

Jernej Zupančič¹

THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE AND MIGRANT CRISIS AND SLOVENIAN RESPONSE

Abstract:

The article deals with the geopolitical interpretations of the causes, geographical size and variability of the migration wave from the areas of the Arab-Islamic arc to Europe after 2013, which occurred after world-economic crisis (2008 onwards) and at the time of new strategic escalation with Russia. Within a few years the number of those immigrants (including refugees) exceeded the number of 5 million. The refugee crisis has become a European problem because of the sequences of decisions, that increased the volume of migration wave, it intertwined with the economic motives of migration, giving up control and underestimated the negative economic and cultural effects. The exile has become a tool of political pressure both within European countries and outside them. The second part is analyzing the Slovene response to the immigration influx. Slovenia was primarily a follower of Europe's migration policies.

¹ University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Key words: migration, crisis areas, geopolitics, islamic world, Slovenia.

Introduction

Since 2013, Europe is facing enormous migration pressure. Due to the volume, dynamics, circumstances, and consequences, the process has been named the "European migration crisis". It followed the global economic crisis and coincides with the increased tension between the US, EU and Russia. Europe was the one that was greatly affected by the global economic crisis. Some countries, such as Germany, Benelux and the Scandinavian states, recovered relatively fast thanks to labour market reforms. However, more than half of the EU countries are still dealing with many economic and social problems, with high unemployment rate as most evident indicator. Almost 8 million EU citizens are working outside their country, and there are around 23 million unemployed (Unemployment statistics, 2015). Because of the exodus of young, educated population, these countries are reporting a problem of social and cultural sustainability. Over 5 million refugees and migrants entered European during this moment. Global migration trend analysis already predicted scenarios of increased pressure toward Europe and North America (Husa, Parnreiter, Stacher, 2010). However, the pace, direction, type and structure of migrants caught the EU almost totally unprepared.

The article deals with the main causes of modern mass migration, widely interprets geopolitical circumstances, presents refugee- and migrant flow through the Balkan Peninsula in detail and further focuses on the Slovenian (political) response to the European migration crisis.

Global framework of mass migration flows

Modern geopolitical structure is characterized by multipolarity, which has replaced the ideological and political dualism of the Cold War (Litwak, 2007). Only for a short period of time, the USA was seen as the only superpower (Barnett, 2004). This primacy was taken from it by the EU in the area of the Western hemisphere, and "Asian tigers", India and Brazil on the east side. The neo-liberal economic paradigm has become a dominant feature and a leading force of new political relations in the world, which in particular increased strategic advantage of the USA and enabled growth of China (Varufakis, 2016). In the contact zones of major geopolitical poles, dynamic reconstruction of the global political map has triggered a series of local wars with ethnicity as their common denominator. In several enlargement processes (1992, 1995, 2004, 2007, and 2013), the EU competed with ethnic paradigm predominately as an economic association, but in real terms it protected the obtained ethnic achievements of the Member States. However, the EU did not develop its specific security structures; it maintained national armies with

increasingly more professional structure and NATO as a security superstructure. Due to operational nature, the US has kept the strongest influence within the NATO, thereby merely continued its security doctrine even after the Cold War. At the insistence of the neo-liberal logic, disproportions between the global North and the global South have further exacerbated the situation in the zone of poverty and conflict, increased the reliance of societies and countries, and often initiated local wars (Barnett, 2004, 14). Poverty and protracted conflicts generate refugee flows.

In the new millennium, powers of the Western hemisphere (and with it the entire Europe) were faced with a new competitor: radical Pan-Islamic movements, after which terrorism has become a convincing global treat. However, it is wrong to interpret it as a form of cultural resistance against historically-conditioned "Western" domination. We have to look for reasons in the centres of Islamic power, from Turkey to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. We should not overlook the influence and power of banks of these countries in many parts of Europe, neither the radicalization (or ideologization) of islamic cultural elements within large diasporas in Europe (Muthuswamy, 2009, 76-80). Quite similar processes and problems related can be traced in predominantly by moslems populated environments in Russia (for example, in Tatarstan), where religions are experiencing a real revival after decades of socialist repression (Graney, 2009, 2-4), and in some more large dimensions these happens in Central Asia

(Davis, Azizian, 2007). Due to its role in the past, Turkey, as a country with imperial tradition, is specifically emphasized here (Akşin, 2007). Its modern geopolitical aspirations are labelled as the "Turkish Y", directed toward the Balkans, Central Asia and Arab south. The third factor is Russia, which is entering as a powerful (and even aggressive) player after three decades of regression (Goldman, 2008). There are many reasons for this, and we have to look for them both in a quarter of a century old strategic repression of Russia toward the east (mainly, expansion of NATO), its elimination from the Balkans, and significant restrictions in its allies in the Mediterranean-Arab countries (mostly Syria and Libya) (Zupančič, 2012, 81—82) after a series of uprisings, so-called the "Arab Spring". The rejection of the "South Stream" project probably further stimulated already tense relations between the US and the EU on one side and Russia on the other. But the key to this was that - especially after the insistence of the US – the continental way, using Turkish territory, dominated in the energy supply of Europe. In the energy paradigm, Turkey gained tremendous strategic importance. Such development was likely dictated by anticipations and desires to transport oil and gas stocks of Mesopotamian Basin via Turkey, which is NATO's ally, and not to Latakia on the Syrian coast, which is a much closer route. However, the solution of the Kurdish issue, both in Iraq and Turkey, is also decisive for both variants of oil and gas pipelines.

Modern geopolitical changes in Arab-Islamic countries

An extensive area from which the majority of refugees and migrants are coming to Europe comprises around 23 million km² of surface with more than 700 million inhabitants. Given the social structure, the balance of power and ongoing newer processes that have a significant impact on the refugee flows, the heterogeneous area of the Arab-Islamic world can be divided into a few areas: Palestine with surrounding countries of chaos, a zone of countries with power, monarchies of Arab Peninsula, a zone of Arab countries in transition, and Islamic zone of poverty in the region of Sahel, Africa. Countries of Central Asia are isolated from this.

Political map of this area is with a few exceptions the result of European colonial interventions since the 18th century. Before that, the main formers of social structures were the Arab expansion and after it the Turkish Empire. Persia was an exception. Withering Ottoman power in the Balkans was ended by nationalism and in Africa by colonial powers of Spain, France, Great Britain and Italy (Legewie, 2004). An attempt of the Pan-Arabian national movement after the collapse of the Turkish Empire was not successful. There were at the same time the Kurdish national expectations active as well, but covered by much more powerful and better organized Turkish nationalists (Fraser, McNamara, Mango, 2011, 39-69; 72). The territory between Levant and the Indian Ocean was controlled as mandated territories by France and Great Britain. They also outlined

the political borders that, with some minor changes, remain to this day. In 1947, Jewish state of Israel was created in Palestine. It increased and strengthened during the wars with Arabs and became a reliable American ally during the Cold War era. The Soviet Union was able to create an alliance with most of the Arab-Mediterranean countries (Zunapčič, 2012, 73-74). They incorporated some elements of the Soviet command economy, but not socialism as a social system. Libya and Syria came close. These countries maintained party and then personal dictatorships. Countries in the power zone have a different history. Kemalist Turkey joined NATO, and Iran ended a long period of monarchy and internationally isolated itself after the Islamic revolution in 1979 (Aksin, 2007). After decolonization of India, multi-ethnic Islamic Pakistan was formed in the western part. A mountainous area between the former Russian and British sphere was filled by Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century. Pakistan remained under the influence of the USA, and the socialist takeover of power in Afghanistan in 1979 was secured by the Soviet military intervention, which expanded to a ten-year war (Smith, 2003). Due to strategic interests the US supported radical Islamic factions in the anti-Soviet struggle, as well as the radical regime in Iraq, after it got involved in a ten-year war with Iran. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered an international military intervention, headed by the USA, which returned to this oil-rich country its independence. In 1992 followed an unsuccessful American operation of securing

humanitarian help in Somalia (Rambotsham et al. 2010). The key milestones were the war against terror and military intervention of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003. Both countries came under international control. But interventions did not bring peace in the region. This was followed by a period of political and territorial fragmentation by creating parastates and extensive areas without control and order (Zupančič, 2005). In 2011, there was a series of popular uprisings in 8 countries with autocratic regimes; this process was later named the "Arab Spring" (Brownlee, Masoud, Reynolds, 2013, 7-24). While in some places these uprisings were relatively quickly resolved with reform measures and interventions, as for example in Egypt (Osman, 2010), elsewhere followed, at least temporary, fundamentalist forms and chaos, and in Libya, Syria and Yemen civil wars. These processes are the direct cause of mass exodus, which from 2014 onwards is strongly knocking on Europe's door.

American interventionism is often blamed for the chaos in many countries of Islamic culture, and consequently also for the radicalization and ideologization of Islam (O'Connor, 2007). This is not true. While other countries have pronounced secularization, there is an evident trend with the Muslim countries introducing religious norms into the legal framework (Lacoste, 2009, 114-116). The introduction of Sharia was followed by intolerance towards other religious communities in most of these environments (De Falco,

Radcliffe, Riccardi, 2014). These systems use religion as a tool for the homogenization of society. In crisis situations and after a collapse of government order, communities lean on religious institutions, since they are the only ones with some sort of order. The second phenomenon is distancing the work of Muslim populations in European countries, including spatial auto-segregation (Lassere, Gonon, 2008), which can only partly be interpreted by social lever, historical trauma and elements of cultural defence (Basaam, 2001). Islamic communities are radicalized without the influence of the mainstream society. At the same time, relations between different branches of Islam got more intense, which raises harsh regional conflicts (Lacoste, 2009). On the other hand, the escalation of anti-Western Pan-Islamic campaign is a reflection of demonstrating demographic, economic, military and cultural power as well as a matter of ambition and apparent expansion (Davis, Azizan, 2007). French geopolitics (Lacoste, 1976) warned about the strengthening of Pan-Islamic territorial pretensions at least two decades before Huntington (1996). Zones of expansion mainly run in two directions: from the Sahel zone of poverty to the south and to the allegedly rich Europe. Refugees are the result of edge conflictualization, but can, in certain cases, also be a mean of colonization of certain territories.

The largest refugee-emigrant areas are Syria and Iraq, two once military powerful countries with totalitarian structure. The Iraqi regime was defeated by the second military intervention of "the

coalition of the willing" under the leadership of the US in 2003. This was followed by an extensive peace mission in cooperation with the work of Iraqi forces and the Kurds (Sandole, 2010). After some initial success, the attempt of reconstruction and revitalization of the country has stalled (Rambodsham, Woodhouse, Miall, 2010). Kurdistan Province in the north has been given a wide autonomy, and the majority of Arab countries were first divided by religious (Sunni, Shiite) affiliation and then locally fragmented. Syrian regime of al-Assad was ended by a popular uprising in 2011. Followed chaos and civil war of all against all (Anderson, 2016). This result of a collapse of ethnically and religiously diverse countries is fairly typical and expected, but its continuation is not. On the ruins of the two countries, a special formation has developed - the Islamic State (ISIS), which was filled by radicalized groups from both countries, but is recruited with Islamic warriors on religious-ideological basis virtually from all over the world (Hanne, Neuville, 2015). There are several radical Islamic movements in the world (for example, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Dsund al-Khalifa), but with the proclamations of the Caliphate only Daesh territorialized. Now, it controls about 150,000 km² of territory with approximately 6 million inhabitants and represents a new core of a broad conflict zone. Explanations that ISIS is mainly a religious radicalization of frustrated heirs of failed regimes interpret the motivation of people because of the past, including elements of "the holy war", but do not explain a clearly wider support

that this formation receives. Countries with mutually conflicting strategic interests are fighting against ISIS. It appears that causing chaos, including refugees, suits them in some respects. It was supported by Saudi Arabia (Hannes, De la Neuville, 2015), now it suits it due to a decline of Shiite part of Iraq, and it can almost smoothly intervenes in Yemen. Turkey has huge profits from the transport of oil (Lendmann, 2016) and finally from the transport of people. Refugees are a very lucrative business for war profiteers and "warlords". Without Turkish intervention ISIS eliminated Turkey's competitor in the south (Syria), while it opposes the Kurds, against which Turkey leads a very unpleasant, from time to time even genocidal policy. Weakening of the Turkey's competitor, the Kurdish Province and neighbouring Arab countries with Saudi Arabia as the main American berth in the wider region suits Iran. It partly suits Russia, as it uses refugees to "soften" its south competitor - Turkey, while increases its alliance with the Kurds. Refugee wave in Europe is causing a serious political crisis of the EU. In terms of European-US-Russian escalation it weakens Europe in the area of the greatest weakness: the Balkans. It suits Israel, since the collapse of Syria and Iraq eliminates its strongest military competitors. Military and economically powerful Israel can easily manage para-state formations, refugee areas, fragile states and fragmented political spaces in the north, and crisis situations allow radical military actions. Even the US has certain advantages: ISIS exerts pressure on allied Arab countries and Kurdish territories and

legitimizes the need for America presence in the region. Some sources accused Turkey (or some structures in Turkish society!) for supporting ISIS (Turkey...2016web).

Immigration influx in Europe and the european migration crisis

In terms of temporal and spatial dynamics and structure, current refugee flows from crisis areas to Europe are quite different than previously known examples. This situation is a result of a series of decisions that transformed the expected crisis effects into surprise, and allowed refugees issue to intertwined almost beyond recognition with forms of economic migrations and thus increase its dimensions and in a short period of time showed a range of social, spatial, political and cultural impacts. The EU revealed itself as weak and, in key aspects, incompetent to approach arising challenges responsibly and with a long-term mentality. Thereby, Europe itself contributed to the fact that refugees became a European problem. Additional problems are strained relation with Russia, weakening of the Balkans, and too strong negotiating position of Turkey.

The majority of migrants come from Syria and Iraq (around 57%), one-fifth from Afghanistan, and only slightly less from the Balkans (mainly Kosovo and Albania), followed by citizens of Iran, Pakistan and sub-Saharan countries from Senegal to Somalia (Park, 2015). Another feature is a strong dominance of younger men, reflecting the prevailing economic motives rather than crisis situation.

There are definitely the most refugees from Syria, but this group also has a quite heterogeneous structure. Among them are next to war victims also perpetrators and also very aggressive fractions (Simon, 2016). Refugees have reached the Turkish territory in about normal age and sex distribution, and after three years, younger and masculinized population is entering Europe.

Migrants are reaching Europe from three main directions. From Sahel and sub-Saharan areas they cross Sahara and reach Maghreb coast and then break through to Spanish enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla) or they cross the Strait of Gibraltar with boats. Despite attempts, this migration flow is successful only for around 3% of all migrants. Illegal migrations are hindered by Morocco, and Spanish control of the narrow aquatorium presents itself as effective. Only few use boats and go to the Canars Islands. Far more frequent direction is across the sea from Tunisian and Libyan coasts to Lampedusa, Malta and Sicily. Due to the length, this rout is the most expensive and also risky; according to estimates more than 4.000 people drowned. This sea route represents approx. 16% of all immigrations to Europe. An extensive maritime operation was organized to secure the aquatorium and to rescue migrants. Some are making their way through the Easter Europe to EU countries. By far the largest part (nearly 80%) of migrations goes through Turkey to the Aegean Islands and the land border. Only a small part has crossed the Turkish-Bulgarian border due to the Bulgarian restrictive border policy. Migration flow continued via

Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary, and after the closing of the Hungarian border, through Croatia and Slovenia to Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavia. Having been crossed by a 1.5 million migration wave, transit countries were faced with major logistics, and consequently also economic problems (Park, 2016).

Characteristics of the migrations flow along the Balkans Route

The Balkans are a natural gateway between Europe and Asia minor and present the shortest route for refugees from conflict areas of the Near and Middle East to the Central, Western and Northern Europe. However, the majority crossed the Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece. It seems that the Turkish authorities have at least somewhat directed the migration flow away from the Istanbul agglomeration. Then follow the Schengen border in Greece, then the crossing of the Balkan countries, which are not EU members, to the next Schengen barrier at the Hungarian and Slovenian borders. The Turkish territory really received the largest number of refugees, but it also became a meeting point for economic migrants from a very wide geographic area. Balkan countries did not hinder migrants. They offered humble humanitarian aid; but these impoverished countries did not have much more. Recording was inadequate. Route of migrants then mostly followed the main transport corridor through the valley of Vardar and Morava all the way to Belgrade. The Serbian authorities also did not stop them, and migrants continued under

police surveillance and with relatively modest help towards the north, to the Hungarian border. When the Hungarian border was closed, the main route was directed to Croatia and then Slovenia. Between Belgrade and Croatian border was a point of concentration. In addition, the migration quota increased, mainly due to certain groups from Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, and some also from Serbia and Bulgaria which joined along the way. Control over migrants was poor, and after the establishment of the bus and railway system of humanitarian convoys, the route became faster, cheaper and safer, which undoubtedly increased the migration flow significantly with people who have nothing really in common with refugees. Authorities and civil society organizations had to provide humanitarian aid (food, clothes, medicines, hygiene supplies, blankets, improvised furniture for emerging refugee centres and the like). Safety and administrative procedures at borders required an increased workload of military, police, medical staff, translation services, public administrations and other bodies.

Slovenian response to the migration wave

Slovenia was faced with a huge refugee wave after Hungary closed its border to them in fall 2015. Along the Sava River corridor migrants reached Slovenian borders in the middle and northern part.

It is estimated that close to 410,000 people (Park, 2016)² from the refugee and migrant wave crossed the border, controlled and uncontrolled. Moreover, Slovenian military ship participated in the control and humanitarian help in the aquatorium of the middle Mediterranean Sea from 2012 onwards. We should begin the outline and assessment of the Slovenian response to the European migrant crisis by considering Slovenian geographical circumstances, the size of the country and, directly, Slovenian politics.

Slovenia lies on crossroads; there, where the eastern part of the Alpine Arc passes through the lower hills into the Dinaric Mountains and delineates the continental Pannonian basin from the Mediterranean Northern Adriatic. Its' size is 20.273 km² and has 2,066.000 inhabitants. Traditional settlement territory of the Slovenes borders on the Italian, German, Hungarian and Croatian ethnic area. The area was until the crossroads of the 1990s as part of the non-aligned socialist Yugoslav federation at the military-strategic point of contact among the NATO Italy, neutral Austria and Hungary, which belonged to the Warsaw pact. After a brief war Slovenia became independent nation in 1991 and less than two decades later joined the EU and NATO in 2004 and entered into the Eurozone and the Schengen area in 2007. Due to convenient geographic position on

² Additional sources from media, collected and revised by author.

crossroads and relatively well developed traffic infrastructure, the country was commonly recognized as a typical strategic gateway.

Another significant aspect of geopolitical position is the border character. More than half of national territory lies inside 20 – km border area (or belt). This is improving the sensibility of the border issues. Slovenia developed well relations towards west and north, to Italy and Austria. There are large Slovene minorities there and the various forms of cross border connections and activities have therefore valuable role. The border towards Croatia is much larger, but far more passive due to long time lasted periphery. This area is more vulnerable than western and northern part and the people have less border experiences. The territory of the country and especially the border zone play an important part in the monitorability of the border. Slovenia is a smaller European country and according to its demographic, economic and military power, it is not an important international factor. However, it has to meet the criteria of monitorability of its own space. In this respect, a large number of less controlled and mostly unknown foreigners definitely present a risk, especially taking into account the structure of these migrants. They came from countries with high level of militarization before the war. There might be (and they actually were, till to most aggressive elements!) among them. For these flows, Slovenia is as transit area for the flows on the “Balkan way”. Therefore, upon the increased arrival of migrants, authorities prepared to offer humanitarian aid, provide

border surveillance and temporary transitional care. Emergency camps were sufficient in warm early autumn days. In key technical and political aspects, Slovenian government was fully flexible to the German permissive politics, knowing that Slovenia is not attractive to migrants and can count on a smaller number of them. Therefore, it agreed to the proposals of the European Commission on quotas. Germany and Austria are by far the most important economic partners. It should be taken into account that only a year earlier Slovenia was also faced with European financial intervention due to a very bad economic situation and the stalemate in the implementation of reforms. It is forgotten that the main reason for the prolonged and difficult economic crisis in Slovenia was probably political weakness. All Slovenian governments since the independence have been coalitions and had to work with many compromises. In such a political environment, a solid reform represented a too big of a political risk. In order to maintain internal political peace (or the stability of governments), they were willing to give in to foreign pressures, which in practice represented mostly German, Austrian and Italian. It was the same in the case of the migration crisis, and Slovenian media and government policy have diligently followed ingerencies of the European Commission and German (especially) politics. Hungarian action with the closure of borders and the influx of migrants to the Slovenian-Croatian border was first a shock. Police force used major, even extreme efforts to cope with the security situation at the border,

and humanitarian organizations took relatively good care for temporary accommodation, sanitary and food supply. With this the migration wave has quickly become the main issue of the domestic policy. Opposition parties criticized the procedures severely, and the populism (both right and left) was looking for short-term benefits. We should not overlook the influence of the media, which showed the situation very selectively and uncritically, and of the non-governmental organizations, which used the refugee wave and the emerging migration crisis for their own promotion; real help should be the obligations of the state. The impression is that political movements understood and interpret the resulting situation a priori from their ideological platforms, but practically they manoeuvred depending on the behaviour of the neighbouring countries. It is symptomatic that in October 2015 the Slovenian Ministry for foreign affairs strongly protested against the Hungarian intention of installing barbed wire at borders, saying that this is reminiscent of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain, but only a month later it was buying the same wire fences from Hungary and installing them at the eastern and southern borders (with Croatia). This decision was influenced by the situation in Europe, the wave of terrorist attacks, which evidently involved also "refugees" who have come through the Balkans route and, therefore, through Slovenia, and an increasingly negative attitude of German government's policy after it was faced with negative effects of migration influx (Meaker, 2016) on its territory and growing support

of right and extreme right-oriented political factions (Schuster, 2016). Both Austria and Germany requested full implementation of the Schengen provisions on the external border (which meant the Slovenian-Croatian border). However, this was much easier to determine than to execute due to the available capacity of the Slovenian security forces and geographical characteristics of the eastern border areas.

The Slovenian-Croatian border with its length of 670km represents almost a half of all land border of the country. The relief is on average lower than on the Austrian and Italian side, and the border line is much more winding. A third of the border line runs along watercourses, however, some (Sotla, Dragonja) are moderate and easily passable, while Mura, Drava and Kolpa are wider and represent a true obstacle, which is increased due to a wider marshy riverside. In some river sections, the border is under dispute and a subject of an arbitration judgement, many sections are economically interesting and attractive due to the exploitation of sand, gravel, aquaculture, water sports and even bathing, and were once an area and subject of bilateral cooperation. The north-eastern part of the upper valley of Kolpa (except across Gorjanci Mts.) runs mostly along lower, passable land with many local roads that cross the border, even though there is much less border crossings. Most of the border zone in both countries is distinctly peripheral and has economically weaker, elderly population. There are many working and family ties from the period of

the joint country; individually areas are rather connected, while institutional bonds are weak. Fairly diverse, hilly surface and mosaic cultural landscape are attractive to visit and living but difficult to control. There aren't a lot of natural obstacles, and they are relatively easy to cross. Due to more densely populated area, the visual control with the participation of the population can be a very effective obstacle for crossing such borders. This is enough for cases of control but not enough for efficient prevention. For this, it requires sufficient police and military forces with appropriate skills and powers. However, Slovenia is relatively weak in the military sector. After joining NATO, a fully professional military structure was established. Its technical development, equipment, training and structure adjusted to NATO standards. This is adequate for the purposes of missions and was also successful (especially in Bosnia and Kosovo). It was effective in cases of natural disasters, such as major floods, fires and ice, where it, together with other factors, intervene effectively. However, the migrant wave revealed major shortcomings, in particular an absolute insufficient number of military quotas, which realistically can be ensured only by a regular military draft. In addition, the country is also poorly prepared in the legal department and the regular army had no powers of the civil security actions in emergency situations. Therefore, the government pragmatically followed a very simple, very unattractive and short-term measure: it closed the border in most sectors with a high fence. This was a very expensive measure, which,

in addition to significantly improved safety, resulted in economic problems for the people living near the border.

There is a third, mainly technical part of the integrated action in terms of the enormous refugee flow. First, it requires an effective physical control of the border line and security of the border area, which was achieved with this unpopular fence. Control of the arrivals was - regardless of the destination of their planned route - fairly modest. The control requires a detailed check and record of documents, in principle, also biometric records and security checks. Poor records allowed many to infiltrate, also problematic and dangerous people. In spring 2016, Austria re-established physical police and military surveillance of its border with Slovenian and Hungary because of immigrants.

After a wave of riots, terrorist attacks and escalating popularity of right, extreme political tendencies in European countries, it was clear that Germany, as the main protagonist of permissive immigration and refugee politics, will not handle such orientation for long. The demand for tighter control of the Schengen border was entirely logical. A threat that Slovenia will become a "blind pocket" with tens of thousands immigrants has become very real. This also lowered the tolerance threshold. The phrase "migrant" in public discourse was generally assimilated with "refugee", which synchronously started to perceive it primarily as a problem. Principled view, mostly linked to ideological background, remained and the

argument is - even for scientists - a priori, unpragmatic and thus useless. They installed temporary refugee centres near border crossings, which facilitated logistics (due to further transport) and enabled a fairly good control. Refugee centres have become a local problem, regardless of the political (in the background, therefore, ideological) affiliation of political groups.

Conclusions

Migration crisis has triggered a series of consequences in the political map of Europe. Europe is, due to recent migration flows divided into a transit country to the south, target areas in the west and north and distanced countries. Slovenia is a typical transit country and officially first “schengen” border country. Despite the high number of immigrants who crossed slovenian borders, relatively small there really remain. Slovenia has agreed to the division of assets of migrants / refugees (or quota-system). The pressure on the Slovenian border is still present and will probably remain so the prospect of European solidarity is clearly relevant item. Slovenia can just hardly migration tensions. At the same time, it is estimated that it will have a country on the Balkan route, due to the sparse population and limited economic capacities and organizational problems, serious difficulties in trying full control of its borders. Slovenia must count on these pressures. Both Italy and Austria are strongly interested for stopping or minimalizing the total number immigrants. But the concentration of

refugees and migrants in the Balkans triggered the risk of conflict in an already unstable country. In addition, it is expected that the migrant in every way trying to reach rich countries of Central and Western Europe. It is estimated that the wire fencing of remaining there for some time, even for several years, despite the unpopularity of this measure. Since the potential stock of migrants is very high – estimated well over 60 million - action in terms of economic and military (security) of interventionism, at least in the medium term represent urgent solution. Other measures followed in the organization of the country. Critical is a particularly small number of security forces. The solution for this is the reintroduction of general conscription, and where appropriate other, even forms of civil security operations.

Bibliography

- AKŞIN, S., 2007, *Turkey. From Empire to Revolutionary Republic*, New York University Press, New York.
- ANDERSON, T., 2016, *The Dirty war on Syria*. Washington, Regime Change and Resistance, Global Research Publishers, Montreal, CA.
- BARNETT, P. M., 2004, *The Pentagon' s New Map. War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, Penguin Group, New York.
- BASSAM, T., 2001, *Krieg der Zivilisationen. Politik und Religion zwischen Vernunft und Fundamentalismus*, Heyne Bücher, München.

- BROWNLEE, J., MASOUD, T., REYNOLDS, A., 2013, *The Arab Spring: the politics of transformation in North Africa and the Middle East*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DAVIS, W. W., AZIZIAN R., 2007, *Islam, Oil and Geopolitics, Central Asia after september 11th*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham.
- DE FALCO, J-M., RADCLIFFE, T., RICCARDI, A., 2014, *Le livre noir de la condition des chretiens dans le monde*, XO Editions, Paris.
- FRASER, T. G., MANGO, A., MCNAMARA, R., 2011, *The Makers of modern Middle East*, Haus Books, London.
- GOLDMAN, M., 2008, *Oilopoly. Putin, Power and the rise of New Russia*, Oneworld Books, Oxford.
- GRANEY, K. E., 2009, *Of Khans and Kremfins. Tatarstan and the Future of ethno-federalism in Russia*, Lexington books, Lexington.
- HUSA K., PARNREITER C., STACHER I. (ed.), 2000, *Internationale Migrationen*, Brandel & Apsel Sudwind, Wien.
- LENDMANN, S., 2016: medmrežje: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/more-evidence-of-turkeys-support-of-the-islamic-state-isis-in-liaison-with-us-and-nato/5500916> (22, 2. 2016)
- HANNE, O., NEUVILLE, F. de la, 2015, *Panstwo Islamskie. Geneza nowego kalifatu*, Dialog, Warszawa.
- HUNTINGTON, S. P., 1996, *The Clash of Civilisations*, Simon & Schuster, New York.

- LACOSTE, Y., 1976, *La géographie, ça sert, d'abord, à faire la guerre*, Maspero, Paris.
- LACOSTE, I., 2009, *Geopolitique. La longue histoire d'aujourd'hui*, Larousse, Paris.
- LASSERRE, F., GONON, E., 2008, *Manuel de Geopolitique, Enjeux de pouvoir sur des territoires*, Armand Colin, Paris.
- LEGEWIE, K., 2004, *Die Türkei und Europa*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M.
- LITWAK, R. S., 2007, *Regime Change. US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- MEAKER, M., 2016, *No German, No English – no jobs for refugees*, web: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/8a2a533c-182a-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e.html#axzz4Cxn8NJD> (24.4.2016)
- MUTHUSWAMY MOORTHY, S., 2009, *Defeating political Islam. The New Cold War*, Prometheus Books, New York.
- O'CONNOR, B., 2007, *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes, Themes*. Greenwood Press.
- OSMAN, T., 2010, *Egypt on the Brink. From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*, Yale university Press, New Haven.
- PARK, J., 2015, *Europe's Migration Crisis*, web: <http://www.cfr.org/refugees-and-the-displaced/europes-migration-crisis/p32874> (citiriano 4.2. 2016)
- SIMON, J., 2016, *They came, they saw, they depart! The view of refugees and migrants in Hungary (2015-2016), Migrants and refugees across Europe*, Rome, april 27-29, 2016, (zbornik)

SCHUSTER, S., 2016, web: <http://time.com/4178642/racist-violence-germany-refugees/> (29.1. 2016)

RAMBOTSHAM, O., WOODHOUSE, T., MIAL, H., 2010, *Contemporary conflict resolution*, 2nd ed. Politiy, Maleden, USA

SANDOLE, D. J. D, 2010, *Peacebuilding*, Politiy Press, Malden & Cambridge.

SMITH, D., 2003, *The Atlas of War and Peace*, Earthscan Publications Ltd., London.

Turkey is Supporting ISIS-Daesh In Mosul And Raqqa, web: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/turkey-is-supporting-isis-daesh-in-mosul-and-raqqa/5550036>

Unemployment statistics, 2015: web: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics

VARUFAKIS, J., 2016, *Globalni minotaver – Amerika, Evropa in prihodnost svetovnega gospodarstva*, Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana.

ZUPANČIČ, J., 2012, *Arabski prostor v geopolitični perspektivi*. Dela, 38, 71-87.

ZUPANČIČ, J., 2005, *Geografski vidik kriznih območij*. Geografski obzornik, 52, 3, 4-10.