

POLISH GEOPOLITICAL SOCIETY



European Journal of Geopolitics

THE ANNUAL OF GEOPOLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PUBLISHED BY POLISH GEOPOLITICAL SOCIETY

**No. 6
2018**

6

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Publisher

Polish Geopolitical Society
(Polskie Towarzystwo Geopolityczne)
ul. mjr Łupaszki 7/26
Kraków, Poland
www.ptg.edu.pl

ISSN: 2353-8554

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Olga Wasiuta, Sergiusz Wasiuta¹

ASYMMETRIC AND HYBRID GEOPOLITICAL THREATS

Abstract:

In the paper the authors draw attention to shortcomings in understanding the complexity of the contemporary warfare. The military conflicts of a completely new type have evolved. At present, the debates are held on future threats which are often defined as a dichotomous choice between fighting terrorists or insurgents and traditional war. Nowadays, all forms of warfare are used, even simultaneously. These kinds of mixed threats are often called asymmetric or hybrid. Hybrid threats include a range of various means of warfare which refer to standard armory, conventional weaponry, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist attacks (coercive measures and violence) as well as criminal behavior used in the combat zone to achieve the political goals. Joint hybrid means are used to gain an asymmetric advantage over the enemy. These types of wars are concealed and waged mainly in political, economic and information spheres.

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Key words: asymmetric threats, hybrid threats, asymmetric advantage, new generation warfare, hybrid warfare, *proxy* warfare.

Contemporary conflicts in Asia, especially the Russian invasion on Ukraine prove shortcomings in understanding the complexity of contemporary war. Traditional wars in which states or their coalitions participate on both sides are gradually losing their meaning. The armed conflicts of new type have evolved. Moreover, our culture and understanding of war do not help stabilize the situation between Russia and Ukraine and fight insurgents successfully (Wasiuta O. 2016).

At present, the debates are held on future threats which are often defined as a dichotomous choice between fighting terrorists or insurgents and traditional war. However, instead of enemies applying basically different approaches, we should expect all forms of warfare to be used, even simultaneously. These kinds of mixed threats are often called asymmetric or hybrid. Hybrid threats include a range of various means of warfare which refer to standard armory, conventional weaponry, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist attacks (coercive measures and violence) as well as criminal behavior used in the combat zone to achieve the political goals.² Joint hybrid means are used to gain an asymmetric advantage over the enemy.

² *The origins of the concept of a hybrid war*. Electronic journal «The Bell», 28 Feb. 2015

These types of wars are concealed and waged mainly in political, economic and information spheres.

The attention of strategists has been drawn to a new form of threat to security, an irregular, armed aggression below the open war threshold. It has become a serious challenge for state authorities, defense systems responsiveness and decision-making processes of international security institutions. It is impossible to analyze any warfare without considering political context and many areas of human interactions beyond a military area.

Warfare was, is and will be in the nearest future a sad part of states activity. The Swiss, Jean-Jacques Babel counted that since 3500 B.C. mankind has lived without wars only 292 years. Over this period there have been 14,550 big and small wars during which 3. 66 billion people died of hunger, plague and other causes (Малышева 2005). Analyzing the history of warfare over this whole period of human existence it should be pointed out that the higher military art has always been about defeating the enemy, complete all military tasks without engaging the army (Сенченко 2009).

The efforts of many philosophers, since the Ancient Times (Sun Tzu, Heraclites, Appian) the Renaissance (N. Machiavelli), the Industrial Era (Carl von Clausewitz, A. Jomini) and the Modernity (B. Alexander, M. Gareev, M. Davey. M. Martin van Creveld, W. Slipchenko, A. Toffler, William H. Hofmeister), were undertaken to

identify, describe and justify crucial features of war and its changing content and shapes.

In geopolitics the nature of controlled chaos warfare is about geopolitical destruction of a state – prey, neutralization its geopolitical features – the size of its territory, number of population, a status on the international stage, economic capacity, military power, complete capacity.

The result of the Russian Federation activities, during 2014 the global and regional security system as well as present international legal system was completely distorted. The terms antiterrorist operation (ATO) and “hybrid warfare” are not the answer to a question what is happening in Ukraine – considering the annexation of Crimea and acts of war in Donbas with all possible weapon used except nuclear one. Thus, there is no answer also to other important questions: What should Ukraine do in the light of the international law and the Ukrainian Constitution? What should Ukraine expect from the international community?

From the international law perspective nobody can provide Ukraine with military support, because if there is no war on Ukrainian territory caused by aggression of another country but only the civil war or conflict, nobody is entitled to intervene from outside. That is the reason why Putin advocates the term “internal civil conflict in Ukraine”, which blocks possibility of any military support for Ukraine, including weapon.

Almost all international security warranties for Ukraine (including the Budapest Memorandum) have proved to be useless when the aggressor became one of the guarantors – the Russian Federation. Neither the leaders of the Old Continent nor their citizens are fully aware of the fact that the aggression against Ukraine is an indirect aggression against European Union and its values. Putin's regime is based on the rule of power, which is demonstrated with repressions, and outside borders – with aggression. Yet, he manages to achieve – at least for a short run- a tactic advantage over the EU and the United States, which try to avoid military confrontation by any means. Violating treaty obligations Russia took over Crimea and set up separatist enclaves in the eastern Donbas. Gaining control over strategic points on the peninsula and in the eastern Ukraine by the Russian special forces was followed by a propaganda campaign of a few years.

The sense of insecurity evoked by open and long borders strengthened an attachment to the army and its almost mythologic role. The strong connection between prestige of the state and the prestige of the army retained and the military goals were more important than any other. The difficult geopolitical position and neighboring different civilizational circles gave the syndrome of the "Siege mentality" (Гомар 2006). The traces of this policy are still present.

The European Union and the Great Britain made “catastrophic mistakes” while interpreting mood of the Moscow Kremlin before the crisis in Ukraine and entered this crisis “like sleepwalkers” announced Christopher Tugendhat, the leader of the EU Commission of the House of Lords in the Report of the British parliamentary commission published in February 2015.

The Report concludes that EU did not realize how deep is Russia’s hostility towards Brussels plans on deepening relations with Ukraine. According to the Report the EU - Moscow relations have been long since based on an “optimistic assumption” that Russia is heading towards democratic system. The Great Britain has had an exceptional commitment to Ukraine, as it was one out of four signatories of the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, which guaranteed integrity of the Ukrainian territory in exchange for renouncement of strategic nuclear weapon – the British parliamentary commission claims. In their opinion neither the Great Britain nor the European Union had any strategic plan how to deal with Russia in a long-run.

“New Ukraine” is explicitly pro-European and ready to fight for Europe, fighting for its own independence. The support for Ukraine is the most beneficial investment for the European Union. Ukraine could even help revive the spirit of unity and common welfare, which underlies the EU. To cut it short, saving Ukraine the Union could save itself.

Adam D. Rotfeld, a former minister of foreign affairs, deputy chairperson of the Polish – Russian Group for Difficult Matters emphasized that ‘Russia has been preparing itself and has been preparing the world for this conflict for at least seven years – since Putin’s speech in 2007 at the Security Conference in Munich. In spite of this, the West is confounded by these developments to which it did not elaborated an effective response. We have a problem. It amounts to the fact that the very foundation of the international political and legal order has been destroyed. The foundations on which the peace and security of Europe have stood over 70 years after the war.

The head of the British counterintelligence M15 Andrew Parker³ for the first time in the history gave an interview⁴ for “The Guardian”, in which he warned that Russia is a growing threat to the stability of the Great Britain, uses a range of means to attempt to influence the situation inside the United Kingdom. Russia has had spies and agents on the whole territory of Europe long since. “Russia uses all organs and capacity to realize its foreign policy outside the country in an

³ Andrew Parker, the head of M15 since 2013, former Deputy General.

⁴ This has been the first interview of the head of this service in the 100 year history of this service. Till 1939 the identity of secretary general of counterintelligence services was secret, later it was advisable to restrain from public activities and avoid media. The guiding principle was speak as little as possible and speak discretely (Exclusive: : ‘*There will be terrorist attacks in Britain*,’ says MI5 chief. In the first interview of its kind, Andrew Parker talks to the Guardian about the ‘enduring threat’ to the UK, surveillance and greater public understanding,

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/01/andrew-parker-mi5-director-general-there-will-be-terrorist-attacks-in-britain-exclusive?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other

[02.11.2016]

increasingly aggressive way, i.e. using propaganda, spying, subversion and cyberattacks. They operate over whole Europe and also the Great Britain – and it is our task to stand in their way – said A. Parker. Russians have had a lot of traditional spies and agents in Europe for a long time. Yet, the new phenomenon is an increasing importance of cyberwar which aims at military secrets, industrial projects and governmental information about a foreign policy. Russia stands more and more in opposition to the West. It is noticeable, for example in Russia's operation in Russia and Syria – emphasized A. Parker.⁵ Russia has been concealing its desires for decades. The relationship between Russia and the West has got worsen since the Crimea annexation, the war in Ukraine and bombing insurgents' positions in Aleppo to support president of Syria Bashar Assad.⁶

The hybrid warfare changes basic rules, creating an alternative reality, not a new border but an alternative picture. Formally, there is no war and there is no aggression. There are internal conflicts, political fight, crisis management and some cases of armed confrontation. There is no aggressor and aggression. Yet, the Russia's aim is not to

⁵ *Kremlin pours cold water on MI5 chief's claims of Russian threat.* Andrew Parker's warnings of hostile measures against the UK 'do not correspond to reality', says Kremlin, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/01/kremlin-pours-cold-water-on-mi5-chiefs-andrew-parker-claims> [02.11.2016]

⁶ *MI5 head: 'increasingly aggressive' Russia a growing threat to UK.* Exclusive: In first newspaper interview given by a serving spy chief, Andrew Parker talks of terror, espionage and balance between secrecy and privacy, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/31/andrew-parker-increasingly-aggressive-russia-a-growing-threat-to-uk-says-mi5-head> [dostęp 02.11.2016]

change the rules of a hybrid warfare but change the border. And not necessarily on the map. Simply, the formal border loses its significance and the state is not controlled by its government but outside powers. Indirectly, even without combat, but by the consequent informal occupation.

At present, the “hybrid warfare” is considered as many-sided term. Hybridity can refer, first of all, to a military situation and conditions, strategy and tactics of the adversary; to the type of forces which the state should create and maintain.⁷ Hybrid warfare differs from the typical war as it lets the adversary engage simultaneously into many stages and has different expectations of the armed forces.⁸

The main pillars of the Russian hybrid warfare are: aggressor presence, frozen or potential conflicts on the territory of a particular state, victims of the active recruitment of agents of influence and indifference of bureaucracy. At present, we can observe the shift of the borders of the democratic and civilized world from the eastern Ukrainian border to the west. Russia wages the war not against Ukraine but the whole democratic world. Actually, it is the conflict of worldviews, the conflict of scenarios for the social development. Russia failed the economic competition. There are other methods left

⁷ *The origins of the concept of a hybrid war*. Electronic journal «The Bell», 28 Feb. 2015, <http://www.thebellforum.com/showthread.php?t=130013> [28.10.2016]

⁸ А.Демидов, *Управляемый хаос*, Официальный сайт журнала „Стратегия России”, №5, Май 2015, http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/fullnews.php?subaction=showfull&id=1430428108&archive=1430773984&start_from=&ucat=14& [28.10.2016]

to apply: bribery, blackmail, terrorism, manipulation, creating internal conflicts, creating loyal groups of Russian local population and immigrants in the EU countries. Religious, ethnic and social differences are favorable foothold for speculations, recruitment and smoldering conflicts. This is what we call today “hybrid warfare”.

Russian hybrid warfare has questioned a traditional idea of unified, free and peaceful Europe and important institutions supporting this idea – NATO and the European Union. Hybrid warfare is often interpreted as something new, but most of its elements occurred and were used almost in all wars in the past. Cohesion and consolidation of these elements, their dynamics and flexibility when applied are exceptional. And additionally, the information component plays a special role, has become as independent and as important as military component. It ensures various levels of operating and creates conditions to claim the war a just war for their own society. That is the reason why Russian annexation of Crimea and aggression in the east Ukraine have become an impulse to analyze and estimate the phenomenon of the contemporary “hybrid warfare”.

The western military theories of the 20th century offered various concepts of future warfare. The so-called concept of proxy war was defined for the first time in 1964 by Karl Deutsch, who considered this war an international conflict, which is apparently an internal conflict, fought between two powers on the territory of the third party-state. In Deutsch opinion proxy war uses the social capacity,

resources and territory of the state in a civil war as the tool to achieve the strategic goals of the external parties (Deutsch 1964). The above quoted definition reflects the context of the cold war, when two superpowers with the nuclear weapon at their disposal avoided a direct confrontation transferring it to the territories of "The Third World" (Mumford 2013; Bryjka 2016).

Whereas, Andrew Mumford identifies four crucial changes in the nature of the contemporary warfare and claims that these changes indicate the potential increasing engagement of states in the proxy strategies. These kinds of wars are the logical activity on the international stage of states, which aim at achieving their strategic goals and avoiding direct, costly and bloody wars at the same time. The author defines the proxy wars as a conflict in which the third party intervenes indirectly to influence the strategic outcome for the benefit of the supported coalition. He also emphasizes that they were ubiquitous in the past but are not thoroughly studied. As one time the president Dwight David Eisenhower stated proxy warfare are "the cheapest insurance in the world".

In spite of the rich expert literature a lot of questions are still unanswered and a dynamic political reality brings new factual material every day modifying challenges, repealing old and creating new threats. Before the term "hybrid warfare" was coined, the terms "asymmetric threats", "asymmetric conflict", "asymmetric warfare" were used.

So, in December 2000 the CIA Report “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts” was released.⁹ It listed, among threats of the 21st century, “asymmetric threats” – a hidden war in which state and nonstate adversaries avoid direct engagement, methods of cyberwarfare are used by economically weak countries, well military organized communities or unconventional delivery of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The interactions between terrorists, narco-business and organized criminal groups which will have better access to information, technologies, finances and sophisticated techniques of deception and manipulation will strengthen. This asymmetric approach adapted by states or non-state actors will dominate in most of threats.

The concept of “asymmetric warfare” was introduced by American strategist in the 1970s. during the analysis of the USA war operations in Vietnam. The British researcher of international relations Andrew J.R. Mack, was the first who explained the term “asymmetric warfare” in 1975. Influenced by the results of the freshly ended Vietnam war he presented 7 types of asymmetry, which can be applied in the limited conflicts (Mack 1975).

Gradually the stress in interpretation of terms is being shifted which is reflected by usage of stable words “asymmetric threats”. The Report of the American secretary of defense in the Bill Clinton William

⁹ *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts*, <http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/globaltrends2015/> [27.10.2016]

Cohen's administration released in 1997 concludes that "the USA conventional military capacity can generate among adversaries the pursuit of asymmetric capabilities against USA forces [...] They will try to gain the advantage over the USA with nonconventional measures to minimize US strengths and exploit perceived US weaknesses. Strategically, trying to avoid a direct military confrontation with the USA an aggressor will use means like terrorism, threat to use a bacteriologic, nuclear or chemical weapon, information warfare or ecological subversion, instead. If forced to start a conventional war with the USA, the aggressor will probably use asymmetric means to prevent the USA access to strategic assets". This Report was wildly quoted and in subsequent documents the definition of the asymmetric strategy of warfare which can be used by the USA adversaries, almost literary included all the issues from the Report by W. Cohen. In 1998 W. Cohen noticed a paradox that in a new strategic environment the American military advantage really increases the risk of nuclear, biological, chemical attacks in the asymmetric threats.¹⁰ In that context asymmetric conflict (asymmetric warfare) applies to blackmail when a weak actor threatens with using WMD against civilians of the adversary state. In the Review of Common Strategies of 1999 asymmetry is defined as an attempt to weaken or destroy USA strength exploiting USA weaknesses with methods that significantly

¹⁰ William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, May 1997, <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/qdr97.pdf> [11.03.2016]

vary from those the USA expects". In the report by the USA secretary of defense Robert Gates¹¹ (February 2010) the term asymmetry is applied with the same meaning. Asymmetric defines strategy and tactics chosen by the USA adversaries with poorer military and security capabilities. From this point of view asymmetric is an antonym of "conventional", "normal" or "traditional" in the definitions of threats, attacks and military operations.

The issue of asymmetric threats, military strategies and operations is actively studied in research centers at war colleges and higher education institutions in the USA¹² and in the professional magazines. One of the first works of this series "Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be defeated?" was published in 1998. The book analyses the USA military-technological successes and a changing character of warfare, terrorism, information warfare and possibilities of asymmetric warfare¹³.

The Report Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts by Institute of Strategic Studies

¹¹ R.Meinhart, *Strategic planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs Of Staff, 1990 to 2005*. April 2006, <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0604meinhart.pdf>; R.M. Meinhart, *Joint strategic planning system insights: chairmen. fs of staff 1990 to 2012*. June 2013. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/ssi_meinhart.pdf [10.03.2016]

¹² R.Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review*. February 2010, p. 80, 87. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/qdr-2010.pdf> [10.02.2016]

¹³ *Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (SSI)*, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/> [10.03.2016]

identifies two kinds of asymmetry – positive and negative. Positive asymmetry gives the USA the military advantage whereas negative symmetry is when the adversaries direct their attacks against the USA defenseless and weak points. As the Report has rightly remarked there is nothing new in this interpretation from the point of view of war theories, simply the word asymmetric has not been used to describe these situations.¹⁴

Russia attributes the creation of hybrid warfare to Americans because it matches the popularized image of the USA as the world imperialist and aggressor. However, Russia out went the United States. Following the Kremlin logic, Russia “controls American aggression” in the world, which is the mechanism of the colorful revolutions”. And the aggression against Ukraine confirms this view. From the Kremlin perspective it was not Russia which started the war with Ukraine. It is the USA and the West which use aggression against “Russian peace” (русский мир) so Russia prevents hybrid warfare by force using all possible means. Russian version of hybrid warfare is about opposing the American warfare and its variations in a form of “colorful revolutions”. However, this explanation is an aggressor camouflaging. Actually, the reality and the beginnings of hybrid technologies of warfare are a bit different.

¹⁴ *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be defeated?* Ed. by Lloyd J. Matthews. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (1998), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub230.pdf> [15.02.2016]

A lot of generals, analysts and “strategists” surprised by the Russian activity in Crimea and in the east Ukraine try to explain their previous “peaceful” analysis with the Russia implementing completely new methods and classify them as “hybrid warfare”. Meanwhile, Russia explicitly tries to prove that their tactics of 2014 have been used in the world since long – by western countries among others. “Myth of hybrid war” by a head of the Centre of Strategic Analysis and Technology, Ruslan Puchow,¹⁵ published for the first time in the magazine “Независимое военное обозрение” is an especially interesting article. R. Puchow explains various aspects of intermediate and asymmetric methods” and connects them to decisions of the updated Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. This work is interesting not only because of the presented views but also because it shows how small chances the West has, for the time being, to win Russian people’s “souls” in the propaganda war with Kremlin. The main thesis of Puchow’s analysis is that the Russian army did not use any new tactics: neither on Crimea nor later in Ukraine.¹⁶ So, for Russians the theories that “the Ukrainian crisis” is some kind of new form of intervention operations by the Russian Federation – defined in the West as “hybrid warfare”, are not true.

¹⁵ S.Metz, *Asymmetry and U.S. military strategy: definition, background, and strategic concepts*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf> [15.02.2016]

¹⁶ Р.Н.Пухов, *Миф о „гибридной войне”*, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html [dostęp 18.05.2016]

For Russians, the term “hybrid warfare” serves propaganda rather than classification purposes, because while formulating an accurate definition of that concept – the tactics which were to be new, have occurred to be known since long. Puchow noticed that this kind of hybrid warfare is a serious challenge for the NATO because it is in so called “grey area” of the NATO commitments (it is not embraced by the standard definitions of warfare). Russian realized that with adequately arranged operations can – theoretically – cause the political breakdown between NATO members when one of the member state asks for help. According to the author “hybrid wars” have been waged over past decades or even centuries many times, except that earlier they were defined as “low intensity conflicts”. “It is difficult to imagine using the military force without any communication and information systems, economic sanctions, methods of “hidden war”, an attempt to weaken the adversary or exploit conflicts (ethnic, social, economic, political) on the adversary’s territory. This has been the alphabet of every war since the ancient times”. Puchow emphasizes that using regular military force without a nationality designation in the low intensity operations or special operations has a long history and cannot be treated as a new occurrence. The history provides also many examples of using the regular troops disguised as so called “voluntaries”.

At the beginning of March 2016, the new thesis about preparations of “colorful revolutions” in different parts of the former

Soviet Union by the West, occurred in the Russian national security documents. The reasons for that was the closing conference of 27 February 2016, where the commander of the Russian General Staff, general W. Gierasimov confirmed again that the Russian army started to develop methods of hybrid warfare. The characteristics of this conference was a very intensive information campaign on the current situation in media. In his speech general W. Gerasimov talked about the hybrid nature of the contemporary wars. Their integral parts are “colorful revolutions”, cyberattacks, preparatory stages to introduce “soft power”, and using conventional forces in these cases is impossible.¹⁷

The fact that for the Russian Federation “hybrid warfare” have become a dominating way to wage wars for long years, is confirmed in the latest article by general W. Gerasimov “From Syria Experience”. This article defines the main priorities perceived by the Russian Federation as the main goals of the “hybrid warfare” (and how this war is treated – “blitzkrieg of the 21st century”) – to achieve political goals with a minimal military influence on the adversary.¹⁸ However, following the dominating Russian views, Gerasimov attributes all these elements to “the treacherous West”, in spite of the fact that it is an

¹⁷ Представители ВЭС ВКС приняли участие в военно-научной конференции Академии военных наук, <http://www.vesvko.ru/news/article/predstaviteli-ves-vks-prinyali-uchastie-v-voenno-n-15999> [11.06.2016]

¹⁸ „Обычными войсками невозможно воевать”. Герасимов рассказал генералам, как противостоять „гибридным войнам” Запада, <http://www.nakanune.ru/news/2016/3/1/22429056/#sthash.iRu4ro8r.dpuf> [15.05.2016]

obvious psychological method of projection – an unwanted (mainly negative) features are displaced onto an adversary. Gerasimov claims that the “hybrid warfare” should involve mainly destabilization of military and economic capacity of the adversary, information-psychological pressure, active support of internal opposition, subversion and guerilla. He also rightly notices that in the contemporary world what counts is the ability to act effectively and quickly especially in an unusual war environment rather than the size of the military forces, particularly, regarding fast development of non-military methods “integrated application of political, economic and information and other non-military measures with support of military forces”. It is difficult to disagree with one of the most important conclusion: “right now a combination of traditional and hybrid warfare constitutes a distinctive feature of any military conflict. Moreover, the hybrid warfare can be applied without open support of military force whereas the traditional warfare cannot”.¹⁹

It is difficult to define accurately who in Russia is an author of the theory on “hybrid warfare”. Yet, Russia has the precursors of theories on non-conventional warfare. In 1945 George Issaron in his book “New forms of combat” (An essay researching modern war)” emphasized that “War is not declared, it simply starts... Mobilization and concentration do not refer to the beginning of war... but are

¹⁹ В. Герасимов, *По опыту Сирии*, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/29579> [15.05.2016]

imperceptibly and gradually organized long before. Certainly, it is not possible to conceal these operations completely. Any size of concentration will be noticeable. However, there is always one more step between the threat of war and its beginning. This step creates doubts if the real military operations are being prepared or it is only a threat. And, until one party has any doubts, the second is concentrating the army, on the borders no military power is used”.²⁰

Russia has one more modern war theorist - E. Messner, who coined the concept of future wars that would be wars for the soul of the nation rather than territories or resources and psychological agitation and propaganda will be more important than weapon. These wars will be the insurgent wars, *мятежные войны*,²¹ wars of chaos, a dominating form of military conflict in the 21st century, in his opinion (Месснер 2004). Conflicts, in which the explosives are national or social differences and disinformation are actually the psychological wars by nature, waged by fueling tension and propaganda. For “these wars” the most useful are special forces or well-trained units for nonconventional operations. These wars are not resolved by the armed forces at the battle field. In these operations the army is not to deter but threaten civilians and the armed forces of the adversary (Sykulski 2014). In his opinion traditional warfare has been

²⁰ Г.С.Иссерсон, *Новые формы борьбы*, Военгиз, Moskwa 1940, <http://militera.lib.ru/science/isserson/index.html> [18.02.2016]

²¹ И. Ходаков, *Неуслышанный пророк*, http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2010-07-02/15_isserson.html [18.02.2016]

exhausted.” In the past the wars were waged in two-dimensions – in the sea and on the land, later evolved to the third dimension – the air. Now the most important is the fourth dimension – the psyche of the adversaries. The world already lives in this dimension. We talk about the information warfare, but this is actually a psychological warfare because the information flow should give effects in the people’s minds. This is just the aim of the information warfare.

This warfare would be completely different from those known so far – without huge armies, front lines, bombing and mobilization. Small insurgent groups, radical organizations, terrorists, criminal groups, corporations, agents, journalists, non-governmental organizations, propaganda experts, diplomats, financiers and businessmen should play the main role. The aim is to imprison the adversary mentally rather than physically who, when defeated, will realize our goals by themselves.

At war agitation is full of double standards: half of the truth for our people and another half for the adversary. These double standards are not enough – a lot of truths are necessary: on every level of awareness, for every specific practices and customs, inclinations, habits and interests – the special logic, honesty or hypocrisy, knowledgeability and sentimentality.

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries there are a lot of studies on the nature of future military conflicts and wars (Петухов 2004; Панарин 2006; Филатов 2006) - the fourth-generation wars

(sometimes the term *the fifth-generation wars* is used). Describing these wars, the authors drew attention to joining military, information, terrorist and other aggressive operations coordinated from one command and control center and designed to achieve the strategic goal. "The new type of world wars" – wrote Petuchow – use disinformation, i.e. – "war against international terrorism, war against proliferation of WMD, chemical and bacteriological weapon" ..." policy of destroying totalitarian regimes and democratization of the former Eastern Bloc and the Third World countries. Information propaganda causes that the vast majority of the world population does not understand what is really happening. To understand the fourth world war, it is worth referring to E. Messner's methodological instruction:²² "To understand the insurgent wars (*мятежные войны*), that *мятежные войны* are the modern way of warfare it is necessary to dismiss the concepts of warfare defined centuries ago. It is necessary to stop thinking that there is a war when the adversaries are fighting and there is peace – when they are not fighting" (Месснер 2013).

Practically, along with these trends the studies on "asymmetric threats", "asymmetric wars" and "asymmetric conflicts" are

²² Eugenij E. Messner (1891-1974) - professional soldier and military theorist. A [Russian German](#), an officer of the Imperial Russian Army. During the Russian Civil War he sided with the White Movement, notably as the last chief of staff of Kornilov Division of the Army of General Wrangler, professor at Military College in Belgrad, during the WWII collaborated with Nazi Germany. In Russia gained popularity in spite of his hostility towards USSR. (И.В.Домнин, А. Е. Савинкин, *Асимметричное воевание*. В: „Отечественные записки”: журнал, 2005, Nr 5; А.Федорович, *Любимый стратег Путина*, http://www.inoforum.ru/inostrannaya_pressa/lyubimyj_strateg_putina/ [11.01.2016])

commenced. In most cases there are scientific articles and a few monographs.

Larisa Deriglazova has provided the thorough analysis of the nature of the asymmetric conflict in her numerous studies starting from 2005 (Дериглазова 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011). She emphasizes that asymmetry defines paradoxical conflict situations in which the strong adversary is not able to protect themselves and defeat the weak. The author draws attention to main characteristics of asymmetric conflicts:

- Unpredictability of the outcome in spite of the open differences in military capacity and status of adversaries,
- A weak actor applying the strategy of identifying “weaknesses of a strong actor”,
- A weak actor applying the forbidden warfare,
- “Indirect” tactics of a weak actor,
- Inability of a strong actor to defend their position and definitely crush a weak actor (2005).

Military theoreticians S. Czekinov and S. Bogdanov considering L. Deriglazova’s studies presented their own concept of the new generation war (Чекинов, Богданов 2013, 2011, 2010). Their model of war consists of eight subsequent phases:

- The first phase: non-military asymmetric warfare including information, morality, psychology, ideology, diplomacy and

economic measures used to create favorable political, economic and military configuration;

- The second phase: special operations to mislead political and military leaders carried out by coordinated actions via diplomatic channels, media and governments, military agencies, false data, orders and instructions;
- The third phase: threatening, deceiving, bribing governments and officers to give up their duties;
- The fourth phase: destabilizing the situation with propaganda, increasing social discontent strengthen by sabotage and subversive operations of various military organizations and paramilitaries;
- The fifth phase: demarcating the no-fly zone over the invaded country, blockade of roads, bridges and transportation hubs, using private military organizations, opponents of social and political order of the attacked country;
- The sixth phase: starting the military operations followed by thorough reconnaissance and intelligence actions with various technologies, means and forces including special forces, signal units, diplomacy and secret service and industrial espionage;
- The seventh phase: combination of targeted information operations, military operations of signal units, operations in cyberspace of air forces, using various weapon systems and platforms (far-reaching artillery, new physical principles

weapon (beam, geophysical, wave, non-lethal biological weapon);

- The eighth phase: gaining control over the remaining adversary resistance points and destroying hostile elements with special forces, operations carried out by reconnaissance units to identify hostile forces that survived and inform rocket and artillery units about their position (coordinates); destroy the adversary fire protection strips with advanced weapons, surround the adversary territory with land forces.

Martin van Creveld characterized new type of war – “non-trinitarian war” which does not match the trinity paradigm of government-army-society.²³ Whereas, an American expert, A. Cohen divided modern military conflicts into three categories: conflicts which use rockets, tanks and knives respectively.²⁴ According to experts’ estimations, in the last years knives were used in 90 % out of 130 military conflicts instead of missiles or tanks. However, as Martin van

²³ *Война и современное государство. Стенограмма лекции профессора истории Иерусалимского университета Мартина ван Кревельда*, <http://polit.ru/article/2006/09/26/kreveld/> [15.02.2016]

²⁴ E. Cohen, M. Eisenstadt, A. Bacevich, *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution* – Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/KnivesTanksandMissiles.pdf> [11.03.2016]

Creveld noticed “history shows that 90% of tanks does not know what to do with knives”.²⁵

The gradual dominance of the term “hybrid warfare” grew together with conception of “three block war” (Boot 2006). The thrust of the concept is that modern militaries must be trained to conduct full scale military action in one city block, peacekeeping operations in the second one and humanitarian aid in the third block, simultaneously.

Today, the “hybrid warfare” is in a center of attention, widely discussed in media, has become a subject of expertise research. The public perception of warfare has also changed. Moreover, the research was conducted by world experts: William J. Nemeth, F. Hoffman, Daniel Lasikom, George Davis, Nathan P. Freier, D. Kilcullen (USA), Frank van Kappenom (Holland). A lot of researchers and scientists indicate the “hybrid” nature of warfare, the conceptualization is to clear and full. In the western theories of 2005-2009 the term “hybrid warfare” occurs, yet, in many cases it was not unified precisely enough to avoid controversies among experts worldwide and interpretations in other terms and concepts. Today the situation is different.

²⁵ *Война и современное государство. Стенограмма лекции профессора истории Иерусалимского университета Мартина ван Кревельда, <http://polit.ru/article/2006/09/26/kreveld/> [15.02.2016]*

Carl von Clausewitz²⁶ predicted in his war book almost 180 years ago that war has its own forms and conditions in every period, so every period should have its own independent theory of war (Brown, Brown 2011).

The state which wages the hybrid war enters into transactions with non-state contractors: military groups, local people groups, the connections with which are formally denied. These contractors can conduct actions the state itself cannot as it is obliged to comply with the Geneva Convention, Hague Convention with respect to the laws and customs of war on land and agreements with other countries. The dirty work can be commissioned to non-state groups and organizations. This happens now in the east of Ukraine. Yet, the peculiarity of this conflict is information propaganda which can be treated as an information war.

In March 2015 the NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbov presented the following definition: “hybrid warfare” employs a broad mix of instruments – military force, technology, crime, terrorism, economic and financial pressures, humanitarian and religious means, intelligence, sabotage, disinformation²⁷.

²⁶ Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Prussian general and military theoretic, fought against Napoleon I in the Russian army 1812-1814 and Prussian 1814-1815. During 1818-1830 a head of Allgemeine Kriegsschule in Berlin (future Berlin War Academy).

²⁷ *ESDP and NATO: better cooperation in view of the new security challenges*. Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, Riga, Latvia, 5 March 2015, NATO,

Contemporary changes in military art are conditioned by asymmetric conflicts, hybrid warfare, so called the fourth-generation warfare or multivariate warfare. The adversary in hybrid warfare is decentralized and resembles rather loosely connected guerilla groups, which is not organized, do not act as a conventional army but analyses all western military and technological solutions and reacts to them immediately. Hybrid war is not declared formally, is waged with unconventional means, is aggressive and complex. It is a real war which has not been declared. Aggressor does not occur openly but hides his role in a conflict by all means. There are also soldiers who are difficult to identify.²⁸ The operation can be conducted by commandos disguised as local bums, separatists, a humanitarian aid convoy. All of that is to avoid consequences partially or completely. Along these operations aggressive propaganda campaign is conducted on the territory of their own country and the international stage.²⁹ Propaganda creates the image of the imaginary aggressor and the victim.

Hybrid warfare can be defined as a non-warfare because a lot of operations are conducted between the army and civilians. Militaries

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117919.htm?selectedLocale=en

[15.02.2016]

²⁸ О.Турчинов, *Тероризм. Гібридна війна. Росія*,
<https://turchynov.com/blog/details/terorizm-gibridna-vijna-rosiya> [15.01.2016]

²⁹ В.В. Власюк, Я.В. Карман, Деякі основи поняття "гібридна війна" в міжнародному праві,

<http://lcslaw.knu.ua/index.php/item/207-deyaki-osnovy-ponyattya-hibrydna-viyna-v-mizhnarodnomu-pravi-vlasiuk-v-v-karman-ya-v> [15.02.2016]

are disguised as civilians whereas civilians hold guns in their hands. The example of this are “the little green men” on Crimea where the Russian propaganda denied accepting them as militaries for a long time because they did not have military insignias and at the same time acted as civilians disguised in uniforms, which according to W. Putin himself can be bought in a shop. Yet, they have weapon but “little green men” avoided using it. It was to serve as a deterrent.³⁰

Hybrid warfare employs non-conventional means, goes beyond the 19th century concept of traditional war based on Clausewitz’ theory, its content, nature and characteristics significantly differ from those of traditional warfare models. The typical feature is that there are no clearly marked frontline of military operations or direct fighting of big military groups, but numerous special forces operations, e.g.: of Russian Main Intelligence Directorate, separatists which are not uniformed although it is clear that they include many militaries of Russian military forces.

According to other definitions – hybrid warfare is a merge of several threats – traditional (engagement of military forces), irregular (guerilla), terrorism and the latest technologies (cyberattacks). Hybrid warfare includes also subversive actions, corruption, energy warfare, economic warfare, financial warfare and of course information

³⁰ Роль информации в гибридных войнах,
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/rol_informatsii_v_gibridnykh_voynakh/
[17.02.2016]

warfare. Generally, it is accepted that hybrid warfare includes guerilla-type operations against the adversary with non-conventional ways and means, terrorist attacks under the false flag, based on the latest technologies, using information and cyber warfare³¹.

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³¹ В.П.Горбулін, „Гібридна війна” як ключовий інструмент російської геостратегії реваншу. В: «Стратегічні пріоритети» – науково-аналітичний що кварталний збірник Національного інституту стратегічних досліджень. 2014, nr 4 (33), с.8; Про поняття «гібридна війна», <http://www.viche.info/journal/4615/> [17.02.2016]

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THE IDEA OF PROGRESS AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE WAR: THE CASE OF GEOGRAPHY

Abstract:

Contemporary culture wars constitute a permanent element of the social reality of the 21st century. One of the manifestations of this is semantic chaos, part of which is terminological confusion in science. Incorrect application of terms and concepts, and especially the introduction of numerous new ones, is also a feature of modern geography, which undoubtedly influences geopolitics. Geopolitics, in fact, originates from geography and uses many geographical concepts. The article analyzes the concept of progress, which is one of the most fundamental from the point of view of understanding social reality. Changes in understanding progress from antiquity, through French Enlightenment thinkers, to contemporary geography are presented. The concept of progress widely accepted in geography and a large part of the academic community, consistent with the so-called political correctness, contrasted with the interpretation of progress used in philosophy and medicine, in which progress is not a synonym, but the

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opposite of development. In this context, the concept of progress in the form used by supporters of Marxism and its contemporary versions (eg postmodernism), as well as representatives of left-liberal ideology, turns out to be an effective means of conducting information warfare aimed at combating conservative and national ideas in society.

Key words: progress, development, geography, geopolitics, cultural war, information war, semantic chaos.

Introduction

The history of each area of knowledge consists of two trends: an empirical-analytical and philosophical-synthetic. The first of them amounts to conduct reliable research concerning strictly-defined objects, in accordance with the methodological requirements. The aim of this research is to document and explain the phenomena, relations and processes. So, the product of this trend is new knowledge. Due to technological innovations of the last decades the growth of new knowledge has been significantly accelerated and the availability of this knowledge has become widespread. The feasibility of obtaining knowledge of any topic at any time is a great prey of science. However, its success has also been accompanied by side effects, which include the annoying information overload. In fact, people nowadays are unable to assimilate the huge amounts of the inflowing

information. They seem to be incapable of neither processing them in an individual way, nor understanding and utilizing them. According to a Polish writer, Nobel Prize Winner, Czesław Miłosz, contemporary information overload constitutes the kind of mental pollution. This is the pollution of human minds with the by-products of science, which is even more dangerous than the pollution of the environment with the by-products of technology (Miłosz 1990). This problem is caused by the fact that those two trends of the knowledge diverged, and the empirical-analytical mainstream became far ahead and dominated the philosophical-synthetic streamlet. For that reason there is more and more knowledge which remains dispersed. Science shows to be in no position to put particular results of research together, to give them structure, to show their overall importance, their meaning and place in the general body of knowledge. This situation is particularly true as far as the contemporary geography in Poland is concerned. We have a lot of kinds and directions of geographical research, and simultaneously the geography itself is losing its identity, coherence and social relevance (Wilczyński 2011). The empirical-analytical knowledge has completely overpowered the philosophical-synthetic concepts. Moreover the latter are often being expressed in a way completely not understandable and incompatible not only for the empirical analysts but also for the broader audiences. The “Lelevel Society” Research Group is trying to make the empirical-analytical and philosophical-synthetic trends compatible by way of the appropriate

studies in the philosophy and history of geographical thought (from 2016 the Group exists in the structure of Polish Geopolitical Society).

The way of structuring and organizing knowledge depends on the prevailing intellectual atmosphere that is shaped by the dominant philosophy and widely accepted ways of interpretation of the most general notions. One of these concepts which determined the modern geographical thought is the idea of progress.

Sources and the evolution of the idea of progress

Progress is one of the general concepts of Western civilization, which have huge literature but, in spite of that, is still the source of confusion. We are not sure which spheres of life and fields of the knowledge could be characterized with the use of this concept. Most of the available books concerning the idea of progress do not explain what does it exactly mean. According to one of the classical books, the idea of human progress

...is a theory which is based on an interpretation of history, which regards men as slowly advancing.... in a definite and desirable direction, and infers that this progress will continue indefinitely (Bury, 2008, p. 6).

The same author argued also that progress must be the necessary outcome of the psychical and social nature of man. So, the idea of progress is just the conviction, that mankind has advanced in the past, is now advancing, and may be expected to continue

advancing in the future. This is then nothing more than the view that human beings and civilization are improving and advancing toward a better goal. The problem becomes more complex when one asks, what does that “advance” and “improvement” mean. According to the eminent American historian of ideas, Robert Nisbet, in its most common form the idea of progress has referred to the advance of knowledge, more particularly the kind of practical knowledge contained in the arts and sciences (Nisbet, 2010). So then, in approaching the problem of progress and geography, we might have been expected, as professional geographers, to think of some famous geographers’ contributions to cultural and technological advancement. Keeping in mind the present-day unfavorable situation in geography, its problems concerning its identity, unity and autonomy, as well as its creativity and social relevance, it might have been thought more appropriate for us to concentrate on the very meaning of the word progress. Our aim is to formulate answers to the question of what is, and what should be progress in geography, and what should be done in order to make geography really advancing and improving. Strict definition of progress in geography seems to be necessary, since numerous processes and changes which occurred in geography in the last decades by no means could be perceived as progressive in the positive sense.

Progress is thought to be the peculiarly Western idea. We have no knowledge concerning the possible “progressivist” attitudes in

other civilizations. For some of them, quite different ideas seem to be more important, e.g. the idea of harmony and equilibrium. As Robert Nisbet wrote,

...only in Western Civilization [...] all history may be seen as one of humanity improving itself, step by step, stage by stage, through immanent forces (Nisbet 2010, p. 2).

The idea of progress in the West was initiated in Antiquity. According to Ludwig Edelstein,

the ancients formulated most of the thoughts and sentiments that later generations down to the nineteenth century were accustomed to associate with the blessed and cursed word progress (Edelstein 1964, p. 3).

One of the sources of our Western strive after improvement is the ancient Greek belief, that the gods did not reveal to men all things in the beginning, but men through their own search find in the course of time that which is better. This declaration, attributed usually to Xenophanes (VI-V BC), is just the essence of one of the most popular Greek myths, that is to say, the Promethaeian myth. According to this, Prometheus was the hero, who have brought to mankind arts and fire, and thus stimulated men to rise culturally to emulate the very gods. The myth, propagated in the literary form by Aeschylus (V-IV B.C.), became the source of the prometheanism idea, which then became particularly important during the Enlightenment epoch. The greatest Greek contributors to the idea of progress, according to Nisbet, were

both the most famous sophist, Protagoras (V B.C.) and the greatest ancient philosopher, Plato (V-IV B.C.). According to their convictions, man's history is one of escape from primeval ignorance, and of gradual ascent to the advancement of knowledge. As a consequence, mankind living previously in deprivation like barbarians and savages, steadily became capable of ascend the scale of culture, learning crafts and arts, reaching the ever-better life conditions. In Nisbet's interpretation (Nisbet, op. cit, p. 5), Plato delineates a historical account of the progress of mankind from lowly origins to its contemporary heights in the dialogue *Protagoras* and *The Statesman*. The first of the mentioned works contains short parable by Protagoras concerning the history of Epimetheus and Prometheus, who had stolen fire and skills from the gods, to deliver them to people (Platon, 1999, p. 10-12). The same mythical event is mentioned by The Visitor in the other dialogue *The Statesman* (Plato, op.cit. p. 98). So, it could be reasonable to formulate a question, if such brief episodes are sufficient to formulate the thesis, that both Protagoras and Plato were adherents of the idea of progress. Moreover, it is worthy to emphasize, that Plato saw the history of civilization as the history of technological progress and simultaneous moral decline.

The greatest contribution to the literature of human progress to be found in ancient thought is "On the Nature of Things" by Titus Lucretius Carus (I B.C.). This philosopher did not share the pessimist opinion of Plato concerning the moral aspect of human history. Book 5

of his evolutionary treatise is devoted to the mankind's cultural progress. From the primitive level of barbarity, men formed religious forms of mental protection from the constant fear of the elements, and step by step (*mentis pedetemptim progredientis*), advanced the creation of particular technological and mental achievements (Lukrecjusz 1957).

Christian philosophers and prophets also contributed to the idea of progress. Among them there is St. Augustine (VI-V A.D.) and Joachim de Fiore (XII A.D.), who developed the concept of historical necessity of changes leading to the utopian period that is the culmination of man's progress on earth. According to R. Nisbet, when these ideas have become secularized in the late eighteenth century, *...the way has been cleared for the emergence of such modern secular millenarianisms as those associated with the names of Saint-Simon, Comte, and Marx* (Nisbet, op.cit. p. 7).

Trying to define the characteristics of the ancient and medieval idea of progress, Nisbet emphasized its following crucial elements: cumulative growth, continuity in time, necessity, and the unfolding potentiality. All of them took shape within the Christian tradition, and their modern, secular forms would be inconceivable in the historical sense apart from their Christian roots (Nisbet, op.cit., p. 10). This is in spite of the fact, that some ancient and Christian concepts were impaired. Bernard Fontenelle in the end of 17th century first formulated the idea of unlimited progress of humanity, as opposed to

the St. Augustine's, who declared mankind to be in its very old age, when the degeneration of faculties, and eventually death, is possible. Fontenelle declared mankind will have neither old age nor will degenerate (Sorel, 1969). By the 18th century intellectuals mostly accepted the modernist view, that due to both natural and human causes, mankind has advanced in culture, is now advancing, and will continue to advance during a long future ahead. By the beginning of the 18th century this optimistic view was supreme among a growing number of intellectuals and became an important element of the intellectual atmosphere during the Enlightenment epoch. It was expressed best in the A.R.J. Turgot's discourse before the audience at the Sorbonne in 1750, entitled *A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of Human Mind*, that is probably the first and complete statement of progress, covering not only the arts and sciences, but the whole of culture – habits, laws, institutions, economy and society. Turgot saw progress as a result of natural order of things and, like Adam Smith, considered the reasons of stagnation were unwise edict, law and custom (Meek, ed., 1973). The idea of progress as a slow, gradual, continuous change that is cumulative, purposive and self-driven is now widely seen as one of the most important intellectual formulations of the Enlightenment, which has dominated Western thought throughout the modern era. The progress rendered as inevitable onward and upward march of civilization through a series of discrete levels were also called development and social evolution,

and no-one of the Enlightenment thinkers made distinctions between these notions. Even today, they are seen as synonyms, particularly in its scientific and technological aspects. First of all, the word progress has been utilized as a synonym of technological and scientific advancement. And because both science and technology have been thought to improve greatly the standards of life, the notion of progress in its scientific-technological aspect has gained an almost univocal positive connotation in social consciousness. Until now, progress is considered to be something positive and good, as opposed to such terms like stagnation, backwardness, and recession. Such a positive value of progress in social consciousness is not limited to the sciences and technology. There appeared also the idea of “social progress” identified with the spread of the leftist ideology, which in the Eastern European countries was tantamount with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Ideologists had utilized the “progressivist” phraseology to discredit all conservative ideas, called “bourgeois”, “reactionary”, or “American”. There are numerous statements in which the notion of progress has been ideologically abused. As a result of this ideological pressure, this notion has greatly influenced not only the ordinary people’s way of thinking, but also the modes of argumentation in scientific research. The general aspiration for being “progressive” and the colloquial understanding of progress, in spite of its inaccuracy, has permeated scientific language, mostly in the area of social sciences, including geography. Such understanding was

typical for the founders of the well-known journal entitled *Progress in Human Geography*, and is still valid in the current scientific discourse in geography (Wise, 1977). Geographers do not realize the possible differences between such terms like progress and development, and this is expressed by the creation of a new notions like “progressive developmentalism” (Heffernan, 1994, p.328). Such unrestricted utilization of words and introduction of new terminology with no strict definitions seems to be contradictory to the basic principles of scientific discourse. In particular, it seems to be unreasonable to try to replace one undefined notion (idea of progress) with the new one, but also devoid of definition (“progressive developmentalism” or “developmental progressivism”). Such a creativity is not useful for comprehension and seems to strengthen the state of terminological confusion.

Contemporary criticism

Due to political and economic shifts in Eastern Europe after 1989, the progress, like many other general concepts, have become the object of reconsideration and contestation. The idea of progress is now in the state of crisis both in Eastern Europe and in the West in the narrower sense (McBride, 1992). Its source is the general distrust of technological innovation based on quasi-religious reverence for pre-technological nature. Such attitudes are based on both the Western cultural heritage (e.g. writings by J.J. Rousseau and Romantic

transcendentalists, and also by Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber) and the different Eastern concepts. According to numerous environmentalists and creators of eco-philosophies, progress is made at the expense of the traditional value system and leads the young generation to a complete isolation of the individual from his social establishment, to a radical separation from any higher values, to reducing the spiritual to bodily needs, and to a losing any contact with the natural world. Even economic aspect of the progress has been called an illusion, since it does not take into account the depreciation of natural capital, including the so-called non-renewable resources (Brown, 1990). At the heart of contemporary skepticism in relation to progress lie three interrelated convictions. Firstly, according to numerous analyses, we have reached the limits of economic advancement, and each new advance in technology weakens the social and moral values which once seemed entirely congruent with economic development. Secondly, there is growing literature on rapid depletion nature and her resources. Some presents a truly convincing refutation of the depletion argument (Simon 1998), but it has had little if any effect upon the majority who follow that argument. Thirdly, there is constantly enlarging belief that science has reached the limits of its own capacity to advance, that science has reached the point, where further achievements will be adverse rather than beneficial so far as human morality is concerned. A very perceptible dethronement of knowledge is taking place, both in the sphere of the

visible scientific output (huge amounts of invaluable publications) and in the institutional aspect (appearance of the so-called *diploma mills*, which rapidly replace traditional universities, or the *predatory journals* which propagate the so-called science, the dissemination of the practice of quantifying scientific achievements, which leads to the pathology of collecting points and multiplying the citation by researchers). Economic crises, the announced environmental depletion, and the decadence in science, are not all reasons for the criticism in relation to the idea of progress. Robert Nisbet sees the additional factor, that is the growing boredom spreading in Western society. To explain this factor Nisbet wrote:

...through technology and the cult of leisure we are pushing work into a constantly diminishing place [...] But all present evidence is that few if any human beings can endure leisure without becoming bored, succumbing to alcohol and drugs, or turning to violence and terrorism in mounting degree (Nisbet, op.cit. p. 25-26).

This vision seems to be conformable to the pessimistic idea of the Spanish philosopher, Jose Ortega y Gasset, expressed in his famous book, *La rebelión de las masas* (2006). Nowadays, these processes are described in a convincing way by Ryszard Legutko (2012). The studies of American authors, Alan Ch. Kors (2001) and James Kurth (2001) are also very instructive.

What is thought to be progress in geography in Poland

The notion of progress did not appear too frequently in geography in Poland. It became particularly useless after the Marxist ideologists stopped criticizing concepts which did not conform with their philosophy. Progress for them was an instrument of propaganda and ideological struggle against “reactionary” and “American” concepts. Due to this, after 1980s Polish geographers were not inclined to judge, what was progressive and what was not. We have no geographical journal with the word “progress” in its title, and there exist no research project aimed at finding “progressive” solutions. We also have no institute and department dealing with philosophy of geography and history of ideas, and there exists no journal interested in publication of philosophical-historical studies (Wilczyński 2011). So, there are no Polish counterparts for such figures like Michael Wise and Michael Heffernan – authors of the above mentioned works concerning geography and progress.

The only Polish author, who had the courage to use the concept of progress after the political crisis of the 1980s, was Z. Chojnicki – the leading figure in the field of philosophy of geography in Poland for the previous 50 years. He decided to restore the concept of progress in a book, which was to summarize the former output of, and show directions for further research works in Polish geography (Chojnicki, 1991). In spite of the fact that it appeared in print in 1991, it remains one of the most frequently cited methodological text in geography in

Poland for several years. Chojnicki argued that for Polish geographers *...the most important thing in future serious research will be the progress in methods which could help us to gain factual data, and [...] introduction the rigorous techniques of field observation and remote sensing methods* (Chojnicki, op.cit. p. 376).

The above statement allows us to understand clearly the way the main Polish methodologist conceive progress. First of all, he emphasizes its two necessary conditions: firstly, it is the quantity and quality of factual data, and secondly, the methods of reprocessing and utilizing them. Shortly, according to Chojnicki, geography in Poland suffers from a growing deficit of facts and methods. In his paper he has mentioned also the need of “theoretical progress”, but he failed to explain what does that mean. He emphasized the importance of factual data and methods in spite of the fact, that we have just experienced the consequences of “quantitative revolution”, when the number of publications composed of new experimental data started to grow exponentially. Instead of a shortage, the true problem has become an excess of information. One of the reasons of this is the bureaucratic management of scientific institutions, which forces us to gain more and more publications. It must be also kept in mind, that there are also additional reasons which have strong ethical and ideological basis (Pelc 1994; Znosko 1994, see also Wilczyński 1998). Similar views have also been expressed in the scientific literature in

English speaking countries. American astronomer and philosopher, T. van Flandern declared that

...something is wrong with science – fundamentally wrong (...). It has been my sad observation that by the mid-career there are very few professionals left truly working for the advancement of science, as opposed to the advancement of self (van Flandern 1993, xv-xvi).

The effectiveness of scientific works, mainly due to institutional and ethical reasons, is no longer measured by the number and quality of formulated and resolved scientific problems. Instead, the main criterion of assessment of the value of research activities became the number of publications. As a result, there appears a glaring disproportion between the number of scientists, the costs of research, and the value of significant output. The scores of insignificant research gain power and the banks of information swell. It has become increasingly difficult to find a truly creative works in the boundless sea of information added each year to the existing scores. As stated by the eminent Polish geologist, it is very difficult now to find any essential contents in the mountains of senseless printed matter (Jaroszewski 1993). It should be noted, that the great majority of this scientific output has found no application and most of the publications have not been utilized at all. There are symptoms of the lack of the authenticity of research works, and it calls into question the sense of continuation of studies, the social relevance and real scientific value of which seem to be plain postulate.

In the light of this situation, the way the progress is conceived in geographical circles in Poland must be recognized as highly paradoxical. On the one side geography in Poland is experiencing a lack of new ideas which could make it possible to utilize, or even to grasp the huge amounts of the available information. At the same time however, the growing quantity of new facts and methods is proclaimed to be the necessary condition of future progress. It must be emphasized, that if Chojnicki is right in his statement and the idea of progress understood in such colloquial sense (which is not far from its Promethean and Enlightenment meaning) is proper and just, the best way to be progressive is nothing more but the production of new factual data and reprocessing them with the use of newer and newer means and methods in the frame of analytical and experimental research. So, if we want such analytical experimentalism was no longer the main direction in contemporary geographical thought, the necessary condition is to replace the Enlightenment idea of progress with any other concept.

Essential analysis of the progressiveness in geography and geopolitics²

To find the alternative concept of progress necessary for the formulation of another vision of geography as a science, we need to

² The geographic aspect has already been developed in my study: Wilczyński 2002.

specify the characteristics of the colloquial understanding of progress that is typical in geographical circles in Poland. The first and the most obvious characteristic, which is a direct consequence of the geographers' efforts of being progressive in the colloquial sense of the word, which is also accepted by Chojnicki, is **multidirectional, quantitative expansion in amounts of factual data and methods**, but also equipments, staff and grants. This is tantamount with the narrowing of fields of interests which leads to distraction of scientific aims and effort, and to excessive specialization and **disintegration in the structure of geography**, which no longer constitutes the unified and integral area of knowledge. It is expressed by the appearance of numerous specialized institutions, commissions, journals, sub-fields, each with its own esoteric seminars, languages, and an exponential growth in the number of publications. One of the newest Polish geographical encyclopedia defines more than 30 sub-fields and directions within geography except the classical specializations of physical and human branches. Particular elements of such disintegrated geography can act freely but they are not completely independent. Instead, there appears **severe competition** between them for more financial aid, which leads to the **loss of the economic principle** and the unreasonable distribution of funds. Competing institutions often needlessly spend money independently for the same aims, having no knowledge about the research being conducted on the other side of the hedge. Our corrupted political system allows

institutions to waste huge amounts of money, and the competition between institutions, sub-fields and single scientists for more subsidies reminds one of the fight between politicians and parties for power and influence, where neither the creative potential nor real needs are important, but only personal connections and political correctness mean.

To recapitulate we can ascertain that the progress in geography implies three interrelated processes: 1) multidirectional quantitative expansion; 2) functional disintegration and appearance of numerous units with different characteristics and aims; 3) competition between these units which leads to the loss of economic principle. Such a definition of progress which consists of three interrelated processes is very similar to the idea of progress which is accepted in theoretical biology and utilized in medicine. The only difference is that in geography progress is thought to be something good, while in medicine progressive changes are synonymous with pathological processes, such as the uncontrolled growth of abnormal tissue in living things, which leads to a malignant tumor. To show that geographical and medical concepts of progress do not differ greatly let us consider the medical description of neoplasm growth in a monstrous tumor called teratoma. In this skin tumor there are growing
....conglomerations of cerebral tissue which are not organized in the functional structure of a brain, many teeth, some of them even fixed in alveolus sockets but with no jaws and muscles which could move them.

There are numerous pieces of organs, strands of muscular tissue which can even contract, perspiratory and sebaceous glands which secrete great amounts of perspiration and tall, skin cells which produce strands of long hair.... That monstrous conglomerate does not however create any intergrated organic system... (Lenartowicz 1986, p. 159-160).

Instead of organic system and functional whole, this monstrous tumor, like contemporary geography, constitutes a loose conglomerate of units with different characteristics and aims. What is similar for all of them, as well as for all the elements consisting contemporary geography, is the unrestrained anxiety to grow and internal competition. In teratoma, like in contemporary geography, there are numerous different components which are chaotically distributed and sometimes can make impression of an organic structure. Modern and progressive geography, like teratoma, can be characterized by uncontrolled growth, sometimes showing the appearance of functional organization. Teratoma can grow thanks to the organism, in which it originated. When the organism exhausted by teratoma dies, it is also the end of teratoma. The organism in which originated contemporary geography is a system embracing knowledge and education. Geography is still too small to become dangerous for its host-organism, but the signs of its impairment during the last decades are evident. As we can see from the memoirs of Professor Alfred Jahn

...just after the World War II Polish universities had lost the right to select research workers, and the consequences of this appeared only in several years [...] At the universities had appeared numerous persons only thanks to their ideological connections [...] A lot of accidentally employed people had even reached professorship...[...] and, as a result, just in 1960s there had originated the crisis in science,which at the end of 1970s had assumed the proportions of disaster (...). The reasons for this crisis was neither lack of subsidies nor equipments (...) As I see, that crisis is tantamount to the crisis of human individual, I reduce it to the moral decline of man. The crisis affected most people, who were being infirm of purpose. Only some outstanding individuals [...] did not turn traitors these days (Jahn, 1991, pp.165-166, 180).

This way the nestor of Polish geographers during 1990s explained, why in Poland ... *the level of scientific research has fallen down dramatically and the professorship lost its former esteem (Vetulani 1992, p. 71-72).*

The purpose of the above overview of modern geography with a description of the tumor was to demonstrate that the idea of progress as adopted by geographers in Poland contributed to the disintegration of geography, to the loss of its identity and further consequences of the decline in the quality of research and in the social relevance and prestige. It turned out that one of the sources of the most basic problems of contemporary geography is the idea of

progress initiated in Antiquity and formulated in its modern shape by thinkers of the Enlightenment. As geographers we can now realize the many-faceted nature of progress, and understand why Ludwig Edelstein wrote that the idea of progress was both blessed and cursed (Edelstein 1964, op.cit.). Answering the question of why from the point of view of geography it is much more cursed than blessed, one should pay attention to the fact that geographers adopted it as typical of the Enlightenment and a bit simplified, overly optimistic, and a little naïve. Not to conclude these considerations in a funeral mood, it should be indicated that there is one comforting aspect of the situation faced by the contemporary, “progressive” geography. Namely, progress in biological, but also in philosophical meaning denotes changes, that usually end tragically, but are not irreversible (Podsiad, Więckowski 1983, p. 343).

In the Polish geopolitical literature, publications on progress have not yet appeared. This word is most often used in its shallow, commonsense and uniquely positive meaning, as a synonym of development. Meanwhile, the definition of *progressive geopolitics* has already become established in Anglo-Saxon geopolitics. Its creator is Irish explorer Gerry Kearns (2009). Progressive geopolitics is one of the many expressions that has emerged in recent decades in science, due to the increasing pressure from the left-liberal circles that today dominate the majority of universities. Progressive geopolitics, like critical geopolitics, feminist geopolitics, is designed mainly to provide

an alternative to classical geopolitics, usually referred to as "conservative". As Kearns writes, progressive geopolitics can challenge both the ideals and the account of reality offered by "conservative" geopolitics. This statement reveals that the goal of the Kearns project is not scientific but rather ideological. He criticizes classical geopolitics for "conservatism" and for recognizing states as the basic elements of the international scene and entities deciding about the matters of this world. It is also unacceptable for him to assume that the most important relations that determine the structure of the world are power relations. This author proposes a different view of the world in which relations between states and people are shaped not by political power and economic power, but by cosmopolitan ideals resulting from a politically correct vision of reality.

As the examples from Polish geographic literature and Anglo-Saxon geopolitics show, progress is one of the concepts whose meaning is freely juggled to achieve specific ideological goals. A change in the way of understanding progress is necessary for the ideologues of the modern information war to fight against the conservative worldview, on which not only science was founded as a specific form of culture, but the entire Western civilization. Ideologists of progress, who a few decades ago were a minority sect, today dominate in universities, media, the Internet, and in many international organizations, trying to impose their own style of discourse on everyone. The only salvation for scientific truth in this

situation is critical thinking and opposition to any attempts to change the meaning of the most frequently used words.

Toward the solution of the problem

From the point of view of the future of geography and geopolitics, progress in its Enlightenment meaning can not be recognized as the useful idea. If geography will grow further by way of such progress, its future may be that of an organism which happened to fall victim to cancer. So, not to trust only in the reversibility of such growth, we are forced to find for geography any better trajectory. Much more advantageous seems to be the understanding of progress typical for Herbert Spencer. This great nineteenth century popularizer and synthesizer of science used to make distinction between two notions: evolution and progress. The former denotes the process of development in the natural world, and the latter in the social reality. Progress in society is then a necessity, which is the result of the natural law underlying the whole reality (Young 1990). Contrary to the Enlightenment interpretation, progress is here the kind of development. And development, according to the available philosophical publications, is the concept contradictory in relation to the Enlightenment concept of progress (see for example Cackowski 1987). Both development and progress denote movement and change, but the Enlightenment progress denotes reversible, quantitative and multi-directional expansion, while development is

the **process of irreversible, qualitative and quantitative changes with a fixed direction**. The result of the progressive growth is the disintegration, while development leads to the creation of integrative factors, increase in complexity and integration of structures (anti-entropic tendency), tantamount with the reaching the higher level of organization (or information capacity). As it was earlier shown, the progress leads to the competition of particular elements and to the loss of economic principle. Development, on the other side, by way of the diversification and integration processes, becomes the source and the necessary condition of energetic and material economy in creation of hierarchic structures.

The philosophical idea of development provides a variety of concepts that can show to be useful in the situation of the identity crisis of geography, its disintegration, abandonment of traditional synthetic objectives and deterioration of its position in the system of knowledge.

We should guard the meaning of science-set concepts such as progress in order to avoid the situation of terminological chaos and thus contribute to the development of science. In the geopolitical context, the struggle for the true meaning of words is an element of the ongoing information war, the results of which will determine the fate of our civilization. This information war, and especially the changed meanings of the concepts and words we use, makes the intellectual atmosphere of our time intertwined with indoctrination,

tendentiousness, and fantasy. The only weapon that we can use, not to succumb to it, and to restore words to their true meaning, is the independence of critical intellect and the willingness to learn open-mindedly from experience of a reality independent of the human will.

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***INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AS A TOOL OF MILITARY
CONFLICTS SOLUTION***

Abstract:

Geographical factors play a critical role in determining how a civil war is fought and who will prevail. Nations fighting for independence, even if they win often don't gain independence because lack of international recognition of their state. Long-term intrastate wars often involve a period of geographical division within the state. An insurgent group may control a portion of the country for a period of years. This happens most often in cases of regional ethnic struggle, but can happen in ideological and religious wars as well. Formal partition has often been proposed by outside actors as a peaceful solution to an intra-state conflict. Kosovo and South Sudan might be best examples of that. This paper will study the outcomes that partitions might create as peace settlements. The concept of partition has never been normatively appealing, but has come to prominence in academic and policy oriented debates. The aim is to review this debate and find conclusions for problem shown in the title.

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Key words: international recognition, civil war, conflict solution, independence, sovereignty, nation.

An international recognition of state and nation

Partition signifies territorial division of the pre-war state. This process is not regional autonomy or federalism, but the creation of a new state. The concept of partition and further international recognition has never been normatively appealing, but has come to prominence in academic and policy oriented debates. The subject of partition, as Clive Christie noted (1992), has always had a bad name. Partition was significantly challenged in 2000 by a quantitative study by Nicolas Sambanis. This study effectively demonstrated that partition does not increase the probability of lasting peace. Subsequent studies have argued the opposite. Chaim Kaufmann has been one of the foremost scholars in this area, focusing on ethnic wars. His 1996 paper "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars" and its successor "When All Else Fails," published in 1998, are most often cited in any discussion of partition. These theoretical studies found that the best way to resolve ethnic conflicts is to separate the groups (Kaufmann 1996).

An area that seems to be inadequately addressed thus far in the academic debate on partition of states is qualitative case studies that seek to apply some of the theories generated and tested in large N

quantitative studies to individual cases of partition. It is important to focus on the meaning of two words: nation and state. Problematic issue of nationality is common among English speakers for which nations is the same as state sometimes. Definitions can be different in non English-speaking countries however. Modern nation definition created by scholars which associate themselves with politics and international relations preferred using of institutionalism definition (Sturm 2007). It says that nation is an ethnic group with common language, culture and history, which has its own state, or had it in the past. Ethnographers has broader definition of nations (Simpson 2007). For them linguistic divisions create nations, not institutional. So what we call a nation? There is a need to divide institutional and ethnographic points of view. In any research both definitions shouldn't be mixed. For this paper an ethnographic approach will be further used. It is often to misunderstand a distinction between nationhood and citizenship (Kymlicka 2004; Smith 2013). Such an approach will allow the researcher to accept or reject the validity of some of these theories, and to suggest new hypotheses for further research.

There are some main theories about partition of both sides of conflict, which reflects western way of thinking. Kaufmann (1996) based his research on the data set created by Ted Gurr (1995) and published in his book *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Building on the idea of a security dilemma, Kaufmann comments very clearly in favor of permanent territorial

separation of the conflict sides, ideally through the creation a new state. The only viable solution to this problem for Kaufmann is the separation of these warring groups into defensible enclaves, thus ameliorating the security dilemma. Kaufmann acknowledges the immense challenges that such a course poses, and states that partitions should only be effected where the nations in war are already separated. Partitions where the populations are not unmixed will actually increase violence!

In contrast to Kaufmann, and partly in response to his work, James Fearon strongly opposed partition in his paper "Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order." Fearon suggested that partition in conflict would tend to give an incentive to other minority groups to begin a war for independence as well. Another argument against partition is that partition proposals may tend to increase the level of ethnic cleansing in a conflict (Fearon 2004).

Carter Johnson's 2008 paper "Partitioning to Peace," made a further step offering that there have to be empirical evidence for the success of partitions. This evidence should make easier which decision will end any analyzed conflict, partition or not. Johnson developed an index for measuring the level of ethnic homogeneity in a post conflict population. This Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI). Echoing Kaufmann's warning, Johnson stated that partitions should only be put in place to resolve conflicts where the nations have already separated, and that theory also was empirically argued.

A different explanation for the desirability of partitions was put forward by Thomas Chapman and Philip Roeder (2007). Chapman and Roeder apply an institutional approach to the effects of partition, suggesting that domestic politics are likely to be more stable and peaceful following a *de jure* partition as opposed to any other peace settlement. *De jure* partitions mean a division made by international organization, such as court or UN. All other mentioned solutions didn't focus on who judges how division is made, usually sampling it as peace settlement effect.

Another conclusion can be found in a paper *The Relative Success of Partition in Resolving Longer Intrastate Wars* of Alexander Hudson and Veronica Kitchen (1998). They stated that partition and recognition of a new state, where there will be no further conflict later, is only likely to be successful following a military victory for the secessionist group.

On the other side, in a broader study of the causes of recurrent civil wars, Barbara Walter (2004) found that states that had been partitioned faced an increased likelihood of further wars. Walter's quantitative analysis found that partitioned states were more likely to face a new war, potentially unrelated to the war that ended in partition. This is a very different argument from those who argue that partition will only lead to an interstate war between the same conflict parties.

Very similar is the most noted empirical analyze of the effects of partition, which have been conducted by Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl. In perhaps the most significant quantitative study of partition, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War" (2000) Sambanis conducted a comprehensive series of statistical tests of the performance of partition settlements in the context of the broader universe of intrastate wars. This study found that partition did not prevent any war recurrence. Data used by these authors caused much critique. That is way they published a second study of the effects of partition in 2009 reiterating the findings of the first study. This article addressed many of the criticisms of the earlier work, and laid the groundwork for further research. Thus, there is significant difference of opinion among scholars who have examined the effects of partitions. Sambanis, Schulhofer-Wohl, and Walter all find that partition is not conducive to peace, while Johnson, and Chapman and Roeder find that partitions are in fact successful. So where is the truth? In many cases the difference is primarily attributable to the construction of the question and the definitions of the variables used.

The United Nations rule of nations self-determination

The self-determination idea is closely identified with Woodrow Wilson, who first used the term publicly in 1918, but it did not emerge as a principle of positive international law until the Soviet Union insisted on it at the 1945 San Francisco Conference on the United

Nations. It did not appear in the League of Nations Covenant. It was common view before II World War that to concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life. The United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference had misgivings about resuscitating the self-determination idea in binding treaty form. Nevertheless, the idea found its way into Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter as the principle of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples." However the drafters did not bother to define self-determination or to identify who the "peoples" were (Kirgis 1994).

The right of self-determination did not appear explicitly in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it became the centerpiece of the General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It appears also in the 1966 UN Covenants on Human Rights. In fact, the self-determination principle in the UN era has a great many faces. The one that virtually everybody now agrees it has is freedom from colonial domination. For many years the majority of states in the UN General Assembly asserted that the expressed will of peoples to be free from colonial domination was the only face self-determination had (Emerson 1971).

Under pressure from the West, the General Assembly in 1970 expanded the concept beyond anticolonialism in its Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations. The declaration disclaimed any intent to authorize or encourage the dismemberment of states, but its disclaimer was tied to a concept of internal self-determination (Rosenstock 1971). This disclaimer referred only to a government representing the whole people. The disclaimer was reiterated in the Vienna Declaration emanating from the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights, with one significant change. The Vienna Declaration exempted only "a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind." General Assembly formulations suggests that from about 1970 on, there could be a right of "peoples"- still not well defined - to secede from an established state that does not have a fully representative form of government, or at least to secede from a state whose government excludes people of any race, creed or color from political representation when those people are the ones asserting the right and they have a claim to a defined territory.

In scholarly journals concerning self-determination, above mentioned evolution of UN approach to the problem, are not only ones. Here can be gathered all more or less controversial assumptions to this idea, and it is as follows:

1) The established right to be free from colonial domination, with plenty of well-known examples in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Titanji 2009).

2) The converse of that-a right to remain dependent, if it represents the will of the dependent people who occupy a defined territory, as in the case of the Island of Mayotte in the Comoros, or Puerto Rico (McElroy, De Albuquerque 1995).

3) The right to dissolve a state, at least if done peacefully, and to form new states on the territory of the former one, as in the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (Szomolanyi 1994). The breakup of the former Yugoslavia and later Serbia and Montenegro (Sekulic 1997).

4) The disputed right to secede, as in the case of Bangladesh and Eritrea (Brilmayer 1991).

5) The right of divided states to reunite, as in Germany (Frowein 1992).

6) The right of limited autonomy, short of secession, for groups defined territorially or by common ethnic, religious and linguistic bonds-as in autonomous areas within confederations (Siroky, Cuffe 2015).

7) Rights of minority groups within a larger political entity, as recognized in Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the General Assembly's 1992 Declaration on the Rights of

Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Gilbert 2001).

8) The internal self-determination freedom to choose one's own form of government, or even more sharply, the right to a democratic form of government, as in Haiti (Kirgis 1994; Seymour 2007).

As many ethnic groups don't have their own states or autonomy statuses, because they have no will to create it, there are also many nations who have will and started their efforts to do so. Most of them tried diplomatic and peaceful ways, but there are known currently military conflicts as emerging threats to world's stability. Both ways are mostly unsuccessful. It is not in the interest of current members of the UN to create a precedence of accepting secessions, especially by Security Council members which are federal states. It might be affecting them in the future.

Unrecognized states

The very first act of recognition was made towards revolting American colonies by revolutionary France in 1778. During 19th and 20th centuries it plays a crucial role in international relations as a political tool. There is three way how international community can treat new emerging state. First is when all members accept a new country, like post soviet republics. Second way is that international community members all refuse to establish diplomatic relations with a

new state, like in case of Chechnya. Third way is when some countries accept a new state, and others don't recognize new entity as a state, like Taiwan, Western Sahara, Northern Cyprus (Kolstø 2006).

A term of unrecognized state is describing all political entities who call themselves a state, but no other state, who is a member of international community or majority of them, accept such entity as a state. There are many causes of lack of recognition. Some motives are political, some economic, but usually it is concluded that territory is part of another independent state like in case of Abkhazia (Kopeček, Hoch, Baar 2016).

The most renown example of unrecognized is Israel thru first 30 years of its modern existence. Most of Muslim countries didn't officially recognize Israel and did it in 1989 on UN forum. When Jordan Kingdom withdraw its laws to western bank on this area Palestinian state was established, but it has recognition of about 100 states only. Arabian-Israeli conflict seems to be ongoing into the unlimited future.

Another spectacular case is that of Western Sahara. It was a colony of Spain until 1975. However cause its a large territory with minor population, Spain decided to divide its lands between Morocco and Mauritania. Before it happened insurgent militia appeared, called POLISARIO and proclaimed independence of Sahrawi Republic. Algeria was the first who recognized new state. Then, most of African states do the same. Mauritania recognized new state and withdraws its troops, but Morocco occupied almost whole territory and broke any

diplomatic relations with those who recognized Sahrawis (Stephan, Mundy 2006).

One more example of complications due to lack of recognition is Taiwan, who is officially continuing an existence of pre-war Republic of China. Still it is recognized by around 25 states, mostly from Oceania and Latin America (Tung 2005). Same recognition problem is in Cyprus, where exists Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Hadjipavlou 2007). Another example is Somaliland and Puntland lying on a territory claimed by fallen state of Somalia (Roethke 2006). Moldavia also has a disintegration problems with Transdnistria and Gagauzia (Herd 2004). Azerbaijan fight with partly recognized Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (Broers 2015). That is only examples, but it can be seen that it is more frequent problem than at first appeared, even in peaceful Europe (Wilczyński 2017).

Current ethnic conflicts

Currently ongoing conflicts are numerous and not always well-known. In 2017 and 2018 there are ethnic conflicts, with at least 1 casualty in:

- Afghanistan with clashes between Hazara and Pashtu peoples;
- Algeria with Kabyle population in eastern part of the country;
- Angola with Mayombe (Yombe) in Cabinda;
- Azerbaijan with Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh;
- Belgium with Arabs, mainly on street of Brussels;

- Cameroon with Kanuri in Lake Chad area.
- Central African Republic with Gbaya in the west.
- Chad with Tama, Toubou and Zaghawa peoples in the north and east, and also with Kanuri near Lake Chad;
- DR Congo with Bakongo (Congo) near Matadi and Kinshasa (willing to restore Kingdom of Congo), with Baluba in Katanga and Kasai, with Chokwe and Phende near Tshikapa, with Hutu refugees and immigrants (Nyatura) near Rwandan border, with Hema, Lendu, Ndaka and Ngiti tribes in Ituri region, with Lega (or Rega) in South Kivu, with Nande, Nyanga and Komo in North Kivu, with Tabwa and Bembe on Lake Tanganyika coast, with Twa (Pigmy) mostly in eastern rainforests,
- Egypt with Coptic Egyptians in central cities, and in Sinai Peninsula with Bedawi population.
- Ethiopia with Amhara mainly near Nekemte, Meke and Dira Dawa locations, with Anuak near South Sudanese border, with Borana, Burji, Garreh and Guji in the south, with Murle in Omo Valley, with Nuer in extreme west, with Somalis in Ogaden and with Oromo in many different parts of the country, mainly in central and western parts.
- France with Arabs, mainly in Marseille and Paris;
- Germany with immigrants from many countries, mainly from Africa and Middle East, and skirmishes took place only in cities;
- India with Kashmiri nation in Kashmir, and with Nagas, Assamese, Bodo and Rajbanshi in the east;
- Iran with Kurds in the west;

- Iraq with Kurds in the north;
- Kenya with Borana, Gabra and Samburu in the north, with Kalenjin, Pokoot and Sabaot in central western part of the country, with Orma and Pokomo in Tana Valley, and with Toposa and Turkana in the northwest;
- Libya with Toubou people in the south-east;
- Mali with Touareg and Arabs of Azawad and also with Fulfulde Massina people in central regions around Mopti.
- Mexico with native ethnic groups in Acapulco, Chichuahua, Chiapas, Sinaloa, Veracruz and Jalisco provinces;
- Myanmar (Burma) with Arakanese fighters in the west; Kachin in the north; Karen and Shan in the east and Chinese in Kokang district;
- Niger with Kanuri population in south-east corner of the country.
- Nigeria with Agatu and Tiv in Benue Valley, with Berom, Irigwe and Tarok nations on Jos Plateau, with Bwatiye (Bacama) and Jukun in Adamawa Region, with Eggon in Nassarawa State, with Fulani in central states, with Hausa in the north, with Igbo in the south, with Kadara in Kaduna region, with Kanuri in the north-east, with Mambila near border with Cameroon, with numerous small Christian tribes in Atakad district, with numerous pagan cult tribes and nations of Niger Delta confederated in so called Deebam Confraternity, with nations and tribes gathered in Maphite Confraternity around Warri, with NDV (Niger Delta Vigilantes; also commonly referred to as Icelanders)

mainly Ijaw militant group active in Rivers and Bayelsa States, and with Youruba in the south-west.

- Pakistan with Balochi nation in Balochistan and North-Western Tribal Territories;

- Russia with Caucasus Emirate gathering Islamic nations from Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia;

- Saudi Arabia with Yemeni Arabs near Yemen Border;

- South Sudan with Dinka in central and northern part of the country, with Jalwau tribe near Wau, with Nuer nation in central and eastern part of the country, with Mabaan and Uduk tribes in the north-east, with Mundari near Juba, and with Murle in the east.

- Sudan with Misseriya Arabs in non-arabic southern borderlands and Darfur, with Falata (West-African immigrants) in central and southern parts of Sudan, with Baggara Arabs and Hamar Arabs in south Darfur and Kordofan, with Kababish Arabs in North Kordofan, with Maaliyah tribe in East Darfur, with Masalit in south and west Darfur, with Dinka near South Sudanese border, with Abbala Arabs in North Darfur, with Ingessana (Gaam) in Blue Nile Valley, and with Zaghawa in West Darfur.

- Syria with Kurds in the north, and with other minority groups self-defense forces (Circassians, Turkoman, Arameans, Armenians and Assyrians);

- Thailand with Pattani near Malaysian border;

- Turkey with Kurds near Syrian and Iraqi border;

- Uganda with Bakonjo (Konjo) and Bamba (Amba) in Ruwenzori Massif (Ruwenzori Kingdom);
- Ukraine with Russians in Doneck and Lugansk separatists republics.

As so it can be seen, there is many countries with determination to forcibly gain an independence (UCDP 2018).

Three solutions and conclusions

There are three solutions of ending most of ethnic conflicts. They are proposed by scholars and experts cited in this paper. All of them aren't ideal, so they have their strong and weak sides, what influences a chances of success in peaceful resolutions. These solution and conclusions focused on a wide approval by international society of recognition as a tool to end long-lasting ethnic conflicts in case of creation de facto independent state.

First idea to make this tool effective is to use the United Nations as a political entity to recognize new states. New de facto functioning states shall have right to write a petition to the UN Secretary General, and then on the forum of UN such case would be discussed and voted. This is interesting but seems to be ineffective. Why member states would vote against interest other members and create new political animosities? This idea in an opinion of the author will not change lot from current international law situation, and thus will fail, especially when secession will target main powers like Russia.

Second idea to introduce mass recognition of de facto states is to use a power and influence of major powers as a protectors of new statehoods. This solution will have to change current stance towards mass recognition in worlds politics before, and that is way it is not very likely. In authors opinion there is another problem as well. New recognized states would become a clients of great protecting powers. Such situation will not provide substantial change for freeing population. From dependence of previous state they will turn their eyes up to another foreigners.

Third idea is more unofficial. It creates an international law that forbids lack of recognition of the facto states which are able to uphold some basic elements of statehood, like security of foreigners, clear juridical system, fluent economy, and some years of de facto independence from previous occupant of its territory. However undertaking such law is very unlikely, and would change significantly an international political system.

What are an effects of such changes, which utilize recognition as a tool to end long-lasting ethnic conflicts? If the international society would introduce such changes, it seem to be more and more states in the world soon. Currently we have almost 7000 living languages, most of which are very small local groups, but still number of nations counts in thousands. Creation of new states would lead to so called balkanization of different parts of the globe, and anarchization of international relations as a consequence, what some

scholars are sure of. Peaceful recognition of de facto states should end long-lasting ethnic conflicts, which are prevailing among war cases. Decrease in amount of ethnic conflicts doesn't actually affect total numbers. It may appear that ethnic violence will be replaced by religious, economic or ideological reasons for wars. Some scholars also guess that such change of political practice would change today peaceful subjugated nations into violent separatists, because such political game would be worthy for them. Anyway it is noticeable, that scholars community debates about a need of ending long-lasting conflicts. An announcement of end of history by Francis Fukuyama in 90's didn't cause decrease in amount of conflicts and casualties as well. The world is more and more violent place, as shows cited statistics. Most people concludes that freedom is worth fighting for if chances of success are calculated and significant. The rhetoric question is how profitable is fighting or even voting for freedom of other nations. One of the Polish generals Tadeusz Kościuszko introduced an ideology, that it is always worth to fight for freedom own as well of others.

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***THE ROLE OF IDENTITY AND RATIONALITY IN CASE OF
POTENTIAL SAUDI-ISRAEL ALLIANCE FROM A CONSTRUCTIVIST
PERSPECTIVE***

Abstract:

The hatred between Saudi and Israel citizens is the main reason for bad relations between those two countries. This hostility was built by the rulers, who sought support for their aggressive policy. After decades of propaganda, hatred became an independent part of Saudi and Israel identity. According to the Rational Choice Theory preservation of the regime is an objective aim of the state, as it is included in one of the most significant goals of the state – security. Improvement of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel might affect domestic stability of those countries, as moderate policy might not be supported by the citizens. Hence forming an official alliance between those countries might not be rational as it could be dangerous for their security. That is why the strategy of avoiding

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mutual recognition can be interpreted as a rational in a sense of Rational Choice Theory.

Key words: Israel, Saudi Arabia, constructivism, national identity, state rationalism, nation.

Introduction

At the end of 2017, the international public opinion was intrigued by the rumours about potential Saudi-Israel alliance. The situation was especially interesting, as Saudi Arabia and Israel do not even recognize each other.

This essay will analyse the validity of a constructivist approach in case of aversion between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The first part of the essay will focus on a description of the state and international system from the constructivist perception, in contrast to the Rational Choice Theory perspective. Then the essay will describe Saudi-Israeli relations and their international background, as it is crucial to understand the problem from a broader perspective. Thereafter essay will discuss the meaning of religious, national and ethnic identities in Saudi-Israel tensions and the other reasons for poor relations between those two states. Last part would be the critique of the constructivist approach from the point of view of the Rational Choice Theory.

Constructivism

Unlike realism or liberalism, constructivism is not a theory, but rather a methodological approach, the so-called paradigm of paradigms. The central role of this approach is the endogeneity of rules, which shapes the behaviour of the actors, and what follows the whole international system. Endogeneity, in contrast to homogeneity, assumes that rules and principles are shaped within the system. In other words, they are not "given" from outside, but they are rather a result of the internal process.

The best way to describe constructivism is to define first the opposite of the constructivist approach – the Rational Choice Theory. The behaviour of the state in the rational approach is based on the model of Homo oeconomicus. This model assumes that actor (in this case state) act rationally in his best interest to achieve the utility. In the case of international relations, the rational approach assumes the utility to be predefined and equally perceived by all actors. Hence all states are the same, as their aims and incentives are the same. That is why state only needs to rationally allocate resources to achieve a goal; gain as much utility (materialistic values like security, wealth etc) as it is possible.

In contrary to rationalism, constructivism assumes the model of homo sociologicus. In this model, states purposes are not unified. Countries' goals can differ, as they are shaped mainly by states' unique identities. The process of defining the state's identity lasts hundreds or

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thousands of years. It cannot be significantly influenced by the volitional action of the actor (for example decision of statesmen, launching new national strategy etc) because of the two reasons. Firstly, the state is not treated as an individual actor (like the consumer in microeconomics), but rather as an aggregate actor, the sum of all people and of all convictions, institutions and other factors influencing the characteristics of the community. The second reason is that evolution of the rules which shapes the behaviour of the state lasts for hundreds of years. This process is hardly measurable and what follows hardly manageable, especially within the short period.

In the opposite of constructivism - rationalism, the behaviour of all rational actors shapes the international system in a similar way like the behaviour of all economic actors (firms, consumers etc) shapes the market in microeconomics. (Waltz, 1979) Hence, the international system always seeks for equilibrium, based on the rational behaviour of the self-interest states. All states have the same, materialistic aims, like security and wealth.

In constructivism international system is based mainly on the behaviour of states, but motives of the behaviour of those states are not unified. That is why two countries could behave differently in a similar situation. The general framework of the system, similarly like the identity of a particular actor evolves in the processes. All rules are endogenous products of the evolution of the system, not exogenous axioms. For example, it is possible that in a particular situation states

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might be self-interested, but it does not need to happen in another situation. It is because self-help, as well as power politics, do not follow logically or causally from anarchy (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, many occurrences in world history were based only on temporary assumptions, not on exogenous axioms. For example, it was not inevitable that USA and USSR were enemies during cold war. It was only a result of the way the international system and relations between those superpowers evolved. Hypothetically those two countries could be allies, as well as USA and UK if only states perceived a different set of rules as a paradigm. The situation might be different if for example USA and USSR were ruled by one dynasty or if USA were a communist country like USSR.

Saudi-Israel relations

The brief description of the international background included in this chapter is necessary, as without a basic understanding of the international situation in the Middle East region it is difficult to understand Saudi and Israeli motives. For a few decades, Sunni Saudi Arabia was perceived as a leader of the Islamic world. It was natural, as two main holy cities of Islam; Mecca and Medina were placed in Saudi Arabia.

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979 Shiite Iran became a rival for Saudi Arabia. Iran was not only the great power in the region but also it pretends to be a new leader of the Islamic world. The situation

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is even more complicated, as Iran promotes competitive branch of Islam–Shia.

The war in Iraq in 2003 created a power vacuum in the region, filled mainly by Iran. Sunni Saddam Hussein sympathized with Saudi Arabia. Lack of Sunni leader started to push mostly Shiite Iraq in the Iranian sphere of influences.

The main area of struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a proxy war in Syria. Iran supports Alawite Bashar al Assad when Saudi Arabia supports the Sunni rebels. The competition between those two powers is also visible in Yemen, where Iran supports Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia supports the government, and in Lebanon, where Iran supports Hezbollah. Recently Iran gained more influence also in Qatar, the country seen as a traditional ally of Saudi Arabia.

In 2018 Iran is defined as a major threat for Saudi Arabia and for Israel. Both countries are especially concerned about the Iranian nuclear program.

Israel, as well as Saudi Arabia, is concerned about the emerging power of Iran. Especially its nuclear program poses a threat to those two countries. That is why they both perceive Iran as the main enemy. Moreover, both states are closely allied with the USA.

Both countries are important military powers in the region of the only Middle East, but only Israel is a member of a Nuclear Club. Theoretically, an alliance between them is the only rational choice, as they have the same main ally and the arch-foe. However, Saudi Arabia

and Israel do not even recognize each other. In fact, both states have been cooperating unofficially for a long time, but no further steps were taken. Many people believe that this situation is caused mainly by historical tensions between those two countries. For many years Saudi Arabia has been supporting PLO and even claimed that Israel should be destroyed. Israel, on the other hand, was accused of creating illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank and abusing the Palestinian minority. Therefore, the hostility between Israel and the Muslim countries in the region became an axiom in the Middle Eastern international politics.

However, both international and domestic politics are the subject of constant evolutionary process. According to the plan of reforms "Vision2030," Saudi Economy is going to become more diversified and less dependent on the oils export. Furthermore, social liberalization women are going to be allowed to drive a car. Many analysts consider recent Political changes in Saudi Arabia as a signal that the improvement of the Saudi-Israel relations is becoming possible. Press communicates seems to support this view. In November 2017 Israel's Chief of Staff, General Gadi Eisenkot, said in an interview with UK-based Saudi newspaper Elaph, that Israel was ready to exchange intelligence with the Saudis in order to confront Iran. A few days a former Saudi justice minister Dr Muhammad bin Abdul Karim Issa (a close associate of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman) told the Israel newspaper Maariv that "no act

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of violence or terror that tries to justify itself by invoking the religion of Islam is justified anywhere, including in Israel". Soon a former senior Israel military figure informed that two Saudi princes told him that "Israel is not an enemy anymore". (BBC 2017) Identity is seen as the main reason for the hostility between Saudi Arabia and Israel. There are three main branches of identity which are going to be described in this essay: Religious, Ethnic and National.

Religious Identity

Israel is officially a Jewish country and Jews see non-Jews as gentiles, while Saudi Arabia is mostly a Sunni Muslim country, and Muslim see non-Muslims as Kafirs. Above terms highlights Muslims and Jewish suspicious stance toward the representatives of different religious groups. Both countries are confessional states. Public law in Saudi Arabia is based on Sharia law and society is highly influenced by Muslim morality and teaching, while Israel law and social order are based on Judaism. Saudi Arabia is the principal in the Muslim world and practising Judaism in the Kingdom is illegal. What is more openly Jewish are not even permitted to visit Saudi Arabia. Foregoing examples can be treated as valid reasons why Saudi Arabia should not have any good relations (or any relations at all) with Israel. However Saudi Arabs have very good relations with Christian/Secularistic USA (with a strong Jewish diaspora and lobby in the country), so it is not a rule that Muslim state cannot have good relations with the non-

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Muslim country. Also, it is not a rule that Israel cannot have good relations with the Muslim state, what was proven by the Camp David Accords. Egypt, the former arch-foe of Israel, recognized the Jewish state and normalized relations with Israel, even though other Muslim countries saw it as a betrayal of a Muslim community.

Common religion not always guarantee good relations. A good example is a diplomatic crisis between Sunni Qatar and Sunni Saudi Arabia. Therefore, religious differences do not necessarily lead to tensions between countries. Also, Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) proven that religious identity might not be as important in the Middle East as it is perceived. During this war, Shiites fought alongside with Sunnis in one army in the ranks of national armies. Hence, religion is not the only factor shaping the identity of the Middle-Eastern countries.

National Identity

Israeli national identity was largely shaped by the tragedy of Holocaust. Modern Jews remember about Shoah and do not want to allow for a repetition of this tragedy. Also, distress caused by the fact that Israel state has been surrounded by the enemies since the very beginning of its existence in 1948 strengthen Jewish national pride and sense of community.

On the other hand Saudi Arabia, as a part of the Arabic community sees Israel as a threat to the regional Arabic peace. Nevertheless, there is no reason why nationalism should be

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recognised as a more valid reason for the inter-state tensions than in the other areas of the world. Nationalism is not the fundamental element of the identity in the Middle East. Also, there were many situations in the world history where nationalism did not stop countries from establishing good relations. A good example is a French-German alliance made soon after the end of the Second World War.

Saudi Arabia is an Arab country, and Israel is not. However Saudi Arabia has bad relations with Arabic Qatar and good with the USA, so the ethnic criterium is not decisive. Also, Jewish community itself is not very ethnically homogeneous. Many Citizens are not Semitic people, but rather Ashkenazi Jews. Despite this fact, there are no significant ethnic tensions in Israel between those two groups. Hence ethnic identity should neither be treated as a direct reason for Saudi-Israel tensions.

Role of propaganda

According to constructivism Israel and Saudi Arabia avoid recognizing each other because of the certain constructed norms, supposedly connected with identity. Nonetheless, those animosities are not clearly caused by religious, national or ethnical reasons. However, citizens of those two countries, especially of Saudi Arabia are unlikely to easily accept the official alliance with the country perceived for many years as an arch-foe. Saudi citizens were taught to

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hate Jews, as well as Jews, were taught to hate Arabs for many years. It is because states sought for the citizens' support of their strong-armed policy toward the rival. They also produce propaganda for external use, to justify their aggressive stance toward the enemy to the international public opinion. In consequence, hatred became an independent part of Saudi and Israel identity, in a similar way like remembrance about the Holocaust became an independent part of Jewish identity. Hence, according to constructivism goals of those two states are not exclusively materialistic (security, wealth), as they were shaped by identities. In that case, the aims of those two countries are to destroy each other.

Rationalist critique of the constructivist approach

As mentioned before, Rational Choice Theory is an opposite of the constructivism. The assumption of the validity of the constructivist approach implies that actors are not rational in the traditional sense of the homo oeconomicus model. It is caused by the fact that their behaviour is not based on the materialistic interest, but rather on self-defined aims. However, it is objectively rational for the regime to seek for self-preservation, as security, the fundamental materialistic aim also assumes self-preservation of the regime. It is clearly materialistic goal for states to be safe also from coup d'etat or revolution, not only from the invasion from abroad. Therefore, preservation of the regime

is an ultimate goal, which is not derived from the identity of the single country.

Middle East is a very unstable region. Many regimes, like Iraqi in 2003 or Iranian in 1979 simply ceased to exist. Some other regimes, like Syrian or Yemeni are in danger due to rebellions. Hence it is possible that Saudi Arabia and Israel cannot declare friendship or even recognize each other for different reasons than only their identities. It could be potentially dangerous especially for Saudi Arabia. This country's regime is based on a coalition of Saudi dynasty and conservative Shiite clerics. In the worst scenario, the radical clerics could stop supporting the Saudi family, what would undermine the legitimization of the regime and potentially destabilize the country. Fact that this pessimistic scenario is rather unlikely to happen does not mean that Saudi Arabia can simply declare an alliance with Israel.

It is estimated by a political scientist that each regime needs 30% of social support to sustain in the long run (below 30% of social support authoritarianism would need to fall back on totalitarian methods). This simplified estimation highlights the fact that each regime needs to constantly seek for social support. The political position of the actors (statesmen, countries, parties) is the sum of all decisions. Even if one decision does not cause the rebellion, it is still reasonable to avoid making decisions which decrease the level of the social support. Therefore, it might be rational for Saudi Arabia not to declare friendship with Israel. Hence both constructivist premise,

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assuming that identity, in this case, hatred, shapes the aims and behaviour of the state and rationalists premise (behaviour of the state is motivated by seeking of materialistic values, like security and wealth) might be fulfilled. In other words, this case is a common ground for those two theories.

Conclusion

Constructivism is not a theory, but rather a methodological approach, the paradigm of paradigms, which highlight the endogeneity of the rules, which are shaped in the internal process. Constructivism assumes the model of homo sociologicus, where the aims and incentives are not the same for all states. Those goals are shaped mainly by the country's identity, which is shaped on the process and evolves constantly. The identity cannot be significantly influenced by the volitional action of the actor because of two reasons; Firstly, the state is treated as an aggregate, the sum of all people and all convictions, institutions etc. Secondly evolution of the identity is hardly measurable and manageable.

In constructivism, the international system is based mainly by the behaviour of the actors with different aims. Its framework is endogenous and constantly evolve in the process. No rules, even self-help or power politics are not fixed.

Iran, which increases its influence in the Middle Eastern region became an enemy both for Saudi Arabia and for Israel. The rivalry

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between Iran and Saudi Arabia is held also in the proxy wars. It seems to be rational for Israel and Saudi Arabia to form an alliance against Iran, especially that both those countries have a common ally – USA. However, these countries do not even recognise each other, but they cooperate unofficially. Israel-Saudi relations might improve, as Saudi Arabia is going to modernize and soften the radical Sharia law and rhetoric of both countries became more conciliatory.

Religious identity of both countries might potentiate the hostility between them, but still, it should not stop them from improving relationships. It is proven by the examples of the relationship between Egyptian-Israeli American-Saudi relations. National identity should not play a bigger role than in different regions, similarly like ethnic identity, which does not seem to be very crucial in that case.

The hatred between Saudi and Israel citizens is the main reason for bad relations between those two countries. This hostility was built by the rulers, who sought support for their aggressive policy. After decades of propaganda, hatred became an independent part of Saudi and Israel identity.

According to the Rational Choice Theory preservation of the regime is an objective aim of the state, as it is included in one of the most significant goals of the state – security. Improvement of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel might affect domestic stability of those countries, as moderate policy might not be

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supported by the citizens. Hence forming an official alliance between those countries might not be rational as it could be dangerous for their security. That is why the strategy of avoiding mutual recognition can be interpreted as a rational in a sense of Rational Choice Theory.

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