

Aleksandar Petrović¹

Danko Kamčevski²

KOSOVO BUBBLE – FROM INFLATION OF VIRTUAL IDENTITY TO THE END OF HISTORY*

Abstract:

This article discusses the Kosovo issue relating it to the theory of Poststructuralism and the Bretton Woods economic system. Just as Poststructuralism denies the existence of truth in its anti-essentialism and as Bretton Woods economy operates with money lacking basis in gold and real value, so does the Albanian politics of identity try to constitute on the specious projections concerning nation, language, and history. The consequence of Bretton Woods system is economic bubble which in the end always burst due to its loss of connection with real value; thus in this article we aim to show that the region of Kosovo is itself one kind of a virtual bubble the bursting of which

¹ University of Belgrade, Serbia.

² University of Kragujevac, Serbia.

*This publication has been implemented within the framework of the project "Science & Orthodoxy around the World", which was made possible through the support of a grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Project SOW and the Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc.

evokes post-humanism and the end of history with grave consequences for the real world.

Key words: Kosovo, Albanians, Serbs, Bretton Woods, Poststructuralism, identity, Skanderbeg, language, history, Posthumanism.

Introduction: Bretton Woods and Poststructuralism

In this paper we shall attempt a rationale of the Albanian presence in the Balkans, particularly in the disputed region of Kosovo. In spite of standard political interpretations, we believe that the question of Albanians can be elucidated the best if we approach it via Poststructuralism as the intellectual framework in which this crux is embedded.

Nothing best describes Poststructuralism than its own proponents: from them we hear and read statements such as: “There are no values”, “There are no essences”, “Everything is discourse”, “Everything is power or phenomenon of power”. In these exchanges we often discover that “meaning is negotiated” (as if it depended on the good will and skills of the speakers and not the thing itself which is discussed). In the titles of symposia, papers and proceedings we see a profuse use of participles and gerunds and often they begin with words such as “investigating”, “researching”, “extending”, “reimagining”, “reassessing” and of course the mentioned favourite

“negotiating”. It is a constant state of flux. Every day we witness an historic event and at the same time we are being convinced that history has ended; human rights activists fight for freedom for self-determination and simultaneously claim that ‘self is Other’, that our identity is a ‘social construct’ and that we are a mass of chemicals bound by inexorable natural laws; mystical experiences are result of chemical imbalance, but LSD can help you have sense of unity and oneness with the world; scientific truth is only what can be tested and verified where as at the same time we have holy cows of the Big Bang theory and Darwinian evolution which are impossible to prove by experiment; “God is dead” (Nietzsche), “Author is dead” (Roland Barthes), “Philosophy is dead” (Stephen Hawking). Let us not be too confused when we try to look at the building of modern thinking and discover it resembles a Hollywood film set; that it has one wall and that it is made of cardboard. There is no building of modern thought because there is no constructive thinking. We live in an era of deconstruction, a philosophical movement aimed against essences, values, laws, permanent ethical precepts.

Poststructuralist way of thinking has led to the emergence of many phenomena, but few are so pervasive and global as the Bretton Woods economic model. This global financial order was established in 1944 in order to provide a universal basis by which it would be easier to exchange one currency for another. The Bretton Woods agreement made it obligatory for 44 nations to do two things: they were to fix

their exchange rates and tie their currencies to the U.S. dollar. The United States themselves tied dollar to gold. At first the system seemed to be successful. There was economic growth. But the Bretton Woods system was disguised in 1971. The United States abandoned tying dollar to the gold basis and there was no more fixed exchange-rate system. However, there remained a significant legacy of the Bretton Woods system. While there is no fixed exchange rate, the reserve world currency is still the American dollar. This means that world became economically dependent on the American economy; and vice versa: the United States could affect the economy of the world simply by printing dollars. In a more metaphysical sense, it means that currency is no longer tied to something real, concrete, like gold, but to a changeable, impermanent, fluid thing like another currency. By severing ties with the golden basis but at the same time keeping connection with the U.S. dollar, the world economy entered a period of all kinds of hocus-pocus financial magic, simulation, illusion, dramatic existence. This clearly relates it to Poststructuralism as a theoretical apology of the system that could be called truncated Bretton Woods.

The chief problem which arises within such a system is a 'bubble' – a theoretical amassing of hollow philosophical and ideological concepts, an economic expansion without real basis, an inflation beyond that which is supported by real production, unhindered by true supply and demand, less and less bearing relation

to the facts of the market. While it lasts, the bubble provides an illusion of knowledge or prosperity; but when it bursts, people are left with worthless assets, useless concepts and immense loans they cannot repay because their money no longer has any value. The strategy of truncated Bretton Woods economy is constant flux. For people not to spot the unreality of the American dollar, it always has to circle around the world, from country to country, and constantly switch hands. This is why Poststructuralism is always allergic to the concept of nation. This free flow of dollar requires national barriers to be removed – and therefore this system does not look approvingly on phenomena such as nation, nationality, nationalism. It does not tolerate any other reserve currency; any kind of seeking a basis (again in gold) could be seen as a threat to the system which has completely been unhinged. People are reprimanded when they want a life-long occupation and are indeed encouraged to always change jobs (in the name of “challenge”, “seeking oneself”, “career-building”); they are even encouraged to seek job outside one’s own country and therefore the truncated Bretton Woods economy has led to massive economic migrations towards wellsprings of dollars. To have one’s own property as well as one’s own mind has become too expensive for an increasing number of people who now have to rent flats and houses as well as prefabricated worldviews. Real value in the truncated Bretton Woods system remains elusive while the value of the dollar is illusive. Printing money without security was the idea which was supposed to change

the world. Such money was used by countries to pay for energy (oil primarily) which was a strong strike against societies based on values. In a certain way the system resembles the moving pictures. That is why apology of Hollywood is at the core of the truncated Bretton Woods. If we slow down a film, we see that there is but illusion of movement and in fact fast sequence of images. Therefore this financial system does not allow any change of pace; nay, it does not allow decreasing the speed, whereas faster is better. Poststructuralism similarly operates with void concepts – all traditional values are dead and abandoned, and only carousel of fast dancing juggle concepts make knowledge go round without any reliable fulcrum. From such a state of art arises the most significant historical product of wedding between Breton Woods and Poststructuralism. This is “Republic of Kosovo”.³ In recent Kosovo’s forced independence we meet notorious phenomena of Poststructuralism: lacking basis, relativity of truth, producing virtual identities, death of traditional values and concepts, expansion regardless of natural constrictions; even ‘ego-boosting’ – if in modern business a person is encouraged to career chasing because he or she is “aspiring”, “a young professional”, than in the same vein we might expect a nation to be encouraged as “pre-eminent”, “essential”, “strategic” and so on.

³ The legal child of Poststructuralism is also Bologna Declaration that tends to reform university education by deepening the void concepts and deconstructing them to dizzy neoliberal carousel of the truncated Bretton Woods.

“Republic of Kosovo” is not sudden political revelation. Modern history of the Albanian people is one of expansion. Twentieth century saw formation of the first Albanian state – Albania; twenty-first century saw emergence of another - Kosovo. Both were made amid the decay of previous countries in the region. Albania was founded while Turkey was retreating from the Balkans; and the process of Kosovo becoming independent began when Yugoslavia was retreating. It seems a simple game: if you need some Albanian state you need a certain state in the process of decline. Or the history itself in the state of decay? One people and two countries in the era of post-nationalism and post-history seems like a very curious phenomenon. That forces us to rise a question - how much is there of a nation in the Albanian nation? It deserves careful examining of twin-state Albanian identity, its historicity and reasons of its construction in 1913 and 2008. Our attempt is to realize why that *inflating of the bubble* was so fast and why the Albanian idea received such an enormous political and military support which is paradoxical and not proportional to its merits or real value.

Inventing the Identity: Skanderbeg and Illyrian Hypothesis

Two historical pillars of the Albanian identity are the figure of George Kastriot Skanderbeg (1405-1468) and its Illyrian roots. Legendary and heroic pursuits of Skanderbeg provide to Albanians an aura of fighters against foreign domination and freedom lovers. The

British people have King Arthur, King Alfred, Queen Elizabeth I, Queen Victoria; Germans have Friedrich Barbarossa; with French they share Charlemagne; the Irish have Saint Patrick. Albanians too have a similar hero: Skanderbeg is a mythical figure around whom Albanians gather. He is a famed warrior from the fifteenth century who fought against the Turkish occupation. There are many epic poems about his achievements. Skanderbeg was for Albanians a symbol of resistance and a source of inspiration. Busts or portraits of Skanderbeg are almost equally revered as Albanian flag. His name has been elevated to the title: all Albanian rulers used to bear the title 'Skanderbeg'. Skanderbeg's exploits on behalf of Albanians, his valour against the Turkish invaders, and his widely spread legend represent a worthy pillar of Albanian identity. But one problem looms still. Skanderbeg was not Albanian.

Several studies attest to this fact (Gopčević 1890; Hadži-Vasiljević 1906; Hadži-Vasiljević 1909; Đorđević 1913; Balcanikus 1913; Oraovac 1913; Stepanović 1913). These studies confirm that George Castriot Skanderbeg ruled over territories inhabited by Serbs; that both his father Ivan (latter monk's name Joakim) and brother Reposh were Serbian – in fact they were buried in the Serbian Orthodox monastery of Hilandar (Chilandariou) on Mount Athos, Greece. It is a most uncomfortable fact for the Albanian historians because evidence about Skanderbeg's father and brother is attainable easily. Moreover, also Skanderbeg's mother Vojislava was Serbian who descended from

Serbian noble family Branković (Petrović 2016). It is hard to believe that Serbs parents got an Albanian child whose brother was a Serb, so it is more rational to consider Albanian national hero a Serb. In such a situation Albanian historians do as famous Prussian philosopher who, upon discovering that his theory contradicted the facts, said - „worse for the facts then“. In that respect, there was an interesting event in the Skanderbeg museum in the Albanian town of Krujë. The museum guide explained that Skanderbeg's father and brother were buried in a Serbian Orthodox monastery simply because Skanderbeg was such a notable and important person, and not because they were in fact Orthodox monks and adepts. (Gorin, 2012) It does not matter that during eight centuries of Hilandar, besides many mighty Serbian rulers and their relations, no one was buried there except monks and adepts. In fact, we owe template of Skanderbeg to a Roman Catholic priest from Shodra Marin Barleti (1450 – 1512) and his biography of Skanderbeg *Historia de vita et gestis Scanderbegi Epirotarum principis* published in 1508/1510 and translated into many European languages.⁴ Skanderbeg was eligible for such a historical apotheosis because at one moment he was converted to Catholicism.

What about the historical basis of the Albanian identity? The official historical doctrine in Albania claims that the Albanian people

⁴ Serbian translation from 1754 ends with notice that Marin from Shodra is of Slavic origin. From some reason translations started to appear at the beginning of XVIII century, at the same time when Antonio Vivaldi opera *Skanderbeg* was first performed.

originate from ancient Illyrian people. The Illyrian hypothesis is important because it lends credence to Albanian claims of being autochthonous people in the Balkans; in contrast with Slavic people who supposedly came to the region later in history, it establishes precedence of the Albanians. However, there are barely any traces of Illyrian people who occupied Balkan Peninsula during the times of the Roman Empire. Illyrians were illiterate and had not left any literature behind them; we know next to nothing about these people and they only appear in records of other people who encountered them – primarily Greeks and Romans. Other peoples in the Balkans have at various times tried to attribute their origins to the Illyrian people. In basic historical text for the Balkan ethnogenesis, *De Administrando Imperio*, written in X century by the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Albanians are mentioned not as living in the Balkans but in a territory roughly corresponding to today's Azerbaijan. First historical references to Albanians in the Balkans were made in the eleventh century, much later than for other people of the region, such as Greeks, Serbs or Bulgarians.

Since historical research does not support the hypothesis, it actually primarily rests on linguistic ground: at Albanian universities it is propounded that Albanian language is a descendant of Illyrian language. However, since there are no Illyrian writings left due to which one premise is completely lacking, how can we make such an inference? Stefan Schumacher and Joachim Matzinger from the

Vienna University were perplexed by the same issue. They told that Albanian language does not in fact originate from Illyrian language. They have nothing in common, cannot fit together, and the conclusion is that, from a linguistic point of view, these are two different languages. (Likmeta 2011). Schumacher further points out that insisting on links between two languages comes naturally from the 19th century context, when crafting national identities went hand in hand with language as the common denominator. But foundation in language is rather tenuous: it rests on comparison with the unknown (Illyrians).

Albanian literature itself does not afford us with much evidence either. First and exclusive examples of Albanian literature come from the ranks of Catholic clergy. First writing is a baptismal formula written by the archbishop of Durres, Pal Engjelli, in 1462; the first book, a missal written by Gjon Buzuku, a Catholic priest, appeared in 1554. Another two members of clergy contributing to Albanian literature were Pjeter Budi, archbishop of Sape; and half a century later, Pjeter Bogdani, Archbishop of Prizren. He did it under a strict control by the Roman church, as Matzinger and Schumacher point out. Late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century saw the helping hand of Vatican in further establishing Albanian literature. Many Catholic schools were founded by Franciscans and Jesuits in Shkodra. The most important poet in the twentieth century was actually a Franciscan priest Gjergj Fishta (1871–1940). Apart from

literary works made by the Catholic clergy themselves, there does not seem to exist any other independent body of evidence suggesting the existence of Albanian language: no monuments, charters, maps. At the same time, the territory of Kosovo is replete with overwhelming evidence of Serbian presence such as inscriptions on monuments, monasteries, charters, churches, paintings and other historical testimonies of Serbs existing in this area. Petar Iskenderov notes similarities between Albanian and Romanian, but also between Albanian and Serbian, Greek and vernacular Latin dialects in the area (Iskenderov 2014). Iskenderov also mentions crucial fact that the documents related to Albanian declaration of independence (1912) were written not in Albanian, but in Turkish, and that the delegates from Kosovo and other parts of the Balkans who participated at the Pan-Albanian congress in Valona *did not speak Albanian at all*. Also the first Albanian government wrote using Turkish script as none of the Albanian ministers did not know the Albanian script (Iskenderov 2014).

As we can see, formation of Albanian literature and therefore Albanian cultural identity seems not to have come as the consequence of intrinsic historical process, and from within Albanian people themselves, but had been initiated and implemented from the outside – namely, by Roman Catholic clergy. It is also interesting to notice that the emergence of Albanian literature and the interventions of the Roman church coincided with the political waning and demise of the

Eastern Roman Empire, Greek and Christian Orthodox in its character. With the fall of Constantinople, it apparently became easier for Catholic clergy to perform their mission in the region. What we see at work is linguistic engineering of a sort on the part of the Roman Catholic Church which in the end became national engineering. Vatican had not shied from similar attempts in history. A good parallel would be the *Donation of Constantinople*, a medieval document supposedly written by the emperor Constantine the Great by which this emperor transferred authority over Rome and the western part of the empire to the Pope of Rome. However, in 15th century, Lorenzo Vala, a Renaissance humanist, used philological methods to reveal the document for what it really was: a forgery made to support papal political authority in Western Europe. We can view the emergence of Albanian literature and written language in the same way. The disappearance of the Eastern Roman Empire made space for fragmentation of the territory and bringing it under the domain of the Roman Catholic Church. That is why all or most early Albanian writers were Catholic priests, some of which writing bilingually. It was important to demonstrate the Catholic roots of the Albanian people, the very roots which could later be used to show these people as belonging to the domain of the Church of Rome, and not Church of Constantinople. Albanian language, whose broad shape according to Schumacher and Matzinger, resembles Greek language, suddenly became Latinized by the intervention of the Catholic clergy. The

sudden appearance of Albanian language leads us to a conclusion that, like the myth of Skanderbeg, Albanian language itself is also a linguistic and a political construct. Traces of Byzantine culture and influences were being erased and that was a basic colonial strategy of Venetian Republic and Vatican. This is supported by the fact that even at the beginning of the twentieth century, people did not use Albanian language or Albanian script, but Turkish language and Turkish script. The factitious language concocted by the Catholic clergy obviously had no contact with reality, i.e. with people of mixed origins who lived at the territory that supposed to be Albanian and who did not accept artificial language nor use it.

The strategy was later adopted by countries of Middle and Western Europe. As Proroković (2014) analyzes, a similar kind of activity was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina after it passed from Turkey to Austro-Hungarian Empire. New history textbooks were written; the designation 'Bosniaks' was invented for the people living in the territory to distinguish them from Serbs; Serbian language was renamed as "Bosnian" or "Ours". Catholic scholastic theology is very well known for its insistence on strict logic and precise distinctions between beings; Catholic mission in Bosnia goes one step further and helps distinctions and differences arise where before there were none. All in all, after the demise of the Eastern Roman Empire, whenever there was some influence of Western Christian Church, there

appeared some new identity, cultural matrix, written literature and obviously new history.

Another example is a fairly recent appearance of the so-called Macedonian language which actually had not existed prior to 1945, and was indeed known as one of the southern dialects of Serbian language. But with the Communist revolution in Yugoslavia and its principle “Weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia”, there was a concentrated effort to weaken the Serbian position and fragment Serbian culture into several new nations, such as Montenegrins, Bosnians, Macedonians, all of which were formerly known only as Serbs. In case of Macedonians, language was the basis. Prilep - Bitola dialect of Central Macedonia was taken as the basis for standard Macedonian. Henceforth, what was previously known as South Serbia or Old Serbia became Macedonia. And at this very moment, simply by walking around the capital of Macedonia, one can see where *this* identity bubble has led Macedonians too. The capital city of Skopje is profusely decorated with statues of Alexander the Great, his father Phillip, and other legendary Macedonian ancient kings. The city airport bears the name of Alexander. Like Albanians claiming to be Illyrians, Macedonians claim to be descendants of the people of Alexander the Great. All traces of the old Macedonian people are lost after the end of the Classical Period: they probably spoke a dialect of Greek language, and have nothing whatsoever with nowadays Slavic population in these areas.

One more example of historical falsification concerns the famous bridge over the river Vardar in Skopje. This bridge was built during the reign of Serbian emperor Dušan the Mighty (1308-1355); and actually during his reign, Skopje itself was the capital of Serbian empire. Now on the bridge we can read a plaque informing us that the bridge was *repaired* in 15th century by the Turks who had by then conquered Skopje. The information on who built the bridge is completely omitted probably because Serbian origins are far more problematic for the identity of Macedonians than Turkish emendations.

In an ethnical sense, Albanians are not too far from the Macedonian example. If we cannot say that all Albanians are descendants of Serbs, we can, however, attest that many Albanians nowadays were formerly Serbs. Iskenderov cites remarks of the Russian consul in Mitrovica, Sergey Tuholka, from the beginning of the twentieth century, who noticed the process of “Albanization” of Serbs. According to Tuholka, Catholic population from the village of Janjevo in Priština district spoke Serbian language whereas the Catholic clergy tried hard to instill in them the sense of Albanian identity. Iskenderov also argues that the eighteenth and nineteenth century saw a rising Islamization of Serbs (especially Catholic Serbs) in the area of Prizren and Djakovica. By receiving Islam, notes Iskenderov, Serbs were registered as Turks, and then at the end of the nineteenth century

these “Turks” became a significant part of the Albanian nation (Iskenderov 2014).

The construction of Albanian identity seems nowadays quite rounded, but it always needs external impulses to be sustainable since it is based on big but specious pillars. The ‘Illyrian hypothesis’ of Albanian origin is scientifically unverifiable and therefore ethnic identification with Illyrians groundless; and the Skanderbeg element is a clear case of appropriation and historical fiction. Therefore in constructing Albanian identity we are witnessing a clear case of projecting current political and historical ambitions (of building a Greater Albania) into the misty history where it had all begun. If money lacked golden basis in the truncated Bretton Woods system and if any poststructuralist conclusion was undermined by the poststructuralist premise that there is no truth, then in Albanian identity we see history without historical evidence, linguistic ancestry without the knowledge of the ancestor language, national literature appearing outside the nation, and the national hero borrowed from another nation; and even demographic appropriation of another people (Serbs) through religious conversion, either to Catholicism or to Islam.

Inflating the Bubble: Albania and Kosovo

The virtual character of the Albanian identity is analogous to unreal economic value of the American dollar which is the strongest

supporter of the second Albanian state. The connecting thread was lack of real-world basis, whether in gold or in history and culture. After the depletion of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 – that is, when the real basis was lost – instead of trying to find another (kind of) basis, the financial structures responded by at first glance comfortable overprinting the dollar. Instead of abandoning the illusion, they proceeded to spread it across the world. Something similar would happen with Albanians: they would receive massive support of groundless dollar and made one of the key nations in the Balkans, which is reversely proportional to their cultural and historical contributions. In this section we turn therefore to formation of *two* countries for *one* nation and the paradoxes involved herein.

Albania appeared as an independent state almost equally strangely as its roots were found in the aforementioned phenomena. In 1912, after the First Balkan War Turkey was almost completely expelled from the Balkans. In a geopolitical attempt to block Serbian access to the Adriatic Sea, European countries supported Big Bang decision for the formation of the Albanian state. From this moment, Albania has received its main role to be a constant adversary to Serbia. It was when Serbia became a serious rival to Austro-Hungary that Albanian state was created. The goal, clearly, was to surround Serbia by Austro-Hungary satellites. Politics of Austria-Hungary has not disappeared with its dissolution after the WWI. European Union consistently continues exploiting its strategy supporting the rise of the

second Albanian state. Only after the secession of Kosovo, Serbia, still in vertigo after the breakdown of its utopian project of Yugoslavia, realized that it has still the same historical task since it is ringed by more or less hostile countries belonging or submissive to the European Union and NATO. And again, Albania plays the key role of battering ram.

An exemption from the typical role of Albania as obstruction to Serbian expansion was the Albanian statesman and officer, Essad Pasha Toptani, who closely worked with Serbian government at the beginning of the twentieth century. Toptani wanted to form a closer union of Serbia and Albania. During the Serbian WWI Golgotha-retreat across Albanian mountains at the end of 1915 he helped Serbians. But all plans of bringing Serbia and Albania closer (and therefore Serbs and Albanians) and thus end rivalry were brought to an end when Toptani was assassinated in Paris in 1920. The message was clear. Therefore he remained the only Albanian politician who actually worked on harmony between two peoples, and not their conflict. Not so long after that, in Marseilles, the same mighty hand assassinated Alexander I, the king of Yugoslavia.

After Toptani's death, all attempts to make permanent peace disappeared. During WWII, when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was invaded by Nazi Germany, Albanians joined Hitler's coalition. They even formed a special 22nd SS division which committed atrocities, severe ethnic cleaning including the massacre of 500 civilians in the

village of Velika (now in Montenegro). It was absurd that this division named “Skanderbeg”, after the Serb medieval ruler, was used as an instrument in exterminating Serbs. But all virtual identities consist of absurdities only. After the war ended, Albanians were never forced to pay any war reparations or were met with sanctions. Contrary to that, all Serbs that were violently expelled from its native region of Kosovo and Metohija by Albanian Nazi troops were banned from coming back to their homes according to state law who forbid their repatriation. That was another absurd, but at the same time clear sign of latent Austro-Hungarian spirit of politics that post-war Yugoslav government will perform in the next decades.

After WWII, Yugoslavia became a socialist country and indeed a victorious side in the war, but absurdities continued. Although Serbian population was not allowed to return to Kosovo and Metohija, Albanians, on the other hand, were quite welcomed and many without any documents moved from Albania to this southern region of Serbia occupying empty Serbian houses. No logical explanation was given for this asymmetrical approach, but it runs with more or less intensity all the time of Yugoslavia existence. Still less were explicable economical policies aimed at the Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohija during the period of socialist Yugoslavia. Kosovo and Metohija was by far the least developed part of Serbia and Yugoslavia. And yet it was here that Albanians were showered with benefits, tax-exemptions, and having their birthrates stimulated. Yugoslav

president Josip Broz Tito was proclaimed as personal godfather of every tenth child in the Albanian family. The result was a demographic inflation of Albanians only in Kosovo, stimulated beyond any reasonable economic, cultural and historical justification. It was the demographic bomb generated as specific and efficient weapon that will explode to weaken Serbia and Yugoslavia. Since 1945 Kosovo was experimental field for policy makers, not only Yugoslavian, who tried to find out what would happen with the demographic bubble that came into being with all models of population control discarded on behalf of political aims. It was the truncated Bretton Woods like inflation of the bubble which would inevitably burst just on time.

After forced resignation of Yugoslav vice-president, a Serb Ranković, in 1967, Tito took absolute power what was followed by virtual rebellion of Albanians in 1968. As a consequence Yugoslavia received a new constitution in 1974, itself paradoxical in another asymmetrical treatment of Albanians and Serbs. By then, Albanians had become a significant minority in Serbia and majority in Kosovo and Metohija. Although numbers spoke the same for Serbs in republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, it was Kosovo and Metohija which was made into an autonomous province within Serbia. Northern part of Serbia, Vojvodina, in which there were not rebellions and Serbs were a stable majority – also was made into an autonomous province. Therefore, Serbia was weakened by having to negotiate its policy with two autonomous provinces, almost

republics, one of which - Kosovo and Metohija - hosted a hostile population. In 1979, during a huge ceremony on the occasion of President Tito's 88th birthday, the last one, the "Relay of Youth" was delivered to him by an Albanian girl from Kosovo, Sanija Hiseni, while behind him was sitting the president of Yugoslavian Alliance of Socialist Youth – also an Albanian from Kosovo. In the middle of the country of the South Slavs she spoke greeting words in Albanian which nobody knows in Yugoslavia except Albanians. The act itself is hugely symbolical. It showed to Albanians that their time has come and that they should take matters into their hands. In a way it concisely and adequately summarizes Tito's legacy. It was thanks to his policies, practically extension of Austro-Hungarian ones, that Albanian bubble was inflated beyond any measure, with clear disregard of both economy and culture.

Therefore it is not strange that immediately after Tito passed away on May 4, 1980, Albanians on March 11, 1981, just to affirm that his legacy is alive and active, launched another, less virtual, rebellion which signaled the end of Yugoslavia.⁵ Albanians entered history with the demise of Eastern Roman Empire. Albania appeared as a state in the final years of the Turkish Empire. The end of Yugoslavia saw

⁵ After 1981 up to 2011 the number of Serbs in Kosovo was reduced ten times. Is not known in the whole history that nation (Serbs) who, according to prevalent political version, violated 'human rights' and committed 'ethnic cleansing' vanishes while victims of 'ethnic cleansing' (Albanians) perpetually grown in number. It is obvious missing the point fallacy whose basic aim is to perplex public opinion.

Albanians being used for the emergence of Kosovo. In the true meaning, Kosovo is the place where history ends, probably only one in the world with pure post-historic, protean identity.

Perhaps one of the reasons for this long post-historic dialectic is their aptness to adopt any identity, indeed any history offered to them. We can see now in what way the 'Kosovar identity' was crafted and how closely it resembles the making of post-Byzantine Albanian identity. In the central square in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, Albanians erected its newest symbol of identity – the statue dedicated to the American still alive past President Bill Clinton. He unfolded it by himself in best tradition of Hollywood soap movies. Instead of iron-Tito now we have soap-Clinton, but the idea of always changeable inflated identity is the same.

In all conflicts in the region of Balkans Albanians remained the only constant; they are made to be the valuable and loyal imperial instrument. The third Albanian rebellion started in 1998, now not virtual because it was backed and de facto lead by special forces of NATO countries. Despite that, Yugoslav forces cleaned up the territory and the bombing was only solution. Bill Clinton deserved monument in Pristina because in 1999 he ordered, without approval of UN Security Council, illegal military attack on Yugoslavia when this country, who as America's ally won the WWI against Austria-Hungary and WWII against Nazi Germany, finally fell apart. America and NATO satellites bombed whole Serbia 79 days under the pretext of protecting human

rights, sure enough of Albanians, who were supposedly persecuted by the 'undemocratic Serbian government'.⁶ But we should not forget that the whole bombing campaign by NATO was ignited by an eyewash of the supposed massacre in the village of Račak, which in the end turned out to be an elaborate (albeit not very consistent) hoax (Gorin 2009: 46).⁷ Hence the governing principle of the Kosovo War from its beginning to the end and in its aftermath is *illusion-making*.

⁶ America paid high price for that bombing of Serbia. Its air forces technological policy experienced complete failure since more than fifty of its visible and "invisible" high tech planes, B2 - Flying Wing, F117A – Night Hawk, A – 10 Warthog, helicopters Apaches... were downed in Serbia using mostly Russian air defense missiles technology from sixties. After that American air forces became more or less paper tiger and they can attack only small countries. It is hard to believe that investing in the next generations of combat planes will save them. They need something more.

⁷ One of the excuses for the intervention was President Slobodan Milošević's hard Serbian nationalism. Milošević was indeed a Serbian nationalist, but not before he was transferred as prisoner to Hague tribunal. That was the best part of his political career because he disassembled Poststructural counterfeit of justice that was performed there on behalf of international law. He persuasively overturned construction of unreal, political charges against him and Serbian political elite which practically meant charges against the Serbian nation. The Hague trial was his practical rehabilitation. Before that he was pure communist who did not believe in Serbian idea but used it for maintaining of his personal power. Parallel to this he believed in Pax Americana, even after bombing, so that in the morning of October 5, 2000, when later that day opposition took power, he still believed that he worked for the Americans. It seems strange that he had such a hard faith, but during the eighties he was among rare European politicians who had direct contacts with David Rockefeller. Such kind of a contact is generally the highest level that European politician can get. Milošević got a multibillion contract for exporting military aircrafts and cars to US. But breaking up of USSR, civil war in Yugoslavia and change of American administration prevented the contract from realization. Emboldened by these developments, the Americans decided to abandon the tactic of advancing slowly; they charged relying on Albanians as a symbol of the future world. Of course that was wrong, but the problem consists in the fact that now they cannot go back, because in the meantime everything has been turned into an illusion. There is no home to stay, only Hollywood all around. It is well known that history has not taught anyone anything. Despite many philosophies of history, we do not know what it serves for. Even worse, we cannot be sure if it really exists. It seems that those anthropologists are right who were claiming that people without history lived better.

These paradoxes, deceits, stilted realities, anti-traditional and materialist are exactly the phenomena of Poststructuralism which we had given in our introductory remarks; and also fit into the truncated Bretton Woods system which does not care about real value, preferring the virtual one.

The result of illusion-making: another several hundred thousand Serbs were expelled from Kosovo and Metohija; Serbian government was changed in 2000 and became pro-Western and democratic. However, puzzlement does not stop with year 2000. When they seceded and received practical independence from the Serbian government, the Albanians did not stop fighting the Serbs. A testimony by an Italian general reveals many Serbian victims right after the end of the NATO intervention in 1999. This general, Mauro del Vecchio, testifies about killings, raping, kidnapping, burning houses, and attacks on churches and monasteries, beheading of monks, which he interpreted as trying to erase Serbian presence.⁸ (Maglie 2016). Since the start of the international supervision in 1999, more than 200,000 non-Albanians were driven from their homes (Hatchett 2009: 67). Kosovo and Metohija was brought into a state of irregularity and lawlessness on practically all levels. Serbs have been expelled and the land and the property taken away, but so obviously

⁸ Interviews was translated into English and posted on INSERBIA website: <http://inserbia.info/today/2016/06/italian-general-reports-on-killed-serbs-in-kosovo-arrived-every-morning/>.

illegally, that in the future it might just as easily slip away from the Albanians as it slipped into their hands during these conflicts.

This was kept hidden from the eyes of the public and surfaced fairly recently. But hidden occurrences are going to be revealed slowly and inevitably. The British newspaper *Guardian* likened the prime minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, to a 'Mafia boss' due to serious allegations of human organs trafficking. The article cites report by Dick Marty, the human rights investigator, and brings the news of six detention facilities in northern Albania used for harvesting human organs mainly in vivo, singling out Thaçi's Drenica group for bearing the greatest responsibility (Lewis 2010). This is clear mark that Kosovo enters its independence via post-humanism.

BBC reported the news titled "Uranium 'killing Italian troops'" and in the same article we find the fact that around 40,000 depleted uranium rounds were fired during the Bosnian and Kosovo campaigns (Fraser 2007). The case even reached the Italian court which ruled that the Italian Ministry of Defense failed to protect Italian soldiers from hazards of exposure to depleted uranium. (ICBUW 2009). Indeed Kosovo was bombed with bombs containing depleted uranium, and the Albanian majority will have to live with it. Today we know that about 10 tons of depleted uranium ammunition was fired all over Kosovo. It means that political mutation will meet future genetic mutations and that their synergy will produce new chimerical beings.

This is an inherent part of the Poststructural experiment and another reliable sign of post-humanism.

It was during that post-humanistic and the supposedly democratic period that there was yet another outbreak of violence in Kosovo and Metohija in 2004. Some 35 churches and monasteries were burned to the ground; as well as 935 Serbian houses and public facilities; 10 Serbs were killed; 4012 Serbs were driven out and displaced from their homes. Even numerous graveyards were desecrated or destroyed for the purpose of completely erasing Serbian presence. Who were Albanians rebelling against then? For Serbian military had left the province already in 1999 and Serbs, living only in surrounded ghettos, were minority in the province. The rebellion was obviously directed towards Serbian identity itself which should be erased in order to provide the new state with alibi of historical reality. In 2008, after a series of failed negotiations, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia and was backed by the United States of America and major Western European countries. There is a pinch of commonsense in the fact that western countries did not recognize independence of Kosovo during the undemocratic regime of the nineties while they did so during the democratic regime of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Just when Serbia got the regime that Albanians and their sponsors would have considered adequate, they were given opportunity to secede. It shows that the reasons for Albanian politics lay far outside Serbia and the Balkans. We can find

them if we discern that Kosovo bubble is analogous to the financial bubbles as produced by the truncated Bretton Woods model. The one-sided secession and diplomatic recognition of the virtual state of Kosovo coincides with the year of the biggest American economic crisis since the Great Depression. It is not by chance. Kosovo is political analogy of an economic havoc. Virtual state is the only choice for virtual economy. In 2008 with the recognition of Kosovo and extreme liquidity crisis coupled with bursting of the housing bubble in the United States led the world into the gravest turmoil. It is overt as regards Albanians: they have been granted two states and their aggressive spreading has been stimulated beyond any economic, cultural and historical justification because their history is a fiction. On behalf of such a twisting international regulations were broken, the United Nations were disregarded and many strange and absurd exceptions made. It is but the other side of the agreement from the truncated Bretton Woods by which political inflation is promoted into being the very foundation of economic policies. Economic and political inflation go hand in hand. Albanian Kosovo was born in the cradle of the truncated Bretton Woods economics which knew no limits in shaking all grounds on which modern societies were based. Hence Kosovo was an experimental field. The financial bubble did not have any basis in real value; political bubble in Kosovo had no basis in history, culture, morals or anything else. It is simply a consequence of the truncated Bretton Woods project in which nothing should have

any basis so that it can go around faster. Therefore the Kosovo bubble and its bursting is not less disastrous than the explosion of the economic bubble because of distorted sense that poststructuralist, posthumanist project of Kosovo identity brings to the world.

In 2015, Kosovo after destroying numerous churches, monuments and cemeteries almost became member of UNESCO, despite the fact, as in the case of Albania, everything about Kosovo is like a chimera. It is supposedly Albanian, but the name of the 'country' is Serbian;⁹ so are more than 90% place-names; nation are called Kosovar, which derived from the Serbian word from the province; cultural heritage (churches, monasteries, etc.) is completely Serbian and Christian in its origin. In Albania we saw appropriation of a Serb, Skanderbeg; in Kosovo, we see a similar process. Albanian historians are now writing that Serbian monasteries in Kosovo were actually built by Albanians: a striking example is that of monastery Visoki Dečani founded by Serbian king Stefan Dečanski (who owes part of his name, 'Dečanski' to the fact of being the founder) for which these Albanian historians claim was built by Albanian tribe Gashi (Vlašковиć 2013). The same article communicates that on the websites we can find information that another Orthodox church, Bogorodica Ljeviška, is the oldest Albanian church in this region. It is all very strange, especially given the fact that Turkish population census from 1455, immediately

⁹ The term 'Kosovo' is derived from the Serbian name for the bird 'kos' which means merle (blackbird).

before the breakdown of the Serbian medieval state, attests that Albanian population in the region of Kosovo amounted to merely 1%. The rest were Serbs. As in the case of Illyrians and Skanderbeg, the crafters of identities and states for Albanians seem not to care about historical facts, nor do they shy away from taking over Serbs's history and culture which are then distorted and/or presented as belonging to the Albanians. Perhaps few people are aware of the fact that Kosovo holds the highest concentration of sacral objects on a territory of this size in Europe. There are over 1,000 of them built by the medieval Serbian state, and they have been under constant attack for centuries. UNESCO put them on its list of protected monuments but under the undetermined name of 'Orthodox monasteries' omitting the fact that these are actually *Serbian* Orthodox monasteries, founded by *Serbian* kings. Doing that way UNESCO has backed implicit spoliation of the Serbian heritage. If Serbian name is disregarded, it becomes much easier to further inflate the virtual history of Kosovo.

This lack of care is not evident only on the side of Albanians but also their international sponsors. Albert Sherman points out that "the side of the Moslems was taken against the Serbs without any thought as to meaning or history." (Sherman 2009: 14). Sherman also interprets this behaviour of the West as a symptom of its own crisis pertaining and adopting a cultural paradigm which is "materialistic, anti-traditional, and hegemonistic" (Sherman 2009: 19) Mary Walsh depicts the surreal atmosphere of Kosovo. As she traverses it, one by

one “fact” turns into an fraud: burned houses are not Albanian but Serbian; Serbian property is relentlessly seized; Italian soldiers look to her like actors on a movie set; Albanians claim that Serbian Orthodox Churches are Albanian national heritage while at the same time trying to blow them up (Walsh 2009: 58-59). Recounting a destiny of a notable family from Urosevac going through many tribulations she too notices strikes not only against Serbian culture and history but also European culture at large, as one work of Giotto (“The Blessed Mother”) was also destroyed in the Albanian rampage (Walsh 2009: 61).

Despite all of that the Western European countries did not hesitate from breaking international rules to help Albanians making false identity. In order for the virtual Albanian identity to float freely and expand, there must not be any other identity, particularly one so historically distinct as the Serbian one. Therefore they continue politics of communist Yugoslav regime who granted Albanians significant autonomy and stimulating their population growth. Only rhetoric has been changed – from “brotherhood and unity” of Yugoslav regime, it shifted to the rhetoric of “human rights”. But both the reason for NATO intervention and the reason for the independence fail to satisfy if considered even within the context of human rights. As the letter from Willy Wimmer (member of the German Bundestag and Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE) to German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, on May 2, 2000,

shows, the NATO intervention was motivated by geopolitical, rather than humanitarian goals. (Wimmer 2000).¹⁰ Wimmer notices analogies with the Roman Empire, states that the purpose was to rectify the missed opportunity from 1945 when the American troops did not enter Yugoslavia. In several paragraphs, Wimmer repeats that international regulations were consciously broken and that in fact Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was considered to lie outside Helsinki Final Act on inviolability of borders, that all secession movements should be encouraged and that Kosovo must be made into an independent state. Yugoslavia would also be permanently excepted from European development.

History has validated Wimmer's observations. Serbia's progress as regards joining the European Union has been illusive for the past sixteen years, the territory of Kosovo hosts the second largest American military base outside America – camp Bondsteel, previously Krivolak camp of Yugoslav Army, and Kosovo received its independence in 2008. Hence, it is not hard to see geopolitical reasons for constructing Albanian twin states. Back in 1913, they served to block Serbian access to the Adriatic Sea. During the second half of the twentieth century they were stimulated to destabilize Yugoslavia and bring back the American influence into the region. If we add to that

¹⁰ Report about State Department/American Enterprise Institute-sponsored conference held on April 28-30, 2000 in Bratislava, Slovakia ("Is Euro-Atlantic Integration Still on Track? Opportunities and Obstacles").

the fact that Kosovo practically has no real economy and that its budget has no monetary ground, but depends on NATO countries contributions (paid off by uncontrolled exploitation of all natural resources) as well as on human trafficking, drugs production and transfer, and all kind of illegal activities we can see an ideal truncated Breton Woods country. America recognizes Kosovo because it considers that virtual country as the matrix for the state of the future. Half of the world follows America in recognizing Kosovo, but another half does not want to be solely matrix. In this sense Kosovo reflects perfectly deep gap in the core of the modern world and shows a crossroad for the future. The aim of all of that is the same: Kosovo must be ideological construct unable to communicate really with its surrounding neighbors and with the world in general.

Such a situation explains why dialogue between Serbs and Albanians is not possible. In order to have dialogue Serbs, as well as the whole world, has to sacrifice history and instead of that accepts poststructuralist politics of illusions. The good example is Essad Pasha Toptani: all attempts to facilitate dialogue (not polemic, let alone, armed conflict) between Serbs and Albanians are always thwarted. Actually it is not possible to have dialogue with invented identity with no provision. Serbian contact with Albanians is encounter with people who claim to have historical precedence, who have appropriated a Serbian national hero and are now simultaneously destroying and appropriating Serbian cultural heritage as well Serbian real estate in

Kosovo.¹¹ Therefore, to even begin to talk with Albanians, whether from Albania or Kosovo, Serbs have to forgo essential parts of their history, to give up on their own cultural heritage, their monuments and churches. To enter this conversation, Serbs have to deconstruct themselves and disappear as the real world dissolved in cyber space.

Conclusion: Consequences and Predictions

Deconstruction is a method promoted by Poststructuralism. It serves to show that there is no truth, that everything is a social/personal construct, ideology forcing itself upon history. But this is matter of Poststructuralism hypocrisy since it too is involved in construction. Nevertheless, Poststructuralist approach, with its disdain for truth, certainty, essence, cannot build anything reliable for the principal reason that it does not use anything but illusions. Poststructuralist identity is a mesmerizing attempt to replace the real world with (twin) towers of sand, metastasized fabrics of printed paper economy and politics. In the case of Albanian identity, poststructuralist construction proceeds by forced appropriation, distortion, and forgery. And these methods have been used in Kosovo

¹¹ Once more about Milosević's 'nationalism': as a president in 1991 he refused to sign law passed to him by the Serbian Parliament that would give back all real estates and properties to Serbian Orthodox Church that were confiscated in 1945 by communist regime. If all of that had been returned to Church, about one third of gross land of Kosovo and Metohija, war would have been more or less objectless. The official name of the Serbian province of Kosovo was 'Kosovo and Metohija'. When Kosovo declared independence in 2008 it erased the name 'Metohija' from his title because the word 'Metohija' means 'land of monastery'.

which has become a kind of a realm of illusion. Everything that can be prefixed by “pseudo-“ or “quasi-“ seems to have appeared in Kosovo. Kosovo is a per excellence example of virtual reality receiving its final historical, or better to say post-historical form.

Not a single building block of the Albanian identity as it is presented to us today is credible. Where the poststructuralist construction used some substantial things – such as historical buildings (churches, monasteries, monuments) or even ethnicities (such as Serbs) – it did so by first deforming them: they become Byzantine/Catholic/Islamic/Turkish in the middle stage and Albanian in the final stage. In the case of Skanderbeg, history and myth are mixed: Skanderbeg was a real person but his exploits are legendary. Both aspects were misrepresented, by claiming that historical Skanderbeg was an Albanian and that legendary Skanderbeg was Albanian savior, the cult hero. Poststructuralist “creation” which freed itself from truth does not know limits. Thus in the case of the Albanian language we see perhaps the very pinnacle of virtual reality. For this building block is not simply existing language known by another name (as in the case of Croatian, Bosnian or Montenegrin which are basically names for Serbian language imposed for political reasons – the proof for this is simple: speakers of all those languages understand perfectly each other); nor is it a distorted existing language (as in the case of Macedonian, where we had a Serbian dialect chosen to represent a whole new language); Albanian language is a completely *new*

language. And being completely new it is thus rootless. It is an artificial creation like Esperanto. Perhaps the most important building block of the Albanian identity was invented. As in the case of the aforementioned Constantine's Donation, the reason for this was political, instrumental, pragmatic. We see it as certain kind of secular Drang nach Ost where first should clean remnants of the Eastern Rome and its culture, and after that proceed towards Euro Asian east. Serbia is of course the first one on that way.

Sponsoring the independence of Kosovo has far-reaching consequences for the integrity and stability of many countries in the world which also have secessionist movements, such as Spain (Basque Country and Catalonia), Italy (South Tyrol), France (Corsica), Turkey (the Kurds), Russia (Chechnya), India (Kashmir), China (Tibet), and even the United States themselves (Puerto Rico and perhaps Texas). Moreover, almost all states in the world are of composite nature so Kosovo represents a dangerous precedent and will likely be used in the future by the secessionist movements as a justification. In spite of that, many countries contrary to their essential interests were forced to recognize Kosovo. Therefore, breakdowns, i.e. bankruptcies of states worldwide will be faster and a gains from that will be enormous for endlessly greedy truncated Bretton Woods economy. The couple charged virtual device Kosovo – Breton Woods could bring insufferable anxiety into world politics and bold affliction to the people, because new nations are invented and used as a bare tools.

The mechanisms of producing false identities employed in segmentation of sovereign countries have been tried and perfected and pose a real threat and an efficient source of intensive social nausea.

Instead of equality and legality America has introduced Hollywood as motherboard for processing historical movements. The fact that NATO war against Serbia was done under a false pretext – the grave exodus of Albanians from Kosovo started *after* the bombing, not before it (Bisset 2009) – serves as a proof that both cause and consequences of this intervention do not have anything to do with truth, justice, protection of a weaker side or any kind of humanitarianism whatsoever. That war has been the final trigger for the ideology of “humanitarian intervention” - completely illusive in its character and with the only one providence: a truncated “Bretton Woods geopolitics”. It means that the whole world order has become an illusion itself and that it does not oblige anyone to anything except to obey mirages.

The inflation of the Albanian balloon on Kosovo is likely to cause more conflicts in the Balkans. Albanian territorial demands do not concern only Kosovo, but also parts of Serbia, Macedonia, Greece and Montenegro. This means that Albanians are set against literally all their neighbors, who will not stand idly and watch their territories being taken away in favour of a nation convinced that they are autochthonous, oldest, supported by the superman from the main

Pristina square, and thus have the most rights to these territories. This might also cause an opposite reaction. Threatened by falsification of history, other nations (not only in Balkans but in all the world) might also try and construct their own combat virtual realities or augment their historical merits in order to show that it is actually they who are “the oldest”, “the pre-eminent” and so on. This would mean opposing Poststructuralism by Poststructuralism and would lead to profusion of half-truths, fabrications, lies which would be seen as legitimate tools for fighting the enemy. Poststructuralism makes illusions multiply like viruses. Thus, Kosovo can be seen as a special laboratory before the pandemic of falsehood is released into the world.

Kosovo pulls behind himself Albania who cannot give any political, economical or cultural response other than rising Islamization. Bandow (2009) and Jatras (2009) both cite former American Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. Bandow lays emphasis on Burns calling Kosovo “a majority Muslim state” (Bandow 2009: 28); whereas Jatras notices that Burns usually referred to Albanians not as Albanians but as “Muslims” (Jatras 2009: 38). Hence it is expected to conclude, as Trifković does, that the purpose might be to create a chain of Muslim countries stretching from Turkey to Bosnia (Trifković 2009: 73). It seems that US upholds a Turkish project to make a one Suni state out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania which would disrupt the new silk road project led by the Chinese. (Tihonov 2016). Even *New York Times*

writes that extreme and intolerant version of Islam is being widely propagated across Kosovo (Gall 2016). It is the same kind of Islam we find in the Islamic State, but also in Saudi Arabia which is said to sponsor this project. By becoming submerged in an artificial Muslim state, Albanians might suffer the fate of Serbs who also become Muslims only to become something else afterwards: Bosnians or Albanians. Perhaps in some future there might be no Albanians and the current Islamization is a symptom of building a new false nation in the Balkans. The only question is who will have the next statue on the main Pristina square. Whoever would be, it will be the triumph of Poststructuralism.

Our final conclusion is actually more prediction than a matter of deduction. In 1913, latter Albanians were given their own country while other Balkan nations fought against Turkey; in 1941 they fought with Germans against Serbs and were rewarded from 1945 by communist stimulation to grow in number and populate Kosovo; in nineties they were encouraged to rebel against Serbia; in 2000s they received yet another country. And in February 2015 they decided it was not enough for them. In this month there was a massive wave of Albanians crossing the borders of the European Union in search for a better life. British newspaper *The Telegraph* reports that the unemployment rate is 45 per cent and that it is more than 60 per cent of young people aged under 24. (Alexander 2015) Inevitable question is: why? Have not the Albanians fought for their country, have they

not suffered supposed oppression from Yugoslav and Serbian governments? *The Telegraph's* Harriet Alexander is perplexed too: "But precisely why this is happening now remains a mystery – the economic situation is nothing new." (Alexander 2015).

Does it mean that it is revealed finally that the Kosovo balloon was actually intended not for Yugoslavia or Serbia only, but Europe as a whole? The scenes of hungry, afraid, distressed Albanians on the borders of the European Union repeated themselves just several months after – in a massive wave of refugees fleeing from the devastation of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and the threat of the Islamic State. Of course, the wave of Albanians was comparatively much smaller than that of the people from the Middle East. But then again, all tests and experiments are comparatively smaller than the final market placements and wide distributions of products once they are finalized. The poststructuralist approach is carefully composed as a music play: first *lento appassionato*, after that *allegro alla turca* and finally *presto con fuoco*. It resembles science as well, inasmuch as it deals with facts, observations, deductions; but it is actually quite opposite from science when we realize that facts are fabrications, observations are fantasies, all deductions are dishonesties, and at the end music is cacophony. It is quite certain that Albanian flight to the Western Europe was just a probe for the planned grand-scale operation. Albanians are more familiar; there are fewer of them; and they are Europeans speaking an Indo-European language. While the

event itself was unexpected and not entirely understood, it is obviously one of political usages of Albanians, this time as a small scale check of the European political palpitation towards refugee crisis that started massively soon after. Albanians did not join refugees; they retreated quietly, their role of battering ram having ended. Until the new poststructural task.

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