Report on the EU Security Union Strategy. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication_on_the_first_progress_report_on_the_eu_security_union_strategy.pdf

¹⁵ EDRi. Keep private communications private. <https://edri.org/our-work/keep-private-communications-private/>

Stanton, Droogan 2020). Study showed, that radicals were using two main communication channels. The first one was official Internet media, such as Facebook and Twitter. The second one – more hidden discussion groups like Gab, 4chan and 8chan.

These two channels differed in extremist narrative. Official accounts on Twitter echoed well-known theme of “white identity under threat”. Racism could be fully expressed at the non-official forums. Researchers observed, that such platforms could perpetrate acts of terrorism and broadcast them to wider audience.

QAnon supporters widely used similar two channel communication, as the first posts were published on the “hidden” website 8chan around 2017 by anonymous author Q. Since 2017 he has instructed his followers via encrypted messages known as “Q drops”.

Q claimed to be a high-ranked government official in the Trump administration. User stated, that he had a “Q” clearance. This means he would work at the US Department of Energy¹⁶ and had access to the Top Secret Restricted Data.

QAnon groups and websites were originally visible in the Google search engine. Users created private group chats for every country, that was to be “endangered”. In this way two basic communication channels were integrated. Facebook group could be start of a “rabbit hole”. From there one could access other materials posted on websites like QNN.

Two channel communication was possible until Google, Facebook and Twitter banned groups and individual accounts¹⁷. This move possibly made QAnon fans move back to underground, where they are more difficult to monitor.

Current pandemic brought together conspiracy theorists and people of radical political views (Buranyi 2020). Protests against lockdowns and “Plandemic” are taking place in Europe’s capitals such as London, Paris and Berlin. Q signs are widely seen among protesters, what confirms spread of the movement to Europe (Kesvani 2020).

¹⁶ USGS, <https://www.usgs.gov/about/organization/science-support/human-capital/national-security-code-designations-security>

¹⁷ Twitter, <https://twitter.com/TwitterSafety/status/1285726278868402177>

Europol analysts observed¹⁸ increase in extremist propaganda published online in 2020. They argue, that online radicalization accelerated due to CoViD-19 pandemic. The first reason is quick adjustment of far-right and far-left agenda to the pandemic lockdowns and regulations. The second reason is greater exposition to radical propaganda, as Europeans tend to browse the Internet longer.

ANTI-5G MOVEMENT

Anti-5G activists finds life-threatening danger in operation of 5G radio infrastructure. The movement dates back to the introduction of the 5G mobile network in 2019. Since then there have been many protests against this system.

In 2020 demonstrations took place in many European countries like the UK, Germany and Spain. Anti 5G slogans often accompany demonstrations against CoViD-19 restrictions.

Although most QAnon supporters are far-right minded, the same cannot be said about anti-5G activists. Europol states, that ideological affiliation of this group is uncertain, although it has a link with anti-lockdown protesters.

Anti-5G activists methods resemble actions of anarchists or leftist militias, as they attack the property, not people (Loadenthal 2020). Main, typical targets of leftist militias are: government and police property, private businesses and telecommunication infrastructure. Method of violence – arson attack – is widespread among the anarchists, as they tend to incite cellphone masts.

During 2020 there were widespread arson attacks on 5G infrastructure. Out of 27 EU countries 10 were affected. As for 19th of October 2020 there were 183 mast attacks in Europe, according to the data gathered by online journal Politico.¹⁹ Nearly 50% of incidents affected United Kingdom (87 out of 183).

¹⁸ Europol, How COVID-19-related crime infected Europe during 2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/how-covid-19-related-crime-infected-europe-during-2020>

¹⁹ Politico. Cerulus L. (2020). EU countries sound alarm about growing anti-5G movement.

In response to these incidents 15 EU member states called on the European Commission to counter-react anti-5G conspiracy theories.

CYBERATTACKS ON THE EUROPEAN STATES

Democratic institutions were under constant threat during CoViD-19 pandemic. Government administration was one of the most cyberattack-targeted sectors, according to ENISA report²⁰ on cybersecurity.

There were multiple cyberattacks on European states institutions throughout 2020. In Finland²¹ and Norway²² parliaments' computer systems were breached. As a result email accounts of MPs were compromised. Police is investigating this case as hacking and espionage.

French city Évreux suffered hacking into the municipal servers in December (Philippot 2020). Couple days earlier similar attack affected town hall of Braunau in Austria (Zeko 2020). Both attacks paralyzed the municipalities for several days.

Both local and central authorities were vulnerable to cyberattacks. What is more, the public health service was targeted. Attacks on medical service during health crisis fall in line with terrorism definition, as these actions would certainly provoke terror and chaos in the public.

Especially disturbing were the cyberattacks against the hospitals, which fought on the front-line of epidemic. On the 13th of March the University Hospital of Brno (Czech Republic) suffered major ransomware attack.²³ Malware encrypted the

²⁰ ENISA, Main incidents in the EU and worldwide,

<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2020-main-incidents>

²¹ Euronews. (2020). Cyber attack in Finland hits email accounts of MPs and parliament

<https://www.euronews.com/2020/12/28/cyber-attack-in-finland-hits-email-accounts-of-mps-and-parliament>

²² Euronews. (2020). Norway's Intelligence Service says Russian groups 'likely' behind

Parliament cyber attack. <https://www.euronews.com/2020/12/08/norway-s-intelligence-service-says-russian-groups-likely-behind-parliament-cyber-attack>

²³ Cyber Law

Toolkit.[https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Brno_University_Hospital_ransomware_attack_\(2020\)#cite_note-Porter-5](https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Brno_University_Hospital_ransomware_attack_(2020)#cite_note-Porter-5)

hospitals data. Staff was forced to shut down all the computers, as well as medical equipment linked to the IT network.

Other European states were also affected, primarily Germany, Italy and the UK. SAFECARE reported approximately 100 security incidents in the European hospitals from February to November.²⁴ 21 of them were cyber incidents. These included ransomware, phishing – sending fake mails impersonating the WHO and hijacking websites.

Hackers not only disturbed normal functioning of hospitals and laboratories, but also exposed sensitive data on patients. The Maze cybercriminal group demanded ransom from the research lab Hammersmith Medicines Research (HMR) (Schwartz 2020). When company didn't comply cybercriminals published private data of almost 2,300 patients. Materials included medical questionnaires and copies of passports or driving licenses.

ASSAULT ON DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Apart from the cybercrime, European states had to cope with social unrest fueled by lockdown resentment. On 29th of August hundreds of far-right extremist tried to storm Reichstag²⁵ (German parliament building) during the demonstration against government restrictions. Offenders managed to reach the outside stairs before being pushed back by the police.

The attack on the Capitol Building is a striking example of alternative outcome. Hundreds of protesters broke into both chambers of Congress in session. Offenders vandalized offices of a few Congressmen (Brewster, Solender 2021). Trespassers were Donald Trump supporters, some were also conspiracy theory believers. Most of them exhibited presidential campaign gadgets like campaign flags and MAGA hats (Make America Great Again). Some of the participants wore QAnon shirts.

²⁴ SAFECARE. <https://www.safecare-project.eu/?p=588>

²⁵ The Guardian. (2020). 'Anti-corona' extremists try to storm German parliament. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/29/berlin-braces-for-anti-coronavirus-protest-against-covid-19-restrictions>

Events in the United States and Germany were alike in many ways. Firstly, they both occurred during mass demonstrations. Secondly, protesters were mostly affiliated with far-right movement. Thirdly, demonstrators assaulted the parliament building. This aspect is crucial. The legislature is the backbone of democratic governance. Attack on this institution and elected representatives is a brutal assault on the core of democratic system.

In the aftermath of the Capitol attack US Justice Department opened more than 25 domestic terrorism cases (Shalal, Shepardson 2021). Protesters actions could be considered as domestic terrorism, according to Congressional Research Service's Insight²⁶. Trespassers could have intended to influence the policy of government by intimidation.

Events in United States and Europe prove, that every democratic system is vulnerable. Possible threats include terrorism, both domestic and foreign state-driven. Assault on Capitol should serve as a warning to European leaders of what could happen in Europe. Sometimes state's own citizens pose the greatest threat.

SUMMARY

Terrorists during CoViD-19 era focused mainly on propaganda distribution, logistics and recruitment. For propaganda they used two channel communication. They exploited official social media platforms, as well as alternative discussion groups. Logistics were handled via Dark Web markets. Recruitment and communication could have taken place via encrypted messaging apps like Signal or Telegram.

CoViD-19 pandemic resulted in more people being susceptible to online extremists narrative. Global crisis produced fertile ground for hostile propaganda and disinformation. In the current Infodemic environment such materials could lead to further radicalization and potentially harmful actions.

Attacks on the Bundestag and Capitol were the final effects of this radicalization process. The same could be said

²⁶ Congressional Research Service. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11573>

about the arson raids on 5G masts and terrorist attacks in Vienna. All these violent actions had roots in online media climate, reinforcing the feeling of injustice and the sense of danger.

European states were vulnerable to cyberterrorist attacks. Both local and central administration offices were targeted. Hackers managed to paralyze the work of state agencies and incited chaos. Especially worrying were the cyberattacks against the health service, as they could lead to patients' death.

Apart from the records on few terrorist attacks mentioned in this essay we still do not have enough data to assess the actual threat of terrorist online activities. In order to have a clear picture more studies are needed. Most valuable would be personal interviews with the internet users, as well as data mining analyses of the social media forums.

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Ilie PRODAN

Moldova State Univ., Kishinev, Moldova

RWANDAN GENOCIDE - HOW A LITTLE COUNTRY CAN CHANGE THE WHOLE CONTINENT

Abstract:

The colonial past of Africa has become the reason for numerous bloody civil wars and genocides that often tended to grow from local conflicts to regional ones. The artificial creation of ethnic differences between Hutu and Tutsi by the Belgian colonial administration in Rwanda-Urundi had become the reason for the large-scale bloody massacre in the region of the African Great Lakes in 1994. This paper analyzes the history of the Rwandan genocide, its consequences on the geopolitical framework of the region as well as the modern vector of development of Rwanda.

Key words:

Rwandan genocide, Tutsi, Hutu, RPF, Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) the African World War, the Singapore of Africa

INTRODUCTION: AFRICA – THE POSTCOLONIAL SUFFERING

Africa is often being viewed quite poorly on the world stage. Poverty has covered the considerable part of the territory of the second-largest continent in the world – 31 out of 46 countries entering the UN List of Least Developed Countries are situated in Africa (as of 11 February 2021). It has reached the lowest rate of economic growth in comparison with all other continents and has remained behind from other regions in terms of modernization.

Country	Year of inclusion	Country	Year of inclusion
Afghanistan	1971	Madagascar	1991
Angola ¹	1994	Malawi	1971
Bangladesh	1975	Mali	1971
Benin	1971	Mauritania	1986
Bhutan ²	1971	Mozambique	1988
Burkina Faso	1971	Myanmar	1987
Burundi	1971	Nepal	1971
Cambodia	1991	Niger	1971
Central African Republic	1975	Rwanda	1971
Chad	1971	São Tomé and Príncipe ³	1982
Comoros	1977	Senegal	2000
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1991	Sierra Leone	1982
Djibouti	1982	Solomon Islands ⁴	1991
Eritrea	1994	Somalia	1971
Ethiopia	1971	South Sudan	2012
Gambia	1975	Sudan	1971
Guinea	1971	Timor-Leste	2003
Guinea-Bissau	1981	Togo	1982
Haiti	1971	Tuvalu	1986
Kiribati	1986	Uganda	1971
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1971	United Republic of Tanzania	1971
Lesotho	1971	Yemen	1971
Liberia	1990	Zambia	1991

Fig. 1: UN List of Least Developed Countries (as of 11 February 2021)

Civil wars, rampant corruption and epidemics have caused an extremely unstable situation in the whole region: «In the resulting chaos, some African countries have become havens for terrorist groups, money laundering, and crime syndicates» (Kissinger 2016).

The political evolution of the African continent has a unique character – all the modern boundaries between states and their national composition have been influenced by the period of colonial rule like nowhere else in the world. During those times, the imperial nations, mainly France and Great Britain, have drawn the administrative borders disregarding any ethnic, religious or tribal features of local character, in order to prevent any consolidated opposition to their colonial administration.

This made the post-colonial Africa have a fragmented character, making the majority of leading scholars refuse to recognize it as a separate civilization (Huntington 2019). Imperial nations have brought elements of Western civilization

in Africa: European languages (English, French, Portuguese), Christianity and even certain democratic mechanisms that, however, have not managed to become functional in the majority of states. The Northern Africa, in its turn, is usually being considered to belong to Islamic civilization. The colonial past and devastating present of this continent made it practically unable to form a distinguished civilization to increase its weight on the international arena. The exceptions, however, are seen in two countries that could be capable to lead Africa towards a more prosperous future – Nigeria and South Africa (Kissinger 2016).

After a long-term colonial pressure, the achievement of independence of the majority of African states has resulted into disruption among African nations, causing bloody civil wars, ethnic conflicts and even genocides that usually tend to grow from local clashes to regional ones.

RWANDA – THE PREMISES FOR THE GENOCIDE



Fig. 2. Geographical position of Rwanda

Rwanda – «the land of a thousand hills» – is a small country situated in Central/Eastern Africa, in the region of the African Great Lakes. It is a landlocked state that is bordered by Uganda on the North, Tanzania on the East, Burundi on the South and Democratic Republic of the Congo – on the West. Even though being a little country, Rwanda has faced a large-scale bloody massacre in 1994 that has completely changed the environment of international relations in the entire region (Ahluwalia 2015).

There is a mistaken judgement that the Rwandan genocide had derived from ethnic reasons and had had long-standing roots of hatred between Hutu and Tutsi – two major ethnicities of the Rwandan society. The historical reality shows, however, that this hatred had been grown artificially by both German and Belgian colonial administrations, and boosted by the newly-established Hutu government since the Rwandan independence in 1962. Being protected by Hutu government officials, the policy of regular pogroms against Tutsi has been promoted on the national level, reaching its peak in 1994 during the Rwandan genocide. Thus, this slaughter has become the «state-sponsored mass murder driven by ideology» (Melson 2003) with a high rate of participation of ordinary Hutu recruited through state propaganda of ethnic hatred. «The Rwandan genocide was the product of a postcolonial state, a racialist ideology, a revolution claiming democratic legitimization, and war – all manifestations of the modern world» (Melson 2003).

Back to the times when the first explorers reached Rwanda and Urundi (nowadays Burundi), they confronted with the reality of culturally and linguistically homogeneous society, which was, however, divided into three groups basing on their occupation – minority Tutsi aristocracy and cattle-breeders, majority Hutu farmers, and Twa – the hunter-gatherers that represented 1% of the Rwandan population. All three patterns of the society shared the same Bantu language, lived in mixed communities with a quite regular practice of mixed marriages (Prunier 1995) which made them more socially unified rather than divided. Even though the nineteenth-century European colonialists tended to promote racial policies and to identify

Tutsi as «extremely tall and thin, and [with] often displaying sharp, angular facial features» (Prunier 1995) and racially superior to Hutu, the real physical difference between them has been noticed as negligible due to numerous «‘mistakes’ [that] were reportedly made during the genocide» (Hintjens 1999), mixed marriages and artificial character of social differences mostly based on self-identification practice as either Tutsi or Hutu, and on the policies promoted by colonial administration. «Although they probably had a common origin, the Tutsi and Hutu were perceived and labeled as distinct tribes and races by the Europeans» (Melson 2003).

Facing a complex social structure of Rwanda-Urundi, the German and then the Belgian colonial administrations did not seem to be capable to reconstruct the existing social order, thus relying on local monarchs called «Mwami». The Tutsi monarchy and aristocracy had ruled over the Hutu peasantry and some parts of Twa hunter-gatherers even before the establishment of the European colonial rule, this position however being empowered by Europeans who tended to put certain racist traits in the social differences between Tutsi and Hutu (Shlenskaya, 2012).

In this regard, the Belgian administration promoted the so-called «Hamitic Hypothesis», according to which the Tutsi were viewed as being originated in Egypt or Ethiopia and conquering Hutu as the inferior tribe of local provenance. Pierre Ryckmans, a Belgian administrator from 1920s, noted: «The Tutsi were meant to reign. Their fine [racial] presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige vis-a-vis the inferior races which surround [them].... It is not surprising that those good Hutu, less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting have let themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt» (Melson 2003). Later on, this «Hamitic Hypothesis» would have become the crucial element of the hatred policy against the Tutsi that had eventually resulted in the massive genocide.

The policy of the Belgian administration was focused on favoring Tutsi population in political, economic and social spheres, treating them as the natural elite of Rwanda and mostly oppressing the Hutu population. For instance, the Belgians initiated the economic policy that forced Hutu to work

for the state without pay. Moreover, in the domain of primary and secondary education, which was under control of Belgian Catholic priests, the access was mostly open to the minority Tutsi population rather than to the Hutu majority. Thus, in 1932, at the Astrida college (now Butare) 45 out of 54 students were Tutsi, while in 1959, 66.1% out of the total number of students also were of Tutsi origins (Melson 2003).

In order to officially differentiate Hutu from Tutsi, the Belgian administration introduced the ethnic classification in the identity documents in 1933-1935 (Shlenskaya 2012). The classification, however, was based on the wealth of the person rather than on his/her origins. Thus, the Belgian administration identified the population that possessed more than ten heads of cattle as Tutsi, while any other person with fewer than ten cattle – as Hutu or Twa, in dependence on their occupation (Hintjens 1999).

The heritage of such colonial policy aimed at dividing and ruling over the population made the previously peaceful and inter-dependent society divided into two polar opposites, one of them righteously hating another. This policy of artificial division of the Rwandan society has become the basic reason for the regular pogroms against Tutsi after independence and, eventually, for the Rwandan genocide.

After the end of World War II, in 1946, Rwanda-Urundi has become the territory under the trusteeship of Belgium. According to the treaty, Belgium was obliged to prepare Rwanda and Burundi for independent existence by introducing democratic institutions and practices into the political structures of these states. In 1947, the governmental Council of Rwanda-Urundi was created in the componse of Belgian authorities together with the representatives of the local population. Since 1952, the new multi-level administrative system was established, offering the local representatives the right to be democratically elected to rule the constituencies. In 1953, basing on the result of elections, the majority of places in the structures on all levels were taken by Hutu (Shlenskaya 2012), which is natural in the state with the majority of the Hutu population.

This has become the reason for shift of the attention of the Belgian authorities to the Hutu population. Since then, the

Hutu-led political movements started to demand the end of Tutsi hegemony and promoted the ideas of «de-tutsization» of Rwanda. Such views were stipulated in the «Bahutu Manifesto» that stayed in the basis of further policy of the Hutu government. Even though focusing on democratization of the state, the Belgians ignored the violent character of the uprising Hutu power. The Manifesto did not call for the equality for all people, rather than promoted the replacement of one system of domination with another (Melson 2003). Instead of tending to diminish the artificial racial differences between Tutsi and Hutu, the latter stood for preservation of ethnic labels in the identity documents. The risk of ethnic persecution of Tutsi was evident – the preservation of these labels indeed offered the opportunity for Hutu assassins to identify Tutsi during the genocide.

Even in 1959, right after the growth of the power of Hutu-led political movements, mostly RDM-Parmehutu (Republican-Democratic Movement Party of the Hutu Emancipation), the tension between Tutsi and Hutu started to grow. The death of the Tutsi Mwami Mutara III after being treated by a Belgian doctor had become the suspicion for the Tutsi population in preparation of the Hutu revolution and aggravated the situation. The clashes among the population during the manifestations resulted in pogroms against Tutsi, causing thousands of people flee to the neighbouring countries. After gaining independence in 1962, the RDM-Parmehutu gained 80% of places in the National Assembly, electing its leader – Grégoire Kayibanda – as the first president of Rwanda. «In this manner the revolution of 1959 transformed Rwanda from a Belgian colony that had utilized a Tutsi elite as a subterfuge for Belgian power into a Hutu ethnocracy dressed up as a populist majoritarian democracy that excluded the “Tutsi race” from the political order» (Melson 2003).

The risks of persecution of Tutsi after the establishment of Hutu government became the reality. The ethnic markers on identity cards offered the possibility to the newly formed government to introduce ethnic quotas in education and economy as well as to execute violence against the Tutsi minority. «From a proud and noble aristocracy, the image of Tutsi has been transformed to a lazy, parasitic and cruel

pastoral 'race', alien conquerors to boot» (Hintjens 1999). The artificially created image of foreigners through the «Hamitic Hypothesis», previously used to protect the right of Tutsi «to reign», has overnight become the justification for the intentions to drive the Tutsi out of Rwanda.

Due to such policy, by 1962 there were already 120,000 refugees fleeing from Rwanda to the neighbouring countries, especially Burundi and Uganda. Just in two years, this number has grown to 336,000 people (Melson 2003). By 1990s, the number of refugees from Rwanda in the neighbouring countries has included around one million people. Later on, the Tutsi diaspora would have played a significant role in the Hutu – Tutsi confrontation on the regional level. However, this was not the only effect of the revolution.

The uprising and revenge policy of the Hutu government in Rwanda against Tutsi population has affected Burundi – the Rwandan neighbour that parallels the social structure of Rwanda due to their common past. Aiming to prevent the Hutu ethnocracy in Burundi, its Tutsi-led army subverted the elections in order to push the Hutu aside from gaining the legal power. In 1972, and repeatedly after, the Burundian authorities performed major operations culminating in massacres against the Hutu. Thus, in 1972 nearly 100,000 Hutu were slaughtered in Burundi (Lemarchand 1996).

The reaction of Rwandan government was immediate – the president Kayibanda and his army chief Juvénal Habyarimana have organized the pogroms against Tutsi in the same year. In July 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana has performed a bloodless coup, proclaiming the Second Republic and establishing a one-party dictatorship system in Rwanda. The only ruling party has become the MRND (Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement), having the monopoly for power in the state. Although declaring the principles of democracy and liberalism, the policy of Habyarimana was still mostly focused on favoring Hutu rather than promoting equality.

However, the economic crisis of 1980s has affected the political and economic system of Rwanda, forcing the government to perform certain steps towards democratization under the insistence of foreign partners – Belgium, France, the

United States, etc. Thus, by 1991 the new constitution was adopted, establishing the multi-party system and introducing democratic mechanisms in the internal political environment of Rwanda. Thus, a number of new political parties has appeared: «Le Mouvement Démocratique Républicain» (MDR), «Le Parti Social-Démocrate» (PSD), «Le Parti Démocrate Chrétien» (PDC), and even the «Le Parti Liberal» (PL) that included both Tutsi and Hutu as members (Shlenskaya 2012).

Yet these democratic changes could not offer any potential for fair Tutsi-minority representation in the government structures, the opposition to the rule of Habyarimana started to grow. The Tutsi refugees abroad have started to form political organizations to oppose the Hutu ethnocracy, the most significant of them being the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, or Front Patriotique Rwandais – FPR), founded in 1987 in Uganda by Paul Kagame. Its goal was to end the ethnic segregation and to cancel the system of identity cards. It called for the repatriation of refugees and start of democratic reforms in Rwanda for consolidation of national unity (Shlenskaya 2012). In 1989-1990, the military wing of RPF – the Rwandan Patriotic Army – was founded.

On October 1, 1990, the civil war in Rwanda has started after the invasion of 10,000 Tutsi from the Rwandan Patriotic Army. The majority of the militias had previously served in the Ugandan army, thus already having military experience and background. By 1992 the army included 12,000 people, and by 1994 – already 25,000 soldiers (Shlenskaya 2012).

The civil war has offered a carte blanche for the Rwandan chauvinist Hutu government to start the campaign of propaganda aimed at dehumanization of Tutsi and spread of ethnic hatred. These were the first steps of preparations of Hutu for the massive genocide of Tutsi. In order to support the aggressive attitude towards the latter, the Hutu government often simulated fake attacks, blaming them on RPF. One of such attacks took place on October 4-5, 1990, when the Rwandan government organized a phony attack on Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda, after that initiating massacres of Tutsi population as a response to the RPF attacks. Moreover, such a strategy was used as an instrument of «habituating ordinary people to violence» (Melson 2003). The propaganda machine of

the Habyarimana regime against Tutsi has become so efficient that the majority of ordinary Hutu were ready to start the slaughter as soon as the moment comes.

The confrontation lasted until August 4, 1993, when the ceasefire agreement was signed by the President of Rwanda and the Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front in Arusha, Tanzania (Arusha Peace Agreement, 1993). The Agreement included the following provisions: creation of a mixed provisional government and institutions in terms of 37 days, the organization of free multiparty elections, the creation of a unified army with the guarantee of half of the places for RPF in the officers' corps of Rwanda and 40% in the reorganized army, representation on the key governmental levels, as well as right for repatriation of the Tutsi refugees back to Rwanda. In order to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was sent on October 5, 1993. Its effectivity, however, has been highly criticized – the whole situation was characterized as «when good men do nothing» – due to limitations of the right to use force in the framework of a humanitarian mission. UNAMIR low effectivity in preventing the genocide was also shown through delaying the deployment of troops and even by the reducing the number of peacekeepers right after the genocide had officially started.

THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

Neither the international community nor the Rwandan government could prevent the escalation of the conflict to the scale of genocide. On April 6, 1994, the aircraft of the president Habyarimana, who was returning from the peace negotiations, was shot down by an unknown armed group, the event that became the start of the slaughter against Tutsi in Rwanda conducted by the «Hutu Power» – a radical Hutu elite at the center of the government (Melson 2003) that blamed RPF in the assassination of the president.

In fact, the disputes regarding the part that is guilty of the assassination of the Rwandan president are still active. The official position of the nowadays Rwandan government is that the airplane was shot down by a group of Hutu extremists who

were against peace negotiations with Tutsi militias. The opposite position, particularly supported by nowadays France, states that the assassination happened by the command of Paul Kagame, one of the founders of the RPF (Shlenskaya 2012, Lal 2007) and the actual president of Rwanda.

After the death of Habyarimana, all the Tutsi were declared to be accomplices to RPF, and after the massive mobilization, the Hutu extremists, Interahamwe police and the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) started to perform unprecedented violence against innocent Tutsi civilians. A significant number of ordinary Hutu has also joined the massacres due to active anti-Tutsi state propaganda. In addition, during the genocide, not only Tutsi, but also the representatives of opposition and «moderate» Hutu (those who opposed the genocide) were killed.

The scale of killings was tremendous and «the speed with which people were slaughtered in Rwanda surpassed that of any other genocide in the modern era» (Melson 2003). Only in three months of slaughter an average estimate number of 800,000 people was killed (Armstrong II, Davenport, Stam 2020). Some estimations even reach the number of over one million of victims (Reyntjens 2004).

The scientific community usually divides the reasons that had brought the Rwandan society to the terror of the genocide into three major categories (Hintjens 1999):

- The external influences, both colonial and neo-colonial;
- Domestic causes, including demographic and economic factors;
- Social conformism and obedience of Rwandans to the state propaganda.

It has already been stated that the character of the «ethnic» hatred between Hutu and Tutsi dates back to the colonial period. However, this is not the only example of an *external influence* on the emergence of the Rwandan genocide.

Thus, for instance, France – the closest ally of the Habyarimana regime – offered unconditioned military support to the Hutu-led Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in order to suppress the RPF guerilla attacks during the 1990-1993 civil war.

The implication of France and its support to the Hutu regime can be explained by its clear geocultural and geopolitical interests in the region. By indirectly influencing the French-speaking territories of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), Rwanda and Burundi, France could gain an easier access to the natural wealth of this region and counterweight the influence of Britain and the U.S. in Eastern Africa through English-speaking Uganda and Tanzania.

Thus, in the period of 1990-1993 Rwanda has got significant military support from France through military troops, trainings, equipment and supplies, in spite of the agreement of French non-participation in the Rwandan combat, training or police operations, signed in 1975 (Lal 2007). There is an undisputable documentation that confirms French stream of arms to Rwanda with the direct consent of the French president François Mitterrand (French24 2019).




Fig. 3: The letter of the Admiral Lanxade to the President of France, 1990.

Moreover, even despite knowing about the intentions of the Habyarimana regime to «eliminate» Tutsi, France remained blind to violent policies and did not stop its diplomatic and military assistance to the Rwandan Armed Forces even after the clear evidence of the massacres being performed (Krosiak 2008). In the period of 1990-1994, France has deployed three missions to Rwanda – the Operation «Noroît», the Operation «Amaryllis» and the Operation «Turquoise», the latter being performed as the humanitarian mission under the mandate of

the UN. The goal of these missions was to evacuate French nationals and to provide shelter to the victims, helping them escape from the country and avoid the threat of the genocide. It is important to notice that these missions were not intended to stop the genocide itself, even though France has had enough diplomatic, economic and military power to do that. Even though the Operation «Turquoise» managed to save between ten thousand and seventeen thousand lives, it also helped the members and direct perpetrators of the genocide flee the country, some of them living in France till nowadays (Kroslak 2008, French24 2019).

The role of France in the Rwandan crisis remains a subject of disputes till nowadays, due to the fact that the majority of the documents are still sealed in the French archives. However, this question has also become the matter of investigations on the state level – in 2019, under the presidency of Emmanuel Macron, the Research Commission on French Archives Relating to Rwanda and the Tutsi Genocide (1990-1994), also known as the Duclert Commission, was established. In March 2021, the Commission has published its final report, stating that there were numerous contradictions found in the French policy towards Rwanda, confirming that France «remained blind to the preparation of a genocide», however not being able to define France as a direct accomplice to the genocide in Rwanda (Commission de recherche sur les archives françaises relatives au Rwanda et au génocide des Tutsi 2021). Therefore, the report demonstrates the external influence from the part of France that had become an indirect reason for the Rwandan genocide to enter such a large scale.

Along with that, the *domestic causes* of economic crisis and high density of the population – 7,128,000 people on the territory of 26,338 km² in 1989 (Prunier 1995) – have become the reason for the internal social tensions that were heated by the anti-Tutsi state ideology. According to the statistics, the practical density (the population density related to the arable land surface, 18,740 km²) in 1989 reached 380 people per km², a quite impressive number for such a little country like Rwanda.

	<i>Population</i>	<i>Gross density</i>	<i>Practical density</i>
1934	1,595,000	61	85
1950	1,954,000	73	102
1970	3,756,000	143	200
1980	5,257,000	200	281
1989	7,128,000	270	380

Source: Jean-Damascene Nduwayezu, op. cit., p. 98. Gross density means population density in relationship to the total surface of the country, i.e. 26,338 km.², while the practical density reflects the population density related to the arable land surface, i.e. only 18,740 km.².

Fig. 4. Population density in Rwanda (1934-1989)

In such situation, a person in Rwanda could possess only 0.5-0.6 acres of land, which is not enough neither for economic agricultural activity nor for a decent life without risk of hunger. In this regard, the genocide was intended to reduce the scale of density of the Rwandan population and being accepted by the Hutu majority has also had the roots of personal interest for obtaining new arable land surface. Such an approach looks inappropriate in the civilized Western world – however, this was the internal reality of the post-colonial Rwanda. Taken altogether with intense political and ideological propaganda, this resulted into one of the cruelest crimes against humanity in the African history.

From the *ideological perspective*, the Rwandan genocide is usually compared with Holocaust (Melson 2003) and other large-scale massacres based on hatred against certain group of population. It was promoted as the ideology of state – till the very last minute of the «Hutu Power» regime in Rwanda the well-known «Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines» – the «Free Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills» – spread hate propaganda against Tutsi, uncovering their locations, names and personal data and manipulating the Rwandan Hutu population, calling them for violence. The high level of obedience of Rwandans made them believe that all Tutsi were accomplices to RPF and pushed them to kill the ones that were peacefully living with them for decades and centuries.

All the aforementioned categories have to be considered while reviewing the essence of the genocide in Rwanda, none of them being able to be ignored (Hintjens 1999).

By July 4, 1994, Kigali – the capital city of Rwanda – was taken by RPF, bringing the genocide to decline. By August 21, the RPF already controlled the whole territory of the country. Since then, the new provisional government of unity was established – the presidential seat was taken by the moderate Hutu Pasteur Bizimungu, while Paul Kagame – the leader of RPF – was named the vice-president and the minister of defense of Rwanda. According to the Arusha Accords, the seat of Prime minister was given to Faustin Twagiramungu.

The newly established government represented the coalition of all existent political parties, with the exception of the banned Hutu extremist parties MRND and CDR – those that were implicated in the genocide. Proclaiming itself as the government of unity, it canceled the ethnic labeling in the identification cards, setting the main priorities of establishment of the national unity, stabilization of the situation in the country, economic revitalization, creation of democratic institutions, etc. (Shlenskaya 2012). It inherited a devastated country with a destroyed infrastructure, collapsed economy, healthcare and education facilities in ruins, weak judicial and civil service, therefore the main mission was to restore the well-being of Rwanda.

By November 1994, the provisional National Assembly was created with 70 deputy places divided among eight political parties. In May 1995, the new constitution was adopted, setting the term for transitional period till the middle of 1999. By that time, the country had to be ready for free elections and creation of permanent executive and legislative bodies (Shlenskaya 2012).

GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GENOCIDE

Since 1990, Rwanda has become the core of instability in the region of the African Great Lakes. The genocide has initiated a massive flux of refugees, both Tutsi and Hutu, to the neighbouring countries, thus expanding the conflict from the

local scale to the regional one. In the long-term period, the Rwandan genocide would have become the cause for substantial changes on the African continent.

During the mandate of the French humanitarian mission «Turquoise», the so-called «security corridor» was created in the Western part of Rwanda, near the border with Zaire. This route has become the primary path for millions of people trying to escape the country. Only in 1994, almost two million of people moved to Zaire, mostly consisting of Hutu that were afraid of revenge of the new government. Amongst them were the members of the Rwandan Armed Forces and Hutu extremist groups like Interahamwe, consisting of Hutu rebels that have later on formed their opposition armed organizations in exile to fight against RPF regime in Rwanda and the Tutsi population in Zaire, also known as «Banyamulenge» (Shlenskaya 2012).

Thus, the migration crisis following the Rwandan genocide has become the powder keg that has thrown the neighbouring countries, especially Zaire (nowadays D.R. of the Congo), into the period of decades of instability, eventually causing the deadliest conflict worldwide since World War II – the Great African War, also known as the African World War, – the one that killed around 5.4 million people in a decade (Reuters 2008).

The major conflict that is known as the African World War has emerged from a local civil war in Zaire, where the dictatorship of Mobutu was leading a corrupt and devastating state policy. The Tutsi population in the East of Zaire, being oppressed by the recently arrived Hutu extremists that were supported by the Mobutu regime, forced Rwanda to prepare an intervention in Zaire.

Together with the Ugandan army, Rwandan military joined the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila – the biggest opponent of the Mobutu dictatorship in Zaire, this alliance also being supported by the armies of Burundi and Angola. The most important role in the fight against Mobutu regime was played by the Rwandan army.

Even though the initial goal of the Rwandan invasion was based on security concerns in order to stop the activity of Interahamwe, the desire for economic exploitation of the

Congolese natural wealth (gold, diamonds, copper, tin, etc.) mostly concentrated in the Kivu region in the Eastern part of the country has become an important, though never acknowledged, reason (Reyntjens 2004). In addition, the Rwandan Patriotic Army has been numerously accused of performing war crimes through violent attacks against Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians in Eastern Zaire (Human Rights Watch 1997, Amnesty International 1997).

By May 1997, the forces of AFDL have managed to overthrow the Mobutu regime, bringing Kabila to power in Zaire which was later on officially renamed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In a short period after the end of the First Congo War, Kabila proved to be inefficient on his ruling position. Despite gaining military support from Rwanda, Kabila's regime did not perform any measures to oppress the activity of the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) formed from ex-FAR and Interahamwe members. He turned against his allies, removing all the Tutsi from Congolese government and accusing the allied countries of tending to exploit the natural resources of Congo. Such attitude led to the aggressive response from Kabila's former allies, pushing the countries into the Second Congo War that has later on grown into the Great African War.

Refusing to retreat their military troops, Kigali regime justified its military presence in Congo by the fight against Hutu extremists that were hiding from the Rwandan justice, while Kampala regime tended to keep its army in Congo for protection of its borders from Congolese rebels. In fact, the main reason still remained the expansion of territorial influence over the naturally wealthy Kivu region (Sidorova 2013).

In August 1998, the military operations in DRC were initiated by the Rally for Congolese Democracy – a rebel group of Congolese Tutsi supported by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi – with the goal to overthrow the Kabila's regime. In the following years, the war embraced Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Sudan, Zambia and Chad (Sidorova 2013) on different levels – from political to military implication of these countries in the conflict. In addition, an approximate number of 25 rebel

groups was fighting in this war against each other. The majority of the sides were tending to take control over the natural resources of the Eastern Congo, thus the DRC becoming the central battleground within this conflict.

This war has become the reason for the deployment of the largest UN Peacekeeping mission ever in 1999, which is still active till the present moment. The Rwandan participation in the Great African War has officially ended in 2002, after signature of Pretoria Accord. This agreement included the provisions of Rwandan retreat in exchange for Congolese assistance in disarmament of the Hutu extremist groups.

Even though the African World War has officially ended in 2003, it bred internal instability for the following decades. The activity of armed rebel groups against the central Kinshasa government have not yet ceased till the very actual moment. Neither has the activity of the Hutu extremist groups, the most prominent being the FDLR – the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. A significant importance represents the activity of the Tutsi-led M23 movement which is considered to be supported by Rwandan and Ugandan authorities. The latter, however, deny any implication in the activity of the rebel groups in DRC.

RWANDA AFTER GENOCIDE: THE SINGAPORE OF AFRICA?

Following the end of the genocide, the Rwandan new government started to perform actions targeted to the reformation of the country. Among the very first steps taken was the building of a justice system to prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide.

Since 1994, the process of investigation of the Rwandan genocide was assisted by the United Nations. In this regard, the special commission was created in 1994 in order to investigate the events and estimate the scale of damage brought by the genocide. Later on, in 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda launched its activity that lasted till the official closure in 2015. The Tribunal reviewed only the crimes committed by the former high officials. By 2005, 20 people were condemned for the implication in genocide. In

2009, the former Rwandan minister of justice Agnès Ntamabyaliro was convicted for the life imprisonment; in 2011 – the former general of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) Augustin Bizimungu was sentenced to 30 years detention (Shlenskaya 2012).

The national justice system, in the period of 1996-2002, also focused on investigation of the crimes performed during the Rwandan genocide. In the mentioned years, around 120,000 people were imprisoned, overwhelming the Rwandan prisons. This pushed the government to adopt a special Gacaca system since 1998. This mechanism represented the community-based instrument to investigate the criminal cases.

According to Gacaca system, approximately 10,000 gacaca jurisdictions were created in each district and province in the country. The jurisdictions consisted of three main bodies: a general assembly (the whole population of the district), a seat (nineteen elected judges) and a coordinating committee (five person chosen to be in charge of administrative matters) (Uvin, Mironko 2003).

By 1999, the transitional term set in Constitution expired, while the expected results of creation of a functional structure of democratic institutions was not achieved. The period was prolonged till 2003, with the previous goals remaining on agenda.

In 2000, major changes in the internal governmental structures were performed (Shlenskaya 2012) – Bernard Makuza was named as the new Prime minister, while Paul Kagame occupied the seat of President of Rwanda, becoming the first Tutsi on this position since independence. The former president Bizimungu left his office, afterwards creating his own opposition political party. In 2004 he was accused of representing a threat for the national security and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Later on, however, he was released from custody in 2007 with personal apology from the president Kagame.

In 2003, in the framework of a national referendum, a new constitution was adopted. Its primary goal was declared the preservation of the national unity. Moreover, the constitution shaped the rules for further democratic elections

in the country and functioning of state institutions. Rwanda was declared a presidential republic.

In the same year, the first direct elections of the president took place, Paul Kagame receiving more than 95% of votes. On the parliamentary elections, the pro-presidential RPF party won the elections with 75.3% of votes. Along with them, two more parties entered the parliament – the Social-Democratic Party (12.3% of votes) and the Liberal Party (10.6% of votes). Therefore, the number of parties represented in the parliament reduced from eight to three.

Since then, the power in the state is preserved in the hands of Kagame and RPF, them winning the elections for numerous times. In 2015, the constitutional referendum was held in Rwanda to offer the right to Kagame to run for the presidency in 2017, being later on elected with 98.8% of votes in competition with independent candidate Philippe Mpayimana who took 0.7% of votes and Frank Habineza whose percentage reached 0.5% of votes.

During the presidency of Kagame, Rwanda has changed drastically. In 2005, the strategy «Vision 2020» was adopted, being focused on reducing the level of poverty and growth of the quality of life (Shlenskaya 2012). Paul Kagame has declared for numerous times to be viewing Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime minister of Singapore, as an inspiration in his policy (The New Times Rwanda 2015). Due to that, the Rwanda has got the reputation of the state that is tending to become the «Singapore of Africa» (Reuters 2015).

Singapore, being the seventh safest (Global Peace Index 2020), the third richest (World Bank 2019) and the third least corrupt (Transparency International 2020) country in the world, has managed to grow from a third-world country to one of the major Asian business hubs in less than a lifetime. The Rwandan government, as it was mentioned before, has focused on implementing the model of Singapore in its country in order to significantly boost its economic and social development. Such policy resulted in the significant growth of Rwandan statistics in comparison with its neighbours.

From the perspective of corruption, Rwanda takes 49th position in the ranking, making it the second least corrupt country in Africa (the first being Botswana with the 35th

position) and the least corrupt country in the region of Eastern Africa (Transparency International 2020).

In terms of safety, Rwanda has only 2.5 murders per year for each 100,000 residents, which is quite impressive in comparison with its neighbours: 11.5 in Uganda, 7 in Tanzania, 6 in Burundi and 13.6 in DRC (UNODC 1990-2018).

The economic growth in Rwanda reaches 9.4% per year, being the fastest growing economy in Africa. The data for its neighbours is the following: Uganda – 6.8%, Tanzania – 5.8%, Burundi – 1.8%, DRC – 4.4% (World Bank 2019).

From the perspective of the ease of doing business, Rwanda is located on the 38th position in the ranking, overcoming such countries like Italy (58th), Cyprus (54th), Belgium (46th) and being located close to Switzerland that is situated on the 36th position (World Bank 2019). In this regard, Rwanda is the highest ranked among the mainland African countries, being the most attractive African state for foreign investments.

To achieve this, Rwanda has implemented numerous anti-corruption reforms and reduced bureaucracy during the registration of the new business – registering a firm in Rwanda takes three days and is cheaper than anywhere else in Africa. «Property rights are strengthening as well—the government is giving peasants formal title to their land» (The Economist 2012). Moreover, in order to become closer to an image of an African business hub, Rwanda has launched a \$300 million project of building of the Kigali Convention Center in 2011 (COMESA 2011).

Thus, in 2005, \$7.960 million was invested in Rwanda, this number reaching \$384.461 million in 2019 (World Bank 2019). In this regard, Rwanda could be seen as an example for other African nations in terms of priorities within their national policies.

Despite the aforementioned evidence of the Rwandan fast growth, the actual political regime of Paul Kagame has been facing numerous criticisms, being labeled as oppressive due to severe limitations on the freedom of speech, assembly, and the press. However, these accusations were denied completely by Kagame himself in the framework of his interviews with press (The New Times Rwanda 2015).

The regime of Paul Kagame has been even compared to the one of Habyarimana: both regimes were dependent on a single political party, both of them have manipulated ethnicity and have oppressed the opposition (Reyntjens 2004). Thus, in 2010, the main opponent of Kagame – the ethnic Hutu Victoire Ingabire – was sentenced to imprisonment after being accused of connections with FDLR rebel group. It is important to note that the year 2010 was the electoral one, with three other political parties being close to the president and several opposition critics killed a month prior to the elections (BBC News 2010).

All these factors have significantly influenced the democratic image of Rwanda, placing it on the 130th position in the world with the score of 3.10 in Global Democracy Index (The Economist 2020).

The presented results of the Kagame policy show Rwanda as one of the leading African countries, representing a potential example for the whole continent to revitalize and reboot their internal political and economic systems. Even though being viewed as authoritarian state, it has managed to reach an impressive success in comparison with its neighbours.

SUMMARY

The colonial past of a little state of Rwanda, situated in the Central/ Eastern Africa, in the region of the African Great Lakes, has become the reason for one of the most horrific genocides in human history, with more than 800,000 innocent people slaughtered in the period of three months in 1994.

The genocide has become the core reason for long-term instability in the whole region, causing a major refugee crisis of both Hutu and Tutsi in the neighbouring countries, expanding the conflict on the international scale. This caused two big wars in the neighbouring Zaire-Congo, the last being known as the African World War that has killed around 5.4 million people in the period of 1998-2003, and affected the countries from the whole continent, from South Africa to Sudan and Chad, as well as empowering numerous rebel groups that remain active till nowadays. Thus, the Rwandan genocide has had a major

influence on the geopolitical framework in Africa, especially in the region of the African Great Lakes.

After the devastating genocide, the power in Rwanda has been taken by RPF – the political party of the actual president Paul Kagame. Since 2000, his policy of national unity, promotion of anti-corruption reforms and focus on foreign investments have offered Rwanda the potential to become the «Singapore of Africa», significantly overcoming the scores of the majority of its neighbours and destroying the Western stereotypes of poor and suffering Africa. Even though being viewed as an authoritarian state, Rwanda has developed a potential to become one of the leading countries in Africa in the upcoming years, even in spite of its small surface and landlocked geographical position.

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Piotr L. WILCZYŃSKI

Pedagogical Univ. of Krakow, Krakow, Poland

ARMS TRADE AND RESOURCES EXPLOITATION - SURVEY OF NEO-COLONIALISM AND NEO-IMPERIALISM IN AFRICA

Abstract:

One of the negative effects of globalization is the unequal distribution of wealth. This is reflected in an economic system in which the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Accordingly equalizing opportunities for increased wealth has become a popular agenda. These problems are caused by neo-colonialism and imperialism present among the poorer countries of the world. With these concepts in mind, it is worth examining the present situation in the poorest part of the globe. The production activities of corporations concentrated upon mining within certain countries can serve as an example of neo-colonialism, while the dependence of poorer countries on arms trade with wealthier countries serves as a characteristic indication of neo-imperialism. This paper examines the existing data on the mining activities in Africa, with appropriate maps included. Also this paper examines a list of arms sales of the last decade as well as the largest dealers. Thanks to conducted research, this article also presents which countries constitute the most influential in the process of neo-colonization and in the context of trade. Also examined is the growing influence of China and past colonial powers.

Key words:

Africa, resources, arms trade, neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism, dependence, globalization, exploitation, mining, arsenal, weapon

INTRODUCTION

The growing influence of China on economy and politics in many African countries put a question of negative effects of

neo-colonialism and neo-imperial policies. This paper has as one of its goals the verification of the popular thesis so present in the media, that China will consume Africa economically (Edoho 2011). In addition, the much talked about negative impact of globalization, such as neo-colonialism, at times referred to as "colonialism with white gloves" will be examined. Also neo-imperialism, that is the building up of trade empires, not by countries, but instead by capital gathered by corporations will be examined (Cheru, Obi 2011; Payne, Veney 1998).

Following the economic crisis of 2007-2008, China surpassed the United States in GNP growth. Many commentators at that time raised the alarm that the Communist government of China had begun increased activity upon the African continent, not only in a desire to gain steady sources of raw materials for its own markets, as well as the development of new markets for its products, but also in a desire to increase its political influence upon the continent. Such assertions became a standard point of reference by observers... assertions which were often accepted without question. But upon verification of the amount of invested capital by the Chinese in the mining industry of Africa shows that the influence of the Chinese upon the continent was exaggerated. And so begs the question, since Chinese neo-colonialism has not resulted in dominance of the mining industry so pivotal in its importance in the Sub-Saharan economies, which countries can claim the title of neo-colonial powers upon the African continent? (Besada, Martin 2015).

NEO-COLONIALISM AND NEO-IMPERIALISM DEFINITIONS PROBLEM

It is exactly in mentioned context, that there arises a conflict in definitions, for there exist many definitions of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism (Spivak 1991; Robertson, Pinstup-Andersen 2001). This research will not delve into which of these academic views are correct and which are incorrect in their definitions. Here it is accepted to hold to the view that neo-colonialism stems from economic and political

influences which in turn are a direct result of the overtaking of entities of production within the strategic business sectors of given countries (Rahaman, Yeazdani, Mahmud 2017; Uzoigwe 2019). This control then allows powerful nations through their corporations to influence the for-profit assets of the colonized country, as well as its use of raw materials, its manufacturing potential and its work force as well (Langan 2018). Thus in effect, the colonial power along with international corporations, can reap benefits similar to the colonial metropolis of a by-gone era, without being accused of using abusive economic tactics (Ogar, Nwoye, Bassey 2019).

It is a similar situation when dealing with the concept of neo-imperialism (Alam 2006), which also can mean different things to different specialists (Wigell 2016). Differing somewhat from neo-colonialism which is dependent upon the overtaking of for profit entities of a given country, neo-imperialism seeks to reach its goals through legal means such as international agreements, lobbying but also through corrupt practices such as blackmail and forcing weaker nations to purchases which are not beneficial for the weaker nation. Such purchases are often dependent upon credit and other forms which result in debt for the weaker nation. The most serious forms of neo-imperialism stem from arms sales and other influences upon a country's ability to defend itself and to self-govern. In effect then, the best way to examine neo-imperialism is to examine the arms-sale contracts of a given nation (Grant 2007; Stavrianakis 2013; Stilwell, Jordan, Pearce 2008; Lumumba-Kasongo 2011).

The two remaining sections of this article are analytical in nature, gathering statistics which provide an overview of the mining industry ownership as representation of neo-colonialism, and arms sales as exemplification of neo-imperialism policy in the Sub-Saharan region. This information is presented in graphs representing both neo-colonial and neo-imperialistic influences of dominant countries upon others, what allows to define most powerful countries in these terms and answer a question about Chinese real presence on the continent.

OWNERSHIP AND EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES

It is a well-known fact that Africa is rich in natural resources, which has led to a greater exploitation of the continent than other regions of the world (Frynas, Paulo 2007). A list of such resources will be presented later in this work, according to the amount of their exploitation (table 1). In this part of the world only asbestos, borax, molybdenum ore, REE¹ ores, thorium ore, sulphur and potassium salts are not mined. Those strategic minerals that are mined, have been represented on map as to better understand the locations of mining activity (fig. 1). Only the most important mines are represented since representing all mines would surpass the limits of such a figure. The map can however give a visual overview of which mineral materials dominate within the borders of certain countries found on the African continent.

Within the Sub-Saharan region the Republic of South Africa (RSA) plays a dominant economic and military role. It also plays a dominant role in the area of mining. This country has one of the world's largest concentrations of hard coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome, nickel, titanium, diamonds, gold and platinum. The RSA also boasts of numerous mining companies of its own, and is one of a small number of countries in Africa, which invests in the exploitation of raw materials in other countries.

The remaining countries of the African continent can be divided into three groups. The first group consists of those countries where mining is at a low level of technological development and is conducted by local residents and small firms (Bancgirigah 2006; Bryceson, Geenen 2016; Hilson, Yakovleva, Banchirigah 2007; Luning 2014). Mining of metals and gemstones dominates in these countries which do not possess the proper infrastructure for mining on a larger scale. Such countries include Mali, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Burkina Faso.

¹ REE – the rare-earth elements, also called the rare-earth metals.




Fig. 1. Main mineral resources exploitation areas of Africa. Source: Author's elaboration.

Table 1. List of strategic mineral resources mined in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa

Mineral resource	Place of production by volume
Energy resources:	
- coal	South Africa (RSA) (mainly Middelburg Basin), Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger and Botswana.
- lignite/brown coal	Ethiopia.
- petroleum	Nigeria (Niger Delta Basin), Angola, Sudan, South Sudan, Congo, Gabon, Dem. Rep. of Congo (DRC), Eq. Guinea, Chad, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, RSA.
- natural gas	Nigeria (Niger Delta Basin), Ivory Coast, Eq. Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, Congo.
- uranium ore	Niger (Arlit, Akouta), Namibia (Rössing), Malawi (Kaleyeckera), RSA.
Iron and ferroalloys ores:	
- iron ore	RSA (Shishen, Kathu, Kolomela), Sierra Leone (Tonkolili), Mauritania (Fdayrik Basin), Nigeria, Uganda.
- manganese ore	Gabon (Ndjole, Moanda), RSA (Hotazel), Ghana (Nsuta), Ivory Coast, Namibia.
- chromium ore	RSA (Rustenburg Basin and Drakensberg Basin), Zimbabwe (Ngezi), Madagascar

	(Bemanevenika), Sudan.
- nickel ore	RSA (Rustenburg Basin and Drakensberg Basin), Botswana (Selebi-Pikwe, Francistown), Madagascar (Ambatovy), Zimbabwe.
- coltan ² ores	Rwanda, DRC, Burundi, Madagascar, Nigeria.
- cobalt ore	DRC (Katanga-Shaba Basin), Zambia (Copperbelt Basin), Madagascar (Ambatovy), RSA, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Uganda.
- tungsten ore	Rwanda, DRC, Uganda, Burundi.
- vanadium ore	RSA (Rustenburg Basin and Drakensberg Basin).
Other basic metals:	
- bauxite (aluminium ore)	Guinea (Sangaredi, Debele, Fria), Sierra Leone, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania.
- antimony ore	RSA.
- tin ore	DRC, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi.
- zinc ore	Namibia (Scorpion Mine), Burkina Faso, RSA, Nigeria, DRC.
- lead ore	RSA, Namibia, Nigeria.
- copper ore	DRC (Katanga-Shaba Basin), Zambia (Copperbelt Basin), RSA, Botswana, Eritrea, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tanzania.
- titanium ore	RSA (Richards Bay, Brand se Baai), Madagascar (Mandena), Mozambique (Moma), Sierra Leone (Sierra Rutile Mine).
Precious metals and gems:	
- silver	Burkina Faso, DRC, RSA, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Niger, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia.
- gold	RSA (Witwatersrand Basin, Vaal Basin, Welkom Basin), Ghana (Gold Coast Basin), Mali (Luolo-Goukoto, Sigiri), Tanzania (Geita), Burkina Faso, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Guinea, Senegal, Togo, Eritrea, Zambia, Burundi, Zimbabwe, DRC, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Niger, Kenya, Mozambique, Madagascar, Botswana.
- platinum and other PGE ³	RSA (Rustenburg Basin and Drakensberg Basin), Zimbabwe (Ngezi, Unki, Mimoso), Botswana, Ethiopia.
- diamond	Botswana (Orapa, Jwaneng), DRC (Tshikapa, Mbuji-Mayi, Tshibue, Kapopo), Zimbabwe (Marange, Ventia, Murowa), Angola (Catoca), RSA (Kimberley, Finsch), Namibia (Mittag), Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Cameroon, Ghana, Tanzania, Congo, Guinea, Liberia.
- other gemstones	DRC (Katanga-Shaba Basin), Zambia (Copperbelt Basin), Madagascar, Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, Kenya, RPA, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Malawi, Botswana, Ivory Coast, Uganda, Lesotho, Burundi, Eswathini.
Chemical resources:	
- sea salt	Namibia, Kenya, RSA, Mozambique, Eritrea, Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, Angola, Madagascar, Mauritius, Somalia.
- rock/brine salt	Botswana, RSA, Mauritania, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Mali, Djibouti.
- barites	Zimbabwe, Nigeria.
- fluorites	RSA (Rust de Winter), Kenya (Kimwarer), Namibia (Okorusu).
- phosphates	Togo (Akoumape, Hahotue), Senegal (Taiba), RSA (Phalaborwa), Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mali, Tanzania.
- graphite	Madagascar, Zimbabwe.
- magnesite	RSA.
- mica	Madagascar, Sudan.

Source: Author's elaboration based on most recent data mainly from British Geological Survey (BGS), US Geological Survey (USGS) and many governmental and corporate data reports.⁴

² Coltan is a mineral of niobium and tantalum.

³ Platinum group elements (palladium, iridium etc.).

⁴ A table and the following was analysed according to British Geological Survey reports are available at: *World Mineral Production 2015-2019*

<<https://www2.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/>> (3 February 2021), and similar for US Geological Survey: *International Minerals Statistics and Information*

The second group of countries is made up of those which possess nationalized mining or mining operated by military forces. Comprising this group are countries having strong governmental focus for central economic planning. There are fewer and fewer such examples but Cameroon or Togo (Pedersen, Jacob 2017) could fit well into this category. Such countries are more likely now to sell already existing firms, increasing their level of debt, which is one of the characteristics of emerging neo-colonialism (Ogar, Nwoye, Bassey 2017; Segell 2019). Within this context China plays a growing role along with other countries with rising economies (Deych 2019; Obi 2019; Olivier 2019).

The third group of countries of Africa is made up of those whose raw material and mineral resources have been bought and exploited by third-party countries or by international corporations. Exemplifying this group are Nigeria, Guinea, Gabon, Zambia, the DRC and others. They are countries whose exports are dominated by mineral commodities.

At this point in the article it is worth noting the origins of such companies and where their investing capital originates. This will allow one to recognize which nations stand out as neo-colonialist in the African Sub-Saharan region. In Southern Africa, as already mentioned the largest economy is that of the Republic of South Africa, which itself conducts neo-colonial activity within other countries of the African continent. Table 2 presents mines and their owners denoting their national origins. Corporations are listed according to their ranking in the markets which pertain to them.

In the RSA, most mining activity is in the hands of their own, native corporations and thus it would be difficult to speak of neo-colonialism in such a context. One can not say the same when speaking about countries neighbouring the RSA. In Lesotho for example, there exists only a few diamond mines. They in part belong to the government which owns from 20% to 30% of their shares. But the largest company which mines diamonds in Lesotho is Nakamwa Diamonds from the Republic of South Africa. Smaller mines belong to Kimberlite Investments (USA), Gem Diamonds (UK), Firestone Diamonds

<<https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/international-minerals-statistics-and-information>> (3 February 2021).

(UK) and Luconna Diamonds (Canada). So it is plain to see that the majority of the profits from the mining of diamonds flows out of the country and into the earnings of foreign concerns. In the case of Lesotho, the earnings are reaped primarily by the RSA and Great Britain. It is a similar case with Suazi, (known as Eswatini since 2018). The Anglo-American Corporation of Great Britain and the RSA owns one mine of iron ore, which presently serves mostly as a tourist attraction. Other mines being actively exploited for hard coal belong to Chancellor House Holdings which has its headquarters in the Republic of South Africa with the RSA holding a majority of shares in the company and with smaller shares held by small companies. A second mine in Eswatini worth mentioning is mined for gold. It belongs to SDZ Holdings LLC from Austria, and Ingweyama Corp from the RSA. The government also holds some shares in this endeavour.

Table 2. Ownership of RSA mines

Mines of:	Owners ranking:	Origin:
coal	1) Exxaro Resources	RSA
	2) Sasol	RSA
	3) South32	Australia
	4) Tegeta Exploration & Resources	Switzerland
	5) Glencore Xstrata	Switzerland/RSA
	6) Umcebo Mining	RSA
	7) Shanduka Group	RSA
	8) Wescoal Holdings	RSA
	9) Kangra Group	India
	10) Keaton Energy Holdings	RSA
	11) Imbawula Group	RSA
	12) Mbuyelo Coal	RSA
	13) Universal Coal	UK/RSA
	14) Kuyasa Mining	RSA
	15) Vunene Mining	RSA
	16) Coal of Africa	RSA
petroleum and natural gas	Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa	RSA
uranium ore	1) AngloGold Ashanti	RSA
	2) Sibanye-Stillwater	RSA
iron ore	1) Kumba Iron Ore	RSA
	2) Assmang	RSA
	3) Palabora Mining	RSA
	4) Evraz Group	Russia
	5) Glencore Xstrata	Switzerland/RSA
manganese ore	1) BHP Billiton	Australia
	2) Anglo American	UK/RSA
	3) Majestic Silver Trading	RSA
	4) Renova Group	Russia
	5) Assmang	RSA
	6) Tshipi e Ntle Manganese Mining	RSA
	7) Asia Minerals	China (Hong Kong)
	8) Samancor Manganese	RSA
chromium ore	1) Glencore Xstrata	Switzerland/RSA

	2) International Mineral Resources	Netherlands
	3) Merafe Resource	RSA
	4) Tharisa Minerals	RSA
	5) Mitsubishi	Japan
	6) Assmang	RSA
	7) International Ferro Metals	Australia
	8) Lonmin	UK
	9) African Rainbow Minerals	RSA
	10) MMC Norilsk Nickel	Russia
	11) ASA Metals	Canada
	12) Eastern Platinum	Canada
	13) Afarak Group	Finland
	14) Bayer	Germany
	15) Anglo American	UK/RSA
nickel ore	1) Anglo American	UK/RSA
	2) Nkomati JV	RSA
	3) Impala Platinum	RSA
	4) Lonmin	UK
cobalt ore	Nkomati JV	RSA
vanadium ore	1) Evraz Group	Russia
	2) Glencore Xstrata	Switzerland/RSA
	3) Duferco Group	USA
	4) Vametco Minerals	RSA
antimony ore	Stibium Mining	RSA
lead-zinc ore	Black Mountain Mineral Development	RSA
copper ore	1) Palabora Mining	RSA
	2) Anglo American	US/RSA
	3) Nkomati JV	RSA
	4) Impala Platinum	RSA
	5) Black Mountain Mineral Development	RSA
titanium ore	1) Rio Tinto	UK/Australia
	2) Horizon Investments	USA
	3) Exxaro Resources	RSA
	4) Mineral Commodities	Australia
silver	Black Mountain Mineral Development	RSA
gold	1) Sibanye-Stillwater	RSA
	2) AngloGold Ashanti	RSA
	3) Harmony Gold Mining	RSA
	4) Gold Fields	RSA
	5) Pan African Resources	UK
	6) Gold One International	Australia
	7) DRD Gold	RSA
	8) Village Main Reef	RSA
	9) Anglo American	UK/RSA
platinum and PGE	1) Anglo American	UK/RSA
	2) Royal Bafokeng Nation	RSA
	3) Aquarius Platinum	UK
	4) African Rainbow Minerals	RSA
	5) XK Platinum Partnership	RSA
	6) Impala Platinum	RSA
	7) Lonmin	UK
	8) Mvelaphanda Resources	RSA
	9) Sedibelo Platinum Mines	RSA
	10) Glencore Xstrata	Switzerland/RSA
	11) Atlatsa Resource Group	RSA
	12) Eastern Platinum	Canada
	13) Tharisa Minerals	RSA
	14) Nkomati JV	RSA
	15) Platinum Australia	Australia
	16) Sylvania Platinum	UK
diamonds and other gems	1) Anglo American	UK/RSA
	2) Petra Diamonds	UK

	3) Diamond Corporation	Canada
	4) Jagersfontein Developments	RSA
	5) Trans Hex Group	RSA
	6) Batla Minerals	France
salt	1) Salt Refiners and Packers	RSA
	2) Swarkops	RSA
	3) Dwaggas Salt Works	RSA
magnesite	Chamotte Holdings	RSA
phosphates	Foskor	RSA
fluorites	Minerales Y Productos Derivados	Spain

Source: Author's elaboration based on most recent data mainly from US Geological Survey (USGS) and RSA Department of Resources and Energy.⁵

There are countries to the north of the RSA which are also under the influence of South African capital. Namibia for example has many mines. All copper and pyrites (iron ore) mines of the country belong to Weatherly International of Great Britain, while the majority of diamond mines in the country belong to De Beers Group, also a British concern. The only fluorite mine in the country belongs to the Solvay Co. of Belgium, while the gold mines found there are mined by B2 Gold of Canada and QRK of Great Britain. The mining of lead and silver in Namibia is in the hands of Encore Xstrata from Switzerland and the RSA. Manganese in Namibia is being mined by Purity Manganese of Israel, while salt is mined by Walvis Bay Salt Holdings of the RSA, Guangdong Nuclear Power Group of China and Rio Tinto of Great Britain and Australia own uranium complex. Zinc is mined in Namibia by Vedanta Resources of India. In summary, over 40% of Namibia's mining concerns are in British hands with firms from the RSA also holding a large percentage.

In Botswana, mining activity is dominated by the extraction of diamonds. The majority of these diamond mines belong to Debswana Diamond Company, a British and Botswanian in origin. This same company is also responsible for the mining of coal. The firm Agate Botswana dominates the industry in the mining of precious stones. The owner of the country's only gold mine is Galane Gold of Botswana and the RSA, while mines for nickel, cobalt and copper are held by BCL a national concern. Salt in Botswana is mined by Chlor-Alkali

⁵ US Geological Survey: *International Minerals Statistics and Information* <<https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/international-minerals-statistics-and-information>> (3 February 2021); RSA Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, <<https://www.dmr.gov.za/resources>> (4 February 2021).

Holdings of Great Britain and the RSA, and silver is mined by Global Natural Resource Investments of Great Britain. Botswana owns the majority of its mines in the form of governmental co-ops belonging to its national treasury.

Of interest is the situation in Zimbabwe where many mines were nationalized and subsequently failed, only to be saved thanks to the efforts of local miners and small enterprisers. Zimbabwe mines a healthy amount of chromium ore while the firm Hwange Colliery extracts a good amount of coal. The co-op RioZim (Zimbabwe), Senzile Resources (RSA) along with a few other concerns also function in this regard. Cobalt and nickel are mined almost exclusively by Asa Resources Corp. of London, while the mining of copper along with platinum are also mined by companies in foreign hands with Impala Platinum and Sibanye-Stillwater (RSA) playing a dominant role. Of course the mining of diamonds comprises an significant role as a source of income for this part of the world. The largest diamond mine in Zimbabwe is found in Murowa with its owner being RZ Murowa Holdings, a firm supported by British capital. A second firm, Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) plays a more limited role in diamond production, although the company owns some mines. The mining of gold in Zimbabwe is largely in the hands of locals who engage themselves illegally in this endeavour. The largest legal gold mine is found in Bindura and belongs to Asa Resources Group of Great Britain. Mitallon Corp also of Great Britain constitutes the second largest company involved in the mining of gold. Zimbabwe German Graphite Mines is a German-Zimbabwean company engaged in the mining of graphite. The mining of tungsten lies in the hands of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund, a national concern. Generally speaking then, Zimbabwe possesses a good amount of mining activity conducted by related national firms. The mining of gold and chrome however is thanks to the activities of small family-run firms who work according to traditional methods. Those firms earning the most income from their mining activities in Zimbabwe are from Great Britain with the Republic of South Africa coming in second.

The situation concerning the mining of gold and gemstones in Mozambique is very similar to that of Zimbabwe,

with the extraction of these resources being dominated by small, local micro-firms. The most active in the area of mining in this country is that of titanium ore, with the largest such mine being in the hands of Kenmare Resources, an Irish firm. Also the mining of hard coal by the Brazilian firm Vale plays a great role in the mining industry here. Other mining companies of much lesser profit margins include: Mina Alumina, a Mozambique firm mining bauxite, Sasol, a South African firm involved in natural gas production as well as the British company Noventa which extracts niobium and tantalum. British and Irish firms hold the largest earnings in the area of mining in Mozambique.

In Madagascar, cottage industry mining is also very common. It is responsible for extracting their renowned gemstones. Small, family run mining firms sell their mined gems directly to the government or to large companies such as Norcross Madagascar Group, a French company. The most lucrative mined substance in Madagascar is nickel and cobalt, extracted by Ambatovy in which the Canadian company Sherritt International owns many shares, as well as Sumitomo of Japan and Kores of Korea. Due to the division of shares, neither of these three companies constitute the largest of mining firms in Madagascar, although they own the largest mines in the country. The second largest mine in this country is in the hands of Rio Tinto, a British-Australian firm extracting Titanium ore. Also in Madagascar chrome is mined by the government while graphite is mined by Etablissements Gallois, a French concern, and Graphmada Equity of Singapore, mica by GA Mineragrex of Great Britain as well as by local firms, crude oil by the Singaporean Company Madagascar Oil, rock salt by Compagnie Salinière de Madagascar of France as well as many local micro-firms. Taking profit and investment capital into account no clear leader emerges even though 80% of the shares in mining result from foreign investments. Approximately 15-20% of these are French or Singaporean. The remaining island countries of the Indian Ocean such as the Comoros Islands, Seychelles Islands the Island of Mauritius as well as the colonies of Mayotte and Reunion do not possess mines other than local de-salination plants, most often belonging to local, family-owned firms.

The majority of Eastern African nations have also become dominated in their mining industries by foreign entities. In Tanzania, the most lucrative mining activity centres around gold, which is mined in many locations in the country. The largest of these mines belongs to the AngloGold Ashanti Company from the RSA. A few smaller mines with greater productivity are owned by Barrick Gold of Canada. A large amount of gold is also extracted by individual miners. This is also true with the mining of diamonds and other precious stones in Tanzania. The largest company involved in the mining of diamonds there is Petra Diamonds of Great Britain. Other companies conducting mining activities in the country are as follows: coal – Intra Energy of Australia, copper and silver – Barrick Gold of Canada, natural gas – Etablissements Maurel et Prom of France, Wentworth Resources of Britain and Orca Exploration Group of Canada, and phosphates and rock salt – MAC Group from the USA. Generally, the largest holding in Tanzanian mining are owned by Canadian and British firms.

Neighbouring Kenya possesses a much scantier mining industry. The mining industry in this country is mainly concentrated upon the extraction of fluorite, sea salt and gemstones. While the mining of fluorite is presently in the hands of the government, rock salt and gemstones are mined by locals and locally owned, small firms. Small amounts of gold are also mined in this way. Iron ore is mined by the Kenyan firm Wanjala Mining, while an Australian firm called Base Resources mines titanium. Kenya remains a country free of neo-colonial pressures which seek to buy up deposits of rich natural resources.

In Uganda the main natural resource mined is tungsten. The entire enterprise involved in the mining of this natural resource is in the hands of KI3R Minerals, a British concern. Uganda also possesses a limited amount of iron ore production, all in the hands of local firms. The country also produces salt and gold, the mining of which is in the hands of private exploiters. The only mine in the country functioning on an industrial level is one mine extracting tungsten.

Neighbouring Rwanda is one of the world's major producers of niobium and tantalum. These mines, of which there are many, are found in the Rwandan basin and are

generally run by small firms belonging to local businessmen. Those natural resources representing a higher level of industrialization in Rwanda are tin and tungsten. The British company of Tinco Investments owns the largest of such mines. An additional and important source of income for Rwanda is found in the mining of gemstones. This industry exists on a small scale by local firms which do not operate at an industrial level. Other natural resources of interest in Rwanda include deposits of natural gas, which is extracted by Contour Global, a British company. British capital dominates the Rwandan mining scene.

Burundian mining is also dependent on a few international firms, as well as local companies. The primary resource mined is gold, which is mined by locals and not on an industrial scale. There also exist small mines in the country extracting tin, tungsten, niobium and tantalum. The majority of this mining activity is conducted on the local level. The largest government-run mining concern is Tantalum Mining Company (TAMinCO).

The main source of income in mining for Malawi is in the area of gemstones, the majority of which is conducted on the local level. Two largest firms are: Mzimba Gemstone Mining Cooperative Society (a Malawian firm), and Silver Hills Gems from the RSA. A large amount of effort also goes into the mining of coal and is conducted by CPL Industries, a British firm, Intra Energy of Australia, and by Allied Procurement, an American company. Malawi is also a major producer of raw uranium. The Australian firm, Paladin Energy is involved in its extraction. Phosphates are mined in Malawi by Optichem, a Malawian owned firm supported in part by capital from the United Arab Emirates. An assessment of Malawi earnings from mining show that despite the activity of foreign firms, it is the wide variety of local, Malawian owned firms which dominate numerous mines, but most earnings eventually find their way into the hands of foreign companies, especially those from Australia.

Neighbouring Zambia possesses rich deposits of copper and cobalt and the list of mine operators is a long one. Among those entities mining these elements are: African Rainbow Materials (RSA), Vale (Brazil), ZCCM-IH (Zambia/RSA),

Jinchuan Group International Mining (China), NFC Africa Mining (Austria), First Quantum Materials (Canada), Vedanta Resources (India), Barrick Gold (Canada), Glencore Xstrata (Switzerland/RSA), Nonferrous Metal Mining (China). Among these entities, Canadian companies are the most dominant. Aside from copper and cobalt in Zambia, a large amount of gold is mined there, mainly by First Quantum Minerals, while precious stones are mined primarily by Gemfields PLC of Great Britain. To a lesser degree coal is mined in the country by Nava Bharat of India as well as by the earlier mentioned ZCCM-IH. The mining of manganese is conducted primarily by Kaboko Mining an Australian firm. Generally speaking, after summarizing of incomes, one half of the mining industry profits in Zambia are under Canadian interests.

The mining industry in the next country of Angola depends primarily on the extraction of oil and diamonds. Angola has also sold mining rights to international concerns. In the area of oil production the following companies dominate: Ajoco Exploration (Japan), Angola Consulting Resources (Angola), AP Moller-Maersk (Denmark), BP (Britain), Canadian Natural Resources (Canada), Chevron (USA), Devon Energy (USA), Eni (Italy), ExxonMobil (USA), Falcon Oil (Ireland), Force Petroleum Group (Canada), Gulp Energía (Portugal), Gema Group (Australia), Ina-Industrija Nafta (Croatia), InterOil (Norway), Marathon Oil (USA), Naphta-Israel Petroleum (Israel), Occidental Petroleum (USA), Odebretch (Brazil), Petróleo-Brasileiro (Brazil), Prodoil SARL (Angola), Roc Oil (Australia), Sinopec (China), Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola (Angola), Sociedade Petrolífera Angolana (Angola), Soco (Taiwan), Statoil (Norway), Teikoku Oil (Japan), Total (France), Tullow Oil (UK), Vaalco Energy (USA). Somewhat more modest earnings in Angola are derived through the mining of diamonds. The largest such enterprise Catoca, is responsible for 80% of diamond mining in the country and is mutually owned by Endiama (Angola), Alrosa (Russia), Daumonty Financing Co. (Panama), and Odebrecht (Brazil). Compiling the total earnings gained from the mining, although Angolan capital dominates, the majority of earnings go to foreign concerns, the largest part of which originate in the USA and France.

The neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is in possession of rich deposits of cobalt and copper, found primarily in the Katanga-Shaba basin, along with diamond deposits in the south of the country. The economy of the country depends on these deposits. The cobalt and copper mines of the country belong to different consortia of which many international companies have shares. The main companies tied with the mining of copper and cobalt are: La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) a state-owned concern of the DRC and the Swiss-South African concern Glencore Xstrata. Much of the capital comes from Chinese, American and Dutch sources as well. The largest group involved in diamond mining is made up of independent miners which extract 70% of the diamonds mined in the country. The largest foreign investor is Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group (China) and the Congolaise d'Investissement Minier, another state-owned DRC company. Other mining endeavours in the country do not bring about great profits. The mining of coal lies in the hands of Gécamines, a national concern, while the mining of precious stones is performed by a small number of private exploiters. The same is true with the mining of gold, but the largest gold mine in Ituri province belongs to the RSA companies. Raw niobium, tantalum, tin and tungsten are also mined by independent miners. Modest amounts of oil is extracted by the English-French firm Perenco Oil, and the local firm Congolaise des Hydrocarbures (Cohydro). The Canadian firm Anvil Mining is most involved in the mining of silver while tin is mined by the local company La Société pour le Traitement du Terril de Lubumbashi (STL). An examination of the revenue generated by mining shows that Chinese companies have the upper hand while local companies come in second and in third place companies of South African origins.

Neighbouring Congo is much poorer in natural resources. It possesses primarily oil and diamonds. Petroleum is mainly extracted by the Italian firm Eni and the French firm Total. Thanks to this, these companies comprise the largest firms in the country. The mining of diamonds and gold is totally in the hands of small local enterprises often family owned.

In contrast, Gabon has rich deposits of manganese ore. Mines belong to the French firm Eramet and to Citic Dameng Holdings of China. Petroleum in Gabon is mainly extracted by the Chinese firm Sinopec and the French firm Total. From mining endeavours in Gabon one can assess that the most profits go to Chinese and French firms. Small amounts of gold are mined by the Moroccan concern Managem, by individual miners and small, family firms as well.

Equatorial Guinea's economy is dependent upon the exploitation of petroleum and natural gas. In addition, small amounts of gold are extracted by local miners. Natural gas is extracted mainly by the American company Marathon Oil and petroleum by Exxon Mobil (USA). Neighbouring islands of St. Thomas and Principe escape mention here, since they do not possess a mining sector.

In Cameroon mined resources include petroleum, gold and diamonds. Gold and diamonds are generally extracted by local miners and firms. Petroleum however is exploited by the state-owned Société National des Hydrocarbures. It is worth noting that among African nations, Cameroon has remained independent of neo-colonial attempts at seizing its mineral riches through foreign investments.

Neighbouring Nigeria boasts of rich oil deposits, with the Niger Delta Basin hosting the largest number of oil wells on both land and sea in Africa. Nigeria owns 40 percent of these reserves through the NNPC (state-owned company), while more than half are owned and operated by foreign corporations, mainly from the USA (Chevron, ExxonMobil, Esso), France (Total), Netherlands (Shell, Phillips) and from Italy (Agip). Natural gas comprises Nigeria's second most exploited natural resource. 40 percent of profits from natural gas is in Nigerian hands through the NNPC. The largest foreign exploiter is the USA by the American companies mentioned above. Fewer profits are gained through the mining of other raw materials in Nigeria. Coal mining is in the hands of the French company Lafarge, while iron ore is mined by the Nigerian Treasury Enterprise. Mines of lead, zinc, niobium and tantalum are operated by private, Nigerian businesses. Gold, tin and precious stones are extracted by informal, local entities. Thus Nigeria does profit from the mining of its raw materials, but a

large percentage of the profits go to the USA as well as to other countries.

Located next, Benin does not conduct any mining, but neighbouring Togo has developed a mining sector. The most important source of profits in the sector derives from the extraction of phosphates, which remain in national hands. A second source of profits comes from the mining of gold and diamonds, mostly by individuals at the local level. The only iron mine in Togo is in the hands of a private local firm.

Ghana, known in colonial times as the Gold Coast, earns the most income through the mining of gold. The government owns 10% of the activity in this sector. The Canadian firms Golden Star Resources, Keegan Resources and Kinross Gold, are the most active of the Gold Coast Basin firms. Near equivalent profits are had however by the South African firms of AngloGold Ashanti and Gold Fields along with the American firm Newmont Mining. Australian and British firms also play a role in this sector. The second source of earning in Ghana's mining industry is in the mining of manganese ore. The owner of a vast mine of this type is the British firm Consolidated Minerals. The mining of bauxite is conducted by the Chinese firm Bosai Group. Diamonds and precious stones are mined from small deposits, their extraction being conducted by locals. The British company Tullore Oil, the main firm of a consortium of companies, is primarily responsible for the extraction of petroleum from the ocean shelf. Salt is produced from the ocean by a private Ghanaian co-ops. After summarization the largest profits from Ghana's mining sector goes to Canadian and South African firms. American and British firms also earn a large share.

The Ivory Coast earns much less from mining than does Ghana, with the most frequently mined material being gold. The majority of the gold in this country is mined by the British-South African firm Randgold and by the Australian firm Newcrest Mining. The second most profitable area of the Ivory Coast mining industry is found in the exploitation of petroleum from the shelf of the Bay of Guinea. Dominating the scene in this endeavour is the Canadian company Canadian Natural Resources and the state-owned Société Nationale d'Operations Pétrolières de la Côte d'Ivoire. Ivory Coast also has two mines of

manganese. First one belongs to the state-owned Société pour le Développement Minier (SDM), and to the China National Geological and Mining Corp., second to Dharni Group of India. Profits from Ivorian mining production go mostly to five countries: UK, Canada, Australia, RSA and to state-owned corporations of Ivory Coast. The rest has minor share.

In Liberia, at present the most important material being mined is gold. The largest mine for the extraction of gold is conducted by the Canadian firm Aureus Mining. Large amounts of diamonds and gold are extracted by independent locals. The second most often mined material is iron ore. One such mine is owned by ArcelorMittal, an international concern with capital largely garnered from India. A second such mine, a much smaller one, is operated by Wuhan Iron and Steel (WISCO) from China. Barite in Liberia is mined by the Swiss firm Steinbock Minerals. The majority of profits from mining in Liberia remains in Canadian and Indian hands.

In Sierra Leone the most important material mined is iron ore. Its extraction is under the auspices of African Minerals, a British firm, and Shandong Iron and Steel Group of China. The mining of diamonds is conducted by the Israeli firm Beny Steinmetz Group and is the most profitable mining endeavour in Sierra Leone. Bauxite is mined by Vimetco from Netherlands and titanium by Iluka Resources from Australia. The latter comprises the second most profitable mining firm in Sierra Leone.

Mining in Guinea is dominated by the exploitation of bauxite, with significant share owned by the Russian firm Rusal. The government of Guinea however owns most of the shares in this area of the country's mining industry. In the mining of diamonds, the company Buona International, a national firm excels. Gold is mined in Guinea mainly by the South African firm, AngloGold Ashanti and a few other foreign firms, in addition to local miners. More than half of the profits from mining in Guinea go to foreign investors, the largest of which are Russian Rusal and AngloGold Ashanti. Nearby Guinea Bissau, Gambia, and the Republic of Cabo Verde, do not possess a developed mining sector on the industrial level as part of their economies.

The next nation to be mentioned is that of Senegal. Mining in this country centres around the mining of phosphates. This mining endeavour is in the hands of three Indian entities, The Archean Group, The Indian Government and The Indian Farmer's Fertilizer Cooperative. The Government of Senegal also plays a role. The mining of gold in Senegal, is conducted primarily by Teranga Gold of Canada. Senegal also mines deposits of titanium and salt. Indian and Canadian investment plays the most important role in the mining industry in Senegal.

The nation of Mauritania possesses rich deposits of iron ore. It is exploited by government firms in cooperation with investors largely from Arab countries. The second most important material mined in Mauritania is gold. The owners of such mines are the Canadian firms Kinross Gold and First Quantum Minerals: the second of which also operates copper mines. Mauritania also exploits petroleum in which the Malaysian firm Petroliaam Nasional Berhad plays a major role. Rock salt is also mined with the national firm Société Mauritanienne des industries du Sel dominating. Mauritania holds most profits from its mines.

In Mali, despite recent civil war, the mining of diamonds and phosphates continues. In the mining of gold, six main corporations have made investments in the industry. More than half of the gold extracted is by Randgold (Britain/RSA). The remaining companies involved are listed according to profits: Resolute Mining (Australia), Anglo Gold Ashanti (RSA), Endeavor Mining (UK), Iamgold (Canada), and Avneel Gold Mining (UK). One phosphate mine is operated in the country by Toguna Groupe, a Malaysian corporation. Britain and South Africa profit the most from the mining sector in Mali.

Mining in Burkina Faso is concentrated upon the extraction of gold. The largest investor is the Russian Company, Nord Gold, two Canadian companies Iamgold and Semafo, as well as the British firm Avocet and Endeavour Mining. Zinc, lead and silver mine is owned by the Swiss/RSA firm Glencore Xstrata. The mining of manganese is in government hands as is 10 percent of mining for gold. Russia and Canada are the countries which reap the most profits from the mining industry in Burkina Faso.

To a large extent the mining sector in Niger is nationalized. The most important material mined is uranium of which one third belongs to the Société de Patrimoine des Mines du Niger (SOPAMIN), a governmental entity. The mining of coal belongs entirely to the Nigérienne de Charbon (SONICHAR). The French company Areva is the largest foreign company exploiting uranium. Japanese and Spanish firms also hold shares in this endeavour. The exploitation of petroleum in Niger is of lesser importance and is in the hands of the Chinese. Phosphates are mined by Malaysia. Foreign companies dominate half of the profits stemming from mining in Niger, with Areva being the largest.

The nation of Chad possesses few oil reserves, Sinopec (China) and Esso (USA) dominate in its exploitation. The government along with the companies Glencore and Petronas also play a lesser role. The mining of gold also exists in Chad but not on an industrial level. The same is true with the neighbouring Central African Republic, where civil war is still taking place.

In Sudan, mining is conducted in the area of gold, petroleum and chromium ore. More than 90% of the gold mined is in the hands of individual exploiters. The largest gold mines on an industrial level is in Jebel Amir. Remaining mines are in governmental hands. The exploitation of oil in Sudan is dominated by the Chinese firm Sinopec, although a few other foreign firms play a role, along with the government of Sudan. The mining of chromium ore is entirely in governmental hands. Other raw materials mined, such as mica and manganese are also in the hands of the government. The mining of salt is conducted by a company from the United Arab Emirates. Most of the profits from the mining industry in Sudan are in Chinese hands.

In South Sudan the only raw material mined on the industrial level is petroleum. Sinopec of China is responsible for 40% of oil production. The second largest firm in oil production is the Malaysian firm Petronas Carigali Overseas Shd. Bhd. The third largest such firm is ONGC Videsh of India. In addition, gold is mined in South Sudan to a minimal degree by individual locals.

The mining industry in Ethiopia has access to many varying raw material of which gold is the most profitable. Most of the gold in this country is mined by individual locals. The only large gold mine is operated by Midroc, an interesting Swedish/Yemeni/Ethiopian firm. The exploitation of brown coal is in the hands of Ethiopian firms such as Delbi Coal Mining Share, as is the mining of silver. The mining of precious stones as well as salt is conducted according to traditional methods, by individuals and family-run firms. This is also true with the mining of platinum. The majority of profits from the

Fig. 2. Profits largest shareholders of mining in Africa



Source: author's elaboration based on latest data from many available companies reports and governmental sources.

mining sector in Ethiopia remains in Ethiopian hands, with capital from Sweden and Yemen also playing a role.

A small number of mines in Eritrea produce finds of gold, copper, zinc and salt. The mining of gold earns the most profits. The Chinese company China Shanghai Corporation for Foreign and Technological Cooperation operates one large mine. Salt is mined by local, private firms. The mining of silver, copper and zinc are confined to one mine of which the owner is Nevsun Resources of Canada. Profits earned in Eritrea is not much more than that brought in by China. In neighbouring Djibouti only salt is mined according to traditional methods. It is also the case in Somalia. Here individual miners extract small amounts of beryl and other precious stones. While this article touches mostly upon the subject of the mining sector of Sub-Saharan Africa countries, fig. 2 also presents information in this light of the remaining countries of the African continent.

DEPENDENCE BASED ON ARMS SALES

Neo-imperialism as a geopolitical problem, differs somewhat from neo-colonialism (Meyer 1989; Okeke, Cilliers, Schoeman 2018) and enjoys great interest as a subject of inquiry and study. Much has been written on the subject by experts at the beginning of the twenty first century, especially in the context of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Ikegami 2011; James 2008). The creation of dependency of weaker nations upon the world's major powers through the sale of armaments has played an important role upon the African continent. In this section of this article, the direction of arms trade as concerns the countries of the Sub-Saharan region will be analyzed, all with the goal of establishing which world powers are attempting to create dependency among its weaker African counterparts through deliveries of ammunition, explosives, military training and the signing of agreements of cooperation. At the conclusion, an analysis will be offered, resembling the visuals presented above on fig. 2.

In order to accomplish this, statistics available from the Stockholm Research Institute (SIPRI),⁶ concerning the armament of the countries to be analyzed will serve as stepping stones. Only the armaments and worth of contracts were taken into account, excluding the costs of ammunition, consumables and changeable parts as well as small weapons in order to reach conclusions. On this basis it was possible to create a list of the main suppliers of arms. The analysis was limited to the years 1999-2019. Reciprocal production was not taken into account. Instead of a detailed description, due to text volume reduction need, statistics are provided in table 3.

Table 3. Major suppliers of military equipment to Sub-Saharan states in 1999-2019 period

Country	Supplier	Contracts	Classes of military equipment bought
Angola	1) Belarus	15	aircraft, artillery, IFV ⁷ , tanks, rocket launchers
	2) Russia	8	aircraft
	3) Bulgaria	8	artillery, tanks, APC, ⁸ rocket launchers
	4) Ukraine	5	IFV, aircraft, APC
	5) Slovakia	4	aircraft, tanks
	6) other	35	artillery, aircraft, naval ships, rocket launchers, APC, IFV, radar systems
Benin	1) Belgium	3	aircraft, aircraft, APC
	2) France	2	aircraft, naval ships
	3) other	2	APC
Botswana	1) France	7	aircraft, APC, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft systems
	2) USA	3	aircraft
	3) other	9	tanks, APC, aircraft, anti-aircraft systems
Burkina Faso	1) Russia	3	aircraft, anti-aircraft systems
	2) France	3	APC, aircraft
	3) RSA	3	APC
	4) other	14	artillery, aircraft, APC, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft systems
Burundi	1) USA	2	APC
	2) Ukraine	2	APC, aircraft
	3) other	2	APC
Cabo Verde Rep.	1) Netherlands	1	naval ships
	2) other	3	aircraft
Cameroon	1) China	8	aircraft, anti-aircraft systems, artillery, APC, IFV, radar systems, naval ships, anti-tank guns, aircraft
	2) Israel	7	artillery, APC
	3) USA	6	aircraft, APC, UAV ⁹
	4) other	16	naval ships, aircraft, APC, artillery
Central African Rep.	1) USA	1	aircraft
	2) other	2	APC, aircraft
Chad	1) Ukraine	12	aircraft, APC, IFV, aircraft, anti-aircraft systems
	2) China	5	rocket launchers, APC
	3) France	4	APC
	4) other	16	APC, artillery, aircraft
Comoros	1) Brazil	1	aircraft
	2) Ukraine	1	aircraft
Congo	1) RSA	6	aircraft, naval ships, APC

⁶ SIPRI, 'Arms Transfer Database', <<https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>> (12 February 2021).

⁷ Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

⁸ Armoured Personnel Carriers.

⁹ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

	2) other	9	artillery, APC, rocket launchers, aircraft, naval ships
DRC	1) Ukraine	16	artillery, APC, aircraft, IFV, tanks, rocket launchers
	2) other	7	aircraft, artillery, APC
Djibouti	1) USA	4	APC
	2) China	3	aircraft, naval ships
	3) other	6	aircraft, naval ships, artillery, APC
Eritrea	1) Bulgaria	7	artillery, APC, tanks
	2) other	9	anti-aircraft systems, rocket launchers, aircraft, radar systems
Eswatini (formerly Suazi)	1) RSA	2	APC, aircraft
	2) Taiwan	1	aircraft
Ethiopia	1) Russia	12	artillery, aircraft, anti-aircraft systems
	2) China	5	rocket launchers, artillery, anti-aircraft systems, APC
	3) other	16	aircraft, tanks, APC, artillery, radar systems, anti-tank guns
Gabon	1) China	6	rocket launchers, APC, IFV
	2) RSA	3	aircraft, APC
	3) other	4	APC, aircraft, IFV
Gambia	1) Taiwan	1	naval ships
	2) Georgia	1	aircraft
Ghana	1) China	9	artillery, rocket launchers, aircraft, naval ships, APC, IFV
	2) Russia	3	aircraft
	3) RSA	3	IFV, APC
	4) other	14	aircraft, APC, naval ships
Guinea	1) RSA	2	APC
	2) France	2	aircraft
	3) Ukraine	2	aircraft
	4) other	5	artillery, aircraft, rocket launchers, APC
Guinea, Equatorial	1) Ukraine	12	aircraft, naval ships, artillery
	2) other	9	naval ships, IFV, aircraft, APC
Ivory Coast	1) Belarus	11	artillery, aircraft, IFV, rocket launchers, APC
	2) Bulgaria	7	anti-aircraft systems, aircraft, artillery
	3) other	11	IFV, tanks, naval ships, UAV, aircraft, APC
Kenya	1) China	6	aircraft, APC, aircraft
	2) USA	5	aircraft, UAV, aircraft
	3) other	16	tanks, aircraft, naval ships, APC, artillery, aircraft
Lesotho	1) France	3	aircraft
	2) Germany	2	aircraft
	3) other	3	aircraft, APC
Madagascar	1) RSA	2	aircraft
	2) France	2	aircraft
Malawi	1) RSA	5	APC
	2) other	1	aircraft
Mali	1) France	6	aircraft, APC, aircraft
	2) Bulgaria	6	APC, aircraft, rocket launchers
	3) RSA	4	APC
	4) other	15	APC, aircraft, artillery
Mauritania	1) China	4	naval ships, aircraft
	2) France	3	APC, aircraft
	3) other	12	aircraft, tanks, naval ships, APC
Mauritius	1) India	4	aircraft, naval ships
	2) Israel	2	radar systems
Mozambique	1) China	2	APC
	2) Russia	2	aircraft
	3) RSA	2	APC
	4) UK	2	APC
	5) other	7	aircraft, naval ships
Namibia	1) China	8	anti-aircraft systems, aircraft, APC, IFV, naval ships
	2) other	11	APC, naval ships, aircraft, radar systems
Niger	1) USA	5	aircraft, APC
	2) France	4	aircraft, APC
	3) other	8	aircraft, APC
Nigeria	1) Italy	9	artillery, aircraft
	2) Ukraine	9	APC, IFV, aircraft, artillery, tanks
	3) France	8	naval ships, aircraft
	4) USA	7	naval ships, aircraft
	5) Russia	7	aircraft
	6) China	6	aircraft, naval ships, APC, UAV
	7) RSA	4	APC, naval ships

	8) other	26	aircraft, naval ships, APC, IFV, rocket launchers, tanks, UAV, artillery
RSA	1) France	6	rocket launchers, radar and sonar systems
	2) Germany	5	naval ships, torpedoes, rocket launchers
	3) other	6	IFV, radar systems, aircraft, satellite
Rwanda	1) China	3	artillery, APC
	2) RSA	3	APC, IFV
	3) Israel	3	rocket launchers, artillery, tanks
Senegal	4) other	7	aircraft, radar systems, APC
	1) France	15	aircraft, naval ships, artillery, APC, radar systems, anti-aircraft systems
	2) RSA	6	APC, IFV
	3) Indonesia	4	aircraft
Seychelles	4) other	20	naval ships, APC, artillery, aircraft, rocket launchers
	1) India	6	naval ships, aircraft, radar systems
	2) China	2	aircraft, naval ships
	3) other	2	radar systems, naval ships
Sierra Leone	1) China	3	naval ships, artillery, APC
	2) Ukraine	2	aircraft
	3) RSA	1	APC
Somalia	1) UAE	2	APC
	2) other	8	APC., aircraft
Sudan	1) China	15	tanks, aircraft, IFV, anti-aircraft systems, rocket launchers, UAV
	2) Belarus	15	tanks, rocket launchers, artillery, IFV, APC, aircraft
	3) Russia	13	IFV, aircraft
	4) Ukraine	11	aircraft, IFV, tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, APC
	5) other	16	aircraft, IFV, APC, tanks, UAV, rocket launchers
Sudan, South	1) UAE	2	APC
	2) Ukraine	2	rocket launchers, tanks
	3) Russia	2	aircraft
	4) other	2	APC, aircraft
Tanzania	1) China	14	aircraft, APC, tanks, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft systems, radar systems, naval ships
	2) other	10	aircraft, APC, radar systems
Togo	1) France	4	APC, naval ships, aircraft
Uganda	1) RSA	7	APC
	2) Russia	5	aircraft, tanks, IFV
	3) USA	5	aircraft, APC
	4) Ukraine	5	aircraft, IFV, APC
	5) other	21	aircraft, artillery, APC, rocket launchers, tanks
Zambia	1) China	8	aircraft, APC
	2) Italy	4	aircraft
	3) other	5	UAV, aircraft, APC, IFV
Zimbabwe	1) China	5	APC, IFV, aircraft
	2) other	7	artillery, APC, aircraft

Source: author's research mostly based on data from SIPRI, 'Arms Transfer Database'.

In conclusion, it is of value to note that the bulk of armaments received by the countries mentioned are second-hand. Often they are presented without charge or at a lower cost. These arms then, serve to combat various rebel groups, who could threaten the interests of the specific world powers presented, in the preceding pages of this article. This analysis did not take into account the delivery of arms for light combat, but their costs in the wider picture of things is marginal.

The countries in question can be divided into five groups. The most stable are those countries which possess their own industrial production of arms. Only the RSA belongs to this

category. Even though the RSA produces its own armaments, it also imports a percentage of arms. To the second group belong those countries which have diversified their sources of armaments in case of arms embargos or worsening relations with the country of supply. To the third group belong countries which purchase arms only from a few suppliers. The fourth group is made up of countries who purchase their arms only from one provider. To the fifth group belong countries which in the past 20 years have made no arms purchases. To this group belong the countries such as Liberia, The Islands of St. Thomas and Principe and Guinea Bissau. The graphical presentation of results represents a synthesis of these statistics (fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Main suppliers of arms for African Countries



Source: author's elaboration based on data from SIPRI, 'Arms Transfer Database'.

While examining this issue, it is important to differentiate between Russia and the now defunct USSR/Warsaw Pact. By taking into account of USSR arms sales with Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian arms sales taken in sum, one can conclude that Russian neo-imperialism has been a dominant force upon the Sub-Saharan countries of Africa.

CONCLUSIONS AND CURRENT NEO-COLONIAL AND NEO-IMPERIAL POWERS IN AFRICA

At the beginning of this article two questions were posed. The first addressed the question of neo-colonial influences in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results of above analysis show that it is not China who owns the largest share in the mining industry of the region, and thus can not be considered the most neo-colonial power in Africa

Of utmost importance is the exploitation of raw materials related to energy production in the region. The largest deposits of petroleum and natural gas in the region are found on the coast of the Bay of Guinea. The main exploiter of these two raw materials in Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola is the United States. Thus it is the USA which should be considered the largest neo-colonial power on the African Sub-Saharan region. It is true that large deposits of raw materials in the region is under the control of Chinese interests, especially in Sudan and South Sudan along with the mining of various metals in the DRC and Gabon, but it is important to recognize the influence of the countries belonging to the British Commonwealth including Australia and Canada. To treat the nations of the British Commonwealth and its shared capital investments as an integrated entity is more than justified, since this commonwealth of countries taken together occupy second place on the list of neo-colonialists. Dominating in this are the countries of Liberia, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda. The Republic of South Africa also wields neo-colonial influence in the region. The capital of the RSA dominates in Mali and Ghana. This places the RSA in

fourth position as a neo-colonial power. The next country of the greatest neo-colonial influence is France. Aside from these countries, additional nations which wield neo-colonial power in the Sub-Saharan Region are: Russia, India, Italy, Israel and Ireland. The main neo-colonialist countries then, in the order of profits are:

- 1) USA,
- 2) British Commonwealth (UK, Australia, Canada),
- 3) China,
- 4) South Africa,
- 5) France.

Other countries of influence although not playing a leading role in the region are: Brazil, Malaysia, Morocco and Singapore. There are very few countries of the region which have not relinquished control over their lands and raw materials for exploitation. Such countries as Maghreb countries, Cameroon, Kenya, Ethiopia, Botswana, Burundi and first and foremost the Republic of South Africa have maintained independence in this regard.

By examining the purchasing of armaments by analysed countries one can see that the most neo-colonial influence in this regard is wielded by China. Seven nations have become dependent on armaments from China including: Tanzania, Cameroon, Zambia, Mozambique, Gabon, South Sudan, and Sierra Leone. China is the second largest source of arms sales for many other countries. Also seven countries have obligated themselves to receive post-Soviet armaments from the Russian Federation as well as from the former USSR republics. These countries are: Algeria, DRC, Angola, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea. A insightful analysis shows a close rivalry in this regard between China and Russia, with neither country taking first place.

The third place power dominating the region in arms sales is the RSA, which possesses its own well developed arms production industry, while remaining a non-nuclear power. Countries taking arms from the RSA are: Mozambique, Ghana, Guinea, Uganda, Malawi and Eswatini. French capital is in fourth place as concerns neo-imperialistic influence in arms sales. Purchasing countries include: Senegal, Mali, Togo, Botswana and Lesotho. Arms sales by the USA finds itself in

fifth place, dominating more the northern regions of the African continent, activity which if taken into account would find itself in first place in arms sales on the continent as a whole. Apparently Sub-Saharan Africa is not an alluring market for the USA as far as arms sales are concerned. The USA dominate only in Niger, The Republic of Central Africa, Burundi and Djibouti. Thus the five most dominant countries in arms sales in the Sub-Saharan region in order of their degree of influences are:

- 1) China,
- 2) Russia,
- 3) South Africa,
- 4) France,
- 5) USA.

Also nations having a dominant role in arms sales in at least one country of the region, in order of ranking are: India, Netherlands, Belgium, Brazil and Taiwan. Also one could include the following countries who play a large role in the export of arms, but who do not play a dominant role. Such countries include: Israel, Germany, UK, Italy and the UAE.

Political decisions play the dominant role in this ranking. It is obvious that much time and effort is needed to develop an armament industry, so weaker, less developed countries depend on imports. The only nation on the African continent able to satisfy the needs of its own armed forces is the RSA. The number of analysed countries which diversify their sources for arms supplies are very few, however to the list of exceptions in this regard includes the countries of Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Kenya, Somalia, Burkina Faso, Congo and Mauritania.

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