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REVIEWS

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KOSOVO BUBBLE – FROM INFLATION OF VIRTUAL IDENTITY TO THE END OF HISTORY*

Abstract:

This article discusses the Kosovo issue relating it to the theory of Poststructuralism and the Bretton Woods economic system. Just as Poststructuralism denies the existence of truth in its anti-essentialism and as Bretton Woods economy operates with money lacking basis in gold and real value, so does the Albanian politics of identity try to constitute on the specious projections concerning nation, language, and history. The consequence of Bretton Woods system is economic bubble which in the end always burst due to its loss of connection with real value; thus in this article we aim to show that the region of Kosovo is itself one kind of a virtual bubble the bursting of which

evokes post-humanism and the end of history with grave consequences for the real world.

Key words: Kosovo, Albanians, Serbs, Bretton Woods, Poststructuralism, identity, Skanderbeg, language, history, Posthumanism.

Introduction: Bretton Woods and Poststructuralism

In this paper we shall attempt a rationale of the Albanian presence in the Balkans, particularly in the disputed region of Kosovo. In spite of standard political interpretations, we believe that the question of Albanians can be elucidated the best if we approach it via Poststructuralism as the intellectual framework in which this crux is embedded.

Nothing best describes Poststructuralism than its own proponents: from them we hear and read statements such as: "There are no values", "There are no essences", "Everything is discourse", "Everything is power or phenomenon of power". In these exchanges we often discover that "meaning is negotiated" (as if it depended on the good will and skills of the speakers and not the thing itself which is discussed). In the titles of symposia, papers and proceedings we see a profuse use of participles and gerunds and often they begin with words such as "investigating", "researching", "extending", "reimagining", "reassessing" and of course the mentioned favourite

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"negotiating". It is a constant state of flux. Every day we witness an historic event and at the same time we are being convinced that history has ended; human rights activists fight for freedom for self-determination and simultaneously claim that 'self is Other', that our identity is a 'social construct' and that we are a mass of chemicals bound by inexorable natural laws; mystical experiences are result of chemical imbalance, but LSD can help you have sense of unity and oneness with the world; scientific truth is only what can be tested and verified where as at the same time we have holy cows of the Big Bang theory and Darwinian evolution which are impossible to prove by experiment; "God is dead" (Nietzsche), "Author is dead" (Roland Barthes), "Philosophy is dead" (Stephen Hawking). Let us not be too confused when we try to look at the building of modern thinking and discover it resembles a Hollywood film set; that it has one wall and that it is made of cardboard. There is no building of modern thought because there is no constructive thinking. We live in an era of deconstruction, a philosophical movement aimed against essences, values, laws, permanent ethical precepts.

Poststructuralist way of thinking has led to the emergence of many phenomena, but few are so pervasive and global as the Bretton Woods economic model. This global financial order was established in 1944 in order to provide a universal basis by which it would be easier to exchange one currency for another. The Bretton Woods agreement made it obligatory for 44 nations to do two things: they were to fix

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their exchange rates and tie their currencies to the U.S. dollar. The United States themselves tied dollar to gold. At first the system seemed to be successful. There was economic growth. But the Bretton Woods system was disguised in 1971. The United States abandoned tying dollar to the gold basis and there was no more fixed exchange-rate system. However, there remained a significant legacy of the Bretton Woods system. While there is no fixed exchange rate, the reserve world currency is still the American dollar. This means that world became economically dependent on the American economy; and vice versa: the United States could affect the economy of the world simply by printing dollars. In a more metaphysical sense, it means that currency is no longer tied to something real, concrete, like gold, but to a changeable, impermanent, fluid thing like another currency. By severing ties with the golden basis but at the same time keeping connection with the U.S. dollar, the world economy entered a period of all kinds of hocus-pocus financial magic, simulation, illusion, dramatic existence. This clearly relates it to Poststructuralism as a theoretical apology of the system that could be called truncated Bretton Woods.

The chief problem which arises within such a system is a 'bubble' – a theoretical amassing of hollow philosophical and ideological concepts, an economic expansion without real basis, an inflation beyond that which is supported by real production, unhindered by true supply and demand, less and less bearing relation

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to the facts of the market. While it lasts, the bubble provides an illusion of knowledge or prosperity; but when it bursts, people are left with worthless assets, useless concepts and immense loans they cannot repay because their money no longer has any value. The strategy of truncated Bretton Woods economy is constant flux. For people not to spot the unreality of the American dollar, it always has to circle around the world, from country to country, and constantly switch hands. This is why Poststructuralism is always allergic to the concept of nation. This free flow of dollar requires national barriers to be removed – and therefore this system does not look approvingly on phenomena such as nation, nationality, nationalism. It does not tolerate any other reserve currency; any kind of seeking a basis (again in gold) could be seen as a threat to the system which has completely been unhinged. People are reprimanded when they want a life-long occupation and are indeed encouraged to always change jobs (in the name of "challenge", "seeking oneself", "career-building"); they are even encouraged to seek job outside one's own country and therefore the truncated Bretton Woods economy has led to massive economic migrations towards wellsprings of dollars. To have one's own property as well as one's own mind has become too expensive for an increasing number of people who now have to rent flats and houses as well as prefabricated worldviews. Real value in the truncated Bretton Woods system remains elusive while the value of the dollar is illusive. Printing money without security was the idea which was supposed to change

the world. Such money was used by countries to pay for energy (oil primarily) which was a strong strike against societies based on values. In a certain way the system resembles the moving pictures. That is why apology of Hollywood is at the core of the truncated Bretton Woods. If we slow down a film, we see that there is but illusion of movement and in fact fast sequence of images. Therefore this financial system does not allow any change of pace; nay, it does not allow decreasing the speed, whereas faster is better. Poststructuralism similarly operates with void concepts – all traditional values are dead and abandoned, and only carousel of fast dancing juggle concepts make knowledge go round without any reliable fulcrum. From such a state of art arises the most significant historical product of wedding between Breton Woods and Poststructuralism. This is "Republic of Kosovo".[3] In recent Kosovo's forced independence we meet notorious phenomena of Poststructuralism: lacking basis, relativity of truth, producing virtual identities, death of traditional values and concepts, expansion regardless of natural constrictions; even 'ego-boosting' – if in modern business a person is encouraged to career chasing because he or she is "aspiring", "a young professional", than in the same vein we might expect a nation to be encouraged as "pre-eminent", "essential", "strategic" and so on.

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[3] The legal child of Poststructuralism is also Bologna Declaration that tends to reform university education by deepening the void concepts and deconstructing them to dizzy neoliberal carousel of the truncated Bretton Woods.

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"Republic of Kosovo" is not sudden political revelation. Modern history of the Albanian people is one of expansion. Twentieth century saw formation of the first Albanian state – Albania; twenty-first century saw emergence of another - Kosovo. Both were made amid the decay of previous countries in the region. Albania was founded while Turkey was retreating from the Balkans; and the process of Kosovo becoming independent began when Yugoslavia was retreating. It seems a simple game: if you need some Albanian state you need a certain state in the process of decline. Or the history itself in the state of decay? One people and two countries in the era of post-nationalism and post-history seems like a very curious phenomenon. That forces us to rise a question - how much is there of a nation in the Albanian nation? It deserves careful examining of twin-state Albanian identity, its historicity and reasons of its construction in 1913 and 2008. Our attempt is to realize why that *inflating of the bubble* was so fast and why the Albanian idea received such an enormous political and military support which is paradoxical and not proportional to its merits or real value.

Inventing the Identity: Skanderbeg and Illyrian Hypothesis

Two historical pillars of the Albanian identity are the figure of George Kastriot Skanderbeg (1405-1468) and its Illyrian roots. Legendary and heroic pursuits of Skanderbeg provide to Albanians an aura of fighters against foreign domination and freedom lovers. The

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British people have King Arthur, King Alfred, Queen Elizabeth I, Queen Victoria; Germans have Friedrich Barbarossa; with French they share Charlemagne; the Irish have Saint Patrick. Albanians too have a similar hero: Skanderbeg is a mythical figure around whom Albanians gather. He is a famed warrior from the fifteenth century who fought against the Turkish occupation. There are many epic poems about his achievements. Skanderbeg was for Albanians a symbol of resistance and a source of inspiration. Busts or portraits of Skanderbeg are almost equally revered as Albanian flag. His name has been elevated to the title: all Albanian rulers used to bear the title 'Skanderbeg'. Skanderbeg's exploits on behalf of Albanians, his valour against the Turkish invaders, and his widely spread legend represent a worthy pillar of Albanian identity. But one problem looms still. Skanderbeg was not Albanian.

Several studies attest to this fact (Gopčević 1890; Hadži-Vasiljević 1906; Hadži-Vasiljević 1909; Đorđević 1913; Balcanikus 1913; Oraovac 1913; Stepanović 1913). These studies confirm that George Castriot Skanderbeg ruled over territories inhabited by Serbs; that both his father Ivan (latter monk's name Joakim) and brother Reposh were Serbian – in fact they were buried in the Serbian Orthodox monastery of Hilandar (Chilandariou) on Mount Athos, Greece. It is a most uncomfortable fact for the Albanian historians because evidence about Skanderbeg's father and brother is attainable easily. Moreover, also Skanderbeg's mother Vojislava was Serbian who descended from

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Serbian noble family Branković (Petrović 2016). It is hard to believe that Serbs parents got an Albanian child whose brother was a Serb, so it is more rational to consider Albanian national hero a Serb. In such a situation Albanian historians do as famous Prussian philosopher who, upon discovering that his theory contradicted the facts, said - „worse for the facts then". In that respect, there was an interesting event in the Skanderbeg museum in the Albanian town of Krujë. The museum guide explained that Skanderbeg's father and brother were buried in a Serbian Orthodox monastery simply because Skanderbeg was such a notable and important person, and not because they were in fact Orthodox monks and adepts. (Gorin, 2012)   It does not matter that during eight centuries of Hilandar, besides many mighty Serbian rulers and their relations, no one was buried there except monks and adepts. In fact, we owe template of Skanderbeg to a Roman Catholic priest from Shodra Marin Barleti (1450 – 1512) and his biography of Skanderbeg *Historia de vita et gestis Scanderbegi Epirotarum principis* published in 1508/1510 and translated into many European languages.[4] Skanderbeg was eligible for such a historical apotheosis because at one moment he was converted to Catholicism.

What about the historical basis of the Albanian identity? The official historical doctrine in Albania claims that the Albanian people

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[4] Serbian translation from 1754 ends with notice that Marin from Shodra is of Slavic origin. From some reason translations started to appear at the beginning of XVIII century, at the same time when Antonio Vivaldi opera *Skanderbeg* was first performed.

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originate from ancient Illyrian people. The Illyrian hypothesis is important because it lends credence to Albanian claims of being autochthonous people in the Balkans; in contrast with Slavic people who supposedly came to the region later in history, it establishes precedence of the Albanians. However, there are barely any traces of Illyrian people who occupied Balkan Peninsula during the times of the Roman Empire. Illyrians were illiterate and had not left any literature behind them; we know next to nothing about these people and they only appear in records of other people who encountered them – primarily Greeks and Romans. Other peoples in the Balkans have at various times tried to attribute their origins to the Illyrian people. In basic historical text for the Balkan ethnogenesis, *De Administrando Imperio*, written in X century by the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Albanians are mentioned not as living in the Balkans but in a territory roughly corresponding to today's Azerbaijan. First historical references to Albanians in the Balkans were made in the eleventh century, much later than for other people of the region, such as Greeks, Serbs or Bulgarians.

Since historical research does not support the hypothesis, it actually primarily rests on linguistic ground: at Albanian universities it is propounded that Albanian language is a descendant of Illyrian language. However, since there are no Illyrian writings left due to which one premise is completely lacking, how can we make such an inference? Stefan Schumacher and Joachim Matzinger from the

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Vienna University were perplexed by the same issue. They told that Albanian language does not in fact originate from Illyrian language. They have nothing in common, cannot fit together, and the conclusion is that, from a linguistic point of view, these are two different languages. (Likmeta 2011**)**. Schumacher further points out that insisting on links between two languages comes naturally from the 19th century context, when crafting national identities went hand in hand with language as the common denominator. But foundation in language is rather tenuous: it rests on comparison with the unknown (Illyrians).

Albanian literature itself does not afford us with much evidence either. First and exclusive examples of Albanian literature come from the ranks of Catholic clergy. First writing is a baptismal formula written by the archbishop of Durres, Pal Engjelli, in 1462; the first book, a missal written by Gjon Buzuku, a Catholic priest, appeared in 1554. Another two members of clergy contributing to Albanian literature were Pjeter Budi, archbishop of Sape; and half a century later, Pjeter Bogdani, Archbishop of Prizren. He did it under a strict control by the Roman church, as Matzinger and Schumacher point out. Late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century saw the helping hand of Vatican in further establishing Albanian literature. Many Catholic schools were founded by Franciscans and Jesuits in Shkodra. The most important poet in the twentieth century was actually a Franciscan priest Gjergj Fishta (1871–1940). Apart from

literary works made by the Catholic clergy themselves, there does not seem to exist any other independent body of evidence suggesting the existence of Albanian language: no monuments, charters, maps. At the same time, the territory of Kosovo is replete with overwhelming evidence of Serbian presence such as inscriptions on monuments, monasteries, charters, churches, paintings and other historical testimonies of Serbs existing in this area. Petar Iskenderov notes similarities between Albanian and Romanian, but also between Albanian and Serbian, Greek and vernacular Latin dialects in the area (Iskenderov 2014). Iskenderov also mentions crucial fact that the documents related to Albanian declaration of independence (1912) were written not in Albanian, but in Turkish, and that the delegates from Kosovo and other parts of the Balkans who participated at the Pan-Albanian congress in Valona *did not speak Albanian at all*. Also the first Albanian government wrote using Turkish script as none of the Albanian ministers did not know the Albanian script (Iskenderov 2014).

As we can see, formation of Albanian literature and therefore Albanian cultural identity seems not to have come as the consequence of intrinsic historical process, and from within Albanian people themselves, but had been initiated and implemented from the outside – namely, by Roman Catholic clergy. It is also interesting to notice that the emergence of Albanian literature and the interventions of the Roman church coincided with the political waning and demise of the

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Eastern Roman Empire, Greek and Christian Orthodox in its character. With the fall of Constantinople, it apparently became easier for Catholic clergy to perform their mission in the region. What we see at work is linguistic engineering of a sort on the part of the Roman Catholic Church which in the end became national engineering. Vatican had not shied from similar attempts in history. A good parallel would be the *Donation of Constantinople*, a medieval document supposedly written by the emperor Constantine the Great by which this emperor transferred authority over Rome and the western part of the empire to the Pope of Rome. However, in 15th century, Lorenzo Vala, a Renaissance humanist, used philological methods to reveal the document for what it really was: a forgery made to support papal political authority in Western Europe. We can view the emergence of Albanian literature and written language in the same way. The disappearance of the Eastern Roman Empire made space for fragmentation of the territory and bringing it under the domain of the Roman Catholic Church. That is why all or most early Albanian writers were Catholic priests, some of which writing bilingually. It was important to demonstrate the Catholic roots of the Albanian people, the very roots which could later be used to show these people as belonging to the domain of the Church of Rome, and not Church of Constantinople. Albanian language, whose broad shape according to Schumacher and Matzinger, resembles Greek language, suddenly became Latinized by the intervention of the Catholic clergy. The

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sudden appearance of Albanian language leads us to a conclusion that, like the myth of Skanderbeg, Albanian language itself is also a linguistic and a political construct. Traces of Byzantine culture and influences were being erased and that was a basic colonial strategy of Venetian Republic and Vatican. This is supported by the fact that even at the beginning of the twentieth century, people did not use Albanian language or Albanian script, but Turkish language and Turkish script. The factitious language concocted by the Catholic clergy obviously had no contact with reality, i.e. with people of mixed origins who lived at the territory that supposed to be Albanian and who did not accept artificial language nor use it.

The strategy was later adopted by countries of Middle and Western Europe. As Proroković (2014) analyzes, a similar kind of activity was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina after it passed from Turkey to Austro-Hungarian Empire. New history textbooks were written; the designation 'Bosniaks' was invented for the people living in the territory to distinguish them from Serbs; Serbian language was renamed as "Bosnian" or "Ours". Catholic scholastic theology is very well known for its insistence on strict logic and precise distinctions between beings; Catholic mission in Bosnia goes one step further and helps distinctions and differences arise where before there were none. All in all, after the demise of the Eastern Roman Empire, whenever there was some influence of Western Christian Church, there

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appeared some new identity, cultural matrix, written literature and obviously new history.

Another example is a fairly recent appearance of the so-called Macedonian language which actually had not existed prior to 1945, and was indeed known as one of the southern dialects of Serbian language. But with the Communist revolution in Yugoslavia and its principle "Weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia", there was a concentrated effort to weaken the Serbian position and fragment Serbian culture into several new nations, such as Montenegrins, Bosnians, Macedonians, all of which were formerly known only as Serbs. In case of Macedonians, language was the basis. Prilep - Bitola dialect of Central Macedonia was taken as the basis for standard Macedonian. Henceforth, what was previously known as South Serbia or Old Serbia became Macedonia. And at this very moment, simply by walking around the capital of Macedonia, one can see where *this* identity bubble has led Macedonians too. The capital city of Skopje is profusely decorated with statues of Alexander the Great, his father Phillip, and other legendary Macedonian ancient kings. The city airport bears the name of Alexander. Like Albanians claiming to be Illyrians, Macedonians claim to be descendants of the people of Alexander the Great. All traces of the old Macedonian people are lost after the end of the Classical Period: they probably spoke a dialect of Greek language, and have nothing whatsoever with nowadays Slavic population in these areas.

One more example of historical falsification concerns the famous bridge over the river Vardar in Skopje. This bridge was built during the reign of Serbian emperor Dušan the Mighty (1308-1355); and actually during his reign, Skopje itself was the capital of Serbian empire. Now on the bridge we can read a plaque informing us that the bridge was *repaired* in 15*th* century by the Turks who had by then conquered Skopje. The information on who built the bridge is completely omitted probably because Serbian origins are far more problematic for the identity of Macedonians than Turkish emendations.

In an ethnical sense, Albanians are not too far from the Macedonian example. If we cannot say that all Albanians are descendants of Serbs, we can, however, attest that many Albanians nowadays were formerly Serbs. Iskenderov cites remarks of the Russian consul in Mitrovica, Sergey Tuholka, from the beginning of the twentieth century, who noticed the process of "Albanization" of Serbs. According to Tuholka, Catholic population from the village of Janjevo in Priština district spoke Serbian language whereas the Catholic clergy tried hard to instill in them the sense of Albanian identity. Iskenderov also argues that the eighteenth and nineteenth century saw a rising Islamization of Serbs (especially Catholic Serbs) in the area of Prizren and Djakovica. By receiving Islam, notes Iskenderov, Serbs were registered as Turks, and then at the end of the nineteenth century

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these "Turks" became a significant part of the Albanian nation (Iskenderov 2014).

The construction of Albanian identity seems nowadays quite rounded, but it always needs external impulses to be sustainable since it is based on big but specious pillars. The 'Illyrian hypothesis' of Albanian origin is scientifically unverifiable and therefore ethnic identification with Illyrians groundless; and the Skanderbeg element is a clear case of appropriation and historical fiction. Therefore in constructing Albanian identity we are witnessing a clear case of projecting current political and historical ambitions (of building a Greater Albania) into the misty history where it had all begun. If money lacked golden basis in the truncated Bretton Woods system and if any poststructuralist conclusion was undermined by the poststructuralist premise that there is no truth, then in Albanian identity we see history without historical evidence, linguistic ancestry without the knowledge of the ancestor language, national literature appearing outside the nation, and the national hero borrowed from another nation; and even demographic appropriation of another people (Serbs) through religious conversion, either to Catholicism or to Islam.

Inflating the Bubble: Albania and Kosovo

The virtual character of the Albanian identity is analogous to unreal economic value of the American dollar which is the strongest

supporter of the second Albanian state. The connecting thread was lack of real-world basis, whether in gold or in history and culture. After the depletion of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 – that is, when the real basis was lost – instead of trying to find another (kind of) basis, the financial structures responded by at first glance comfortable over-printing the dollar. Instead of abandoning the illusion, they proceeded to spread it across the world. Something similar would happen with Albanians: they would receive massive support of groundless dollar and made one of the key nations in the Balkans, which is reversely proportional to their cultural and historical contributions. In this section we turn therefore to formation of *two* countries for *one* nation and the paradoxes involved herein.

Albania appeared as an independent state almost equally strangely as its roots were found in the aforementioned phenomena. In 1912, after the First Balkan War Turkey was almost completely expelled from the Balkans. In a geopolitical attempt to block Serbian access to the Adriatic Sea, European countries supported Big Bang decision for the formation of the Albanian state. From this moment, Albania has received its main role to be a constant adversary to Serbia. It was when Serbia became a serious rival to Austro-Hungary that Albanian state was created. The goal, clearly, was to surround Serbia by Austro-Hungary satellites. Politics of Austria-Hungary has not disappeared with its dissolution after the WWI. European Union consistently continues exploiting its strategy supporting the rise of the

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second Albanian state. Only after the secession of Kosovo, Serbia, still in vertigo after the breakdown of its utopian project of Yugoslavia, realized that it has still the same historical task since it is ringed by more or less hostile countries belonging or submissive to the European Union and NATO. And again, Albania plays the key role of battering ram.

An exemption from the typical role of Albania as obstruction to Serbian expansion was the Albanian statesman and officer, Essad Pasha Toptani, who closely worked with Serbian government at the beginning of the twentieth century. Toptani wanted to form a closer union of Serbia and Albania. During the Serbian WWI Golgotha-retreat across Albanian mountains at the end of 1915 he helped Serbians. But all plans of bringing Serbia and Albania closer (and therefore Serbs and Albanians) and thus end rivalry were brought to an end when Toptani was assassinated in Paris in 1920. The message was clear. Therefore he remained the only Albanian politician who actually worked on harmony between two peoples, and not their conflict. Not so long after that, in Marseilles, the same mighty hand assassinated Alexander I, the king of Yugoslavia.

After Toptani's death, all attempts to make permanent peace disappeared. During WWII, when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was invaded by Nazi Germany, Albanians joined Hitler's coalition. They even formed a special 22nd SS division which committed atrocities, severe ethnic cleaning including the massacre of 500 civilians in the

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village of Velika (now in Montenegro). It was absurd that this division named "Skanderbeg", after the Serb medieval ruler, was used as an instrument in exterminating Serbs. But all virtual identities consist of absurdities only. After the war ended, Albanians were never forced to pay any war reparations or were met with sanctions. Contrary to that, all Serbs that were violently expelled from its native region of Kosovo and Metohija by Albanian Nazi troops were banned from coming back to their homes according to state law who forbid their repatriation. That was another absurd, but at the same time clear sign of latent Austro-Hungarian spirit of politics that post-war Yugoslav government will perform in the next decades.

After WWII, Yugoslavia became a socialist country and indeed a victorious side in the war, but absurdities continued. Although Serbian population was not allowed to return to Kosovo and Metohija, Albanians, on the other hand, were quite welcomed and many without any documents moved from Albania to this southern region of Serbia occupying empty Serbian houses. No logical explanation was given for this asymmetrical approach, but it runs with more or less intensity all the time of Yugoslavia existence. Still less were explicable economical policies aimed at the Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohija during the period of socialist Yugoslavia. Kosovo and Metohija was by far the least developed part of Serbia and Yugoslavia. And yet it was here that Albanians were showered with benefits, tax-exemptions, and having their birthrates stimulated. Yugoslav

president Josip Broz Tito was proclaimed as personal godfather of every tenth child in the Albanian family. The result was a demographic inflation of Albanians only in Kosovo, stimulated beyond any reasonable economic, cultural and historical justification. It was the demographic bomb generated as specific and efficient weapon that will explode to weaken Serbia and Yugoslavia. Since 1945 Kosovo was experimental field for policy makers, not only Yugoslavian, who tried to find out what would happen with the demographic bubble that came into being with all models of population control discarded on behalf of political aims. It was the truncated Bretton Woods like inflation of the bubble which would inevitably burst just on time.

After forced resignation of Yugoslav vice-president, a Serb Ranković, in 1967, Tito took absolute power what was followed by virtual rebellion of Albanians in 1968. As a consequence Yugoslavia received a new constitution in 1974, itself paradoxical in another asymmetrical treatment of Albanians and Serbs. By then, Albanians had become a significant minority in Serbia and majority in Kosovo and Metohija. Although numbers spoke the same for Serbs in republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, it was Kosovo and Metohija which was made into an autonomous province within Serbia. Northern part of Serbia, Vojvodina, in which there were not rebellions and Serbs were a stable majority – also was made into an autonomous province. Therefore, Serbia was weakened by having to negotiate its policy with two autonomous provinces, almost

republics, one of which - Kosovo and Metohija - hosted a hostile population. In 1979, during a huge ceremony on the occasion of President Tito's 88th birthday, the last one, the "Relay of Youth" was delivered to him by an Albanian girl from Kosovo, Sanija Hiseni, while behind him was sitting the president of Yugoslavian Alliance of Socialist Youth – also an Albanian from Kosovo. In the middle of the country of the South Slavs she spoke greeting words in Albanian which nobody knows in Yugoslavia except Albanians. The act itself is hugely symbolical. It showed to Albanians that their time has come and that they should take matters into their hands. In a way it concisely and adequately summarizes Tito's legacy. It was thanks to his policies, practically extension of Austro-Hungarian ones, that Albanian bubble was inflated beyond any measure, with clear disregard of both economy and culture.

Therefore it is not strange that immediately after Tito passed away on May 4, 1980, Albanians on March 11, 1981, just to affirm that his legacy is alive and active, launched another, less virtual, rebellion which signaled the end of Yugoslavia.[5] Albanians entered history with the demise of Eastern Roman Empire. Albania appeared as a state in the final years of the Turkish Empire. The end of Yugoslavia saw

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[5] After 1981 up to 2011 the number of Serbs in Kosovo was reduced ten times. Is not known in the whole history that nation (Serbs) who, according to prevalent political version, violated 'human rights' and commited 'ethnical cleansing' vanishes while victims of 'ethnical cleansing' (Albanians) perpetually grown in number. It is obvious missing the point fallacy whose basic aim is to perplex public opinion.

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Albanians being used for the emergence of Kosovo. In the true meaning, Kosovo is the place where history ends, probably only one in the world with pure post-historic, protean identity.

Perhaps one of the reasons for this long post-historic dialectic is their aptness to adopt any identity, indeed any history offered to them. We can see now in what way the 'Kosovar identity' was crafted and how closely it resembles the making of post-Byzantine Albanian identity. In the central square in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, Albanians erected its newest symbol of identity – the statue dedicated to the American still alive past President Bill Clinton. He unfolded it by himself in best tradition of Hollywood soap movies. Instead of iron-Tito now we have soap-Clinton, but the idea of always changeable inflated identity is the same.

In all conflicts in the region of Balkans Albanians remained the only constant; they are made to be the valuable and loyal imperial instrument. The third Albanian rebellion started in 1998, now not virtual because it was backed and de facto lead by special forces of NATO countries. Despite that, Yugoslav forces cleaned up the territory and the bombing was only solution. Bill Clinton deserved monument in Pristina because in 1999 he ordered, without approval of UN Security Council, illegal military attack on Yugoslavia when this country, who as America's ally won the WWI against Austria-Hungary and WWII against Nazi Germany, finally fell apart. America and NATO satellites bombed whole Serbia 79 days under the pretext of protecting human

rights, sure enough of Albanians, who were supposedly persecuted by the 'undemocratic Serbian government'.[6] But we should not forget that the whole bombing campaign by NATO was ignited by an eyewash of the supposed massacre in the village of Račak, which in the end turned out to be an elaborate (albeit not very consistent) hoax (Gorin 2009: 46).[7] Hence the governing principle of the Kosovo War from its beginning to the end and in its aftermath is *illusion-making*.

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[6] America paid high price for that bombing of Serbia. Its air forces technological policy experienced complete failure since more than fifty of its visible and "invisible" high tech planes, B2 - Flying Wing, F117A – Night Hawk, A – 10 Warthog, helicopters Apaches… were downed in Serbia using mostly Russian air defense missiles technology from sixties. After that American air forces became more or less paper tiger and they can attack only small countries. It is hard to believe that investing in the next generations of combat planes will save them. They need something more.

[7] One of the excuses for the intervention was President Slobodan Milosević's hard Serbian nationalism. Milosević was indeed a Serbian nationalist, but not before he was transferred as prisoner to Hague tribunal. That was the best part of his political career because he disassembled Poststructural counterfeit of justice that was performed there on behalf of international law. He persuasively overturned construction of unreal, political charges against him and Serbian political elite which practically meant charges against the Serbian nation. The Hague trial was his practical rehabilitation. Before that he was pure communist who did not believe in Serbian idea but used it for maintaining of his personal power. Parallel to this he believed in Pax Americana, even after bombing, so that in the morning of October 5, 2000, when later that day opposition took power, he still believed that he worked for the Americans. It seems strange that he had such a hard faith, but during the eighties he was among rare European politicians who had direct contacts with David Rockefeller. Such kind of a contact is generally the highest level that European politician can get. Milosevic got a multibillion contract for exporting military aircrafts and cars to US. But breaking up of USSR, civil war in Yugoslavia and change of American administration prevented the contract from realization. Emboldened by these developments, the Americans decided to abandon the tactic of advancing slowly; they charged relying on Albanians as a symbol of the future world. Of course that was wrong, but the problem consists in the fact that now they cannot go back, because in the meantime everything has been turned into an illusion. There is no home to stay, only Holywood all around. It is well known that history has not taught anyone anything. Despite many philosophies of history, we do not know what it serves for. Even worse, we cannot be sure if it really exists. It seems that those anthropologists are right who were claiming that people without history lived better.

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These paradoxes, deceits, stilted realities, anti-traditional and materialist are exactly the phenomena of Poststructuralism which we had given in our introductory remarks; and also fit into the truncated Bretton Woods system which does not care about real value, preferring the virtual one.

The result of illusion-making: another several hundred thousand Serbs were expelled from Kosovo and Metohija; Serbian government was changed in 2000 and became pro-Western and democratic. However, puzzlement does not stop with year 2000. When they seceded and received practical independence from the Serbian government, the Albanians did not stop fighting the Serbs. A testimony by an Italian general reveals many Serbian victims right after the end of the NATO intervention in 1999. This general, Mauro del Vecchio, testifies about killings, raping, kidnapping, burning houses, and attacks on churches and monasteries, beheading of monks, which he interpreted as trying to erase Serbian presence.[8] (Maglie 2016**).** Since the start of the international supervision in 1999, more than 200,000 non-Albanians were driven from their homes (Hatchett 2009: 67). Kosovo and Metohija was brought into a state of irregularity and lawlessness on practically all levels. Serbs have been expelled and the land and the property taken away, but so obviously

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[8] Interviews was translated into English and posted on INSERBIA website: ihttp://inserbia.info/today/2016/06/italian-general-reports-on-killed-serbs-in-kosovo-arrived-every-morning/.

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illegally, that in the future it might just as easily slip away from the Albanians as it slipped into their hands during these conflicts.

This was kept hidden from the eyes of the public and surfaced fairly recently. But hidden occurrences are going to be revealed slowly and inevitably. The British newspaper *Guardian* likened the prime minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, to a 'Mafia boss' due to serious allegations of human organs trafficking. The article cites report by Dick Marty, the human rights investigator, and brings the news of six detention facilities in northern Albania used for harvesting human organs mainly in vivo, singling out Thaçi's Drenica group for bearing the greatest responsibility (Lewis 2010). This is clear mark that Kosovo enters its independence via post-humanism.

BBC reported the news titled "Uranium 'killing Italian troops'" and in the same article we find the fact that around 40,000 depleted uranium rounds were fired during the Bosnian and Kosovo campaigns (Fraser 2007). The case even reached the Italian court which ruled that the Italian Ministry of Defense failed to protect Italian soldiers from hazards of exposure to depleted uranium. (ICBUW 2009). Indeed Kosovo was bombed with bombs containing depleted uranium, and the Albanian majority will have to live with it. Today we know that about 10 tons of depleted uranium ammunition was fired all over Kosovo. It means that political mutation will meet future genetic mutations and that their synergy will produce new chimerical beings.

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This is an inherent part of the Poststructural experiment and another reliable sign of post-humanism.

It was during that post-humanistic and the supposedly democratic period that there was yet another outbreak of violence in Kosovo and Metohija in 2004. Some 35 churches and monasteries were burned to the ground; as well as 935 Serbian houses and public facilities; 10 Serbs were killed; 4012 Serbs were driven out and displaced from their homes. Even numerous graveyards were desecrated or destroyed for the purpose of completely erasing Serbian presence. Who were Albanians rebelling against then? For Serbian military had left the province already in 1999 and Serbs, living only in surrounded ghettos, were minority in the province. The rebellion was obviously directed towards Serbian identity itself which should be erased in order to provide the new state with alibi of historical reality.

In 2008, after a series of failed negotiations, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia and was backed by the United States of America and major Western European countries. There is a pinch of commonsense in the fact that western countries did not recognize independence of Kosovo during the undemocratic regime of the nineties while they did so during the democratic regime of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Just when Serbia got the regime that Albanians and their sponsors would have considered adequate, they were given opportunity to secede. It shows that the reasons for Albanian politics lay far outside Serbia and the Balkans. We can find

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them if we discern that Kosovo bubble is analogous to the financial bubbles as produced by the truncated Bretton Woods model. The one-sided secession and diplomatic recognition of the virtual state of Kosovo coincides with the year of the biggest American economic crisis since the Great Depression. It is not by chance. Kosovo is political analogy of an economic havoc. Virtual state is the only choice for virtual economy. In 2008 with the recognition of Kosovo and extreme liquidity crisis coupled with bursting of the housing bubble in the United States led the world into the gravest turmoil. It is overt as regards Albanians: they have been granted two states and their aggressive spreading has been stimulated beyond any economic, cultural and historical justification because their history is a fiction. On behalf of such a twisting international regulations were broken, the United Nations were disregarded and many strange and absurd exceptions made. It is but the other side of the agreement from the truncated Bretton Woods by which political inflation is promoted into being the very foundation of economic policies. Economic and political inflation go hand in hand. Albanian Kosovo was born in the cradle of the truncated Bretton Woods economics which knew no limits in shaking all grounds on which modern societies were based. Hence Kosovo was an experimental field. The financial bubble did not have any basis in real value; political bubble in Kosovo had no basis in history, culture, morals or anything else. It is simply a consequence of the truncated Bretton Woods project in which nothing should have

any basis so that it can go around faster. Therefore the Kosovo bubble and its bursting is not less disastrous than the explosion of the economic bubble because of distorted sense that poststructuralist, posthumanist project of Kosovo identity brings to the world.

In 2015, Kosovo after destroying numerous churches, monuments and cemeteries almost became member of UNESCO, despite the fact, as in the case of Albania, everything about Kosovo is like a chimera. It is supposedly Albanian, but the name of the 'country' is Serbian;[9] so are more than 90% place-names; nation are called Kosovar, which derived from the Serbian word from the province; cultural heritage (churches, monasteries, etc.) is completely Serbian and Christian in its origin. In Albania we saw appropriation of a Serb, Skanderbeg; in Kosovo, we see a similar process. Albanian historians are now writing that Serbian monasteries in Kosovo were actually built by Albanians: a striking example is that of monastery Visoki Dečani founded by Serbian king Stefan Dečanski (who owes part of his name, 'Dečanski' to the fact of being the founder) for which these Albanian historians claim was built by Albanian tribe Gashi (Vlašković 2013). The same article communicates that on the websites we can find information that another Orthodox church, Bogorodica Ljeviška, is the oldest Albanian church in this region. It is all very strange, especially given the fact that Turkish population census from 1455, immediately

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[9] The term 'Kosovo" is derived from the Serbian name for the bird 'kos' which means merle (blackbird).

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before the breakdown of the Serbian medieval state, attests that Albanian population in the region of Kosovo amounted to merely 1%. The rest were Serbs. As in the case of Illyrians and Skanderbeg, the crafters of identities and states for Albanians seem not to care about historical facts, nor do they shy away from taking over Serbs's history and culture which are then distorted and/or presented as belonging to the Albanians. Perhaps few people are aware of the fact that Kosovo holds the highest concentration of sacral objects on a territory of this size in Europe. There are over 1,000 of them built by the medieval Serbian state, and they have been under constant attack for centuries. UNESCO put them on its list of protected monuments but under the undetermined name of 'Orthodox monasteries' omitting the fact that these are actually *Serbian* Orthodox monasteries, founded by *Serbian* kings. Doing that way UNESCO has backed implicit spoliation of the Serbian heritage. If Serbian name is disregarded, it becomes much easier to further inflate the virtual history of Kosovo.

This lack of care is not evident only one the side of Albanians but also their international sponsors. Albert Sherman points out that "the side of the Moslems was taken against the Serbs without any thought as to meaning or history." (Sherman 2009: 14). Sherman also interprets this behaviour of the West as a symptom of its own crisis pertaining and adopting a cultural paradigm which is "materialistic, anti-traditional, and hegemonistic" (Sherman 2009: 19) Mary Walsh depicts the surreal atmosphere of Kosovo. As she traverses it, one by

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one "fact" turns into an fraud: burned houses are not Albanian but Serbian; Serbian property is relentlessly seized; Italian soldiers look to her like actors on a movie set; Albanians claim that Serbian Orthodox Churches are Albanian national heritage while at the same time trying to blow them up (Walsh 2009: 58-59). Recounting a destiny of a notable family from Urosevac going through many tribulations she too notices strikes not only against Serbian culture and history but also European culture at large, as one work of Giotto ("The Blessed Mother") was also destroyed in the Albanian rampage (Walsh 2009: 61).

Despite all of that the Western European countries did not hesitate from breaking international rules to help Albanians making false identity. In order for the virtual Albanian identity to float freely and expand, there must not be any other identity, particularly one so historically distinct as the Serbian one. Therefore they continue politics of communist Yugoslav regime who granted Albanians significant autonomy and stimulating their population growth. Only rhetoric has been changed – from "brotherhood and unity" of Yugoslav regime, it shifted to the rhetoric of "human rights". But both the reason for NATO intervention and the reason for the independence fail to satisfy if considered even within the context of human rights. As the letter from Willy Wimmer (member of the German Bundestag and Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE) to German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, on May 2, 2000,

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shows, the NATO intervention was motivated by geopolitical, rather than humanitarian goals. (Wimmer 2000).[10] Wimmer notices analogies with the Roman Empire, states that the purpose was to rectify the missed opportunity from 1945 when the American troops did not enter Yugoslavia. In several paragraphs, Wimmer repeats that international regulations were consciously broken and that in fact Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was considered to lie outside Helsinki Final Act on inviolability of borders, that all secession movements should be encouraged and that Kosovo must be made into an independent state. Yugoslavia would also be permanently excepted from European development.

History has validated Wimmer's observations. Serbia's progress as regards joining the European Union has been illusive for the past sixteen years, the territory of Kosovo hosts the second largest American military base outside America – camp Bondsteel, previously Krivolak camp of Yugoslav Army, and Kosovo received its independence in 2008. Hence, it is not hard to see geopolitical reasons for constructing Albanian twin states. Back in 1913, they served to block Serbian access to the Adriatic Sea. During the second half of the twentieth century they were stimulated to destabilize Yugoslavia and bring back the American influence into the region. If we add to that

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[10] Report about State Department/American Enterprise Institute-sponsored conference held on April 28-30, 2000 in Bratislava, Slovakia ("Is Euro-Atlantic Integration Still on Track? Opportunities and Obstacles").

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the fact that Kosovo practically has no real economy and that its budget has no monetary ground, but depends on NATO countries contributions (paid off by uncontrolled exploitation of all natural resources) as well as on human trafficking, drugs production and transfer, and all kind of illegal activities we can see an ideal truncated Breton Woods country. America recognizes Kosovo because it considers that virtual country as the matrix for the state of the future. Half of the world follows America in recognizing Kosovo, but another half does not want to be solely matrix. In this sense Kosovo reflects perfectly deep gap in the core of the modern world and shows a crossroad for the future. The aim of all of that is the same: Kosovo must be ideological construct unable to communicate really with its surrounding neighbors and with the world in general.

Such a situation explains why dialogue between Serbs and Albanians is not possible. In order to have dialogue Serbs, as well as the whole world, has to sacrifice history and instead of that accepts poststructuralist politics of illusions. The good example is Essad Pasha Toptani: all attempts to facilitate dialogue (not polemic, let alone, armed conflict) between Serbs and Albanians are always thwarted. Actually it is not possible to have dialogue with invented identity with no provision. Serbian contact with Albanians is encounter with people who claim to have historical precedence, who have appropriated a Serbian national hero and are now simultaneously destroying and appropriating Serbian cultural heritage as well Serbian real estate in

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Kosovo.[11] Therefore, to even begin to talk with Albanians, whether from Albania or Kosovo, Serbs have to forgo essential parts of their history, to give up on their own cultural heritage, their monuments and churches. To enter this conversation, Serbs have to deconstruct themselves and disappear as the real world dissolved in cyber space.

Conclusion: Consequences and Predictions

Deconstruction is a method promoted by Poststructuralism. It serves to show that there is no truth, that everything is a social/personal construct, ideology forcing itself upon history. But this is matter of Poststructuralism hypocrisy since it too is involved in construction. Nevertheless, Poststructuralist approach, with its disdain for truth, certainty, essence, cannot build anything reliable for the principal reason that it does not use anything but illusions. Poststructuralist identity is a mesmerizing attempt to replace the real world with (twin) towers of sand, metastasized fabrics of printed paper economy and politics. In the case of Albanian identity, poststructuralist construction proceeds by forced appropriation, distortion, and forgery. And these methods have been used in Kosovo

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[11] Once more about Milosević's 'nationalism': as a president in 1991 he refused to sign law passed to him by the Serbian Parliament that would give back all real estates and properties to Serbian Orthodox Church that were confiscated in 1945 by communist regime. If all of that had been returned to Church, about one third of gross land of Kosovo and Metohija, war would have been more or less objectless. The official name of the Serbian province of Kosovo was 'Kosovo and Metohija'. When Kosovo declared independence in 2008 it erased the name 'Metohija' from his title because the word 'Metohija' means 'land of monastery'.

which has become a kind of a realm of illusion. Everything that can be prefixed by "pseudo-" or "quasi-" seems to have appeared in Kosovo. Kosovo is a per excellence example of virtual reality receiving its final historical, or better to say post-historical form.

Not a single building block of the Albanian identity as it is presented to us today is credible. Where the poststructuralist construction used some substantial things – such as historical buildings (churches, monasteries, monuments) or even ethnicities (such as Serbs) – it did so by first deforming them: they become Byzantine/Catholic/Islamic/Turkish in the middle stage and Albanian in the final stage. In the case of Skanderbeg, history and myth are mixed: Skanderbeg was a real person but his exploits are legendary. Both aspects were misrepresented, by claiming that historical Skanderbeg was an Albanian and that legendary Skanderbeg was Albanian savior, the cult hero. Poststructuralist "creation" which freed itself from truth does not know limits. Thus in the case of the Albanian language we see perhaps the very pinnacle of virtual reality. For this building block is not simply existing language known by another name (as in the case of Croatian, Bosnian or Montenegrin which are basically names for Serbian language imposed for political reasons – the proof for this is simple: speakers of all those languages understand perfectly each other); nor is it a distorted existing language (as in the case of Macedonian, where we had a Serbian dialect chosen to represent a whole new language); Albanian language is a completely *new*

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language. And being completely new it is thus rootless. It is an artificial creation like Esperanto. Perhaps the most important building block of the Albanian identity was invented. As in the case of the aforementioned Constantine's Donation, the reason for this was political, instrumental, pragmatic. We see it as certain kind of secular Drang nach Ost where first should clean remnants of the Eastern Rome and its culture, and after that proceed towards Euro Asian east. Serbia is of course the first one on that way.

Sponsoring the independence of Kosovo has far-reaching consequences for the integrity and stability of many countries in the world which also have secessionist movements, such as Spain (Basque Country and Catalonia), Italy (South Tyrol), France (Corsica), Turkey (the Kurds), Russia (Chechnya), India (Kashmir), China (Tibet), and even the United States themselves (Puerto Rico and perhaps Texas). Moreover, almost all states in the world are of composite nature so Kosovo represents a dangerous precedent and will likely be used in the future by the secessionist movements as a justification. In spite of that, many counties contrary to their essential interests were forced to recognize Kosovo. Therefore, breakdowns, i.e. bankruptcies of states worldwide will be faster and a gains from that will be enormous for endlessly greedy truncated Bretton Woods economy. The couple charged virtual device Kosovo – Breton Woods could bring insufferable anxiety into world politics and bold affliction to the people, because new nations are invented and used as a bare tools.

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The mechanisms of producing false identities employed in segmentation of sovereign countries have been tried and perfected and pose a real threat and an efficient source of intensive social nausea.

Instead of equality and legality America has introduced Holywood as motherboard for processing historical movements. The fact that NATO war against Serbia was done under a false pretext – the grave exodus of Albanians from Kosovo started *after* the bombing, not before it (Bisset 2009) – serves as a proof that both cause and consequences of this intervention do not have anything to do with truth, justice, protection of a weaker side or any kind of humanitarianism whatsoever. That war has been the final trigger for the ideology of "humanitarian intervention" - completely illusive in its character and with the only one providence: a truncated "Bretton Woods geopolitics". It means that the whole world order has become an illusion itself and that it does not oblige anyone to anything except to obey mirages.

The inflation of the Albanian balloon on Kosovo is likely to cause more conflicts in the Balkans. Albanian territorial demands do not concern only Kosovo, but also parts of Serbia, Macedonia, Greece and Montenegro. This means that Albanians are set against literally all their neighbors, who will not stand idly and watch their territories being taken away in favour of a nation convinced that they are autochthonous, oldest, supported by the superman from the main

Pristina square, and thus have the most rights to these territories. This might also cause an opposite reaction. Threatened by falsification of history, other nations (not only in Balkans but in all the world) might also try and construct their own combat virtual realities or augment their historical merits in order to show that it is actually they who are "the oldest", "the pre-eminent" and so on. This would mean opposing Poststructuralism by Poststructuralism and would lead to profusion of half-truths, fabrications, lies which would be seen as legitimate tools for fighting the enemy. Poststructuralism makes illusions multiply like viruses. Thus, Kosovo can be seen as a special laboratory before the pandemic of falsehood is released into the world.

Kosovo pulls behind himself Albania who cannot give any political, economical or cultural response other than rising Islamization. Bandow (2009) and Jatras (2009) both cite former American Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. Bandow lays emphasis on Burns calling Kosovo "a majority Muslim state" (Bandow 2009: 28); whereas Jatras notices that Burns usually referred to Albanians not as Albanians but as "Muslims" (Jatras 2009: 38). Hence it is expected to conclude, as Trifković does, that the purpose might be to create a chain of Muslim countries stretching from Turkey to Bosnia (Trifković 2009: 73). It seems that US upholds a Turkish project to make a one Suni state out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania which would disrupt the new silk road project led by the Chinese. (Tihonov 2016). Even *New York Times*

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writes that extreme and intolerant version of Islam is being widely propagated across Kosovo (Gall 2016). It is the same kind of Islam we find in the Islamic State, but also in Saudi Arabia which is said to sponsor this project. By becoming submerged in an artificial Muslim state, Albanians might suffer the fate of Serbs who also become Muslims only to become something else afterwards: Bosnians or Albanians. Perhaps in some future there might be no Albanians and the current Islamization is a symptom of building a new false nation in the Balkans. The only question is who will have the next statue on the main Pristina square. Whoever would be, it will be the triumph of Poststructuralism.

Our final conclusion is actually more prediction than a matter of deduction. In 1913, latter Albanians were given their own country while other Balkan nations fought against Turkey; in 1941 they fought with Germans against Serbs and were rewarded from 1945 by communist stimulation to grow in number and populate Kosovo; in nineties they were encouraged to rebel against Serbia; in 2000s they received yet another country. And in February 2015 they decided it was not enough for them. In this month there was a massive wave of Albanians crossing the borders of the European Union in search for a better life. British newspaper *The Telegraph* reports that the unemployment rate is 45 per cent and that it is more than 60 per cent of young people aged under 24. (Alexander 2015) Inevitable question is: why? Have not the Albanians fought for their country, have they

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not suffered supposed oppression from Yugoslav and Serbian governments? *The Telegraph*'s Harriet Alexander is perplexed too: "But precisely why this is happening now remains a mystery – the economic situation is nothing new." (Alexander 2015).

Does it mean that it is revealed finally that the Kosovo balloon was actually intended not for Yugoslavia or Serbia only, but Europe as a whole? The scenes of hungry, afraid, distressed Albanians on the borders of the European Union repeated themselves just several months after – in a massive wave of refugees fleeing from the devastation of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and the threat of the Islamic State. Of course, the wave of Albanians was comparatively much smaller than that of the people from the Middle East. But then again, all tests and experiments are comparatively smaller than the final market placements and wide distributions of products once they are finalized. The poststructuralist approach is carefully composed as a music play: first *lento appassionato*, after that *allegro alla turca* and finally *presto con fuocco*. It resembles science as well, inasmuch as it deals with facts, observations, deductions; but it is actually quite opposite from science when we realize that facts are fabrications, observations are fantasies, all deductions are dishonesties, and at the end music is cacophony. It is quite certain that Albanian flight to the Western Europe was just a probe for the planned grand-scale operation. Albanians are more familiar; there are fewer of them; and they are Europeans speaking an Indo-European language. While the

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event itself was unexpected and not entirely understood, it is obviously one of political usages of Albanians, this time as a small scale check of the European political palpitation towards refugee crisis that started massively soon after. Albanians did not join refugees; they retreated quietly, their role of battering ram having ended. Until the new poststructural task.

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ONGOING CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THEIR IMPACT ON EUROPE

Abstract:

The Middle East is a region that significantly affects world events. A relatively hopeful period in the form of revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring, from North Africa to Gulf countries has been "drowned" in a return to "business as usual". The political situation has escalated to the extent possible in many countries of the region and has grown up into open military conflicts and terrorist activities of individuals or smaller groups. A number of hotbeds of tension is present in the region now - Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan in a broader context. The most complicated situation is on the border between Syria and Iraq, where followers of radical Islamist terrorist organization of Islamic State has created a state of the same name on its conquered territories. Events that take place in this space greatly affect not only immediate contact regions of Europe but also more distant areas. Central Europe and Slovakia is no exception. "Export" of

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Islamic fundamentalism in Europe and extension of activities of Islamic state in the form of terrorist attacks and the recruitment of volunteers left no doubt that Europe and the world are facing very tough opponent. Conflicts taking place in this region have an impact on Europe in the secondary form too. Tens of thousands of migrants who come mainly from Syria and Iraq are trying to leave their homes due to military events and persecution and to save their lives by fleeing and a subsequent immigration in the developed countries of Central and Western Europe. This rampant process has caused conflicts within the EU and "stripped" different positions of individual countries diametrically.

Key words: Middle East, Islamic State, Europe, Conflicts.

Middle East today

The current situation in the Middle East region is a reflection of historical events. Main factors have been colonialism, the formation of successor states after the World War I, the border organization, the location of mineral resources (especially oil and gas) at the beginning of the 20th century and the strategic importance of the region (the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bosporus and Dardanelles, railway Berlin - Baghdad - Basra). These aspects have caused enormous interest of world powers (Britain, France, Germany, USA, Russia) in this region.

Direct consequences of the colonial and post-colonial policies have been territorial claims and border changes of the actors involved.

After World War I existed in the Middle East only two independent states, Turkey and Iran, four other states were formed during the interwar period (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt). Main focal points of conflicts became Palestine, Kurdistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, etc. The current political and economic development is marked by a "combat" for dominance in the region between three main geopolitical players – Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The first of these three players is Turkey (a successor state of the Ottoman Empire). Ottomans, after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the destruction of the Byzantine Empire, dominated in the western part of the region (together with parts of southeastern Europe) from the first half of the 16th century. They tried to suppress the Persian and Arabic influence. The Ottoman Empire went through a gradual decline since the mid-19th century. In 1923 was created Turkey and reform processes introduced by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk brought overall expansion of the new state - it was connected with efforts for a revision of "lost territories". Turkey is a state, which currently supports military operations of the opposition Free Syrian Army in neighbouring Syria, which has been ruled by one of the main opponents of Turkey's policy in the region, Syrian President Bashar al - Assad.

The second player is Saudi Arabia, an absolute theocratic state based on conservative and bigoted monarchical system of Saud family and a mainstay of Wahhabi Islam (Puritan reform movement (forerunner of modern reformism) based on the rejection of innovation and practices of pre-Islamic times). Saudi Arabia is the main US ally in the region, but it is also a major, albeit tacit supporters of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the opponents of Bashar al - Assad-in-Syria.

The third player is Iran (Persia until 1935), the biggest historical rival of the Ottoman Empire and a current rival of Saudi Arabia and Turkey for position of leadership in the region. It is a stronghold of the Shiite form of Islam and opponent of sunnitism penetration. The development of country has fundamentally changed the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Nowadays, it tries to maintain considerable influence in Iraq and Syria and it supports Hezbollah and Shiite militias. It is the main support column of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al - Assad.

An important player in the region is definitely Israel that tries to liquidate the ancient enemy – Syria with its Zionist policy implemented with the support of the United States and other Western countries (Issue of strategic Golan Heights - control of water resources and share of control of potential transit lines exports of strategic materials). A similar scenario is also preparing in Iran.

Factor, that is impossible to analyze current events in the Middle East and North Africa without, is also a process called revolutionary wave of Arab Spring movement which began in the whole Arab world. It began in 2010 and was aimed to fight against poverty, poor economic and social conditions, corrupt and authoritarian regimes long reigning in the countries of the region (Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, Libya and others). The whole process involved falls of regimes, armed uprisings, civil wars associated with high numbers of casualties (over 134,000).

In the Middle East and North Africa have been implemented identical scenarios (Syria, 2010, Libya 2011) since 2003 (Iraq). Military interventions by Western countries under the tutelage of the US, which were preceded by the induction of internal strife within the borders of states, followed by civil war, by a removal of an old regimes connected with their physical liquidation (Saddam Hussein in 2006, Muammar Gaddafi, 2011) was the situation in these countries out of control and it launched a wave of uncontrolled development and activation of the various fundamentalist and Islamist groups. Destabilization of the region was further strengthened by the withdrawal of the US occupation forces from Iraq, paralysis of instruments of state power in the country and by intensifying confessional tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq but also in other countries (Yemen, Syria).

In the following part, we present a model example of the currently strongest and most active terrorist group in the Middle East – the Islamic State, activities of whose interfere other continents (Asia, Africa, Europe).

The Islamic State

The Islamic State (IS) - the earlier sign - Jihad Organization in Mesopotamia (2004-2006), the Islamic State in Iraq (2006-2013), the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (2013-2014), Movement of Islamic state (2014 - present) - Arab term (Daesh) is a terrorist organization that seeks the establishment of a universal wahhabi caliphate reassuming the idea of a new world order under the tutelage of Islam. IS leads a "holy war" through uncontrolled terror against the people practicing religions other than Sunni Islam (Christians, Yazidis, Shiite Muslims and others). It presents by the physical liquidation of soldiers, journalists, humanitarian workers, together with media coverage and Internet use ("online" executions), destruction of cultural monuments of high historical value (Palmyra, Nimrud, Hatra, Rakka, Mosul etc.). IS is not recognized under international law of any country of the world. The capital is Rakka in North Syria. Its main head is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the first Caliph Ibrahim. IS separates from al - Qaeda. Armed forces (approx. 50,000 to 120,000) consists of mercenaries of many nationalities from all over the world (Caucasus, Near and Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa, Russia, Australia, US, EU

and others) and realize fast mobile operations. Guerrilla warfare follows a good knowledge of local conditions (former officers of the Iraqi and Syrian army). IS conquered oil fields and water sources in northern Iraq and north-eastern Syria by its massive expansion. It derives funds from taxes, sales with petroleum and trades with precious historical artifacts. A significant part of incomes comes from wealthy Middle Eastern donors, especially from the Gulf countries (mainly from Saudi Arabia and Qatar). IS has overcome with its activity al - Qaeda and fulfilled its vision (territory gain, foundation of caliphate, getting the attention of global jihadists). Another spawn of IS became the inability of Middle Eastern leaders to find a new model of governance for the majority of population, experiments with pan-Arab socialism, corrupt regimes of authoritarian rulers and a shift towards more radical Islam, as well as the effect of external influences of world powers (an unprecedented invasion to Iraq without the mandate of the UN Security Council). A type of military operations in Iraq and Syria, in addition to pro-Western activities in Iraq since 2003, became the baseless accusation of Syria by the United States on ownership of nuclear weapons, the subsequent destruction of chemical weapons by Syrian regime, the abolition of the state of emergency in the country, which lasted from 1963 to 2011, presidential election in June 2014, the winner of which became al - Assad and the subsequent civil war of apocalyptic proportions

(destroyed country, huge human casualties, hundreds of thousands of refugees).

Military conflict in the region IS controls attends several actors, characteristics and objectives of which are presented in the following part.

Coalition forces of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Kurdistan - military and religious group led by Iran. It represents so called Republican Shia Islam as an opposite of Wahhabi and Salafist Sunni Islam. Its military power is estimated to approx. 120,000 fighters. They fight against Syrian opposition supported by the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Turkey and Israel, whose main demand is the resignation of President al - Assad. Syrian president belongs to the Alawite religious group belonging to the Shiite branch of Islam. On the side of regime are Iran, Russia and Lebanon's Hezbollah.

Kurdish armed force Peshmerga - 20,000 Kurdish militants fighting actively against IS.

Pro-Western coalition of 25 countries led by the US - its origin dates back to August 2014. Activities of USA took place in Syria since 2013 (deliveries of weapons to Syrian opposition). Its main objective was the elimination of the current Syrian government al - Assad by opposition forces. Nowadays, this rhetoric has been changed. Other objectives of the pro-Western coalition forces are the destruction of IS. Military forces of 12,000 militants together with 7,000 soldiers of the Syrian opposition realize an air attacks on positions of IS,

implement training and instructional activities of soldiers and members of the special forces (US SEAL and Delta Force, British SAS, French Foreign Legion, the Turkish Red Berets and MAK and others), disrupt logistics of IS and operate diversion activity related to the physical liquidation of IS representatives.

Russia - a major supporter and ally of the al - Assad regime (material, technical and logistical assistance). It fights against IS and the opposition forces. At the same time it pursues its geostrategic and security interests (direct distance area controlled by IS in eastern Syria from the Russian Federation is only 600 km - thousands of Russian citizens from the Caucasus and other regions fight among IS). The main objective is to paralyze IS.

An Nusra Front - a militant jihadist group mostly of Sunni Muslims who fight for the overthrow of the al - Assad regime. It is one of many offshoots of al-Qaeda. It consists primarily of Mujahideen. Other allied groups against al - Asad are Fatah al-Islam, Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Martyrs Brigades of Al-Baraa Ibn Malik, Jaish al-Islam, Liwa al-Islam, Brigade Omar al-Farouq and others.

Hezbollah - the Lebanese Shia political and military organization sponsored by Iran. It fights on the side of the al - Assad forces against IS and the Syrian opposition.

Result of activities of participating sides and the causal contexts of the conflict (2011-2015)

Over 500,000 fighters have been deployed on all fronts and sides in combat operations in Iraq and Syria. The conflict brought more than 260,000 victims (soldiers and civilians). Approximately 4 million registered refugees fled from Syria and 2,5 million from Iraq. Material damages include 100 billion USD in Iraq and 15 billion USD in Syria.

Further terrorist attacks and suicide actions, organized by members of the IS or its sympathizers have taken place in Libya, Tunisia (National Museum of Bardo, the attack on holidaymakers on the beach of Imperial Marhaba Hotel in Susa), Yemen (Sana'a, Aden), Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara), Lebanon (Beirut), France (Paris), Southeast Asia (Jakarta), etc.

The basic problem is the inability of the United States, Europe, Russia and Middle East regional powers to make an agreement on a common strategy to fight not only against IS but also other jihadist and Islamist militant groups. There is seen deep individualism of individual leaders and virtually "zero coordination" of collective actions. Moreover, the reluctance, inertia and ignorance of Western states to take a critical position on the situation in the Middle East and North Africa (the Arab Spring) is added. Many of the participating states of conflict have had their subjects of interest mainly in the economic level (strategic raw materials). They also supported old

regimes, and when those were no longer satisfactory, they chose the way of their removal (Hussein, Gaddafi, Mubarak). There was an effort to replace them with new ambitious leaders, but they at some point become even worse than the previous one. And it resulted in the bloody civil wars, where the Western powers participate too (the sale of arms to various factions - efforts to gain influence in areas rich in minerals and water resources - for political and economic influence in the region).

Impact on Europe

Europe borders to the southeast (Bulgaria - Turkey and Greece - Turkey borders) directly to the region of the Middle East (3% of the territory of Turkey is part of the European continent). In the current tense situation is the direct contact rather problematic. It raises many questions and is a potential source of unrest. Turkey, as a NATO member state, participates directly or indirectly through logistic support on some military operations against IS. The policy of the Turkish government of R. Erdogan is considerably unbalanced and causes mistrust on both poles of the political spectrum of participating sides. The fact is weak, virtually no military and political influence of European countries (especially the EU) on the events in the Middle East. European commitment narrowed to participate in military operations (air strikes of France, UK and potentially other states). After a long period of waiting and missteps of European political

leaders, there began peace talks between the warring parties of the Syrian conflict in Geneva.

The biggest problem that plagues Europe and is directly related to military operations in Syria and Iraq is uncontrolled influx of migrants and refugees to the "old continent". Only in 2015, more than 1 million people came to Europe, who fled according to official versions due to war and terror of IS. Many indications, however, point to the inconsistency of these claims. The stream of refugees leads mainly to the strongest European economies (Germany, France, Great Britain, the Nordic countries), which clearly points to the effort to get many privileges from the social system of the state concerned. Another significant factor is the effort to create a coherent religious (especially Muslim) community and thus to bring even greater diversity in quite colourful multi-ethnic environment of European cities. Financial support for these confessional groups, given by the laws of the state concerned (especially Germany), is thus an indispensable part of a planned strategy. Several European countries after the initial euphoric and in many ways illogical and irrational approach to migration issues, in which they criticized especially the "new" EU countries (V4) and threatened them, among other things by the suspension of financial and project support (funds), gradually accept some tough measures, which should slow the pace of influx of migrants and refugees. Forecasters estimate their number in the near future to more than 3,000,000. Several economic analysts say with

regard to the refugee crisis of another global threat. Claims of positive or negative economic benefit of these mostly unskilled people also vary. Slovakia, in close cooperation with V4 countries, especially Hungary and the Czech Republic, enforced to the refugee crisis and waves of migrants to Europe fundamental position, particularly as regards the allocation of quotas. Further development will show which alternative and currents of opinion have become reality and which have not.

Forecasts and Conclusions

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan developed and submitted a plan to organize conditions in Syria. Due to ignorance and zero support of participating sides, including major powers (financial and military donation of participants of the conflict), this plan foundered. At a conference of intelligence services in Washington in October 2015, intelligence chiefs of the United States and France, John Brennan and Bernard Bajolet noted, that countries in the Middle East and North Africa (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya) are no longer in a position to restore its original boundaries. For any central government is not possible to restore full control over contiguous territory within the limits set out by two world wars, which creates the conditions for a new geopolitical assumptions (http://www.ta3.com/clanok/1071764/sefovia-rozviedok-neveria-v-obnovenie-povodnych-hranic-syrie-ci-iraku.html).

"The Greater Middle East Project" was very famous - RAND Corporation study: "The future security environment in the Middle East, conflict, stability and political change." Primary concerns relate to the control and shipment of mineral resources (oil, gas), potential direct control over the region and weakening of the political influence of Syria, Iran and Russia. Similarly, there is preparing a project of a new state "Great Kurdistan" (Free Kurdistan), whose main task should be to link Sunni territory of Kurdistan and northern Iraq and to block one of the main allies of Syria - Iran (so-called Peters' map). As there were discovered one of the largest deposits of natural gas in the world (the Qatari - Iranian gas field North dome /South Pars and Levantine pool in the Mediterranean), a critical issue of creating a transport corridor from mining towns on the Mediterranean coast is becoming the most important. For Western states is inconvenient rival Islamic pipeline project (Iran artery), which should provide transport of natural gas from Iran through Iraq to Syria around the city of Homs, which is the most important transport junction on the main road to the port of Tartus on the Mediterranean coast. US activities in the region aim to overthrow the pro-Iranian and pro-Russian regime of al - Assad (geopolitical interests of the US, Israel, S. Arabia, Qatar), which was associated with creating of anti-Assad revolt in 2011 with financial support from Qatar and rebel control of routes of upcoming pipeline.

A significant downside of all sides was weak support for peacekeeping activities (interviews, roundtables, dialogue) before

escalating the conflict, respectively before the start of the Civil War by the US and EU, no stronger support for the Annan peace plan, the lack of tools petition rights in the EU, the need for the creation of humanitarian corridors in affected areas and the minimum support of political parties that promote peaceful coexistence between communities. A positive example was the Movement Musalaha (Reconciliation), which was founded in 2012 and preaches inter-religious character (Christians, Muslims, laity, men, women). The best example of the rejection of the war in Syria is the Syrian Patriarch of Antioch, Gregory III. Laham assertion: "I do not want to be an apologist for Syria, but I am Syrian, and when I see that the world mass media talk a lot about Syria in a false way, I can only say that among all the Arab countries, Syria was the state with the lowest poverty, smallest illiteracy and the greatest freedom. Health care and education were free, free banking and trading, women participated in social, economic and political life, and no less important is that everyone could profess own faith in Syria. This is precisely why this conflict is even more frightening. Syria is the place of integration and peace and not of blood and division." (https://www.tkkbs.sk/view.php?cisloclanku=20121024025).

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Adam Myślicki[1]

UKRAINIANS' CRISIS IMMIGRATION TO POLAND – A CHANCE FOR POLISH DEMOGRAPHY?

Abstract:

The accession to EU in 2004 has initiated the unprecedented in the Polish newest history mass emigration to the Western Europe – far beyond 2 millions of our countrymen reside temporary out of our state borders. Growing tendency is permanent, emigrants do not want to return to their homeland. At the same time the total fertility rate in Poland decreased dramatically in comparison to the beginning of the economic transition period (the beginning of the nineties). These demographic tendencies represent a serious threat to the future of Poland. Official forecasts suggest that in 2050 the population in Poland will decrease to the level between 32 and 36 million of people, and its age structure will be highly unfavorable. And now, since 2014, we have witnessed the unexpected new migration trend in the Ukraine-Poland direction. The estimates indicate that today about 1 million Ukrainians reside legally or illegally on the Polish territory, and their number raises. The author tries to indicate some significant statistics

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in order to provide necessary data for further considerations on the issue.

Key words: Ukraine, Poland, immigration, emigration, demography, visa, temporary stay, "Employer's declaration (…)", repatriation, law on foreigners, foreigners' work.

The introduction – a word on the post-accession emigration of Poles

The information presented in the previous year by the Central Statistical Office[2] shows[3] that at the end of 2014 the number of 2.320 thousands of Polish citizens (representing approximately 6,6% of the whole population of the country) resided temporarily beyond the borders of their homeland. The main destinations of our countrymen invariably remain the countries of the European Union (1.901 thousands), Germany and the United Kingdom in particular. The statistics reveal that with the exception of the period between 2008 and 2010 the number of Poles abroad grew year by year, and the decline in the number of Polish citizens in some EU countries affected

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[2] Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

[3] „Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004 – 2014", Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa, 05.10.2015r. [„The information on the range and the directions of the temporary migrations from Poland in the years 2004-2014", the Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, 05.10.2015];
/http://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5471/11/1/1/szacunek_emigracji_z_polski_w_latach_2004-2014.pdf/

by the crisis, such as Spain and Greece, were offset by a much higher increase in others.

Many opinions have already been expressed in reference to the question of the balance of profits and losses for our country that resulted from such a turn of events. Such aspects of the emigration like a possibility to gain experience, language skills, or build capital by young Poles, as well as frequently mentioned and beneficial for our economy impact of money transfers to family members from migrant workers, create a positive picture of the phenomenon. This last element is usually overlooked in economic statistics, although it represents admittedly variable but significant contribution to the level of affluence of Polish households. It is estimated that at its peak, between 2005 and 2007, the value of private transfers to Poland exceeded 2% of GDP, what stands for the amount of over 20 billion PLN per year[4].

Most experts, however, share the opinion that benefits of Polish emigration are short-lived, and their "economic impacts (..) will be (...) very severe. Poles will contribute to their residential countries prosperity, mainly in the EU. Polish economy will suffer losses, and

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[4] „Wpływ przepływów pieniężnych na polską gospodarkę w latach 1992-2012 – raport Western Union, przygotowany przez Centrum Analiz Społeczno-Ekonomicznych - CASE", Warszawa, 29 czerwca 2012 [„The money tranfsers' influence on Polish economy in the years 1992-2012 – Western Union report, prepared by the Centre of Social-Economic Analysis – CASE", Warsaw, 29 of June 2012] /http://www.case-research.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2012_Western%20Union%20Raport.pdf/

money transfers will decrease gradually[5]." From a geopolitical point of view, mass emigration results in reducing of the nation's vitality primarily in a very empirical, almost tangible dimension. The research shows that it has a permanent character, increasingly the whole families are heading for better life abroad not only their providers[6]. From the psychological point of view a possible return-decision is more difficult as the period spent on emigration grows longer. It should be taken into account that the descendants of outgoers will probably not return to the country of their ancestors. They would not have such strong impulse for resettlement as the economic one that drove for their parents for departure. Additionally, it is highly possible that they would be culturally bound with the country they grew up in.

The perfect storm is rising upon our country. According to the Central Statistical Office data for 2014[7], in 2050, depending on which one out of four of its estimates would come to reality, the population of Poland will oscillate between 32 and 36 million with the rate of people over 65 between 31,3 and 35,7 percent! Let us know that in 2013 that rate reached 15,8%. Quoted data takes into account

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[5] „Emigracja Polaków po 2004 roku i jej skutki", Biuletyn OPINIE FAE nr 9/2014, Warszawa, 17.06.2014 r, [„Poles' emigration after year 2004 and its consequences", OPINIE FAE bulletin No. 9/2014, Warsaw, 17.06.2014]
/http://fae.pl/biuletynopiniefaeskutkimigracjipolakow.pdf/

[6] *ibidem*

[7] „Prognoza ludności na lata 2014-2050", Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa 2014 [„The populationprognosis for years 2014-2050", Central Statistical Office, Warsaw 2014];
/http://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5469/1/5/1/prognoz a_ludnosci_na_lata   2014 - 2050.pdf/

migration factors what will influence the demography in Poland assuming that a balance between the emigration abroad and the immigration from abroad will be negative for our country up to approximately 2035, after which it should remain positive. Given the rapid increase of Ukrainian immigration to Poland since 2014, the Central Statistical Office's forecast should be updated – in the part of migration predictions.   Unfortunately, there is no possibility to anticipate how dynamic the new trend (the Ukrainian immigration) will be in the nearest future. Nevertheless, it seems that the demography in Poland is determined by rather low TFR (total fertility rate). It oscillates between 1,22 and 1,4 since 1999 whereas at the beginning of nineties it was even 2,0[8].

One of the emigration results is a significant decrease of unemployment rate in our country which, after the accession to EU, between May 2004 and October 2008 fell down from almost 20% to record-breaking 8,8%[9]. Although this indicator, due to the world economic crisis of 2008, increased in subsequent years, it dropped once again to the level of 8.8% in June 2016, the first four-year period of decline in unemployment is the direct consequence of an outflow of more than two million of our citizens to the richer EU countries. It is very naive to judge it positively. Similar situation of the poorest state

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[8] *Ibidem*, p. 35
[9] Official data of the Central Statistical Office; /http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/rynek-pracy/bezrobocie-rejestrowane/stopa-bezrobocia-w-latach-1990-2016,4,1.html

in Europe – Moldova – is worth mentioning. According to statistical data, estimated unemployment rate in the country dropped between 2010 and 2015 from 8% to less than 5%[10] (a great statistical result, is it not?). At the same time between 15% and 20% of its population stays permanently abroad[11]. Fortunately, Poland is far away from the economic status of that little country, as well as to its highly ineffective employment structure with the extremely high ratio of working in budgetary sector, but the analogy is visible. Not to mention the case of Moldova, the low unemployment rate in Poland is very important for the subject of the article which is the immigration of citizens of Ukraine to Poland.

Ukraine

The economic migrations of Ukrainians have a long tradition. Far before the advent of the political crisis at the turn of 2013/2014, the number of Ukrainians working outside their homeland on a permanent basis exceeded one million people. The main directions of travel were Russia and the European Union. There are interesting data on changes of destination countries. According to the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in issue 187 of its "OSW Commentary"[12], there

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[10] /www.statista.com/statistics/513349/unemployment-rate-in-moldova/
[11] "Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe – Impact of visa abolition" – the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) report, Warsaw, Jule 2014, p. 181
[12] Marta Jaroszewicz „Kryzysowa migracja Ukraińców", Komentarze OSW, nr 187, 19.10.2015, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. M. Karpia [Marta Jaroszewicz „The crisis

was a significant change in the years 2010-2012. The place of current leaders: the Czech Republic and Italy, was taken over by Poland. Among the factors which could be decisive in this respect one can indicate Polish liberal visa policy which *i.a.* has introduced in 2006 a possibility to perform the work by citizens of former six Soviet Union countries, Ukraine included, without an obligation to obtain a work permission from the competent local authority[13], proximity of Poland in comparison to the above-mentioned countries, and a significant decrease in unemployment which resulted in a lack of manpower in Polish companies.

Referring to the destabilization of Ukraine as a consequence of the "Maidan Revolution" and Russia's military intervention in 2014 in Crimea and Donbas initiated enormous immigration flows – of both internal and external character. According to the official data, the internal migration has reached the number of 1,5 million people resettled within the Ukraine from the Crimea and war areas. At the same time, the emigration flow to Russia (pro-Russian Ukrainian citizens) could have involved even half a million people[14]. The increase

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Ukrainians' migration", OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) Commentaries, No. 187, 19.10.2015]/ http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/komentarze_187.pdf/

[13] Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 30 August 2006 on the foreigners' work performance without the work permit obtaining obligation (Official Journal 2006 No. 156 pos. 1116)

[14] Marta Jaroszewicz „Kryzysowa migracja Ukraińców", Komentarze OSW, nr 187 [Marta Jaroszewicz „The crisis Ukrainians' migration", OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) Commentaries, No. 187]

of the immigration to the EU countries has not gained such significance with one exception – the case of Poland.

Administrative and legal context

Before we put our attention to the statistics which shows the trends, a few words on the possibilities of legal stay and work in Poland for Ukrainians from the legal and administrative point of view. It is not the purpose of this paper to describe in details the current procedures in this regard, but rather to illustrate the general picture so that a person who is a layman could understand the definitions used in the article later on.

Citizens of Ukraine are obliged to get a visa before they enter the EU borders. Apart from transit visas (type "A" and "B"), a foreigner may apply for a visa type "C" which entitles him/her to stay in the Schengen Area (after one or several entries) for 90 days within half a year, or a visa type "D" that allows entry and continuous stay in Poland or several consecutive stays lasting more than 3 months in total. The Law of 12 December 2013 on foreigners defines the specific purposes for obtaining a visa. It is easy to guess that a visa issued for tourism would be the visa type "C", and for business or work purposes would be type "D", which gives the possibility for longer stay in one of the EU countries, such as Poland. It is important to remember that a national visa type "D" does not exclude the possibility for traveling to other Schengen Area countries, unless it contradicts the purpose of

the stay in our country, which was the basis for obtaining it. However, when analyzing the following statistics, we shall remember that for many Ukrainian citizens who do not have the possibility to obtain a type "D" visa (e.g. due to a lack of connections for finding a potential employer), even a visa type "C" will be the gate for longer stay in our country. It is a kind of open secret that the majority of Ukrainian citizens who come to our country with a visa type "C" often intends to take an illegal job. A long-term visa obtaining, which is very often a next step, is only a simple formality when one eventually finds an employer.

The above mentioned Law on foreigners specifies the possibilities of obtaining a residence permit in Poland – temporary or permanent ones. A temporary residence permit (issued for a period not longer than three years) is usually justified by the desire to work in Poland (which represents 66% of all permits issued in the period between 1 January to 31 July 2016), the second most often purpose is education (studies). Family reasons and others are marginal.

The data on the number of permanent residence permits issued, as well as long-term EU resident permits, are of no importance for our subject (the increase in migration movement on the Ukraine-Poland direction). They usually involve the people who have inhabited Poland for several years already, or who have some origin connections with the country. Therefore, statistical graphs below have a supportive

character. However, they illustrate the fact that with a lapse of time more Ukrainians are willing to settle in Poland.

It is worth to take a look at liberalisation of the policy in regard to foreigners' work in Poland, which is reflected in the above mentioned regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 30 August 2006 (see footnote 12). This regulation has introduced the possibility of employing citizens of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation or Ukraine without obligation for them to obtain a standard work permission. A sufficient ground for a foreigner to obtain a work visa in this case is to submit to the Polish diplomatic mission a document confirming a desire to hire them by a particular Polish employer. The document, "The employer's declaration on the intention of employing a citizen of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation or Ukraine", includes employer's and employee's data, information on salary, position and terms of employment, and shall be registered in a nearest labour office that confirms that there is lack of manpower on the local market. "The employer's declaration (…)" is the basis for seasonal or temporary work since it empowers to work performance for six months during the one-year period only. It is obvious that getting a standard long-term work permission for a foreigner, who has already worked on

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"The employer's declaration (…)" basis already, is not a big problem if only there is a good will of the employer.

Statistics

In order to picture the migration tendencies on the Ukraine-Poland direction the author of the article has used the official data published by Polish government's institutions. Below most important figures are presented.


Fig. 1: The number of „Schengen" and domestic visas issued for Ukrainian citizens by Polish diplomatic missions in the years 2013-2016 (note: for 2016 the number refers to the first half, the column is lifted as an estimation for the rest of it).

Above on the graph 1 the chart which pictures the number of visas issued by Polish diplomatic missions for citizens of Ukraine in the years 2013-2015[15] and first half of the 2016[16].

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[15] „Raport na temat obywateli Ukrainy wg stanu na dzień 28.02.2016 r.", Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców ["The report on the citizens of Ukraine for the day 28.02.2016", the

Below on the graphs 2, 3 and 4 the number of administrative decisions of the Foreigner Office with regard to the legalisation of foreigners' stay in Poland, issued for citizens of Ukraine in the years 2013-2016[17].

Fig. 2: The number of permanent stay permits in the years 2013-2016.

Foreigners Office]; /file http://udsc.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/UKRAINA-28.02.2016-r..pdf/

[16] „Migracje do Polski w I poł. 2016 roku – krótkie podsumowanie statystyk", Europejska Sieć Migracyjna [„Migrations to Poland in the first half of 2016 – the short summary of the statistics", the European Migration Network];
/https://www.emn.gov.pl/esm/aktualnosci/14051,Migracje-do-Polski-w-I-polowie-2016-r-krotkie-podsumowanie-statystyk.print/

[17] ˝Raport na temat obywateli Ukrainy wg stanu na dzień 07.08.2016 r.", Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców ["The report on the citizens of Ukraine for the day 07.08.2016", the Foreigners Office]; /http://udsc.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/UKRAINA-7.08.2016-r..pdf/

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
Fig. 3: The number of long-term resident's stay permits in the years 2013-2016.

Fig. 4: The number of temporary stay permits in the years 2013-2016.

On 1 July 2016 citizens of Ukraine held over 83 thousand valid residence cards (stay permits) on Polish territory, and in the years

2013-2015 the number of applications, both for permanent and temporary stay, statistically doubled year by year. In the first months of 2016 the number of applications for permanent stay decreased, whilst for temporary stay increased when compared to the same period of 2015[18].

The temporary stay permit (up to 1 May 2014 the temporary residence permit)[19], and for permanent residence (up to 1 May 2014 to settle) are not only legal possibility for stay and work in Poland. Another one is to get the work visa type "D" on the basis of a Polish target employer (which can be both a legal person, and a natural person who does not perform a business activity) "The employer's declaration to employ citizen of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation or Ukraine". The visa together with "The employer's declaration (...)"entitles for work on the Polish territory for a maximum total period of 180 days during one full year (for details see above).

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[18] *Ibidem*

[19] On 1 May 2014 a new Law on foreigners of 12 December 2013 (official journal 2013, pos. 1650) has come into force; it replaced the expression „temporary residence" with the „temporary stay" one, and" settlement permission" with „permanent stay permit".

Below on the graph 5 statistics on the number "The employer's declarations (…)" registered in Polish labour offices (the value for 2016 concerns only its first half)[20]:


Fig. 5. The number of "The employer's declarations (…)" registered for citizens of Ukraine in the years 2012-2016

As you can see in the chart above, in 2015 there was more than twofold increase compared to the year 2014, and the first half of 2016 shows a similar trend.

Finally, the statistics (Fig. 6) on the number of work permits issued for citizens of Ukraine in the years 2012-2015 and the first half of 2016[21]:

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[20] Dane statystyczne Ministerstwa Rodziny, Pracy i Polityki Społecznej [The statistical data of the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy]; /https://www.mpips.gov.pl/analizy-i-raporty/cudzoziemcy-pracujacy-w-polsce-statystyki//

Fig. 6: The number of work permits in the years 2013-2015 and a first half of 2016.

An interesting calendar-relating picture of migration phenomenon emerges from the data above. It indicates unambiguously the year of 2014 when the increase in the most important categories (temporary stay permission, registered "Employer's declarations (…)", and work permissions) has been initiated, and next two years (2015-2016) when it has continued.

Although one can see here a clear chronological correlation with the political events in Ukraine, it should be noted that the migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland has financial, not political, character. If we accepted this thesis, we should recognize that it is actually the economic crisis caused by the political and military ones which is the cause for the phenomenon. It is supported by statistics on

[21] *Ibidem*

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the number of applications for international protection submitted by citizens of Ukraine – in the first seven months of 2016 there were 800 (as of 7th of August 2016) only[22]. The refugee status was granted to 16 persons. There's no doubt that in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of registered legally working citizens of Ukraine these numbers are quite small. The conclusion is that the Ukrainians come to Poland for work, not for political asylum.

Given the macroeconomic indicators of the country, we should not be surprised. For two years: 2014-2015 GDP *per capita* of Ukraine continued to decline hitting the rock bottom in the first quarter of 2015 with a score of -17.6% (yes, minus!). The first growth had its place in the first quarter of 2016 – 0,1%[23]. As inflation regards, for almost the entire 2015 (the worst one) it maintained the level of 40% compared to the respective months of the previous year[24]. The Transparency International ranked Ukraine a shameful number 130[25] in its Corruption Perceptions Index for 2015 as the last out of all European countries. Every possible economic experts' comment on Ukraine leave no illusion as per prospects of the country for the coming years.

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[22] "Raport na temat obywateli Ukrainy wg stanu na dzień 07.08.2016 r.", Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców ["The report on the citizens of Ukraine for the day 07.08.2016", the Foreigners Office]
[23] http://pl.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp-growth-annual
[24] http://pl.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/inflation-cpi
[25] http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/

When analyzing migration statistics on the Ukraine-Poland direction, it's worth to take a closer look to the before-crisis forecasts (or "before-war" one which refers to the military actions in Donbas and the expression of which is preferable by some commentators).

Besides the above-mentioned forecast for the Polish population in the years 2014-2050 prepared by the Central Statistical Office, a very interesting and professional OSW (the Centre for Eastern Studies) report titled "Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe - Impact of visa abolition"[26] and released in July 2014 - did not take into account such a large influx of Ukrainians to Poland as well. It is based on interviews with a number of experts from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (using a research method of *Delphi*). The author rightly anticipated that with the lapse of time the employment of workers from behind the river Bug will raise gradually but her assumption was that the liberalisation of the visa policy and work law for foreigners by Polish authorities would bring only a moderate increase of migration[27]. As we can see, unexpected turns of history can surprise even experts.

Polish authorities' actions

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[26] "Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe – Impact of visa abolition" – the OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) report, Warsaw, Jule 2014.
[27] *Ibidem*, p. 108

The Analysis of actions taken by successive Polish governments leads to the conclusion that, generally speaking, they favour immigration in Poland in two key areas: immigration of people of Polish origin and increase in the workforce for Polish work market.

The former has waited a long time for the regulations which would unambiguously encourage Poles for repatriation operation from the East (inhabitants of the former Soviet Union). The Repatriation Law of 2000[28] has left the initiative in local authorities' hands (municipality councils) who were supposed to provide a residence for coming families. The costs of the operation could be subsided by the state budget on the basis of an agreement with the respective voivode. Projected funds for grants, Polish language and retraining courses were very modest. No wonder that from the beginning of the term of above mentioned law only more than 5,000 compatriots from the former Soviet Union benefited from it, although it is known that only in Kazakhstan about 35 thousand people hold Polish nationality. As the representatives of the current government declare, the newly prepared Repatriation Law which is coming into force at the end of 2016 would shift the burden of the issue to the state institutions which should result in much greater efficiency[29]. Far more important to the people of Polish origin living abroad was the

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[28] Law on repatriation of 9 November 2000 roku (*Official Journal 2014.0.1392)*
[29] http://www.tvpparlament.pl/aktualnosci/anna-maria-anders-ustawa-o-repatriacji-trafi-do-sejmu/25153857

adoption of the Law on the Pole's Charter[30]. By the end of 2015 Polish authorities issued over 160 thousands of these for people living in the former Soviet Union countries. In the vast majority the citizens of Belarus and Ukraine become their holders, with low prevalence of the former. The work on the amendment of the Law, which would significantly facilitate the settlement and obtaining Polish citizenship by card holders, is ongoing[31].

The law regulations concerning foreigners' work in Poland has been liberalised in 2006 along with the regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 30 August 2006 on the foreigners' work performance without the obligation to obtain a work permit (official journal 2006 No. 156 pos. 1116). Above mentioned graph on the number of "The employer's declarations (…)" shows the unambiguous trend. Despite the huge number of work permits applications, a good pace of Polish foreigner's offices' bureaucratic work is observed (a term for its consideration does not exceed usually a one-month period).

Taking into account the timetable of legislation adopted, which gradually liberalises the rules of the foreigners' employment, and

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[30] Law on the Pole's Chapter of 7 September 2007 (Official Journal 2014, pos. 1187); The Pole's Chapter is designed for the former Soviet Union countries' citizens or the stateless person from such country; it entitles to ordinary Polish citizen's benefits, like: business activity and work without a work permit obtaining obligation, the education free of charge, etc.
[31] http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/karta-polaka-beda-zmiany-w-karcie-polaka-czy-to-droga-do-repatriacji-,artykuly,377350,1.html

which tries to meet the eastern Polish diaspora expectations, one can feel like it was constituted at the time when the Law and Justice party was in charge. However, if one looks at the migration policy strategy of the rival political power being at the helm of the power in Poland in recent years, expressed *i.a.* in the document "Polish Migration Policy - current state and postulated actions"[32], accepted by the Council of Ministers on 31 July 2012, it defines priorities identical with the position of their political opponents. Namely, the document emphasises the post-accession mass emigration from Poland as a demographic challenge linked to the probability that emigrants would not return to the home country. It raises the question of the "old" Law on repatriation's (see above) low effectiveness, as well as the need of our country's "special interest" for people of Polish nationality in the East in the context of their return to the homeland, their integration on the Polish labour market and in Polish society. It mentions the Law on the Pole's Charter, as an important element of the policy in regard to Polish diaspora. It notes also that foreign workers fulfill a complementary role on the Polish labour market working on positions unattractive for Poles, but with the passage of time the situation may

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[32] „Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania", Warszawa, lipiec 2012, Zespół ds. Migracji Departamentu Polityki Migracyjnej Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych [„Migration policy of Poland – the current state and postulated actions", Warsaw, July 2012, The Migration Team of the Migration Policy Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs]

change, and the Polish labour market is likely to be increasingly attractive for foreigners.

The recommendations for the Polish migration policy point to the need of making the admission possible and facilitating the legalisation of foreigners' stay in Poland mainly for persons of Polish origin, Polish citizens' relatives, people studying in Poland, connected professionally or by business with our country, as well as for other categories of people[33]. Moreover, what is recommended is further liberalisation of legislation in regard to foreigner's work, that would meet the labour market's needs, and the measures for the promotion and facilitation of foreigners' studying in Poland, especially by individuals of Polish origin.

As for the final matter, these actions bring the desired effect. Data show that each following year the number of foreign students in Poland increases. In the academic year 2015/2016 it was already 57119, 30589 of which are students from Ukraine (previous year numbers, respectively – 46101 and 23392[34]). However, given the phenomenon in not crucial for our considerations, we would not go deeper into the issue.

As it was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the government's actions on this sphere are not aimed at migrants of

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[33] Ibidem, p. 14

[34]
http://www.perspektywy.pl/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2899
:w-polsce-studiuje-57-119-studentow-zagranicznych-ze-157-krajow&catid=22&Itemid=119

Ukrainian origin directly. However, if one takes into account that in 2015 about 98% of the registered "Employer's declarations (...)" concerned citizens of Ukraine, it is hard to resist the impression that every regulation in this regard refers mainly to them, not to the other five countries' citizens which are granted with this special facilitation for work in Poland without the obligation to obtain a work permit.

In the context of the phenomena, the public debate on immigration to Poland also concentrates almost exclusively on the issue of Ukrainians. One of the most interesting voices is the position of the Polish Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers[35] which opts strongly for the use of our neighbor's demographic potential by *i.a.* immediate legalisation of stay of all Ukrainians residing on the territory of the Republic of Poland (a curiosity because Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers recommends to further extend the solution above also to Belarusian and Vietnamese, as a "preferred due to their diligence and seamless assimilation")[36].

The migration from the Ukraine as our lifeline?

We are witnessing far-reaching demographic changes in Europe. Whilst most media focused on the so-called "Migration crisis"

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[35] Związek Przedsiębiorców i Pracodawców (ZPP)

[36] „Raport – Imigranci z Ukrainy ratunkiem dla polskiej demografii" Związek Przedsiębiorców i Pracodawców, Warszawa, styczeń 2016 [„Report – the immigrants from Ukraine as a rescue for Polish demography" Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, Warsaw, January 2016] /http://zpp.net.pl/files/manager/file-596945f12121e4fd3e2ab09d36dd1b62.pdf/

after rapid influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa to the Western Europe, there are changes in Poland. Not that mediumistic, not that noticeable, but of huge importance for the future of our country in the forthcoming decades. As we noted at the beginning of this elaboration, the low fertility rate of Polish families in conjunction with the mass exodus of Poles through the open borders after the EU accession, creates an extremely pessimistic vision for the future of Poland as a depopulated country of old people. At the same time – since 2014 – a wave of Ukrainians has reached Poland. We can estimate about 1 million of people (providing that a hard to calculate number of illegal workers is added) fulfill Polish after-migration generation gap in 40%. Many of them work in Poland temporary or in rotation-mode (see statistics on "The employer's declarations (…)" above) but provided the economic crisis in Ukraine is to be deeper, even the geographical proximity would not stop the integration processes similarly as it is with Poles in Germany. From the ordinary Ukrainian family's point of view, the main factor when choosing the place for living would be for sure the difference in life standards between respective countries.

At the moment, the influx of Ukrainian citizens to Poland appears to be the only important factor, which seems to have the potential to stop the negative demographic trends in our country. Would it happen? It seems to be possible, given the pessimistic economic prospects for Ukraine. We shall not forget, however, that at

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the present moment the European Commission is working on lifting the visa regime for Ukrainian citizens[37]. It is difficult to predict how new circumstances will influence the migration decisions of Ukrainians – will they prefer to emigrate to richer countries of Western Europe?

Practically, all Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland currently do not face any difficulties when travelling further away from our country to the west. Poland is in the Schengen Area, the control on the border with Germany has been lifted several years ago. Moreover, about a half of visas issued for citizens of Ukraine by Polish diplomatic missions are the Schengen visas (in 2015 a number 456085 out of total 922240), making the travel throughout Europe possible. They do not, however, entitle to work legally, nor to stay for a longer than 90 days within any 180-day period. It seems, that this is the key factor which determines that the average worker from Ukraine prefers to be employed by the Polish farmer for several Polish zloty per an hour instead of working for a several Euro at the German *bauer*.

Despite the development of new technologies, the availability of which often determines the importance of particular countries on the international arena, the demographic potential remains one of crucial factors deciding on the position on the geopolitical map of the world. It is essential when speaking about the state economy or mobilisation possibilities in case of war. The intention of the study's

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[37]   http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/ke-zniesienie-wiz-dla-ukrainy-i-gruzji-mozliwe-jeszcze-w-tym-roku/08lzhw

author was to emphasise the most important pieces of the puzzle, which is the phenomenon of migration in Poland. There is no doubt that political decisions on the issue would have a significant influence on the future of our country in the next few decades, and their effects will be one of the major determinants of the Polish position on the geopolitical map of Europe and of the world. And we should be aware of it.

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Jernej Zupančič [1]

THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE AND MIGRANT CRISIS AND SLOVENIAN RESPONSE

Abstract:

The article deals with the geopolitical interpretations of the causes, geographical size and variability of the migration wave from the areas of the Arab-Islamic arc to Europe after 2013, which occurred after world-economic crisis (2008 onwards) and at the time of new strategic escalation with Russia. Within a few years the number of those immigrants (including refugees) exceeded the number of 5 million. The refugee crisis has become a European problem because of the sequences of decisions, that increased the volume of migration wave, it intertwined with the economic motives of migration, giving up control and underestimated the negative economic and cultural effects. The exile has become a tool of political pressure both within European countries and outside them. The second part is analyzing the Slovene response to the immigration influx. Slovenia was primarily a follower of Europe's migration policies.

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Key words: migration, crisis areas, geopolitics, islamic world, Slovenia.

Introduction

Since 2013, Europe is facing enormous migration pressure. Due to the volume, dynamics, circumstances, and consequences, the process has been named the "European migration crisis". It followed the global economic crisis and coincides with the increased tension between the US, EU and Russia. Europe was the one that was greatly affected by the global economic crisis. Some countries, such as Germany, Benelux and the Scandinavian states, recovered relatively fast thanks to labour market reforms. However, more than half of the EU countries are still dealing with many economic and social problems, with high unemployment rate as most evident indicator. Almost 8 million EU citizens are working outside their country, and there are around 23 million unemployed (Unemployment statistics, 2015). Because of the exodus of young, educated population, these countries are reporting a problem of social and cultural sustainability. Over 5 million refugees and migrants entered European during this moment. Global migration trend analysis already predicted scenarios of increased pressure toward Europe and North America (Husa, Parnreiter, Stacher, 2010). However, the pace, direction, type and structure of migrants caught the EU almost totally unprepared.

The article deals with the main causes of modern mass migration, widely interprets geopolitical circumstances, presents refugee- and migrant flow through the Balkan Peninsula in detail and further focuses on the Slovenian (political) response to the European migration crisis.

Global framework of mass migration flows

Modern geopolitical structure is characterized by multipolarity, which has replaced the ideological and political dualism of the Cold War (Litwak, 2007). Only for a short period of time, the USA was seen as the only superpower (Barnett, 2004). This primacy was taken from it by the EU in the area of the Western hemisphere, and "Asian tigers", India and Brazil on the east side. The neo-liberal economic paradigm bas become a dominant feature and a leading force of new political relations in the world, which in particular increased strategic advantage of the USA and enabled growth of China (Varufakis, 2016). In the contact zones of major geopolitical poles, dynamic reconstruction of the global political map has triggered a series of local wars with ethnicity as their common denominator. In several enlargement processes (1992, 1995, 2004, 2007, and 2013), the EU competed with ethnic paradigm predominately as an economic association, but in real terms it protected the obtained ethnic achievements of the Member States. However, the EU did not develop its specific security structures; it maintained national armies with

increasingly more professional structure and NATO as a security superstructure. Due to operational nature, the US has kept the strongest influence within the NATO, thereby merely continued its security doctrine even after the Cold War. At the insistence of the neo-liberal logic, disproportions between the global North and the global South have further exacerbated the situation in the zone of poverty and conflict, increased the reliance of societies and countries, and often initiated local wars (Barnett, 2004, 14). Poverty and protracted conflicts generate refugee flows.

In the new millennium, powers of the Western hemisphere (and with it the entire Europe) were faced with a new competitor: radical Pan-Islamic movements, after which terrorism has become a convincing global treat. However, it is wrong to interpret it as a form of cultural resistance against historically-conditioned "Western" domination. We have to look for reasons in the centres of Islamic power, from Turkey to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. We should not overlook the influence and power of banks of these countries in many parts of Europe, neither the radicalization (or ideologization) of islamic cultural elements within large diasporas in Europe (Muthuswamy, 2009, 76-80). Quite similar processes and problems related can be traced in predominantly by moslems populated environments in Russia (for example, in Tatarstan), where religions are experiencing a real revival after decades of socialist repression (Graney, 2009, 2-4), and in some more large dimensions these happens in Central Asia

(Davis, Azizian, 2007). Due to its role in the past, Turkey, as a country with imperial tradition, is specifically emphasized here (Akşin, 2007). Its modern geopolitical aspirations are labelled as the "Turkish Y", directed toward the Balkans, Central Asia and Arab south. The third factor is Russia, which is entering as a powerful (and even aggressive) player after three decades of regression (Goldman, 2008). There are many reasons for this, and we have to look for them both in a quarter of a century old strategic repression of Russia toward the east (mainly, expansion of NATO), its elimination from the Balkans, and significant restrictions in its allies in the Mediterranean-Arab countries (mostly Syria and Libya) (Zupančič, 2012, 81—82) after a series of uprisings, so-called the "Arab Spring". The rejection of the "South Stream" project probably further stimulated already tense relations between the US and the EU on one side and Russia on the other. But the key to this was that - especially after the insistence of the US – the continental way, using Turkish territory, dominated in the energy supply of Europe. In the energy paradigm, Turkey gained tremendous strategic importance. Such development was likely dictated by anticipations and desires to transport oil and gas stocks of Mesopotamian Basin via Turkey, which is NATO`s ally, and not to Latakia on the Syrian coast, which is a much closer route. However, the solution of the Kurdish issue, both in Iraq and Turkey, is also decisive for both variants of oil and gas pipelines.

Modern geopolitical changes in Arab-Islamic coutries

An extensive area from which the majority of refugees and migrants are coming to Europe comprises around 23 million km2 of surface with more than 700 million inhabitants. Given the social structure, the balance of power and ongoing newer processes that have a significant impact on the refugee flows, the heterogeneous area of the Arab-Islamic world can be divided into a few areas: Palestine with surrounding countries of chaos, a zone of countries with power, monarchies of Arab Peninsula, a zone of Arab countries in transition, and Islamic zone of poverty in the region of Sahel, Africa. Countries of Central Asia are isolated from this.

Political map of this area is with a few exceptions the result of European colonial interventions since the 18th century. Before that, the main formers of social structures were the Arab expansion and after it the Turkish Empire. Persia was an exception. Withering Ottoman power in the Balkans was ended by nationalism and in Africa by colonial powers of Spain, France, Great Britain and Italy (Legewie, 2004). An attempt of the Pan-Arabian national movement after the collapse of the Turkish Empire was not successful. There were at the same time the Kurdish national expectations active as well, but covered by much more powerful and better organized Turkish nationalists (Fraser, McNamara, Mango, 2011, 39-69; 72). The territory between Levant and the Indian Ocean was controlled as mandated territories by France and Great Britain. They also outlined

the political borders that, with some minor changes, remain to this day. In 1947, Jewish state of Israel was created in Palestine. It increased and strengthened during the wars with Arabs and became a reliable American ally during the Cold War era. The Soviet Union was able to create an alliance with most of the Arab-Mediterranean countries (Zunapčič, 2012, 73-74). They incorporated some elements of the Soviet command economy, but not socialism as a social system. Libya and Syria came close. These countries maintained party and then personal dictatorships. Countries in the power zone have a different history. Kemalist Turkey joined NATO, and Iran ended a long period of monarchy and internationally isolated itself after the Islamic revolution in 1979 (Aksin, 2007). After decolonization of India, multi-ethnic Islamic Pakistan was formed in the western part. A mountainous area between the former Russian and British sphere was filled by Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century. Pakistan remained under the influence of the USA, and the socialist takeover of power in Afghanistan in 1979 was secured by the Soviet military intervention, which expanded to a ten-year war (Smith, 2003). Due to strategic interests the US supported radical Islamic factions in the anti-Soviet struggle, as well as the radical regime in Iraq, after it got involved in a ten-year war with Iran. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered an international military intervention, headed by the USA, which returned to this oil-rich country it independence. In 1992 followed an unsuccessful American operation of securing

humanitarian help in Somalia (Rambotsham et al. 2010). The key milestones were the war against terror and military intervention of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003. Both countries came under international control. But interventions did not bring peace in the region. This was followed by a period of political and territorial fragmentation by creating parastates and extensive areas without control and order (Zupančič, 2005). In 2011, there was a series of popular uprisings in 8 countries with autocratic regimes; this process was later named the "Arab Spring" (Brownlee, Masoud, Reynolds, 2013, 7-24). While in some places these uprisings were relatively quickly resolved with reform measures and interventions, as for example in Egypt (Osman, 2010), elsewhere followed, at least temporary, fundamentalist forms and chaos, and in Libya, Syria and Yemen civil wars. These processes are the direct cause of mass exodus, which from 2014 onwards is strongly knocking on Europe's door.

American interventionism is often blamed for the chaos in many countries of Islamic culture, and consequently also for the radicalization and ideologization of Islam (O'Connor, 2007). This is not true. While other countries have pronounced secularization, there is an evident trend with the Muslim countries introducing religious norms into the legal framework (Lacoste, 2009, 114-116). The introduction of Sharia was followed by intolerance towards other religious communities in most of these environments (De Falco,

Radcliffe, Riccardi, 2014). These systems use religion as a tool for the homogenization of society. In crisis situations and after a collapse of government order, communities lean on religious institutions, since they are the only ones with some sort of order. The second phenomenon is distancing the work of Muslim populations in European countries, including spatial auto-segregation (Lassere, Gonon, 2008), which can only partly be interpreted by social lever, historical trauma and elements of cultural defence (Basaam, 2001). Islamic communities are radicalized without the influence of the mainstream society. At the same time, relations between different branches of Islam got more intense, which raises harsh regional conflicts (Lacoste, 2009). On the other hand, the escalation of anti-Western Pan-Islamic campaign is a reflection of demonstrating demographic, economic, military and cultural power as well as a matter of ambition and apparent expansion (Davis, Azizan, 2007). French geopolitics (Lacoste, 1976) warned about the strengthening of Pan-Islamic territorial pretensions at least two decades before Huntington (1996). Zones of expansion mainly run in two directions: from the Sahel zone of poverty to the south and to the allegedly rich Europe. Refugees are the result of edge conflictualization, but can, in certain cases, also be a mean of colonization of certain territories.

The largest refugee-emigrant areas are Syria and Iraq, two once military powerful countries with totalitarian structure. The Iraqi regime was defeated by the second military intervention of "the

coalition of the willing" under the leadership of the US in 2003. This was followed by an extensive peace mission in cooperation with the work of Iraqi forces and the Kurds (Sandole, 2010). After some initial success, the attempt of reconstruction and revitalization of the country has stalled (Rambodsham, Woodhouse, Miall, 2010). Kurdistan Province in the north has been given a wide autonomy, and the majority of Arab countries were first divided by religious (Sunni, Shiite) affiliation and then locally fragmentized. Syrian regime of al-Assad was ended by a popular uprising in 2011. Followed chaos and civil war of all against all (Anderson, 2016). This result of a collapse of ethnically and religiously diverse countries is fairly typical and expected, but its continuation is not. On the ruins of the two countries, a special formation has developed - the Islamic State (ISIS), which was fill by radicalized groups from both countries, but is recruited with Islamic warriors on religious-ideological basis virtually from all over the world (Hanne, Neuville, 2015). There are several radical Islamic movements in the world (for example, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Dsund al-Khalifa), but with the proclamations of the Caliphate only Daesh territorialized. Now, it controls about 150,000 km2 of territory with approximately 6 million inhabitants and represents a new core of a broad conflict zone. Explanations that ISIS is mainly a religious radicalization of frustrated heirs of failed regimes interpret the motivation of people because of the past, including elements of "the holy war", but do not explain a clearly wider support

that this formation receives. Countries with mutually conflicting strategic interests are fighting against ISIS. In appears that causing chaos, including refugees, suits them in some respects. It was supported by Saudi Arabia (Hannes, De la Neuville, 2015), now it suits it due to a decline of Shiite part of Iraq, and it can almost smoothly intervenes in Yemen. Turkey has huge profits from the transport of oil (Lendmann, 2016) and finally from the transport of people. Refugees are a very lucrative business for war profiteers and "warlords". Without Turkish intervention ISIS eliminated Turkey`s competitor in the south (Syria), while it opposes the Kurds, against which Turkey leads a very unpleasant, from time to time even genocidal policy. Weakening of the Turkey`s competitor, the Kurdish Province and neighbouring Arab countries with Saudi Arabia as the main American berth in the wider region suits Iran. It partly suits Russia, as it uses refugees to "soften" its south competitor - Turkey, while increases its alliance with the Kurds. Refugee wave in Europe is causing a serious political crisis of the EU. In terms of European-US-Russian escalation it weakens Europe in the area of the greatest weakness: the Balkans. It suits Israel, since the collapse of Syria and Iraq eliminates its strongest military competitors. Military and economically powerful Israel can easily manage para-state formations, refugee areas, fragile states and fragmented political spaces in the north, and crisis situations allow radical military actions. Even the US has certain advantages: ISIS exerts pressure on allied Arab countries and Kurdish territories and

legitimizes the need for America presence in the region. Some sources accused Turkey (or some structures in Turkish society!) for supporting ISIS (Turkey...2016web).

Immigration influx in Europe and the european migration crisis

In terms of temporal and spatial dynamics and structure, current refugee flows from crisis areas to Europe are quite different than previously known examples. This situation is a result of a series of decisions that transformed the expected crisis effects into surprise, and allowed refugees issue to intertwined almost beyond recognition with forms of economic migrations and thus increase its dimensions and in a short period of time showed a range of social, spatial, political and cultural impacts. The EU revealed itself as weak and, in key aspects, incompetent to approach arising challenges responsibly and with a long-term mentality. Thereby, Europe itself contributed to the fact that refugees became a European problem. Additional problems are strained relation with Russia, weakening of the Balkans, and too strong negotiating position of Turkey.

The majority of migrants come from Syria and Iraq (around 57%), one-fifth from Afghanistan, and only slightly less from the Balkans (mainly Kosovo and Albania), followed by citizens of Iran, Pakistan and sub-Saharan countries from Senegal to Somalia (Park, 2015). Another feature is a strong dominance of younger men, reflecting the prevailing economic motives rather than crisis situation.

There are definitely the most refugees from Syria, but this group also has a quite heterogeneous structure. Among them are next to war victims also perpetrators and also very aggressive fractions (Simon, 2016). Refugees have reached the Turkish territory in about normal age and sex distribution, and after three years, younger and masculinized population is entering Europe.

Migrants are reaching Europe from three main directions. From Sahel and sub-Saharan areas they cross Sahara and reach Maghreb coast and then break through to Spanish enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla) or they cross the Strait of Gibraltar with boats. Despite attempts, this migration flow is successful only for around 3% of all migrants. Illegal migrations are hindered by Morocco, and Spanish control of the narrow aquatorium presents itself as effective. Only few use boats and go to the Canars Islands. Far more frequent direction is across the sea from Tunisian and Libyan coasts to Lampedusa, Malta and Sicily. Due to the length, this rout is the most expensive and also risky; according to estimates more than 4.000 people drowned. This sea route represents approx. 16% of all immigrations to Europe. An extensive maritime operation was organized to secure the aquatorium and to rescue migrants. Some are making their way through the Easter Europe to EU countries. By far the largest part (nearly 80%) of migrations goes through Turkey to the Aegean Islands and the land border. Only a small part has crossed the Turkish-Bulgarian border due to the Bulgarian restrictive border policy. Migration flow continued via

Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary, and after the closing of the Hungarian border, through Croatia and Slovenia to Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavia. Having been crossed by a 1.5 million migration wave, transit countries were faced with major logistics, and consequently also economic problems (Park, 2016).

Characteristics of the migrations flow along the Balkans Route

The Balkans are a natural gateway between Europe and Asia minor and present the shortest route for refugees from conflict areas of the Near and Middle East to the Central, Western and Northern Europe. However, the majority crossed the Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece. It seems that the Turkish authorities have at least somewhat directed the migration flow away from the Istanbul agglomeration. Then follow the Schengen border in Greece, then the crossing of the Balkan countries, which are not EU members, to the next Schengen barrier at the Hungarian and Slovenian borders. The Turkish territory really received the largest number of refugees, but it also became a meeting point for economic migrants from a very wide geographic area. Balkan countries did not hinder migrants. They offered humble humanitarian aid; but these impoverished countries did not have much more. Recording was inadequate. Route of migrants then mostly followed the main transport corridor through the valley of Vardar and Morava all the way to Belgrade. The Serbian authorities also did not stop them, and migrants continued under

police surveillance and with relatively modest help towards the north, to the Hungarian border. When the Hungarian border was closed, the main route was directed to Croatia and then Slovenia. Between Belgrade and Croatian border was a point of concentration. In addition, the migration quota increased, mainly due to certain groups from Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, and some also from Serbia and Bulgaria which joined along the way. Control over migrants was poor, and after the establishment of the bus and railway system of humanitarian convoys, the route became faster, cheaper and safer, which undoubtedly increased the migration flow significantly with people who have nothing really in common with refugees. Authorities and civil society organizations had to provide humanitarian aid (food, clothes, medicines, hygiene supplies, blankets, improvised furniture for emerging refugee centres and the like). Safety and administrative procedures at borders required an increased workload of military, police, medical staff, translation services, public administrations and other bodies.

Slovenian response to the migration wave

Slovenia was faced with a huge refugee wave after Hungary closed its border to them in fall 2015. Along the Sava River corridor migrants reached Slovenian borders in the middle and northern part.

It is estimated that close to 410,000 people (Park, 2016)[2] from the refugee and migrant wave crossed the border, controlled and uncontrolled. Moreover, Slovenian military ship participated in the control and humanitarian help in the aquatorium of the middle Mediterranean Sea from 2012 onwards. We should begin the outline and assessment of the Slovenian response to the European migrant crisis by considering Slovenian geographical circumstances, the size of the country and, directly, Slovenian politics.

Slovenia lies on crossroads; there, where the eastern part of the Alpine Arc passes through the lower hills into the Dinaric Mountains and delineates the continental Pannonian basin from the Mediterranean Northern Adriatic. Its' size is 20.273 km² and has 2,066.000 inhabitants. Traditional settlement territory of the Slovenes borders on the Italian, German, Hungarian and Croatian ethnic area. The area was until the crossroads of the 1990s as part of the non-aligned socialist Yugoslav federation at the military-strategic point of contact among the NATO Italy, neutral Austria and Hungary, which belonged to the Warsaw pact. After a brief war Slovenia became independent nation in 1991 and less than two decades later joined the EU and NATO in 2004 and entered into the Eurozone and the Schengen area in 2007. Due to convenient geographic position on

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[2] **Additional sources friom media, collected and revised by author.**

crossroads and relatively well developed traffic infrastructure, the country was commonly recognized as a typical strategic gateway.

Another significant aspect of geopolitical position is the border character. More than half of national territory lies inside 20 – km border area (or belt). This is improving the sensibility of the border issues. Slovenia developed well relations towards west and north, to Italy and Austria. There are large Slovene minorities there and the various forms of cross border connections and activities have therefore valuable role. The border towards Croatia is much larger, but far more passive due to long time lasted peripherity. This area is more vulnerable than western and northern part and the people have less border experiences. The territory of the country and especially the border zone play an important part in the monitorability of the border. Slovenia is a smaller European country and according to its demographic, economic and military power, it is not an important international factor. However, it has to meet the criteria of monitorability of its own space. In this respect, a large number of less controlled and mostly unknown foreigners definitely present a risk, especially taking into account the structure of these migrants. They came from countries with high level of militarization before the war. There might be (and they actually were, till to most aggressive elements!) among them. For these flows, Slovenia is as transit area for the flows on the "Balkan way". Therefore, upon the increased arrival of migrants, authorities prepared to offer humanitarian aid, provide

border surveillance and temporary transitional care. Emergency camps were sufficient in warm early autumn days. In key technical and political aspects, Slovenian government was fully flexible to the German permissive politics, knowing that Slovenia is not attractive to migrants and can count on a smaller number of them. Therefore, it agreed to the proposals of the European Commission on quotas. Germany and Austria are by far the most important economic partners. It should be taken into account that only a year earlier Slovenia was also faced with European financial intervention due to a very bad economic situation and the stalemate in the implementation of reforms. It is forgotten that the main reason for the prolonged and difficult economic crisis in Slovenia was probably political weakness. All Slovenian governments since the independence have been coalitions and had to work with many compromises. In such a political environment, a solid reform represented a too big of a political risk. In order to maintain internal political peace (or the stability of governments), they were willing to give in to foreign pressures, which in practice represented mostly German, Austrian and Italian. In was the same in the case of the migration crisis, and Slovenian media and government policy have diligently followed ingerencies of the European Commission and German (especially) politics. Hungarian action with the closure of borders and the influx of migrants to the Slovenian-Croatian border was first a shock. Police force used major, even extreme efforts to cope with the security situation at the border,

and humanitarian organizations took relatively good care for temporary accommodation, sanitary and food supply. With this the migration wave has quickly became the main issue of the domestic policy. Opposition parties criticized the procedures severely, and the populism (both right and left) was looking for short-term benefits. We should not overlook the influence of the media, which showed the situation very selectively and uncritically, and of the non-governmental organizations, which used the refugee wave and the emerging migration crisis for their own promotion; real help should be the obligations of the state. The impression is that political movements understood and interpret the resulting situation a priori from their ideological platforms, but practically they manoeuvred depending on the behaviour of the neighbouring countries. It is symptomatic that in October 2015 the Slovenian Ministry for foreign affairs strongly protested against the Hungarian intention of installing barbed wire at borders, saying that this is reminiscent of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain, but only a month later it was buying the same wire fences from Hungary and installing them at the eastern and southern borders (with Croatia). This decision was influenced by the situation in Europe, the wave of terrorist attacks, which evidently involved also "refugees" who have come through the Balkans route and, therefore, through Slovenia, and an increasingly negative attitude of German government's policy after it was faced with negative effects of migration influx (Meaker, 2016) on its territory and growing support

of right and extreme right-oriented political factions (Schuster, 2016). Both Austria and Germany requested full implementation of the Schengen provisions on the external border (which meant the Slovenian-Croatian border). However, this was much easier to determine than to execute due to the available capacity of the Slovenian security forces and geographical characteristics of the eastern border areas.

The Slovenian-Croatian border with its length of 670km represents almost a half of all land border of the country. The relief is on average lower than on the Austrian and Italian side, and the border line is much more winding. A third of the border line runs along watercourses, however, some (Sotla, Dragonja) are moderate and easily passable, while Mura, Drava and Kolpa are wider and represent a true obstacle, which is increased due to a wider marshy riverside. In some river sections, the border is under dispute and a subject of an arbitration judgement, many sections are economically interesting and attractive due to the exploitation of sand, gravel, aquaculture, water sports and even bathing, and were once an area and subject of bilateral cooperation. The north-eastern part of the upper valley of Kolpa (except across Gorjanci Mts.) runs mostly along lower, passable land with many local roads that cross the border, even though there is much less border crossings. Most of the border zone in both countries is distinctly peripheral and has economically weaker, elderly population. There are many working and family ties from the period of

the joint country; individually areas are rather connected, while institutional bonds are weak. Fairly diverse, hilly surface and mosaic cultural landscape are attractive to visit and living but difficult to control. There aren't a lot of natural obstacles, and they are relatively easy to cross. Due to more densely populated area, the visual control with the participation of the population can be a very effective obstacle for crossing such borders. This is enough for cases of control but not enough for efficient prevention. For this, it requires sufficient police and military forces with appropriate skills and powers. However, Slovenia is relatively weak in the military sector. After joining NATO, a fully professional military structure was established. Its technical development, equipment, training and structure adjusted to NATO standards. This is adequate for the purposes of missions and was also successful (especially in Bosnia and Kosovo). It was effective in cases of natural disasters, such as major floods, fires and ice, where it, together with other factors, intervene effectively. However, the migrant wave revealed major shortcomings, in particular an absolute insufficient number of military quotas, which realistically can be ensured only by a regular military draft. In addition, the country is also poorly prepared in the legal department and the regular army had no powers of the civil security actions in emergency situations. Therefore, the government pragmatically followed a very simple, very unattractive and short-term measure: it closed the border in most sectors with a high fence. This was a very expensive measure, which,

in addition to significantly improved safety, resulted in economic problems for the people living near the border.

There is a third, mainly technical part of the integrated action in terms of the enormous refugee flow. First, it requires an effective physical control of the border line and security of the border area, which was achieved with this unpopular fence. Control of the arrivals was - regardless of the destination of their planned rout - fairly modest. The control requires a detailed check and record of documents, in principle, also biometric records and security checks. Poor records allowed many to infiltrate, also problematic and dangerous people. In spring 2016, Austria re-established physical police and military surveillance of its border with Slovenian and Hungary because of immigrants.

After a wave of riots, terrorist attacks and escalating popularity of right, extreme political tendencies in European countries, it was clear that Germany, as the main protagonist of permissive immigration and refugee politics, will not handle such orientation for long. The demand for tighter control of the Schengen borer was entirely logical. A threat that Slovenia will become a "blind pocket" with tens of thousands immigrants has become very real. This also lowered the tolerance threshold. The phrase "migrant" in public discourse was generally assimilated with "refugee", which synchronous started to perceive it primarily as a problem. Principled view, mostly linked to ideological background, remained and the

argument is - even for scientists - a priori, unpragmatic and thus useless. They installed temporary refugee centres near border crossings, which facilitated logistics (due to further transport) and enabled a fairly good control. Refugee centres have become a local problem, regardless of the political (in the background, therefore, ideological) affiliation of political groups.

Conclusions

Migration crisis has triggered a series of consequences in the political map of Europe. Europe is, due to recent migration flows divided into a transit country to the south, target areas in the west and north and distanced countries. Slovenia is a typical transit country and officially first "schengen" border country. Despite the high number of immigrants who crossed slovenian borders, relatively small there really remain. Slovenia has agreed to the division of assets of migrants / refugees (or quota-system). The pressure on the Slovenian border is still present and will probably remain so the prospect of European solidarity is clearly relevant item. Slovenia can just hardly migration tensions. At the same time, it is estimated that it will have a country on the Balkan route, due to the sparse population and limited economic capacities and organizational problems, serious difficulties in trying full control of its borders. Slovenia must count on these pressures. Both Italy and Austria are strongly interested for stopping or minimalizing the total number immigrants. But the concentration of

refugees and migrants in the Balkans triggered the risk of conflict in an already unstable country. In addition, it is expected that the migrant in every way trying to reach rich countries of Central and Western Europe. It is estimated that the wire fencing of remaining there for some time, even for several years, despite the unpopularity of this measure. Since the potential stock of migrants is very high – estimated well over 60 million - action in terms of economic and military (security) of interventionism, at least in the medium term represent urgent solution. Other measures followed in the organization of the country. Critical is a particularly small number of security forces. The solution for this is the reintroduction of general conscription, and where appropriate other, even forms of civil security operations.

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Gideon Biger

LATRUN – A NO MAN'S LAND IN ISRAEL

Abstract:

The article deals with the geopolitical interpretations of the cases of no man's lands. On the example of Latrun area, which is located on Israel-Palestine demilitarized zone it is analyzed how conflict history affected political situation of this land, how it is governed and how both sides want take it. Situation in Latrun remains unclear. Israel considers it as part of Israel, but the Palestinians see this area as part of the former West Bank.

Key words: Israel, Palestine, no man's land, crisis areas, geopolitics.

Introduction

A no man's land is a unique area usually situated between two countries, which creates a common land boundary between countries with no real agreement on the exact location of the line. Sometimes a situation like this creates an area which is not a part of any country but remains as a zone with no legal sovereignty.

The term *no man's land* first appeared during World War I in Europe describing the area between two front lines, especially in the Western Front, which was not held by any side of the conflict. Later it became a phenomenon in the boundary making process in Asia, especially after World War II. The *no man's area* existed between North and South Vietnam as a division between the two rivals. The same situation still exists between North and South Korea - an area about 4 km wide is located between the two countries, stretched along the whole Korean peninsula separating armies of the two rival political entities. *No man's land* is also known by its American name: DMZ (Demilitarize Zone), which is a incorrect name, as demilitarize zones are zones under one country's sovereignty but without any military existence in that area.

More *no man's lands* can be found in Cyprus along the so-called "Atila Line", between the area held by Cyprus and the area held by the Turks, which is also called The Turkish Republic of Cyprus. In this paper we will deal with a special - a *no man's land* between Israel and Jordan. It was created in 1949 and even that it disappeared in 1967 it still exists and might have an influence on the future relations between Israel and the future Palestinian state

Latrun Area

Latrun is a name given to a village located near the road between the port city of Jaffa and Jerusalem. According to Christian

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tradition, the good thief crucified with Jesus, came from that area. In late 19th century, a French Christian order built a monastery there and during World War II the British authorities built a huge fortress nearby in order to protect the junction between the west – east and the north-south main routes of Palestine.

British Palestine, an area allocated to Britain after World War I, was divided between a Jewish State and an Arab state in November 1947 (fig. 1). The Arabs refused to accept the partition and started a war, first between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, and later, after the establishment of the State of Israel 14th May 1948, between the Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Transjordan versus the newly born State of Israel. This war lasted to the early months of 1949 and it was ended by a series of armistice agreements between Israel and each of the countries involved in that war (except Iraq, which never signed an armistice agreement with Israel). The armistice agreements introduced armistice lines which separated the fighting forces and consequently established non-recognized but real border line between Israel and the Arab countries later known as "The Green line" (accordingly to the color of the pencil used in the delimitation process). Those lines were basically marking the areas each army occupied up to a moment in which the cease-fire agreement was achieved. During the war, the Arab Legion of Jordan occupied the monastery and the fortress of Latrun and the Israeli army although

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
Fig. 1: The UN Partition plan of November 29th 1947.

Fig. 2: Case-fire line.

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
and tried to occupy this important spot, could not occupy it. So the agreed armistice line left those buildings in the Jordanian territory.

As that area is partly a hilly area, the armistice lines there was marked as two lines, showing the positions of the two armies at the time of the cease-fire (fig. 2). Those lines came to be the armistice lines. The two parties, Israel and Jordan, accepted the need to divide the area by establishing one line but during the process of changing the two lines into one the process was stopped. This is how the "area between the lines" came to life and it existed as a *no man's land* for about 19 years, till 1967 (fig. 3).

Fig. 3: The Latrun *no man's area*.

The *no man's area* of Latrun, which is about 44 sq. km, was partly a fertile plain area and partly a hilly area. The plain area is suitable for cultivation and was cultivated by the Arabs of the near by villages for centuries before the war. The two lines left that area in an un-known sovereign hand. Part of this area belongs to the monastery; other parts belong to the Arabs. The non recognized area then became an area of dispute concerning the right to cultivate the fertile land. Both sides agreed to leave the monastery area in the hand of the monastery people, as they were under the patronage of France. When it comes to the remaining area, for 19 years each side tried to occupy the land for cultivation by agriculture activities.

Israeli cultivators from newly established Kibbutzim on the Israeli side of the line, entered the area, cultivated about 600 hectares of it, while Arab farmers cultivated about 50 hectares adjust to the Jordanian line. During the year no one established control or built any permanent buildings in that area, not even planted any fruit trees. It was only used for a one year crops, mainly wheat, barely and vegetables. Here and there some small clashes between the two sides occurred as in October 1965. That year it even led to a two days of "tractors War" in which some cultivators and soldiers were wounded. A non-official agreement established the situation as Israel tried to achieve a formal agreement for dividing the area but Jordan refused to sign any formal agreements with Israel.

1967 War and after.

During the War of 1967 Israel occupied the whole West Bank including the "no man's area" of Latrun. Apart from incorporating the area of Jerusalem into the former Jordanian area Israel never annexed the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and that area is still concerned as "an occupied area" governed by a military commander. The situation of the *no man's area* remains unclear. Israel considers it as part of Israel, but the Palestinians see this area as part of the former West Bank and as such, a part of their territory (especially after a 1988 declaration of Jordan that abolished all it's claims for the West Bank, giving it to the Palestinians). Israel established some new settlements in that area (one of them is the unique Jewish-Arab village of Neve-Shalom), gave the cultivated areas to near-by villages, and built a part of the new highway between Tel Aviv to Jerusalem on it. The former Arab villages existing near the lines were evacuated days after the 1967 war and therefore abolished. The Palestinians never abolished their claim to that area (fig. 4).

During the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian authorities, it was suggested that the area should be considered as an area which half of it belongs to Israel and the other half, although belong to the Palestinians, will remain in Israel, which will give the Palestinians the same amount of land as compensation for it. As the peace talks were halted, the future of this area is still waiting for final settlement.

Fig. 4: Palestinian map showing the entire *no man's land* in West Bank
Area.

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John Hallam[1]

MEASURES TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL, MISTAKEN, UNAUTHORIZED OR INTENTIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DETONATIONS

Abstract:

This working paper for the OEWG is based on a paper given to a side-panel in New York at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. It has been considerably updated for the OEWG. We are antinuclear weapons organization and this presentation is open and its final version resulted from conference of our Open-Ended Working Group in Geneva May 2016 on Nuclear Risks and Accidental Nuclear War.

Key words: nuclear weapons, NPT, disarmament, apocalypse, deterrence.

Ambit – Nuclear Risk and the OEWG

The Open-Ended Working Group is mandated to consider not only a path to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons – a goal of existential importance – but another closely related goal also of

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[1] People for Nuclear Disarmament / Human Survival Project.

existential importance, namely measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized, or intentional nuclear detonations. (Panel 2 (b)) Particularly in the current context, the actual RISK of not just one or two nuclear explosions, but of a major nuclear conflict is arguably as great as it was during some of the tensest periods of the cold war. This makes the work of Panel 2(b) of critical importance. In addition, it is important to note that measures taken to reduce the risk of accidental (or deliberate, but based on misinformation or miscalculation) use of nuclear weapons take the world to a position in which the elimination of nuclear weapons become much easier. Interim steps of short-term nuclear risk reduction are in themselves steps to abolition.

The Time Factor.

Six minutes (varying from zero minutes to 10) is around the time that a commander of missile forces, a defense minister, or a President, has to decide, after a 30 second briefing (for US and Russian Presidents,) whether or not to launch about 2000 nuclear warheads, as early warning systems indicate – likely incorrectly – that the other 'side' has launched. It is thus unsurprising that a major factor in considering the likelihood of an inadvertent nuclear 'exchange' is the extremely compressed time-frames within which decisions have to be made by senior military and/or heads of state or government. Indeed, much of the discussion on the likelihood or otherwise of an accidental

'apocalypse', and of measures to make such an event less likely turn around giving decision-makers more time to think over decisions involving the launch of large numbers of nuclear weapons. Given the in-minutes/seconds time-frames currently involved, it is hard to see how rational decision-making can be achieved at all. This factor alone ought to be enough to make nonsense out of theories of deterrence, which assume, without any factual foundation whatsoever, that 'rational' decision-making is always possible, and that decision makers always have access to correct data. In fact neither is likely ever to be the case. Simply giving decision-makers more time to take decisions whose consequences are likely to be apocalyptic would achieve a major reduction in the risk of inadvertent nuclear conflict. Hence recommendations for lowering the risks of accidental nuclear war frequently revolve around this question of decision-making time.

In the US and Russia, around 900 missile-mounted warheads are on–alert in silos or mobile launchers and able to be fired, in some cases in less than a minute. In addition there are submarine-based warheads that can be launched in less than 10 minutes. China, which has traditionally kept its missiles off high alert, relying on dispersion and concealment in the 'underground great wall' for survival, is now talking about placing its modest nuclear forces on high alert.

Just how the compressed time-frames put decision-makers under impossible pressures is illustrated by the following anecdote concerning a 1979 false alarm, told by former Carter national security

adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Council of Foreign Relations in April 2012: "..... I remember being woken up one night at 3:00 a.m. to be told by my military assistant that we are under nuclear attack. It obviously didn't happen, since we're all here. (Laughter.) There would have been... 85 million Americans and Soviets dead six hours later. (...) Part of my job was to coordinate the response, if something like that happened, to notify the President. I had three minutes in which to notify him. During those three minutes, I had to confirm it in a variety of ways. And then he would have four minutes to decide how to respond. And then 28 minutes later, some of us would be dead and we'd be living in a different age. (...) I got a message from my military assistant, a general, who simply woke me up at 3:00 a.m. at night on the red phone and said, "Sorry to wake you up. We're under nuclear attack." (Scattered laughter.) That kind of wakes you up.... And, he adds, 30 seconds ago 200 Soviet missiles have been fired at the United States... But there were subsequent confirmations and clearly within – well, within actually almost two minutes prior to me calling him on the third minute--it was clear that this was a false alarm. So I did nothing. I went back to sleep. (Laughter)."

But then came the real punch line. The interviewer asked, "And if the confirmation had been a little late, could we have had a problem?" Brzezinski's answer: "We might have had." (emphasis mine).

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If it is indeed true that the other 'side' (Soviet in the '70s and '80s, Russian now, Indian or Pakistani) actually has launched, then it is indeed the end of what 'we' know as 'the world'. If (as is quite probable) the incoming missiles are merely a computer glitch (as in Brzezinski's anecdote above) and 'our' side launches anyway, it will just as surely be the 'end of the world' as the 'other side' (if acting in accordance with "deterrence" theory) will launch in response, making 'our' belief (whether 'we' are US or Russia, India or Pakistan) that the 'end of the world' has arrived, self-fulfilling. (It is noteworthy that at the conclusion of the war-game, filmed by the BBC, participants in fact violated the 'rules' of deterrence by refusing to instruct UK trident submarine crews to incinerate Russia).[Inside the War Room, BBC]

Consequences – Human Survival

Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in 'Self Assured Destruction', in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that:

"A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war

between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade."

A conflagration involving US/NATO forces and those of Russia would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead US/Russia scenario.

The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December

2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans' ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even Climate Change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now—and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well. A seminal BAS (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) article of October 2008 entitled 'Minimizing the Risk of Human Extinction' places two nuclear-weapons-related actions at the very top of its rather consequential 'to-do' list. It gives topmost ranking to lowering the alert level of nuclear weapons systems, and next to top ranking to the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Consequences – Electromagnetic Pulse

The 'mere' destruction of the information-based techno-structure and the complete disappearance of the global financial system (and just about everything else technologically dependent) could be accomplished with a very few large warheads (such as the Chinese DF5, of 5Mt) exploded in space, with the effects of Electromagnetic Pulse. In fact results of EMP can also be duplicated by a very large coronal mass ejection such as the 'Carrington Event' that took place in 1859. Studies by the US Congress (2004, 2008) indicate

that in either event (High altitude/outer space nuclear explosion(s) or 'Carrington Event') up to 90% of US citizens could starve to death, as all delivery systems failed. This, without the destruction of a single city. Most studies (including the 2004 and 2008 Congressional ones) say that electronic systems in the entire continental US could be crippled by a single large warhead exploded about 100-400Km out in space. 5 x 5Mt warheads exploded in space above continental landmasses would be enough to take global civilization back to medieval times. The drastic effects of EMP, even without a single city being directly destroyed, show just how vulnerable civilization now is, not only to nuclear weapons use, but potentially to geomagnetic phenomena also. This is quite independently a civilizational risk that warrants both study and action.

The Apocalypse 'lite' – South Asia

Even a 'mini' India/Pakistan nuclear exchange, involving 100-200 Hiroshima-sized warheads, could put up to 2 billion people worldwide at risk from famine, in part as a result of drastic declines in production of corn, winter wheat, rice, and soy production in the US, India, and China. [Ira Helfand – 'Nuclear Famine - A Billion People at Risk'] Such scenario-building depends critically on what assumptions are input to the study. Critical assumptions in Ira's Helfand's study are how many warheads get to be used (he chose 50 on each side – a number that is probably too low by a factor of two), and targeting – he

assumed, probably correctly, that cities would be primary targets. Ira's assumptions, if anything, probably underestimate, rather than overestimate, the impact, as at least double the numbers of warheads he assumes, look most likely to be used.

Nuclear Risk Factors

So just how likely really is such a scenario? Is it just science fiction with which NGOs frighten roomfuls of diplomats? How likely really is a completely catastrophic event-sequence, between India and Pakistan or between NATO and Russia? Some common-sense things can be said about catastrophic nuclear risk, without too much mathematical complexity. I have depended very much on the highly numerate risk analysis provided by Seth Baum of the GCRI (Global Catastrophic Risk Institute) and Martin Hellman of Stanford.

--Seth Baum in a NY 2015 NPT presentation, and a subsequent masterly presentation at the Vienna Conference on Humanitarian Consequences, noted that nuclear risks have been drastically underestimated. Prof Martin Hellman at Stanford, using quite different statistical techniques, came to similar conclusions. Hellman called for a US National Academy of Science study to be carried out on the risk of accidental nuclear war.

--Risk is not simply a function of the probability of a given event, but is a function of probability times consequences, or '$r = p \times c$'.

This means that even if the probability of a global nuclear exchange is relatively low, the potential consequences are so grave (as we see from the above) that only a probability of zero or very close thereto, can be acceptable.

--Even if the probability of an accidental apocalypse seems reasonably low (say, 0.1%-1%) in any given year, if this is taken over an indefinitely large number of years, the risk approaches asymptotically to 100%.

--Nuclear risk has palpably increased in the last 2-3 years, with the most obvious signs being the movement of the hands of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 'Doomsday Clock' from five minutes to three minutes to midnight.

Most recently, the annual Bulletin Doomsday Clock Symposium has retained the position of the hands at three minutes to midnight, amid a spate of dire warnings by everyone from former defense secretaries to former heads of nuclear missile forces of the US and Russia as to the danger of inadvertent nuclear war.

In the Doomsday Clock's own words:

"Three minutes is too close. Far too close. We, the members of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, want to be clear about our decision not to move the hands of the Doomsday Clock in 2016: That decision is not good news, but an expression of dismay that world leaders continue to fail to focus their efforts and the world's attention on reducing the extreme danger

posed by nuclear weapons and climate change. When we call these dangers existential, that is exactly what we mean: They threaten the very existence of civilization and therefore should be the first order of business for leaders who care about their constituents and their countries." [Doomsday Clock/BAS announcement of 22 Jan 2016].

There has been a series of articles on nuclear war risks and nuclear deterrence in Der Spiegel (arguing that nuclear war risks now are actually higher than during the cold war), The Guardian, Foreign Affairs, The Economist, and others. Most recently there have been warnings from former Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. OEWG delegates should also, if they have not already seen it, view the aforementioned BBC's recent documentary in which cameras are placed in a normally classified NATO war-game involving prominent decision-makers, some of whom may even be right here. The results are chilling as a crisis in the Baltic states escalates by what one might call a 'WW-I type escalation sequence', into WW-III. [Google 'Inside the War Room BBC'].

The clearest driver of increased risk (as Inside the War Room illustrates) is of course, the current crisis in Ukraine, with the associated nuclear threats, and the wider deterioration in NATO-Russia relationships. Even to make nuclear threats in and of itself considerably increases risk. Part of this increased risk has been a rising incidence of confrontations between NATO and Russian military forces. Snap Russian (and NATO) exercises, notably in the Baltics

(around which the BBC war-game doco revolved) with nuclear-armed forces in close proximity increase the risks hair-raisingly.

According to the European Leadership Network:

"Since the Russian annexation of Crimea, the intensity and gravity of incidents involving Russian and Western militaries and security agencies has visibly increased. This ELN Policy Brief provides details of almost 40 specific incidents that have occurred over the last eight months... These events add up to a highly disturbing picture of violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea, simulated attack runs and other dangerous actions happening on a regular basis over a very wide geographical area." and "To perpetuate a volatile stand-off between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance and its partners in the circumstances described in this paper is risky at best. It could prove catastrophic at worst."

A 'mock' attack on what seems to have been a peace festival(!!) on the Danish island of Bornholm underlines this ELN statement.

Even more worrying is a recent (1April) statement by NATO's Philip Breedlove: "We are prepared to fight and win if we have to... our focus will expand from assurance to deterrence, including measures that vastly improve our overall readiness," A statement that will surely simply invite a Russian counter- escalation. According to Russia's NATO representative, Aleksandr Grushko: "We are not passive observers, we consistently take all the military measures we consider

necessary in order to counterbalance this reinforced presence that is not justified by anything... Certainly, we'll respond totally asymmetrically." Grushko did not elaborate on his statement, but said Russia's actions would correspond to its "understanding of the extent of the military threat, would not be extremely expensive, but also highly effective" All this ratchets up both the likelihood and the consequences, of a European, NATO/Russia clash, now being openly spoken of by Breedlove. Meanwhile, minuteman missile forces and Russian strategic rocket forces (as well as Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces) rehearse the 'apocalypse' on a regular basis. It's not imaginary for them. It's what they do.

Missiles are fired from test sites, from missile silos, and from mobile launchers and submarines, a number of times a year by both the US and Russia. In the past these exercises have been routine. Most recently, they have become increasingly public and threatening: almost a form of political theater. The most recent US firings from Vandenberg airbase, done in the immediate aftermath of a DPRK space launch that was condemned as ICBM development, involved two launches of what did not pretend to be anything other than an ICBM, in a single week. According to Ian Kearns (himself a participant in Inside the War Room) of the European Leadership Network: "A dangerous game of military brinkmanship is now being played in Europe." "If one commander or one pilot makes a mistake or a bad decision in this situation, we may have casualties and a high-stakes

cycle of escalation that is difficult to stop." Most recently,(Apr 1) Ian Kearns wrote: '...(1) Between March 2014 and March 2015 alone, we logged over 60 dangerous incidents in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are pleased that this work is profiled in the newly released Munich Security Conference Report 2016, (2) because our contention has been and remains that, against the backdrop of wider mistrust and tension in the NATO-Russia relationship, the ongoing incidents have the potential to trigger a major crisis between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance. More specifically, if additional crisis avoidance mechanisms are not put in place, more recent assertive Russian military activities, coupled with reassurance measures adopted by NATO in response, will increase the risks to stability in Europe.'

A somewhat different story to that of purely Russian aggression is recounted by Dr Christoff Lehman of Global Research, according to whom on 7 April 2015, a NATO (US) reconnaissance plane was intercepted approaching Russian territory over the Baltic Sea and forced to turn back by SU27's. It seems that (as NATO accuses Russia of doing) the planes transponder had been turned off. It seems both sides, (not just Russia), play these risky games.

Theodore Postol, a US physicist, recently warned at a conference on nuclear risk last February in NY that Russian and US nuclear forces have now created a danger of accidental nuclear war that is 'comparable to that of some of the most tense periods during

the Cold War.' It is clear from this that nuclear risks right now are at an absolutely unacceptable level. And, whether Russia, the US/NATO or both (most likely) are to 'blame', those rights and wrongs and mutual blaming pale into insignificance in comparison to what, potentially, is at stake.

Absurdities of Deterrence

It is a fatal paradox of deterrence as routinely conceived – that in order to maintain 'strategic stability' we have to (incredibly but really) threaten the 'end of the world'. In order to keep the end of the world 'off' the agenda (i.e., to frighten our potential adversaries into not doing anything we don't like) we have to keep the end of the world 'on' the agenda (so they are frightened enough). But that means that the end of the world is indeed, really, 'on' the agenda…an absurd and fatal paradox. These NATO and Russian exercises along the borders of the Baltic states should give rise to very deep concern.

There have already been too many 'near misses'. Deterrence depends on the absolute impossibility of mistakes. Under deterrence theory, decision-making is presumed to be absolutely rational and informed by perfect data and mistakes and malfunctions never happen. Yet precisely the opposite is what we in fact observe to be the case. Mistake, miscalculation and malfunction seem to be the rule not the exception. Indeed with the compressed decision-making time-

frames earlier referred to, rational decision-making would seem to be all but impossible.

When does the Miracle Supply Run Out?

Statistically speaking we probably already shouldn't be here. A study of those near misses leads one to conclude that the only reason we are here is by what General Lee Butler terms 'Divine Providence'. Without committing to any particular theology, we might well profitably ask, 'just when does our miracle supply run out?' Are we, right now, tempting fate or the Deity just a little too much? Or is 'Divine Intervention' infinite and never-ending? Should we find out? If so, this is an experiment that can be done only once (especially if it fails!). Obvious 'near miss' incidents include a number of sub–incidents during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in one of which WW-III was nearly initiated by a wandering bear that activated a B-52 scramble-alarm; incidents with computer tapes for 'doomsday' in 1979 (resulting in what a Congressional committee who happened to be present at the time called 'blind panic') and with a malfunctioning computer chip in 1980 and 1981 (it happened three times). On the Russian side there was the famous incident involving Col. Stan Petrov of September 26, 1983; the Able Archer war scare just over a month later, and the Norwegian Weather Research Rocket incident of 1995, in which we are reputed to owe our existence to an unknown adviser who said 'excuse me Mr President, let's wait another minute'.

Some of these incidents are described in greater detail in the Chatham House publication 'Too Close for Comfort', as well as in a number of my own NPT panel presentations. Chatham House lists in some detail incident after incident in which a nuclear exchange is narrowly averted. From time to time further incidents keep surfacing, notably one in which cruise missile operators in Okinawa during the Cuban Missile Crisis (the cruise missiles were equipped with 5Mt warheads) were inadvertently (it seems) ordered to launch, and an incident in which an order to launch was inadvertently and unknowingly sent out to all US nuclear forces by someone who literally didn't realize what they were doing.(!)

Cyberspace

In recent years, greater attention has been given to the possibility of cyberspace attacks on nuclear command and control systems. The Vienna conference was addressed on that subject by Camille Francoise, and Jason Fritz addresses the problem in Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, written for the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). The issue of cyberspace risks is addressed by a resolution adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), whose membership includes members of parliaments of both nuclear-armed states and those involved in 'extended deterrence' relationships.

The IPU Assembly adopted a final resolution, which, among other things.

Noted that: '...military ICT systems for the deployment and use of force are susceptible to acts of cyber warfare that could lead to third parties intercepting and deploying such systems to cause unauthorized, illegal and destructive use of force…and was especially concerned that the hacking of nuclear weapon command-and-control systems could result in the unauthorized launch and detonation of nuclear weapons and cause unparalleled catastrophes;' The IPU also expressed concern about: the suggestion by military planners that nuclear deterrence be maintained as an option for dealing with the existential threat of a cyberattack. The IPU recommended that: '...Parliaments from nuclear-weapon States call on their governments to rescind launch-on-warning policies, stand down nuclear weapons from high operational readiness and extend the decision-making time for nuclear-weapon use in order to prevent unauthorized activation and deployment of nuclear weapon systems, pursuant to the negotiation of agreements to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and achieve their elimination.' In the current context of nuclear risk this IPU resolution could be literally world-saving.

Eliminating/Reducing Nuclear Risk

A number of things can be done to eliminate or reduce nuclear risk. It is astonishing that none of these commonsense measures were

discussed or raised at the recent Washington conference on nuclear security. Indeed, surreally, the risk of nuclear weapon USE, except as an act of terrorism, was not canvassed. It is commendable that some of these measures are being talked about here and now. In addition to the below, you are particularly referred to the IALANA paper on 'Nuclear Disarmament – The Road Ahead', and in particular to its recommendation one, calling for an immediate worldwide moratorium on exercises and war-games involving nuclear forces, and on the testing of nuclear delivery systems and on making statements that make or imply a threat to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances. Russian and NATO decision-makers please take note!

First of all nuclear weapons can and should be eliminated 'yesterday'. If nuclear weapons no longer exist then the risk of a catastrophic nuclear conflict, deliberate or inadvertent, can only be zero, at least in the short to medium term. This does not mean that all conflict will cease or that nirvana will instantly ensue. They won't. It merely means that lesser conflicts, however appalling in and of themselves, will no longer pose the risk of spiraling into an event sequence that risks human survival itself. Nuclear weapons are an existential threat to all humans including those not directly involved in any conflict. These weapons must be treated as such and outlawed.

Secondly, various interim risk reduction measures can be taken on the understanding that they are way-stations in a rapid movement to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

These include (but are not confined to): No longer targeting cities. Cities if targeted are the source of the bulk of the 180million tonnes of dark black smoke that will blot out the sun for decades after a large scale nuclear exchange. Mayors For Peace has detailed proposals about this contained in the Ypres Declaration.; Taking nuclear weapons off high alert. I mentioned the six minutes of decision-making time. This is an artifact of quick-launch, high-alert procedures that leave no time to ascertain whether or not an indication that the other has launched is really the end of the world approaching at three times the speed of sound, or merely a malfunctioning chip someplace. Much discussion has already taken place about increasing decision-making time. Both the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review and (from an entirely different angle) the Swiss/NZ study 'Re-Framing De-Alert' focus on increasing decision-making time. Even thoughtful opponents of de-alerting such as former ambassador Chris Ford acknowledge its desirability. Lowering alert status is precisely about increasing decision-making time. Once more, in the current atmosphere of US/NATO vs Russia military confrontation, adequate decision-making time – a whole lot longer than six minutes – will absolutely be required to assure the avoidance of catastrophe.

Two highly worthy UNGA resolutions urging a lowering in alert status, and thus an increase in decision-making time, are India's Reducing Nuclear Dangers resolution, and the De-Alerting Group's Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems, itself a major

result of this author's efforts. Operational Readiness has steadily increased its support. Reducing Nuclear Danger deserves much more support than it gets. 'Out-of-bloc' support (ie from countries other than NAM) for Reducing Nuclear Dangers would send a helpful message. In the context of a possible placing of some of China's strategic nuclear forces on high alert, these UNGA resolutions are of especial importance.

Establishing the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) that the US and Russian Governments have now agreed to set up three if not four times (first agreed in 1998 in the aftermath of the 1995 Norwegian research rocket incident), but which still has not been established. JDEC, if it existed, would do much to remove misunderstandings that could prove terminal for civilization.

Moving the patrol areas of SLBMs further away from potential targets.(Mosher, Schwartz and Howell, 2003) This would certainly increase warning times and make fingers on triggers less itchy.

No First Use agreements/declarations. Also of especial importance in view of a possible Chinese move to high alert. In addition, India regularly puts up a resolution urging a convention to forbid nuclear weapons use, a potentially useful risk - reduction step.

REVIEWS

Adam Myślicki[1]

THOMAS, A. R. (ED.) „GEOPOLITICS, DEVELOPMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY: ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA AT THE CROSSROADS"

The publication *„Geopolitics, Development, and National Security: Romania and Moldova at the Crossroads"* represents six articles distantly connected not only to each other but also to the main theme expressed in the title. The authors of the preface, Sebastian Vaduva from the Emanuel University of Oradea and Andrew R. Thomas from the University of Acron, see it as an attempt to look closer at the two nations. On the one hand, they share the language, common history and cultural heritage, on the other, after twenty years after the Soviet Union collapse, which was a critical historical occurrence for them, the distance between them on the road to the EU and NATO integrations extends. The intention of the author of this review is not to engage in polemics whether the selection of the articles is adequate for the publication's theme or not. Let the reader make the opinion themselves. Below one can find their summaries with a brief commentary where geopolitical issues of our concern are involved.

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The elaboration *„Governmental Administration and the Security of Romania in a Global Context”* begins with considerations on the challenges for political elites of 21st century in regard to the phenomenon of globalisation. In this context, the authors (Sebastian Vaduva and Petru Filip from the Emanuel University of Oradea) refer quite generally to the questions of the technological progress (which accelerates constantly, first, it changes the global market environment, second, it contributes to the increase of disproportions between the developed and developing countries, since the former ones have already adopted a new, modern, short-lived cycle production where there is no place for aging of products before new ones appear), the globalisation phenomenon's opportunities and risks, as well as perspectives of central and integrated management of the future of the global village. These considerations are a background for the second track of the article which refers to Romania. The authors introduce the reader to the socio-political conditionings of Romania after the Iron Curtain collapse. It includes a critical glance on the post-communist heritage and an analysis on the process of law adjustment to the EU standards, which resulted in a successful accession in 2007. We can feel strong pro-European and pro-Atlantic sympathies of the authors who are looking forward to further and deeper integration with western structures as the only right political way for Romania.

The most interesting article in the publication from the geopolitical point of view is the next one – *„Geopolitics and Security by the Black Sea: The Strategic Options of Romania and Republic of Moldova".* Dan Dungaciu from the University of Bucharest portrays the geopolitical environment of the Black Sea area in a comprehensive manner, referring to the series of questions: geographical (the general map of resources and geopolitical axes in the region), political (e.g. one of the most significant for the Europe transition of German foreign policy strategy from the *"Neo-Gaullism"*, based on the assumption of German-French counterbalance for USA, to *"Euro-Atlanticism"* as closer cooperation with the biggest empire, or the Constitution for Europe project's failure in 2005 consequences), and the NATO activity in region in the nineties (*Northern European Initiative* and *Northern Dimension Initiative* programmes) and later (the possible extension of the *Action Endeavour* to the Black Sea in 2005 considerations). The author does not forget to mention, how the main political doctrines, that influenced the region, were changing. Namely, the shift from the cold-war concept of *„low politics – high politics"* (subordinating the environmental, economic, social and internal issues as of smaller importance to the political-military one) to the sustainable one, named "The Copenhagen School", is described. A series of comparative studies regarding security issues in regions of other European seas are talked over.

Summing up such a multi-threaded context presentation, the author concludes that only the progressing NATO expansion (and following EU's one) can be a guarantor of the political stability in the region. Given the Romania accession to the NATO in 2004, the next goal should be Moldova, bearing in mind that it has not only military sense but rather political one, which can influence every non-military aspect of the state running.

The political situation in the region has changed after the article was written, so the position of the present commentator is privileged, especially that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that these changes (*i.a.* the Ukrainian crisis together with the Crimea annexation by the Russian Federation in 2014, or the USA influence losses in Turkey in 2016 in result of internal policy of the president Recep Erdogan) came out of the NATO (USA particularly) expansion attempts in the region. Taking into account another occurrences and political conditions (the war in Georgia in 2008, or the progressing power oligarchisation in Moldova), one can have the impression that the NATO members' political engagement in the region recommended by the author is not the only one receipt for its stability.

The articles in third and fourth chapters of the publication concerns, respectively, the new technology transfer between the "global village" and Romania in the context of progressing globalization, and the propositions of the research on Romanian

hospitality industry. The former is interesting from the geopolitical point of view only for its considerations on the pessimistic "brain drain" phenomenon (the outflow of valuable individuals from the developing countries to the developed ones, like the USA), or the disproportions concerning foreign investments' access to modern technologies *(Foreign Direct Investments)* resulted from the globalisation processes. The second study may have a geopolitical significance only assuming that turism, as a strategic branch of Romanian economy, would have an important impact on the budget of the country.

Chapter 5., containing the elaboration „*Between Russia and the EU: The Sociopolitics of the Republic of Moldova – A Transdisciplinary Approach"* is quite a theoretical presentation of socio-political conditionings in Moldova in its newest history after regaining independence in 1991. Without any doubt precious for acquainted with the issue, the article represents too general and wide collection of commentaries on particular phases of political transformations in the country which can be hardly absorbable even for lettered layman. What is valuable, at least some essential obstacles in smooth conversion from post-Soviet republic into the western-style democracy are identified very accurately. The author enumerates here *i.a.*: 1) the social split to fractions: pro-Romanian, pro-Russian, and opting for independent path "in the middle"; 2) a big distance from the western countries and institutions in case of Moldova in contrast

to Romania, Poland, and Baltic states, what brought completely different results for the mentioned countries; 3) lack of uniform, consolidate, pro-western informational message in Moldavian media which would support pro-European course of the political elite. The author assumes optimistically that the Moldova's EU accession is possible in 2019 already (the elaboration is dated of December 2014) with the following conscious remark that the EU and NATO engagement can provoke some negative reactions from Russia's side.

It is hard to escape the feeling that in the article – which in fact is of high value – some questions were treated in quite a superficial manner. Namely, in such wide elaboration more information on factors which represent some serious obstacles for democratisation processes in Moldova shall be provided. First of them is the fact of the existence within its borders (because the independence of this quasi-state has never been recognised by Moldova, the official state border does not exist, too) separatist Republic of Transnistria. The next one is unprecedented – as for European standards – deep misappropriation of the country by oligarchic elites which are interested only in the drain on its resources and finances. It would be worth to mention also about the huge employment emigration which has permanent character and concerns, according to official data, about 15-20% of Moldova's population. These factors, in the opinion of the author of this review, are of the great importance for the question being the main theme of the article. Moreover, we should notice that at

present, in 2016, given the international conditionings, as well as the internal political situation in Moldova, any anticipation on the data of its accession to the EU is too optimistic. In my opinion it was too optimistic at the end of 2014 as well.

The publication is finalized by an interesting article representing a comparative study on two religion systems of the antique times – the polytheism of Mesopotamia and biblical monotheism, in the context of the ancient societies' sense of economic and military security. However, it is hard to refer its content to the issues related to current conditionings and geopolitical trends in the region, no matter if one speaks of the Black Sea or the Middle East areas.

To sum up the whole publication, we can assume that the reader who is not acknowledged with the socio-political characteristic of both Romanian-language countries would gain some general knowledge in terms of their political and socio-economic conditionings and problems resulting from their newest post-transition history. On the other hand, for persons of a good familiarity with the subject, most of the information regarding the newest history of Romania and Moldova would be precious as much as such selective content would be complementary for their knowledge.

The authors – one after another (where the elaboration refers the geopolitical issues) – present clear pro-European and pro-Atlantic preferences and show their concern about possible Russian interference in the Europeanization processes in the region. The

publication showed up in December 2014 and some of its elements doubtlessly have an earlier date of edition. The authors' concerns turned out to be right and their optimism – in the matter of Europeanization - did not find its confirmation in the reality. The western expansion has been stopped. In this regard we shall admit that the occurrences which have happened in the region since 2014 have changed the reality so profoundly that its perception shall be for sure brought up to date, and expectations adjusted to the real scale.