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Abstract:

The study briefly summarizes the understandings of globalization, its beginning, and periodization in social sciences. It introduces the understanding of globalization as a process whose dynamics is determined by its driving forces, outlines the concept of the driving forces of globalization, and offers the periodization of globalization according to the changes globalization undergone under the impact of its driving forces. The paper focuses on the classification of the driving forces of globalisation according to various criteria and formulates basic general principles of driving forces of globalization that may be applicable in predicting further globalization development.

Key words: globalization, driving forces of globalization

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2 The paper is a partial outcome of the grant project KEGA No. 024PU-4/2012 Geoconflictolgy – teaching conception of a new subject and elaboration of academic textbook implementation.
Globalization has become a subject of research in many social sciences. Each of them employs different scientific methods and yields unique results of their analysis of this process. The main purpose of this paper is to present the findings of my research on the relation between globalization and its driving forces. The paper briefly summarizes the results of my analysis of different understandings of globalization, various perceptions of its beginnings, and its periodizations, that have been used in social sciences. Following the results of the analysis, it specifies basic characteristics of globalization and its driving forces in my understanding, and proposes my periodization of globalization. It further gives a typological arrangement of the driving forces identified in the process of globalization development, outlines the principles of driving forces of globalization arising from the analysis of essential attributes and historical aspects of these driving forces, and introduces a concept of predicting the development of globalization.

At present there is lacking an unambiguous understanding of globalization in social sciences. Since 1920s, when the word was

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coined⁴, there have developed at least six different understandings of globalization: 1. Globalization as *specific principles of children’s mental processes working or the teaching method employing these principles* (in pedagogy and pedagogical psychology Decroly 1925, 1929); 2. Globalization as *a spreading of phenomena across the whole world* (in sociology Meadows 1950, 1951); 3. Globalization as *a social process or trend, or as a set of processes or trends* (in political sciences and international relations theories Modelski 1972, Harf and Trout 1986, Cox 1992, Held 1999, etc.; in sociology Aron 1968, Beck 1986, Robertson 1987, Albrow 1990, Giddens 1990, etc.; in international law theory Falk 1972, etc.; in economy Barnet and Müller 1974, Levitt 1983, etc.); 4. Globalization as *a way of global power configuration* (in sociology Tomlinson 1991); 5. Globalization as *a strategy* (in economy Krugman 1995, etc.); 6. Globalization as *an ideology* (in sociology Wallerstein 2000, etc.).

Apart from the dispute over the understanding of globalization among social scientists, there exists a debate, especially among those who understand globalization as a social process or a set of processes, on the issue of when globalization has its beginnings. Their perspectives on this issue considerably differ. The emergence of

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⁴ Jean-Ovide Decroly was one of the first scientists who systematically used the word globalization. He had been using the word from 1924, in 1929 he published the monograph named *La fonction de globalisation et l’enseignement*. For the detailed bibliography of Jean-Ovide Decroly see VAN GORP, A.: *Tussen mythe en wetenschap: Ovide Decroly (1871 – 1932)*. Leuven: ACCO, 2005, pp. 249 – 268.
globalization has been dated back to *the prehistoric period* (Held 1999, Hopkins 2002, Steger 2003), to *the 3rd century* (Therborn 2000), to *the beginning of the 10th century* (Modelski 1972), to *the 15th century* (Harf and Trout 1986), to *the 19th century* (Cox 1992), or to *1980s and 1990s* (Kaldor 1999).

The development of globalization as a historical process can be divided into several periods. The periodization of globalization has been the subject of research in the social sciences since the end of the 20th century (Held 1999, Therborn 2000, Hopkins 2002, Steger 2003). However, at present there does not exist a generally accepted periodization of globalization. The variety of the existing globalization periodizations can be illustrated by the Table 1.

For these reasons it is important to start any research on globalization by providing the understanding of the phenomenon which is to be analyzed. In my research *globalization* is understood as a social process whose defining characteristics can be summarized as follows:

- It is a *process of intensification of social relations* on the local, regional, continental, intercontinental, or global scale, followed by the increase in interconnectedness and interdependence of the human society. Globalization manifests itself in many spheres of social life – in the sphere of social being (economics, technology, etc.) and in the sphere of social consciousness (ideology, politics, law, ethics, culture, etc.).
• It is a *historical process* that is not completed and whose quality and quantity change in the process of its development; the roots of this process can be traced back to the rise of the first human civilizations;

• It is a *controllable process*; the potential for its control increases as human understanding of this process develops (in past globalization was a spontaneous, uncontrolled process, at present it is controlled, or there exists a tendency to control it, in some social spheres whereas in other social spheres it is a spontaneous, uncontrolled process);

• It is *contradictory in character* what manifests itself in attaining a different level of intensity and acceleration on various territories and in various social spheres, or in having different impacts while working in the same way.

• The intensity level and difference in impacts of globalization are determined by the *driving forces of globalization, socio-historical development, socio-economic relations, and the natural environment*.

By the *driving forces of globalization* I understand a complex of essential, long-running factors or agents that stimulate the process and determine its development, nature, quantity and quality, its intensity, and direction. It is either a human being (individual, group, or society with such qualities, needs, feelings, interests, demands, desires, ideas that motivate people to intensify their social relations and to cooperate with other individuals, groups, societies) or nature.
(such environmental conditions, natural disasters, epidemics, etc. that force people to intensify their social relations and to cooperate with one another or that facilitate their cooperation) that is a bearer of the driving force of globalization. The dynamism of the driving forces of globalization is determined by the contradiction between human needs, feelings, interests, demands, desires, ideas and their fulfilment, or between human qualities and feelings and their engagement in human conduct, or the contradiction between environmental conditions, natural disasters, epidemics, etc. and people's struggle to survive, or maintain or improve the quality of their lives.

This complex of driving forces is not only a source of development, it itself constantly changes and develops; its structure, intensity, direction, and relations between its components undergo a change. Driving forces of globalization can work independently or in the complex with other driving forces (in the interaction with other driving forces of globalization their impact may be strengthened or weakened). They can influence the whole process of globalization or particular stages of the process. An analogous driving force (or a complex of driving forces) can give rise to various manifestations of globalization (various in the sense of different quantity, quality, intensity, direction, etc.) in different space and time (i.e. in different economic, political, or social conditions).
In my perspective the roots of globalization can be traced back to the rise of the first human civilizations. Analysing the changes in the development of globalization (i.e. the changes in its character, quality, quantity, intensity, or direction) determined by the driving forces of globalization I identified the following eleven periods of globalization: first period (10 000 BC – 3500 BC), second period (3500 BC – 5th century AD), third period (5th century – 10th century), fourth period (10th century – 15th century), fifth period (15th century – 1800), sixth period (1800 – 1850), seventh period (1850 – 1918), eighth period (1918 – 1945), ninth period (1945 – 1970), tenth period (1970 – 1990), eleventh period (1990 – present).

In the first period of globalization there emerged the earliest manifestations of globalization at a local level, e.g. cooperation in satisfying primary needs (cooperative hunting and gathering), coexistence (clans and tribes), spreading and adopting new pieces of knowledge, spreading of ornaments, creating the first cultures, establishing and spreading of cults and religions, spreading of agriculture and stock raising, spreading of a new way of life brought with agriculture and stock raising, spreading of specialisation and


6 The beginnings and endings of particular periods represent only approximate points in time when the transition from one stage in globalization development to another took place. For globalization has been developing continuously and consistently, in each of the periods its old qualities were dissapearing and new ones were emerging.
differentiation of labour, emergence and spreading of new organisational forms.

During the second period the process acquired new qualities and its manifestations appeared at a regional or an intercontinental level, e. g. integration into larger units (states, alliances), spreading of systems of writing, establishing trade contacts, wars, colonisation of new territories, use of law, establishing qualitatively new political units (empires).

In the third period there emerged new manifestations of globalization at a continental or an intercontinental level, e. g. invasions of barbarian tribes, merging into culturally related tribes and establishing states, spreading of the feudal system, spreading of religious ideology, spreading of dogmatics, emergence of clergy.

In the fourth period the changes in globalization character manifested at a continental and an intercontinental level, e. g. the territorial expansion of the church (the Investiture Contest, the Crusades).

In the fifth period new manifestations of globalization were observable at a continental or an intercontinental level, e. g. spreading of Renaissance and Humanism, spreading of Reformation, spreading of education (due to the invention of a printing press), intensification of intercontinental relations (due to the overseas discoveries), colonisation.
In the *sixth period* the changes in globalization development manifested itself at a continental and an intercontinental level, e. g. industrial revolution, spreading of new knowledge and technologies.

In the *seventh period* there occurred new manifestations of globalization at a regional, a continental, an intercontinental and the global level, e. g. spreading of new organizational forms in trade, spreading of a new trade and tariffs policy, spreading of the idea of free trade, economic crises, organization at international level (the Internationals), establishing international governmental and intergovernmental institutions and organizations.

In the *eighth period* the new quality, quantity, and intensity of globalization manifested at the global level, e. g. the Great Depression, the World Wars, founding of the League of Nations, founding of the UN.

In the *ninth period* other new manifestations of globalization emerged at the global level, e. g. establishing new international organizations (the IMF, the World Bank Group, the GATT, etc.), the Cold War (the threat of global nuclear war), international cooperation in solving global problems (disarmament, pollution of the environment, etc.)

In the *tenth period* the change in globalization direction was followed by its new manifestations, e. g. spreading of ideas of free trade and their implementation in practice (adopting neoliberal policy), cooperation within informal groupings (G-5, etc.).
In the eleventh period the globalization character, quality, quantity, and intensity changed what has manifested itself by e.g. spreading of the ideas of neoliberalism and adopting neoliberal principles and measures at the global level, spreading of anglo-american way of life, culture, and ethics, spreading of new strategies of development by multinational and transnational corporations, new international division of labour, creating virtual economy, establishing free-trade zones, emergence of global protest actions against neoliberalism (anti-globalization/alter-globalization movement), establishment of organizations based on alternative (non-neoliberal) principles (the ALBA), international scientific cooperation (the ISS, etc.).

In each period the dynamism of globalization was determined by specific driving forces. These driving forces of globalization can be classified and typologically arranged according to various criteria, e.g. a bearer of a particular driving force of globalization, objectiveness/subjectiveness, duration, territorial dependence/independence, geographical scope, progressiveness/regressiveness. See Table 2 for the detailed analysis and typology of driving forces of globalization that were operating in particular periods of globalization.

One of the possibilities how to develop the given classification is to take into consideration a bearer of a particular driving force of globalization. In general it is either a human being or nature who is a bearer of the driving force therefore driving forces of globalization
may be classified as social or natural. Most of the driving forces I have analysed are social ones.

Social driving forces may be further classified according to two other criteria. The first one refers to whether a human being in the process of globalization has a position of an individual, or it is a part of a group, society or state. As an example of a driving force arising out of an individual it is possible to mention primary needs. Driving forces arising out of a group stem from living of a human being in society, such as for example, desire for self-determination, desire for social and political rights, etc. Driving forces arising from society or state, and thus originating in aggregating of people in a more or less ordered communities, refer to, for example need for regulation of international relations in various areas of social life, need to solve different problems at international level and so on.
### Table 2: Typology of the driving forces of globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driving force</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Subjective</th>
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<th>Unstable in Time</th>
<th>Dependent on Territory</th>
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<th>Local/Regional</th>
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<td>Natural need for searching new territories for settlement</td>
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<td>Need to regulate international relations in different areas of social life</td>
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<td>Attempt to spread economic, political, and/or cultural influence</td>
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<td>Driving force arising from interests and desires</td>
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<td>Desire to gain or maintain economic or political supremacy</td>
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Legend:
- **I**: Individual
- **G**: Group
- **S**: Society/state
- **N**: Nature
- **Continental/Intercontinental**: First period of globalization (10,000 BC – 3500 BC)
- **Second period of globalization (3500 BC – 6th century BC)**
- **Third period of globalization (6th century – 10th century)**
- **Fourth period of globalization (10th century – 15th century)**
- **Fifth period of globalization (15th century – 1800)**
- **Sixth period of globalization (1800 – 1850)**
- **Seventh period of globalization (1850 – 1914)**
- **Eighth period of globalization (1914 – 1945)**
- **Ninth period of globalization (1945 – 1970)**
- **Tenth period of globalization (1970 – 1990)**
- **Eleventh period of globalization (1990 – present)**
- **Regressive**: From a human perspective regressive – mildly regressive
- **Progressive**: From a human perspective progressive – mildly progressive
- **From an environmental perspective regressive – mildly regressive**
- **From an environmental perspective progressive – mildly progressive**
- **Driving force does not operate**
- **No data/Not analysed**
- **Change in character due to interaction with other driving force of globalization**
The criterion of objectiveness/subjectiveness indicates to what extent a particular driving force is dependent on consciousness of individuals or groups of people. For example, the forces of nature (climatic change, drought, bad crop, natural catastrophes, etc.), primary needs of human beings (need for food, security, shelter, etc.), changes arising from activities of human beings (demographic changes), etc. are typical objective driving forces of globalization. On the other hand advancement of one’s own interests (economic, financial, political, etc.), decision of individuals or institution that have extensive reach (decisions of politicians, representatives of transnational corporations, international organizations, etc.), desire for freedom, aesthetic need, feeling of being powerless and the ability to overcome it through imagination can be mentioned as typical subjective driving forces of globalization. In my analysis of driving forces of globalization it has proved that both objective and subjective driving forces have been forming the process of globalization (from its beginning till the present stage) approximately to the same extent.

Time aspect is another possible criterion according to which driving forces of globalization can be typologically arranged. Considering that all driving forces of globalization develop and change, it is interesting to analyse their duration in time. Some driving forces have been active since the beginning of the development of human society, though they have been changing in quantity, quality, intensity, etc. (e. g. impact of environmental conditions, lack of mineral
resources, primary and some secondary needs of human being, advancement of one’s own interests, etc.). The other ones have emerged recently and did not affect the previous development (need to solve global problems, need to inform and be informed through mass media, etc.). The results of my analysis show that most driving forces of globalization have its origin in the early history of humankind.

Territorial aspect can be adopted as another criterion of the typology of the driving forces and the attention can be pointed out to the question of *dependence/independence of a driving force on territory*. Not each driving force is active, or equally intensive, on all territories (e. g. need to protect against cold weather is less intensive near the equator than in the temperate zone). My analysis, however, proved that most of driving forces of globalization work independently on territory.

It is also possible to classify the driving forces of globalization according to their *geographical scope*. Taking into consideration that the extent of impact of the driving forces may change in the process of their development, it is inevitable when developing the classification to take into account the aspect of time. There are only several driving forces which have been global since the beginning of their involvement in the globalization process. A need for food, shelter, and living in a secure environment can be mentioned as examples. At first many driving forces of globalization had only local impact and they

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were gradually reaching regional, continental, intercontinental, and global scope. As an example of such driving force business interests can be mentioned.

Progressiveness/regressiveness, another criterion which can be used to classify the driving forces of globalization, uncovers a dialectical character of the driving forces of globalization. In this paper progressiveness means gradual improvement of human and environmental conditions whereas regressiveness refers to their decline. Most of the analysed driving forces can work progressively or regressively depending on various circumstances (space, time, social and political organization, direction of individual or group interests etc.), or they can even work progressively and regressively with the same intensity at the same time (e.g. considering a lack of mineral resources as a driving force of globalization, under certain circumstances they can result in the establishment of business contacts between two or more distant areas, however under other circumstances it can escalate a conflict). Only few factors or agents can be laid exactly on the one end of this scale. For example, aesthetic need, need for communication between societies, need to solve global problems are more progressive driving forces, on the other hand aggressive advancement of economic or political interest is more regressive driving force. However, it is necessary to emphasize that this categorization is very relative.
The study of driving forces of globalization is inevitable because only in this way we can improve our understanding of principles behind globalization and forecast its further development. During my research I have discovered three principles of driving forces of globalization.

Driving forces of globalization change and develop over time. One of the concomitant phenomena of this process is a transformation of the nature of some driving forces (principle of transformation of driving forces). For example, need for food, clothing, and shelter (driving forces which are objective in their nature), were transformed into desire for gourmet food, fashion clothing, decent housing (driving forces which are subjective in their nature). This transformation was possible due to long-lasting fulfilment of the primary needs (e. g. by producing surplus value which enabled individual to free himself from everyday providing of food and clothing, or searching for shelter) and by means of its interconnecting with other driving force (e. g. with aesthetic need, a subjective driving force of globalization, which stimulated aesthetic feeling to be considered while preparing food, designing cloths, or arrangement of housing). Not all driving forces of globalization were transformed in this way, and even those, which have been transformed, do not work on each place of our planet with the same intensity. This transformation is gradual.
The transformation of a driving force can come about in an opposite direction. If a primary need stops to be satisfied for a longer time (e.g. in a case of the outbreak of war, natural catastrophe, etc.), a desire of an individual, as a subjective driving force of globalization, will transform again into the primary need, as an objective driving force of globalization.

This “subjectivization” and “objectivization” of driving forces will consequently have an impact on the nature of the globalization process. Globalization driven by objective driving forces has a tendency towards commonality, i.e. it will come about for welfare of the whole (which does not have to be global). Globalization driven by subjective driving forces has a tendency towards individualism, i.e. it will be carried out in the interest of maximization of fulfilment of individual needs and desires.

The process of globalization is not influenced only by the principle of transformation of one driving force into another, it is also a result of antagonistic interaction of several driving forces of globalization. Some driving forces interact in mutual antagonism (the principle of antagonism of driving forces of globalization), e.g. objective need for healthy environment coincide with a regressive subjective desire for profit (e.g. it manifested itself in the question of the adoption and the enforcement of the Kyoto protocol), or there is a contradiction between progressive subjective need for healthy diet.
and regressive subjective desire for profit (e.g. it can be observed in the BSE scandal or melamine scandal).

Antagonistic interaction of driving forces can be observed in the direction of the process of globalization. The course of globalization is given by those driving forces, which prevail in political and economic decision-making structures of society in a particular moment.

Another principle, typical for driving forces of globalization, is their tendency towards gradualness and intensification (the principle of gradualness and intensification of driving forces), which results in more effective organising and larger territorial sphere of activity of the process of globalization.

Globalization driven by the complex of its driving forces can develop in two ways. On one hand it can end in the self-destruction of humankind, if regressive subjective driving forces prevail over the progressive objective and subjective ones. On the other hand it can result in the change of the global order, if globalization is driven by its progressive objective and subjective driving forces, which aim is to preserve the life on earth and organise it in such a way so that a new world order was based on social justice and would at least satisfy primary needs for each individual. This would require a reform of global and regional international institutions as well as legislative and executive bodies of nation-states. The reform should lead to the elimination of regressive subjective driving forces in decision-making process on the global level. For example there is a need to eliminate
regressive subjective driving forces desire for profit concerning armament industry and desire for power, heading to military conflicts, and to transform them into the progressive driving force desire for peace. This elimination of regressive subjective driving forces should be carried out by measures with global reach and obligatory character (e.g. disarmament should be accepted and applied in all countries, it should not be only partial).

The operating of the driving forces of globalization may be illustrated by the following example. In last decade an imbalance between a driving force of a desire for maximization of profit (neoliberal and neoconservative political and bank elite governing since the period of the Reagan’s and Thatcher’s administrations has been its bearer) and a driving force of need to regulate financial policies of banks and other financial institutions (which has been enforced by policies of state-controlled economies). The roots of this imbalance may be found in adopting a series of deregulation measures at national and international level or in overlooking hazardous and risky financial policy of banks and other financial institutions (e.g. in cases of Enron, Lehman Brothers and other). This trend in political decision-making, which originated in Great Britain and in the USA, was gradually spreading to other countries\(^7\) and was followed by some decision-making bodies of international institutions (the IMF, the

World Bank, and others) until it prevailed over political tendencies preferring the government interventions in economy. Present global financial and economic crisis was a result of this trend in decision-making\textsuperscript{8}. Intolerable state of existence in crisis makes a room for driving force of need to regulate international financial policies of banks and financial institutions, which has become a subject of negotiations of heads of states and governments at continental, intercontinental, or global level (e.g. the EU, the BRICS, the G20, etc.). It is possible that in taking preventive measures against crisis some new control and regulatory mechanisms emerge, through which it will be possible to anticipate the threat of outbreak of another crisis and to prevent its return in a global scope by taking appropriate regulatory measures. Such mechanisms may appear at the global level, or at a local, regional, continental, or intercontinental level, and if they prove to be effective, they may be adopted elsewhere.

The presented example is only one of the possibilities how to apply the concept of driving forces of globalization in analysing the development and dynamics of globalization processes. There exist many other alternatives of applying the concept of the driving forces of globalization and these may be the subject of further research.

My findings lead to the conclusion that globalization and its driving forces constantly change and develop over time. A particular manifestation of globalization depends on the character of a driving force, or driving forces, stimulating it at that moment. Driving forces of globalization may assume different qualities: its bearer may have an attribute of either a human being or nature; their influence may be dependent or independent on consciousness of individuals or groups of people, time, or territory; their geographical extent may be local, regional, continental, intercontinental, or global; their impact may be progressive or regressive, etc. Being determined by various driving forces, the nature of globalization may alter.

The complex of the driving forces of globalization is not only a source of development, it itself undergoes a change; its structure, intensity, direction, and relations between its components become different over time. The understanding of the principles behind the development of driving forces of globalization may thus improve our ability to predict the further development of globalization. During my research I had discovered three principles of the development of driving forces of globalization: the principle of transformation of driving forces of globalization, the principle of antagonism of driving forces of globalization, and the principle of gradualness and intensification of driving forces of globalization. It has proved that globalization is a knowable and predictable process.
Globalization driven by its driving forces may develop in two directions: either to a self-destruction of humankind or to a change of the global social order. A future direction of globalization will depend on a character of driving forces that will stimulate the process, e.g. on whether in its development subjective regressive driving forces prevail over objective and subjective progressive ones or vice versa. Subjective driving forces depend on human consciousness, therefore a man may intentionally influence them, and thus decide about the further development of humankind. The impact of objective driving forces of globalization is independent on human consciousness; however, on the basis of their understanding a man may predict and appropriately stimulate human activities.

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Mariusz Falkowski¹
Marek Pytel

TYPOLOGY OF BASIC ACADEMIC NOTIONS RELATED TO THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM

Abstract:
The article presents a typology of basic academic notions related to basic academic notions connected with the transport system in a broad sense. It covers a wide spectrum of analyses of such transport issues as: transport, transport system, transport infrastructure, transport line, transport route or transport network. It discusses multi-aspect and multi-criteria approach to their interpretation from the perspective of various authors, with particular emphasis on relations between these notions.

Key words: transport system, transport, transport infrastructure and transport policy.

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FALKOWSKI M., PYTEL, M., Typology of basic academic notions related to the transport system, EJG, 1, 2013, pp. 37-60.
INTRODUCTION

A transport system has a significant influence on the social and economic growth and development of every country. It is true that lack of a proper transport system or its inappropriate functioning or a wrong needs analysis related to its further development, have an immediate negative effect on the economic, social and political and even military situation of the whole region. It is a consequence of the fact that it is an important element stimulating the right functioning of a given state, through, among other things, effective and economical flow of material means (raw materials and products), transport of people participating in manufacturing and tourism processes. It also ensures overall performance of tasks related to needs of people employed in manufacturing processes such as: education, science, healthcare, culture or satisfying various material and non-material needs of the society. It is also an important determinant related to the military security of a given state. All these factors generate traffic flows of both goods (delivery traffic) and passengers, which at the same time are components of the transport system. Thus, it plays and important role in stimulation of effective operation of various branches of national economy and is a factor contributing to their growth. Lack of cohesion between transport activity and other branches of the economy directly weakens development opportunities.
of a given region\textsuperscript{2}, because there are close dependencies between these entities. These dependencies became also the subject of interest for various scientific and academic environments, because they have significant influence on generation of important phenomena and processes, which have impact on social and economic development\textsuperscript{3}.

It may seem that such notions as \textit{transport system}, \textit{transport} or \textit{transport policy} are not specially interesting for academic researchers. However, a more profound analysis shows that these notions are becoming an interesting analytical spectrum, because they are characterised by a multi-aspect approach to their definition, and their interpretation, depending on the author, can be presented in various ways. In connection with these issues, the authors of this article undertook the task of familiarisation with the most important typology of these notions in the perspective of various academic considerations, because such issues are usually discussed in system and multi-criteria categories.


\footnote{\textsuperscript{3} Social and economic development – process of positive quantitative and qualitative changes, thanks to which already existing phenomena in all areas of economic, cultural and social activity as well as social and manufacturing, political and system-wide relations are increase or improved and apart from this new phenomena are created and developed. These changes take place in time and space dimensions; \url{www.pl.wikipedia.org} (27.09.2012).}

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1. THE NOTION AND TYPOLOGY OF TRANSPORT

The notion of transport has historical and geopolitical background. In an analysis of this issue, one cannot overlook that it is an issue permanently attached to overcoming distance, i.e. it is inseparably connected with one of the basic human needs on Earth, namely the need to relocate. The issue can also by analysed from the perspective transport of people only and transport of goods by offering transport services. Although these are two different subject areas, one can notice a certain dependence they have in common, namely human need to relocate. Hence one should try to answer the question: what is transport and present a typology of this notion.

In available scientific and academic analyses, there are numerous definitions of this notion, because it is an interdisciplinary issue. The notion of transport, in its widest etymological meaning comes from a Latin word “transportare”, i.e. carry”, “cross”. The most general definition of this notion can be found in the encyclopaedia published by PWN, which states that it is a branch of economy which provides services related to relocation of people and goods\(^4\). It is a rather general definition which allows for any interpretation. Thus if one would like to discuss this notion in detail, the issue would have to be analysed from the perspective of various semantic criteria, such as:

activities, phenomena, logistics concepts, technological or economic processes, which characterise this notion.

Being understood as a group of activities, according to the PWN Encyclopaedia definition, the notion of transport is related to relocation of people and material goods using appropriate means of transport infrastructure, it encompasses both relocation from one place to another as well as all other activities necessary to reach this goal, i.e. loading activities (loading up, unloading, reloading) and any other activities (e.g. handling and other charges)\(^5\). A similar interpretation of this notion is used in a studies by Karbowiak (2009)\(^6\). However, according to Dworecki (1999), it is a separate group of activities necessary for physical relocation of goods from the forwarding place to the reception place\(^7\). The same author considers transport also in the categories of the logistics concept, i.e. as phases of real movement in the supply chain. These phases in connection with a manufacturing process and turnover of goods are its integral part\(^8\). A similar interpretation is presented by Towpik (2004), who states that it is relocation of people, goods or energy in space depending on human needs in this respect\(^9\). It should also be

\(^5\)Ibidem.
\(^8\)Ibidem, p. 243.
reminded that, as Karbowiak (2009) has already mentioned, speaking of transport one should remember about three basic and inseparable elements of this system, namely: a road, means of transport and a transport process\(^{10}\).

Looking at this notion from the perspective of technological processes, one should present the issue like Tarski (1973), as a particular type of transfer, relocation or forwarding various elements, i.e. transfer of people, goods or energy\(^{11}\). Using the criteria of the state economic system, the notion may be defined as a complex sector of the national economy from the technical, economic and organisational point of view which belongs the materials manufacturing sector, Mindur (2002)\(^ {12}\). Transport may also be defined as an element of social and economic infrastructure, Gołembska (1999), as a separate part of the social and economic encompassing both elements of social and economic infrastructure\(^ {13}\). From the perspective of physical phenomena, is presented as conscious transfer of matter and energy for the purpose of moving objects or goods.

\(^{10}\) H. Karbowiak, op. cit., p. 7.  
\(^{11}\) I. Tarski, Ekonomika i organizacja transportu międzynarodowego, Wyd. PWE, Warszawa 1973, p. 11.  
being matter or energy particles, to another place than before, Hołowiński (1961)\(^\text{14}\).

Transport is also defined as an economic notion and then it is interpreted as a process resulting from human needs, taking place in time and space and consisting in payable services resulting relocation of people and loads, Rydzkowski and Wojewódzka - Król (2008)\(^\text{15}\), it also involves creation of auxiliary services directly related to this process\(^\text{16}\). However, in accordance with and economic analysis based economic activity, including a manufacturing process, Szczepaniak (2002) defines transport as a way in which people overcome space to relocate themselves or deliver results of their work to places where there is demand for them which can be in this way satisfied. This definition can only be complemented with a statement that transport is manufacturing process in which people, having limited resources, perform relocation of people, goods and energy in space for the purpose of satisfying their various needs and desires\(^\text{17}\). Going further in this analysis of an economic aspect of this notion, one should notice that a result of transport as a manufacturing process is a product in


\(^{15}\) Auxiliary needs encompass shipping, freight brokers’ services, etc. (see T. Szczepaniak, (ed.), *Transport i spedycja międzynarodowa*, Wyd. PWE, Warszawa 1985, p. 14).


the form of a carriage service (transport), which is paid for, so it is strictly related to the national economy.

To sum up these consideration on the typology of the notion of transport, one may unequivocally state that it is a set of activities involving relocation of various material goods in time and space using auxiliary services (logistics, shipping, control and customs), finally resulting in carriage services including loading, unloading and storage. Thus it is possible to attribute three basic functions to transport in the national economy, which prove its complementarity\(^\text{18}\) in relation to other sectors of the national economy. These functions include\(^\text{19}\):

- **consumption**, through transport services one can satisfy carriage needs; most often this sector is served by passenger transport, which in turn satisfy transport related needs of people, most often connected with their personal needs;
- **manufacturing**, satisfying manufacturing needs by rendering transport services, i.e. ensuring exchange of goods in transport of raw materials, prefabricated elements, materials, etc., for further production and shipment of finished results of manufacturing activity, ready for individual consumption;

\(^{18}\) In this case it means lack of possibility of replacing it with other activity.
integration, uniting society by making it possible to relocate people and goods from one place to another.

In this characteristics of transport it is not possible to omit its division into particular categories, (Fig. 1). The first division of transport types van take into account the environment in which people or loads are relocated:

- **land transport**, it can be further divided into transport on land, underground (e.g. underground systems) and above over land (e.g. cable lines), rail transport (railway) and railless (vehicle transport);
- **water transport** (sea and inland waterway);
- **air transport** (aviation);
- **transmission transport** (pipeline, wire, conveyor).

With regard to the type of carried load, or the subject of shipment, transport can be divided into transport of goods and passengers. It may have universal character (shipment of various loads or any people) or specialised (shipment of one or a few types of loads, e.g. in refrigerated vehicles, or a group of people, e.g. in ambulances or military vehicles). Specialisation in transport may result striving for mechanisation of loading operations (e.g. containers, palettes, loading packages, etc.), especially in the case of a need to use various means of transport. Moreover depending on the way of relocating a load, it is

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20 Encyklopedia PWN, op. cit.
possible to divide transport into continuous transport (e.g. pipeline) discontinuous (vehicle, rail, air, etc.). With regard to its availability for users, transport can be divided into public, economic (e.g. own transport or company transport of companies having their own fleets) or individual transport, to satisfy transport needs of individuals or groups of people (e.g. the closest relatives). With regard to organisation, transport may be divided into regular and irregular, while if one takes into account the use of loading units, it is divided into conventional and multimodal transport\textsuperscript{21}. Moreover, transport can be divided with regard to the type of transaction into domestic and international.

\textsuperscript{21} Multimodal transport – shipment of goods using at least two transport types. There is only one shipment agreement, one contractor is responsible for the whole shipment. In scientific literature it is frequently mistaken with combined or intermodal. Intermodal transport is shipment of goods in one unit using at least two subsequent transport branches, while combined transport is intermodal shipment in which the main part of transport is rail, water inland or sea and only a short section at the beginning or at the end is vehicle transport (See: Terminology on combined transport, Economic Commission for Europe, European Conference of Ministers of Transport, European Commission, New York - Geneva 2001).
A condition necessary for transport to function is the so called transport line, i.e. a road connecting two transport points. Most often it has a functional character, which means that it is inseparable from traffic, shipment or transmission of goods and people or a

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22 Road – an appropriately separated strip of land prepared for vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

23 Transport points – they set the beginning, course and end of transport lines and routes, i.e. places for loading, unloading and reloading or the starting and finishing points of a passenger journey.

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particular means of transport (e.g., a train, vehicle, ship or aeroplane) on a strictly defined section, using an appropriate road\textsuperscript{24}.

A group of transport lines connecting points, nodes\textsuperscript{25} or towns is called a transport route, while a group of roads and transport lines as well as points and nodes makes a transport network. There are many transport networks (e.g. road, rail, tram), which complement and replace one another. Thus, a transport network can be defined, following Ratajczak (1999), as a system of road, rail or other connections, occurring in a given area whose shape is strictly related to the distribution of population centres and geographical characteristics\textsuperscript{26}, it is one of the main elements of a transport system.

2. ESSENCE OF A TRANSPORT SYSTEM

For the purpose of a deeper analysis of the notion of a transport system, it is necessary to start with a definition of its meaning. According to the encyclopaedia published by PWN, it is a notion comprising a group of elements, relations and processes, which process a stream of loads and passengers, often defined as a demand


\textsuperscript{25} Nodes – they are a special type of transport points in which at least three roads or transport lines intersect. Usually in a given area there are more transport points than nodes because nearly each of them is a forwarding point, a reception or reloading point, however, only some of them have the function of nodes.

\textsuperscript{26} W. Ratajczak, Modelowanie sieci transportowych, Wyd. UAM, Poznań 1999, p. 15.

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for transport services in an output stream from this system\textsuperscript{27}. It is quite a complex and rather unclear definition, hence it requires an in-depth interpretation of its meaning. In defining this notion, it is worth referring to Neider (2008), who presents this issue as a correlation between the activity of all transport branches\textsuperscript{28} and uniting them both internally (\textit{horizontal and vertical coordination}) and externally (\textit{domestic and international coordination})\textsuperscript{29}, so he describes this notion as an integrated set of means related to all transport branches occurring in a given area. According to the same author, \textit{horizontal, internal coordination} is based on a division of transport tasks into particular transport types, i.e. it shapes the transport market in regular way in a given country by working on appropriate transport policy contributing to its development. Certainly, the state may direct its activity through various incentives and allowances to further development of selected transport types. This may result from certain political aspects, such as: the financial situation of the state, capital intensity of infrastructural investments\textsuperscript{30}, demand for transport

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{27} Encyklopedia PWN, op. cit.
\bibitem{28} Road, rail, sea, water inland, air and pipeline transport.
\bibitem{29} J. Neider, op. cit., p. 14.
\bibitem{30} Capital intensity of investment – collecting sufficiently large financial means, preferably originating from various sources, for activity related to infrastructure development. Production of transport services is highly capital intensive activity because nowadays shipment is related availability of a sufficient number of modern means of transport, whose purchase often means expenses of about hundreds of millions or even milliards of euros or dollars. Moreover, services necessary for passengers and goods between transport points requires investments in infrastructure, equipment and other facilities.
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services, social issues or the geopolitical location\textsuperscript{31}. According to the same author, the \textit{internal vertical coordination} encompasses all activities related to the state transport politics, first of all creating appropriate conditions for the complementary character of particular transport types used to deliver goods to their destinations and ensuring appropriate competition in the market of transport services. Thus the potential of particular transport branches must be complementary to one another, to limit creating small throughput places (the so called bottlenecks\textsuperscript{32}) and it should ensure substitution opportunities\textsuperscript{33}, which means that there should not be single-branch systems.

According to the same author \textit{domestic external coordination} is directly connected with the state transport policy and involves striving for situations in which transport and its development meet the expectations of other economy sectors. Thus transport services should be available in all places where there are economic entities which need this type of services and so they need access to various transport networks. The need for such services should be balanced with

\textsuperscript{31} Ibidem, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{32} The term denotes an element or a place where throughput is limited, which leads to slowing down and interferences in traffic continuity. As a result external costs increase, e.g.: natural environment pollution growth, fuel consumption, machines and vehicles wear and tear, etc., in consequence overall transport costs grow. Most often such “bottlenecks” are: bridges, railway crossings, roads ingoing to cities, compact development, crossroads or wrong traffic organisation.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibidem, p. 28.

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appropriate volume of supply, i.e. sufficient quantity of available transport services. According to the author, this will be related to ensuring appropriate throughput in transport networks and, in the case of entities offering transport services, preparation of a significant number of differentiated means of transport and types of transport equipment, as well as ensuring appropriate quality of these services. The *international, external coordination* consists in adjusting domestic transport policy to transport systems in the European Union member states, i.e. it is strictly connected with the European Transport Corridors and should ensure fluent international traffic service for other states thanks to allowing transit\textsuperscript{34} across its territory.

The issue is presented from anther perspective by Potrykowski and Taylor (1982), who treat a *transport system* in a very general way, namely they claim that it encompasses various types of technical equipment, economic issues and organisations. The determinants mentioned here, according to these authors, must be interrelated with one another to allow feedback between them. This in turn should be used to organise and conduct the whole transport process, served by one or more transport branches\textsuperscript{35}, i.e. it should be strictly connected with the economics and organisation of transport activity. Yet another characteristics of a *transport system* is presented by

\textsuperscript{34} Ibidem, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{35} M. Potrykowski, Z. Taylor, op. cit., p. 12.
Karbowiak (2009), who states that it is a set of elements related to one another and the surroundings in such a way that relocation of people and loads is possible\textsuperscript{36}.

Thus a transport system, according to Jacyna (2009), can be defined as a system of technical, organisational and human elements connected with one another in a way which enables effective relocation of people and loads in time and space\textsuperscript{37}. This means that a transport system comprises such elements as: road, rail, air, water inland, sea or pipeline networks (transport infrastructure), fleets of vehicles and ships (suprastructure), service stations, railway stations, ports and stops and all equipment used to manage and control transport including human resources to serve them\textsuperscript{38}. Thus it has to be defined by the following elements\textsuperscript{39}:

- *activity purpose*, i.e. passenger mobility and loads relocation;
- *input determinants*, i.e. materials, power, machines and equipment necessary for the system to function, workforce, material resources, etc.;

\textsuperscript{36} H. Karbowiak, op. cit., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibidem, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{39} M. Mrozicka, *Materiały pomocnicze do nauczania przedmiotu „Systemy i środki transportu”*, www.wysockisw.ovh.org (27.03.2012).
- **equipment condition**, i.e. transport infrastructure and equipment\(^{40}\);
- **operating system**, i.e. activities necessary to conduct a relocation process;
- **human resources**, i.e. resources of professional knowledge, skills and experience;
- **output determinants**, i.e. mass of relocated loads and the number of transported passengers;
- **environment**, i.e. other national economy sectors, e.g. industry, civil engineering, agriculture, commerce, etc.;
- **interrelations** between particular elements of the system.

Therefore the transport system contributes to the creation of development incentives in the national economy, it may trigger the economy if it can meet certain goals, namely if it can ensure increased availability of transport services in time and space to allow to reduce costs of transport services and its time with simultaneous, steady improvement energy efficiency and reduction of individual emission indices, and also to contribute to the development of multimodality, safety increase for traffic participants and meeting basic needs and

\(^{40}\) *Transport equipment* – all types of vehicles used for various purposes (e.g. passenger and commodity transport, coaches and rolling stock). In inland water and sea transport it is called a *fleet* (e.g. passenger or commercial fleet).
expectation in the society\textsuperscript{41}. All this leads to the conclusion that the system is an essential factor in building a cohesive and effective transport system integrated with the domestic, European and global systems. It is also a natural step in the direction of a better use of the economic potential of the state. Without an efficient and well operating transport, it is not possible to increase the economic growth or improve development in international trade.

3. TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT POLICY

An important element in the transport system, without which the system cannot operate is transport infrastructure, it is a part of economic infrastructure\textsuperscript{42}. With reference to a transport system, infrastructure encompasses all basic, transport related elements of technical equipment, they are man made and have fixed location. Transport infrastructure is usually identified with social capital which is apart of both roads and other transport facilities\textsuperscript{43}. Transport infrastructure encompasses roads of all transport branches (roads, railways, airways, seaways, water inland routes and pipelines), transport points and other auxiliary equipment, used for road and transport points service. It is divided into linear (natural and manmade

\textsuperscript{41} Transport Development Strategy until 2020 (with a perspective until 2030), Ministry of Transport, Civil Engineering and Maritime Economy, Warsaw, 22 January, 2013, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{42} Infrastructure is generally divided into economic and social.
\textsuperscript{43} Transport facilities comprise, except for roads, also bridges, railway bridges, tunnels, overpasses, culverts, underground lines, railway lines, tramways, ports, airports, etc.
roads) and point transport infrastructure (transport points, seaports, airports, railway stations and logistics centres). Natural roads are mainly water inland routes and sea routes as well as air corridors, while manmade roads are all roads vehicle transport (motorways, express roads, national and local roads), busbars and local railways as well as pipelines for transport of liquids and gas, electric power transmission lines. Therefore it can be said that transport infrastructure is nothing else but all road, rail, water inland networks, sea motorways, sea and river ports, airports and other internal connection points between existing modal networks. It is extremely important in the economic policy of every country, because it triggers the economy as it increases investment attractiveness of particular regions. It can be said that the quality of the economy in a given country and its competitiveness largely depends of its infrastructure development. All this must be appropriately correlated thanks to well managed transport policy of the state, i.e. another issue which requires detailed characteristics of its meaning.

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45 In inland water and sea transport there are also some typical elements of manmade routes, such as canals with water gates and other hydrotechnical structures. Apart from this, in the case of navigable rivers there is constant human intervention to maintain their navigability (canalised, regulated and deepened rivers, etc.).
46 Decision No. 884/2004/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 29 April 2004, Art. 3, item 2; natural modal networks are connections between a few transport branches, frequently they are conventionally called combined connections.
In primary sources transport policy is not explicitly defined, so it is necessary to present a typology of selected definitions. Generally it may be assumed that this policy is part of general state economic policy of the state. A general understanding of this word is presented by Predhöl (1958), as “shaping” transport through activity of certain public and legal organisations and institutions. According to the same author, the main goal of transport policy is finding right proportions between transport development and needs resulting from general assumptions for national economy growth, it has to create incentives for economic growth in a particular direction. On the other hand, Bissing (1956) defines transport policy as “all state activity and ways of influencing the relocation process undertaken to maintain transport unity”. This unity, according to this author, is maintained when shipment tasks are shared among transport branches in such a way that there is a guarantee that transport needs will be met, and at the same time technical and economic requirements of carriers are met. Pirath (1949) presents yet another version of the definition of this notion, it is “care for maintaining the state and strengthening its economy by supporting its development and modernisation of transport facilities”. Therefore, he expresses an opinion that this policy is carried out by every state to maintain order in transport

50 C. Pirath, Die Grundlagen Verkehrswirtschaft, Berlin 1949, p. 3.
related issues being a part of the whole economy from the perspective of the whole society. This politics may also be viewed in the same way as Tarski (1970) did, namely as “state activity leading to achievement of particular economic benefits or even non-economic goals thanks to measures and means related to transport”\textsuperscript{51}, so he identifies transport policy with the internal and international politics of the state. On the other hand Piskozub (1975) claims that “transport policy is an activity which shapes the economic reality on the basis of general theories”\textsuperscript{52}, the basis of which the author attempts to find in transport economics.

According to the same author, the basic role of this policy is developing a uniform transport system through, e.g. coordination of transport development with selected other sectors of the national economy, coordination within particular sectors and coordination of connections between branches\textsuperscript{53}. The issue is interpreted in a similar way by Morawski (1978), who also defines this policy as state policy\textsuperscript{54}, however, its goal is ensuring proper availability of transport services for the society and the national economy\textsuperscript{55}, so in his considerations he refers to the basic task of this policy, namely ensuring throughput of

\textsuperscript{54} Uwzględnia również występujące w jej strukturach organy państwowe.
transport networks. This state can be achieved only if balance between transport demand and supply is guaranteed. According to the same author, transport policy can be defined as “a process of social choice between certain undertakings related to the development and operation of transport taking into account various assessment criteria”\textsuperscript{56}. These criteria may be, e.g. energy saving, social preferences, natural environment pollution, bottlenecks, availability of job markets or potential customers. Finally the definition of this notion developed by Grzywacz (1991), should be mentioned as well, in his interpretation, it is “programming the development of the transport system and impact on its efficient operation with regard for the requirements of theories and economic laws”\textsuperscript{57}, so he refers in his considerations to using models and research methods existing in transport economics\textsuperscript{58}.

**SUMMARY**

To summarize this analysis of notion related to the transport system one cannot remain immune to the claim that it is multi-criteria notion, as on one hand it describes points, lines, transport routes, so it characterises a transport network and presents dependencies

\textsuperscript{56} Ibidem, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{58} *Transport economics* – sector of economy dealing with issues related to economic activity in the transport sector.

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between them, on the other hand it indicates development directions for the state transport policy in terms of coordinated activities aiming at ensuring social and economic development. In the above mentioned definitions one can clearly see certain differences between authors who characterise this notion taking into account various dimensions and thus give it more extensive meaning. Therefore, the presented analysis unambiguously shows that speaking about the transport system, means a wide comparative spectrum of characteristics of various determinants and academic notions.

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RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS AND GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA.
PHENOMENON OF SPACE

Abstract:
In contemporary Russia some authors propose to build a new Eurasian empire that the spatially and strategically overcome the previous version – the Soviet Union. New empire therefore is proposed to be a „big-continental world perspective“. The are also opinions, suggesting that Russia’s energy should focus on restoring its territorial size.

Key words: Russia, geopolitics, space, Russian geopolitics, Russian mentality

Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian self-reflection conditions ranged between exaggerated overstatement of its own importance and inferiority complexes. This was reflected in Russian geopolitical thinking, reacting to the changed situation stormy ideological development and trying to apply it formulated conclusions.
in practical politics. Even today the Russian geopolitics ambitions to influence the decisions of Russian politicians. This is due to the reduction of spatial and demographic potential of Russia, which took place twenty years ago, and have had a significant negative impact on the feelings of a whole generation of Russians raised the awareness of the size of the image their own state. This note was a source of Russian national self-confidence and creating Russian determinant identity (see Mondry 2010).

Development of Russia's geopolitical thinking in the last twenty years is also apparent from the social order. On the basis of the Russian elite from the early 90’s last century seeks to formulate a new paradigm, which would explain the position and role of Russia in the world today, and outlined possible options for the future. Russian geopolitics seeks from his position to answer the question what is today Russia from a global perspective and what path should be issued after the trauma at the end of the last century.

Demand analysis of present and future problems of Russia's new geopolitical conditions, inspiring the amount of work that went in the title the word "geopolitics" and its derivative epithets. Focus was on and. and projects to outline Russia's return to the position of global power. One of the conditions for achieving this goal was considered the restoration of the territorial scope of the original route of the new
expansion. A. I. Mikhaylov (1999) called the Russian geopolitics in the late 20th century "ideology restore superpower status of the country."

The strength of Russia had always been associated with the control of a large area. Indeed, some authors speak of age-old Russians love the territories that formed during the historical development in the context of ensuring the existence of the Russian nation. It is therefore not surprising that in Russian (not only political) thought was a space issue has special significance. Therefore have several works of Russian thinkers and artists but significant geopolitical accents. According to E. Lewandowski (2004) determined the geography of Russian national character, though, like their native land space, or Russian soul knows no boundaries. In this far-reaching sense monotonous plains and boundless diaľavy in its infinite and supernatural are reflected in the image of the Russian soul.
Already in the Russian state of permanent collection of the Russian concept of countries (sobiraniye russkikh zemel'), which is the core of the territorial expansion of the Moscow of the Russian state. It was justified by uniting territories inhabited by Eastern Slavs - today's Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. This thesis, however, passed only in the mid-16th century, when it began to Russian expansion to the north and south, focused on the subjection of "non-Slavic" Areas (Vykoukal 2000).
American expert on Soviet (and Russian) issue of G. F. Kennan argued that after World War II, the Soviet Union still regarded as surrounded by enemies and confront this situation by expanding wants. In accordance with the Russian propaganda highlighted the boundless space of the Soviet state, but the lack of natural barriers on the borders. As stated R. Strausz-Hupe (1947) "in Russian foreign policy is dominated by a strategic factor, its objectives during the czarist and communist rule are the same: achieving strategic frontiers ...". Understood in this way - but understood differently - the border should eliminate the danger of enemy encirclement.

Reflections on the role of space in the life of Russian society led to an interesting view of the conclusion which mention D. N. Zamyatin (2002). According to him, the analysis of the history of Russia, it is appropriate to talk about geocracy even when not done itself, represents and interprets the manipulation through a defined area. In the case of Russia, it is not surprising, because the Russian state as a tool of power has always been a means of territorial expansion.

Finding the status and further development of Russia's roads created in the geopolitical thinking from the 90's the 20th century, several competing directions that competed with one another and compete. There is no doubt that in practical politics we find strong spatial emphasis, aiming to secure the territorial integrity of Russia and to strengthen its position in the post-Soviet space in Eurasia as
well as the world. V. Putin after two years in the presidency, said: "... we are a global power, not only because we have a great military and economic potential, but we have to do and geographic reasons. We are still physically present in Europe, Asia, the north and the south and everywhere we have some concerns."

**Phenomenon of space in Russian mentality**

Russian philosopher I. Ilyin brought into the Russian political thought, the concept of "burden of space." Based on the fact that vast territory, controlled by Russia was not only a sign of its great power status, but the size of Russia was also his undoing. The State has long carried its imperial burden, only to have the government paid close attention to the changing area of law only as a benefit in its own superpower status. It is significant that the Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov acknowledged that "... Russian tsars have won so many areas. We will now be easier for the fight of capitalism " (Gaidar 1995).

Vast Russian empire meant a huge burden for statehood Russian nation. As wrote philosopher N. Berdyaev (2003), "Russian nation has spent huge forces loss caused by the vastness of the Russian state." Colonization of large areas was a significant burden for the economy of the state as absorbing huge material and human resources, but also the mental energy of the population, especially the Russian state-forming nation.
As V. Veber writes (2001), the basic cause of the backwardness of Russia and the "Empire hypertrophy, excessive size that the state is incapable of doing. Keeping the growing empire and particularly to solve the problem of managing such a large territory was beyond the power of the Russian state over its economic potential. "It turns out that it was a tax is too high for great power behavior of the Russian ruling elite and the increasing Russian confidence. The emergence of the crisis in the global situation changed in the late 20th century was basically inevitable.

Efficient organization of vast areas should be provided in 1918 by autocracy (samoderzhavia). This form of government should be able to perform under certain conditions, not only the role but also ensure dissemination of the territory through its relentless expansion, which also justify the legitimacy of military force totalitarian empire and the nature of the ruling regime. In fact, this one should seek an alternative reason for questioning the application of liberal democracy in Russia. As he writes P. Juza (1999), “any type of consolidated democracy is relativized while maintaining current territorial form of Russia, which has historically formed exclusively imperial manner”.

Is known that the rate of expansion was Russian world unique. M. Švankmajer (1993) notes that since the early 17th century until the time of Stalin, Russian, or Soviet empire was expanding day by day over the 90 km². While in other countries expanding expansion ended
up after only a few decades, Russia expanded its own territory continuously since the Middle Ages up to 20th century. Like the process of European powers on other continents, and Russian expansion was primarily associated with the application of military force, often associated with scientific inquiry, which, however, was followed by a gradual colonization of the territory of the European part of Russia. Finally, the acquired territories began to consolidate government.

Explanation of the reasons for the expansion of the Russian state has been the subject of many considerations. According to N. I. Cymbayeva even some Russian politicians on this issue could not find an answer. "A true empire can not place limits its expansion is irrational" (Cymbayev 1997). Aptly in that spirit, expressed in his diary in 1865, Russian Interior Minister P. S. Valuev: "Tashkent conquered generals M. G. Tchernyev. Nobody knows why and what for. "Territorial expansion but has played in the lives of a large part of Russian society, as evidenced by the fact that it is the addition of collective and one of the pillars of Orthodoxy so. Russian ideas that emerged in the late 19th century (see Berdyaev 2003).

The analysis shows a number of other typical Russian thinking, quite surprising cause of Russian expansion. Linked to the statement of the Russian philosopher P. A. Chaadaev in 1836, according to which "... our country to have ever noticed it, had to be added from the
Bering Strait to the Oder "(Nolte 1992). In other words, according to him, the territorial size of the culvert between Russia only major country in the history of mankind. This statement follows the British historian N. Davies, who believes that "the greatest country in the world needed to feed a growing country and people to balance their sense of insecurity" (Davies 2000).

Russian expansion to the expansion of other countries differ mainly by their multi-way. Each course brought it to a new, often unrealistic and unrealized plans of conquest. So for example, during the reign of Catherine II. considered to extend Russia's geopolitical influence on the whole territory of the former Byzantium, the Balkans with the Orthodox population and the eastern part of the Mediterranean. The empress associated with its governance even conquering the whole of Europe.

Brake Russian expansion in the late 19th century was due to conflicts with more powerful opponents like the lack of plans for further action. Still, the anticipated acquisition of the Straits and Constantinople, considered the campaign in India and acquired more territory in the Pacific. We can therefore conclude that the Russian expansion to the end of the 19th century was pragmatic, as in this period sought (particularly in Asia) to avoid more conflicts and clashes. Moscow rulers behave very rationally and were willing to give up any goal, if it was possible to be too great a risk of expansion to shift to
safer areas. Some authors also point out that the Russian government is deliberately not strive to dominate the overseas territories. Here lies the difference between Russia and the European powers. They were originally formed as nation states, which expanded overseas, while the Russian empire are created in parallel with the Russian state in the inseparable historical process.

Despite stalled Russian expansion, or even retreat from Russia conquered the territory in the early 20th century, especially after World War I, the imperial policy is part of the political doctrine of the Soviet Union as the successor to Russia. Partially transformed only in terms of creating zones of influence, thus dropped from the direct connection to the Russian state. This resulted in a system of satellite countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

We can say that many problems associated with the load space is Russia still struggling despite the changed technological conditions. It should be especially noted the vast territory size effect on population density, which is uneven and the average low. In addition, each population too isolated and separated. As R. F. Turovsky writes (2005), "a clear picture of Russia's archipelago, consisting of hundreds of large and small cities, scattered amidst forest wilderness."

The people of Russia have always uninhabited contiguous territory, but lived separate and mutually self-sustaining remote communities and therefore lack of national feeling or national
belonging (Pipes 1998). To this may be added to the problems with the formation of regional identity, which is only a very Russia underdeveloped. The sparsely populated territory Asian part of Russia is so enhanced the macro-regional (Siberia), or local identity. These weaknesses and amplifies asymmetric ethnic structure significantly polycentrism developed and underdeveloped economy, which is unable to sustain its vast territory and population to an acceptable level of life.

Amplification of demographic pressure from the neighbors is one of the consequences of the mentioned features of the Russian territory. This is particularly the Far East, in relation to China. The area is not densely populated areas in Russia's Amur Region not comparable to the relatively high density of population in northeastern China. In addition to the lack of advanced communications network, as well as high transportation costs are forcing some Russian regions peripheral to seek economic contacts with neighboring states rather than the distant metropolis, as well as the Far East.

For problematic factor contributing to the load space can be difficult to treat and natural conditions, particularly climate, coupled with the significant complication suitability large part of the Russian territory for permanent settlement and economic exploitation. Creating conditions for the development of a modern economy and

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the creation of permanent settlements in some parts of Russia, particularly in the north, requires a high financial cost. This fact cannot be fully offset by a significant mineral resources and other natural resources.

As follows from the factors mentioned above, the solution of the problem of political control over a huge space has a specific meaning for Russia. Consisted in finding the optimal political system and create balance in relations between the center and regions in terms of expanding the territory and it was associated particularly with the need to control the vast empire from a single center. The recipe for the solution to be the centralization of power and intimidation of the population concerned local apparatus (Galeotti 1998). The power center was personified ruler, disposing of absolute power, relying on the spiritual and mystical irreplaceable role in Russian society.

The functioning of the vast empire thus depended on the relations between the center and regions. Until the early 20th century was dominated by the center this session, then the balance of power began to change in favor of the regions. This was reflected in the promotion of disintegrating tendencies, threatening territorial compactness Russian territory. The emergence of the Soviet Union did not mean their elimination. There was only to brake through the process of disintegration of some "cosmetic" changes. Such was the
transformation of the empire without »Russian« in its name" (Prôčková 1997).

In terms of the relationship of the Russian center and regions inevitably marked by constant efforts to expand the center and maintain territory. According Turovsky (2005) is incorporated in this respect the whole logic of the historical development of Russia as a spatial phenomenon. The definition of the optimal model of the relationship is stil one of the unsolved problems of Russia.

**Russian geopolitics in the context of Russia´s space**

As Z. Brzezinski writes (1999), "the vastness of the territory of Russia in Eurasia has been long predestined elite countries to consider in geopolitical terms." This is so even now, when the discussion on the geopolitical factors and the development of Russia status particularly intense and passionate. In the geopolitical considerations of Russia's focus is always awarded for the relationship between Russia and the territorial scope of the guidelines for its foreign policy, especially with a view to self-preservation and economic development.

History of Russian geopolitical thinking goes back to the 19th century, although geopolitical elements found in the works of Russian thinkers in the previous period. For the formulation of the first Russian geopolitical doctrines were used knowledges of history, geography, linguistics, ethnography, psychology, culturology, but also other sciences. Such a doctrine is like now focused on defining the place of
Russia in Eurasia and global scale, the formula for finding the next state and territorial development and foreign policy orientation as a great power. Geopolitical concept originated in the circles of scientists, especially philosophers, historians and geographers, but also geopolitical elements we find in the works of Russian writers and columnists. Spatial specifics of Russian landscape influenced the whole range of intellectual development in Russia. This was reflected in Russian thinking, not only in the context of science, but also art.

For the founders of Russian geopolitics can be considered historians. In writings on and in address the issue of the position of Russia in the world, even in the spatial context. In the context of the topic of this paper is need to concentrate on the work of historian and slavist V. I. Lamansky. He said that Russia should be universal state which dominate on most of the Europe and two fifths of the Asia. Its western boundaries will form a line joining the ports of Gdansk and Trieste. Russian empire would be ranging from Vienna to Beijing. Geopolitical approach, however, can also be found in works of art. Poet F. I. Tyutchev's poem "Ruskaya Geographiya" as he writes of the Eastern Empire, Eastern Roman Empire, which boundary extends to the west along the River Elbe.

The founders of Russian geopolitics may include geographer V. P. Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky. In his book, published in 1915, assigned to the Russian empire transcontinental type powers that ranged "from
sea to sea." Territorial integrity of Russian state does not interfere even Ural Mountains, which is seen as just as before, dividing Russia into two unequal parts. Pointed out, however, that the regions of Russia heterogeneity increases the risk of its desintegration. Despite this lack argued that Russia transcontinental nature makes it more powerful than the European colonial empires. This position must be fixed by building roads, consolidating compactness Russian territory and achieve the most equal siting. To meet this objective, it is necessary to create a network of cultural colonization centers in sparsely populated areas in the Ural Mountains, which serve as focal points of development of surrounding areas. He said Russia "is not necessary to distinguish Europe and Asia, but rather must seek to unite them into a single geographic entity ..." (quoted Eberhardt 2006).

Russian geopolitics I. I. Dusinsky in the book "Geopolitika Rossyi" in 1910 presented the view that the task of the immediate future for Russia's further territorial expansion. This creates the conditions for it to become an empire that will decide not only the fate of the Eurasian continent, but around the world. According Dusinsky important than the western borders of the Russian southern borders. In this respect, Russia should expand into Anatolia, Armenia and Kurdistan dominate the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Thus, the Black Sea became a Russian internal sea.
The reasoning of the natural definition of the Russian (Soviet) area contributed significantly Eurasian geopolitical school, developed in the environment of the Russian emigration in the interwar period. According to them, Russia's territorial unity and stability in nature had its borders and the state, which was in the very center of the Eurasian continent had become a natural unifier Eurasian continental space. Integrity vast territory of the Russian state is justified in creating a separate Eurasian civilization, distinct from the East and the West (Europe and Asia). So separate category was created Eurasian community, naturally concentrated around a common (Russian) state.

In the Soviet Union, the geopolitical thinking of not developing ideological reasons, although a number of his foreign policy decisions of the political elite based on geopolitical premises. The collapse of the Soviet Union was reflected in the rapid development of geopolitical ideas and produce a range of publications. The current Russian geopolitical thinking responds to a new situation in which he found himself post-Soviet space, particularly in Russia after 1992. This change requires the formulation of a new paradigm that would explain Russia's position in the world and its future prospects, including the territorial development. Already shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there were radical notions about restoring Russia's size. E.g. A Russian politician Ruckoi in 1994 said that the geopolitical situation of Russia "clearly shows that Russia is the only bridge
between Asia and Europe. Whoever becomes master of this space will become master of the world“ (quoted Brzezinski 1999).

Current neoeurasians who restored the original Eurasian geopolitical school, based on the notion that geographically, climatically, linguistically, culturally and religiously, Russia is a synthetic unity of the West Eurasian and East Eurasian. Russia is vast, but the natural services that significantly interferes with Europe and Asia, as well as "mediator" between East and West in terms of "bridge" between the continents. A. G. Dugin (1997), the most prominent representative neoeurázijstva, proposes to create a Eurasian empire, which should consist of four parts: the European empire (Germany and Central Europe), the Pacific Empire (centered in Japan), the Centralasian Empire (with its center in Iran) and the Russian Empire.

The current Russian author V. L. Cymbursky (2000) in his project „Island of Rossia“ (ostrov Rossia) was based on the vast expanses of the Russian state, which gives the requirements for the conclusion before the rest of the world. The condition for this is to increase the efficiency of the use of Russian territory and especially Siberia Siberia and the Far East Far East. The weakening of the position of Russia, according to him, due to his involvement in the space outside the civilizational platforms, particularly in the area of „between“ civilization of Europe, or let us say in Europe alone. Russia should
abandon efforts to restore the empire and its "global mission". It should focus exclusively on solving its own internal geopolitical problems. The main task of Russia is according Cymbursky close and focus on the intensification of settlement and the acquisition of its previously underutilized territories, which will strengthen the territorial integrity of Russia.

For some lines of contemporary Russian geopolitical thinking, especially neoeurázijcov is characterized by identification with the idea of "heartland" according to Russia's territorial synonyms. Russians are terrestrial, continental, Eurasian nation prone to integration and formation of a "special continental, Eurasian Community" (Dugin, 1997). It is therefore a nation that is natural and empire builder who during his creating, defense and dissemination of consolidated and matured. The adoption of the idea of "heartland" to help promote the idea of the necessity of maintaining a large, stable and integrated Russia.

Russian geopolitics seeks to contribute not only to explain the specifics of Russia and its mission, but also to maintain and consolidate its entirety, which is threatened from the early 20th century. This serves to internal geopolitics, which is “power-political analysis, useful for understanding the relationship between regions of different scales to each other and to the state as a whole“ (Ištok 2008). In the case of Russia, it is about convergence of two

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development trends: on the one hand, efforts to ensure the unity of the state, based on the legal homogeneity throughout its territory, and on the other hand, the need to maintain the ethnic and economic sovereignty of Federation entities, which create a heterogeneous regional-political structure. It is significant that when M. S. Gorbachev understood that the internal security threat of the Soviet Union greatly exceeds the terms of the importance of foreign threats, as well as from the aspect of possible consequences for the integrity (Gadzhiev 2000). Even now, in the Russian geopolitical thinking approaches developed just inside geopolitics.

**Explanation of the size of Russia in the Russian geopolitical thinking**

Reflections on the causes of Russia's development into an area of the largest government department in the world are just a natural part of the work of Russian historians, but also geopolitics. Russian A. E. Vandam at the beginning of the 20th century presented the state as a biological organism to ensure its existence must absorb a new territory. If the state does not extend the territorial, threatened with decline and extinction. In the case of Russia, supported its expansion to the south and east.

For Russia, it is significant that provides justification for the expansion of the Russian concept of the „Third Rome“ (*tretyi Rim*) which was formulated by monk Philoteus in the turn of the 15th and
16th century. Russians supported the messianic mission to protect all Orthodox nations. The concept of the „Third Rome“ (*tretyi Rim*) necessarily included in the geopolitical element itself, which consists in significant reasoning of the Russian state as a unifier of Orthodox Nations (Kolossov - Mironenko 2001). Moscow as the „Third Rome“ (*tretyi Rim*) should be at the center of the newly created extensive empire that would arise through joining the Russian regions. This belief has become a defining part of Russian identity.

Unification Russian regions might start to defeat the Mongols, the Russians had naturally taken by Mongolia role conquerors huge area stretching from Eastern Europe to the Far East. Maybe you agree with the view that the concept of the "Third Rome - tretyi Rim" superpower has created the identity of the Russian nation and the absolutism contributed to stability, the strengthening of the Russian Orthodox Church and the nation. It also justified the expansion of Russia as the third universal empire after the fall the Roman Empire and the Byzantium Empire (Eberhardt 2006).

Russian geographer V. P. Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky, claimed that it is the process of "space combat", which is the most important historical process. This applies of course principally Russia, the development of the liberation from Mongol domination rooted in territorial expansion. In this context, the Russian geopolitics highlights the fact that at the beginning of its existence, the Russian nation was
on the plane, open on all sides. Country not except the northern Arctic regions of natural boundaries, which could serve as a natural barrier to the outside threat. This was particularly steppe areas in the south southeast. Therefore, it was necessary to look for natural barriers that define the natural boundaries of Russia.

This approach previously presented by historian M. N. Karamzin, who wrote of the need to shift the Russian borders the sea-coast as a natural barrier in all geographic directions. The main task of the Russian state was in his continuous territorial expansion as an essential attribute of a great power is the control of a large territory. Subordination to a new territory is therefore entirely natural phenomenon and reflects positively on the strength of the state. Russia was strong because it was huge.

Geographical and geopolitical predisposition (inland location on the plane and threats from neighbors) bring to the Russian foreign policy three fundamental questions, which had a successful solution to transform Russia into a world power, and also because it has been associated with huge territorial gains. These issues were:

- Northern issues which consisted in achieving the longest coast of the Baltic Sea,
- Western issue, which was seen as a question of national reunification under old Russian territory of the former Kievan Rus'
- Eastern question, under which relations with the Eastern understanding, but also southern neighbors, and whose solution was a key prerequisite for the survival of the Russian state (Duleba 2000).

Russian politician G. Zyuganov (1997) speaks of three problems whose solution was necessary for the existence of Russia:

- The need to provide access to the Baltic Sea, and thus breaking of the Western “cordon sanitaire“.
- The need to ensure access to the Black Sea and thus breaking of the South “cordon sanitaire“.
- The need to ensure the security of Russia in the Caucasian-Central Asia strategic direction of civilization fracture between Slavic-Orthodox and the Turkish-Islamic civilization.

Russia was thus "organism, always forced to self-defense", while its rightful form was to achieve natural boundaries, which correspond to the interests of the Russian state security. For these borders so they can be considered for Russia and coastal oceans separating Eurasia from the rest of the world.

In addition to the absence of natural boundaries are creating the Russian state surrounded by hostile neighbors who belonged to the other civilizations and did not hide desire for control over territories, inhabited by the Russian people. Russia reacted very sensitively to the neighborhood of another strong power and therefore its limits trying to move away from its central area and thus
face the danger of attack from the outside. However, this process does not eliminate the risk, in turn, created new threats in the form of a new conflict.

Russian geopolitical thinking responded well to break Russia's expansion during the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century. Russian state definitively became one of the world centers of power. Russian expansion met with economic power and the limits of the Russian state. Consummation of the territorial development in the form of dominance in Central Asia and the lack of progress in the Far East meant that the geopolitical concept of development of the Russian state began to focus on other tasks up to date. This was mainly to ensure effective political control and power over a territory of the Russian Empire. Dominant in this context was to maintain access to the Baltic Sea, as well as control of Ukraine, Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and the territory to the east of it. This objective has managed to meet until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Further expansion of Russian territory was not necessary. Continued expansion westward in the mid-30th and 40 the 20th century in the Russian geopolitical thinking understood as a continuation of the "gathering of the Russian countries" that have been lost especially after the defeat in the war with Poland in 1920, or as acquiring territories that contribute to strengthening the security of the country (border westward movement before World War II).
In addition to efforts to obtain "natural" borders Russia sought access to warm, so warm-water sea. This role is an essential part of the definition of safe conditions for the existence of the Russian state. It developed in the early 20th century A. Y. Snesaryov, who championed the idea of dominating the Indian Ocean to the south from Central Asia.

Expansion of Russian territory was thus under the above interpretations completely natural process, the result of a struggle for a decent existence of the Russian nation and the state. Thus, Russia has become (not only from the territorial point of view) completely without power in its discretion, under the influence of objective geographical, geo-strategic and geo-historic times. They are simply formed by territorial acquisition without power, without the guaranteed control over a huge area of Eurasia was not possible existence of the Russian state.

In connection with the expansion is necessary to mention the subjection of ethnic groups that lived in the conquered territories. View of geopolitics and Russian historians to this question is often presented as a voluntary subjection of Russian domination. Russia therefore, under this approach does not get as colonizer. The mentality of the Russian people did not place at the expense of other life. Moreover, according to many thinkers of the Russian leadership understood that if the non-Russian peoples oppressed, they can not
keep within the Russian Empire as a result of its huge size and limited resources. Russian expansion did not directed overseas, was not linked to disrupt the traditional Russian culture and statehood was far radical forms of nationalism (Podoprigora - Krasnopevceva 1995).

The Russians could not be colonizers, were colonists. Russian historian V. O. Klyuchelevskoy wrote that colonization is a cornerstone of Russian history (cit. Johnson 1998). This colonization was first enforced, then voluntary. From the above it can be concluded that one of the main causes of the Russian expansion can be „hungry for land“. It resulted from the fact that Russia is considering the geographical conditions and primitive agriculture still needed new land.

Russian expansion was, according to some opinions mainly Russian civilizational sense. Unlike other powers was not a utilitarian quest for colonies, or banal battle for "living space". Russia expanded its national territory as carriers of special missions in accordance with their deep understanding of the need for unification of the vast Eurasian space. According to M. N. Karamzin Russian expansion brought considerable benefit conquered territories, because they have become part of a well organized state with a strong central government. This civilizational task was interpreted as decisive for raising the level of ethnic groups subjected to whom the Russian colonization brought new development opportunities (Baar 2005).
This argument was used to legitimize the Russian government over large non-Russian territories.

**Conclusion**

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the diminishing role of the Russian state, whose symbol was the reduction of its size and lack of control over non-Russian territories of the former empire. Although this contributed to a change in the mentality of the Russians and the Russian crisis of identity. While the Western colonial powers after decolonization had problems with its own historical and national identity in the case of Russia, the situation is different. The concept of law and the notion of empire overlap and therefore post-Soviet Russia was to search for a new state ideology to define their own identity.

This stems from the significant importance of the spatial factor, deliberately cultivated in creating an identity of the Russian nation. This led to the mythologizing if its laying down a position in the Russian political culture (Potulski 2010). This was reflected in the Renaissance perception of the Russian nation as a community, which is intended to carry globally unique historical mission. Critical access to thesis which supporting this way the formation of the Russian consciousness is found in only a few works of Russian authors whose mention in the text of this article.

Russia still reconciled with problems not only with the collapse of the Soviet empire. Result is precluding the possibility of losing even
a small area, even at a time when sharply reduces the importance of the immediate political and military control of vast territories. The problem was and still is the perception of the former Soviet republics as sovereign states. This factor influenced the emergence of the term "near abroad" (blizkoye zarubezhie), which marked the post-Soviet countries have a special place in Russian foreign policy.

The balance of the current status of Russia attempted Russian geographer A. I. Treybish. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about by him not only for Russia's geopolitical losses, but also profits. For cons should be considered as a return to the borders of the early 17th century (in the west), and the early half of the 19th century (in the Caucasus region or central Asia). Russia lost a large area of geopolitical influence, created numerous Russian minority for Russian borders and the number of the generated voltage at its borders and in their vicinity. Be seen as positives retain control of vital natural resources, preservation approaches to the Black and Baltic Sea and direct contacts with the developed countries and the stabilization feature unique transit corridor in Eurasia (Kolossov - Mironenko 2001).

The collapse of the Soviet Union is seen as a crime against the great Russian nation, "which over the centuries with enormous sacrifice and loss collected, the department defended a huge state," which has become a "guarantor of global geopolitical equilibrium and guarantee the security of all nations Eurasian continent“ (Zyuganov
1997). For today's Russia is an important fact that the former multi-ethnic empire (including the Soviet Union) was perceived as the Russian state and its history was primarily a history of Russians (testicular 1996). Therefore, for many Russian thinkers not present a full Russian Federation Russian State.

According to A. G. Dugin (1997) is the current Russian Federation only temporary service in a rapidly changing global geopolitical process. Thus, Russia today, according to some Russian authors is again before three huge tasks that deal began in the 17th century. Now, however, does not have to meet them three hundred years, as it was during the framing of the Russian Empire. Presentation expansion plans aimed at restoring Russia's size proves that the fascination with space in Russian thinking was far from over.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, while maintaining Russia's position as the largest country in the world, but stayed the territorial continuity of its geopolitical core (or axis). This core, according to A. Duleba (2000) has developed several centuries and located in Europe and Asia runs from the mouth of the Danube along the Black Sea coast, including Crimea east through eastern Ukraine and central Russia in the east, which stretches along the two railway arteries to the Far East, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Restoring the status of Russia as a global power is therefore related to the renewal of...
territorial continuity of the core. In this context, it is particularly alarming loss of Ukraine.

For Russia has by some authors to build a new Eurasian empire that the spatially and strategically overcome the previous version, which was the Soviet Union. New empire therefore "must be Eurasian, and big-continental world perspective" (Dugin, 1997). Such reasoning is consistent with the thesis that Russian expansion "must take place in any rational international political circumstances, and considering their own options and possibilities of any opponent it played little role. ... Russia ... must either expand or perish ..." (Luňák - Pečenka 1996).

Opinions, suggesting that Russia’s energy should focus on restoring its territorial size can not be considered dominant in Russian (only) geopolitical thinking. E.g. by A. Bovin (1998) is the only chance for the Russians in terms of the new global situation to overcome deep-rooted complex of imperial power and to participate in creating a multipolar order, in the creation of stable relationships and to avoid conflicts, which would be incompatible with the interests of Russia. The author points out that the violence spread to the territories of the Russian Empire, which was inhabited by different ethnic and cultural well capable defenses have been one of the causes of its decline.

As in the past, and today Russia is therefore seeks to define. This stems from the belief that it had assigned a special mission, which is associated with a special spiritual destiny. In this connection it
should be noted that Russia saw itself as a separate country, not only geographically, but mostly mentally. Russians themselves mystified its peculiarity and made its message. This message is a myth about the size and vastness of the Russian landscape, which has persisted to the present day and also affected the Russian geopolitical thinking. In connection with the Russian state so dominated psychology major country with frequent use of communication as "one sixth of the world", "territory without borders", "unlimited source of raw materials," and so on., Which were presented in the press and electronic media.

Russian space problem will still attract the attention of researchers in many disciplines. Doing so may not always agree with the Russian geographer Y. L. Pivovarov (1992), according which all heterogeneity in the huge territory of the country and its particularity, large differentiation of the population, economy and nature is Russia "synthetic world consisting of many nations, cultures, religions, like boiler, which washed out a new substance people."

Russia is still the largest state of the world and its dimensions can be compared with the continents. It also is among the most populous country on the planet. These factors, along with its military might predispose its power position in the world in the near future. The question is how to reconcile the change in its global geopolitical situation.
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JOACHIM LELEWEL’S GEOGRAPHICAL IDEAS AND HERITAGE

Abstract

During the IGU Congress in 1934 held in Warsaw there was presented the project of new international scientific organization, namely Joachim Lelewel Society, which was to deal with history and philosophy of geography. Unfortunately this decision was not carried into effect because of incoming global conflict and World War II that disabled the necessary friendly contacts between potential members.

Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861) was one of the most important founders of history of geography. This field was his inspiration and source of research interests. Lelewel understood that the condition of geography's development is both the increase in theoretical concepts necessary to comprehend and describe the Earth surface, and the extension of geographical horizon due to exploration. According to his views, the pure description and map making is not sufficient to be called geography. This is because geography is a special kind of knowledge which embraces all the terrestrial phenomena, and this could be substantiate on the basis of history of geographical ideas. Moreover, an exact recognition of geography's development is the best basis for future research. Lelevel has expressed his philosophy of the field mainly in his works concerning the development of ancient
and medieval geography. Those works gave him respect of such known persons like Karl Ritter, Hermann Wagner or Lucien Gallois.

The purpose of this short paper is to show the Lelevel's main ideas and concepts concerning the essence of geography. This is necessary since this XIXth century scholar, who became the patron of the international scientific society, remains rather not known among contemporary scientists. The additional aim is to show, that his original ideas could be useful from the point of view of contemporary geographical problems and interests.

Keywords: Joachim Lelewel, history of geographical thought, philosophy of geography, geographer, historical geography
1. Origin, early years, education and professions of Joachim Lelewel

Joachim Lelewel’s origin roots back to the Astrian noble family von Loelhöffel. His ancestors moved to Prussia in the seventeenth century, to save their property before the Ottoman invasion. They obtained Prussian citizenship under the name Loelhöffel von Löwensprung. Lelewel’s grandfather Heinrich moved to Poland and was a professor at the universities of Vilnius and Warsaw. His father Karl Loelhöffel von Löwensprung became Polish royal treasurer. He received Polish citizenship with the change of the name to Karol Lelewel\(^2\) (Więckowska, 1980).

After finishing school run by the Piarist Order in Warsaw, Lelewel studied mathematics, natural history, geography and the classics at the University in Vilnius since 1804 (Janeczek, 2005). Young

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2 Pronunciation: lelevel.
Lelewel was highly influenced by his professor of ancient literature Godfryd Ernest Groddeck. He inspired Lelewel to research ancient geography, as well as to search for texts focused on Slavic and Baltic lands in the works of ancient Greek and Roman geographers, and then also among the works of the Arabs. After graduating in 1808 he launched the first lectures in Poland on the history of geography in Krzemieniec College. A few years later he moved to Warsaw, where he took a job as a curator of the library, and was a member of parliament. In 1815, he became a member of the Friends of Sciences Society in Warsaw. He was also the founder of a scientific and literary journal “Tygodnik Wileński.”

In 1820 he received his doctorate at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. In 1821 he moved back to Vilnius, where he worked as a history professor at Vilnius University. However, due to his anti-Russian views, he lost his job in 1824. He was already well known and famous (Janeczek, 2005).

After returning to Warsaw he continued his political activities and scientific research. During the November Uprising, he served as Minister of Religious Affairs and Enlightenment of Poland. After the fall of the uprising he went on exile to Paris, where they expelled him in 1833 for his political activities. Then he settled in Brussels, where he

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3 The Vilnius Weekly.
lived in voluntary poverty, while devoting himself to scientific research until his death in 1861 (Olszewicz, 1967).

2. Achievements

The main Lelewel’s areas of interest were global geography and history. However he also dealt with politics and cartography.

In the field of science, to his merits belongs that, he is the first who calculated the middle of European continent. It lies between Bialystok and Vilnius accordingly (Zawadzka, 2008). Lectures and works created by him, so called Lelewel’s School, focused on geographical and historical processes, had a major impact on the development of Polish science and education (Więckowska, 1980). Other well-known geographers, such as Alexander von Humboldt, who wrote about Lelewel as "erudite of historical geography" (von Humboldt & Ideler, 1836, p. 395), relied and based on his works. Karl Ritter, was fascinated by Lelewel’s research and translated some works of Lelewel to German, his native language. Skelton who compared ancestors of historical geography: Lelewel, Jomard and Santarém with each other, pointed the Pole as a main researcher. In Skelton’s words: "...of three scholars, it was Lelewel, working with demonic energy and near fanaticism, who provided his atlas with the most penetrating and complete accompanying text, to which the map reproductions are subsidiary” (Skelton, 1972, p. 53). Lelewel’s works are still valid today. Rzepa believes that "at the present time, Lelewel’s
works are a starting point for research in the fields of the history of geographical thought, cartography and historical geography as well” (Rzepa, 1980, p. 105). In addition, Lelewel created a huge collection of books, maps and atlases. He wrote about it to his brother in one of his letters: „neither the Warsaw Library (...) nor the old Vilnius Library has ever had such a collection as I have put together” (Lelewel, 1878-1879, p. 360). It was partially destroyed and plundered by the Red Army’s pillaging units in 1939 (Mikoś, 1984). The Lelewel’s unique skills and knowledge were described by contemporary Polish poets like Adam Mickiewicz in a poetic composition “Do Joachima Lelewela”⁴ (Mickiewicz, 1822).

Knowledge, wisdom and charismatic personality gave Lelewel an incredible political support, especially among young people rebelling against the contemporary political situation. He expressed his views in a deep Polish patriotism and promoted republican views. His republicanism, however, had not originated either from the achievements of the founding fathers of the United States, nor in the ideologues of the French Revolution. He proclaimed his own view based on the need for rehabilitation and return to the medieval Polish tradition of Slavic-based selfgoverning rallies. With these views in 1824 he was sentenced to lose the title of professor. Furthermore, his brilliant career as a politician was ruined by the fall of November

⁴ Tribute to Joachim Lelewel.
Uprising (1830-1831). During the uprising he was a member of the Administrative Council and the National Government. At that time he founded the Patriotic Society - a radical republican party with a very progressive program of social reforms. As its head he held in Warsaw a huge demonstration in honor of the Decembrists in January 25th, 1831. Probably he is an author of famous revolutionary motto of that period "For our freedom and yours." On October 5th, 1831, along with other leaders of the uprising, he fled from the occupied country, and never returned. In Switzerland, along with others, on the framework of Pan-Slavic ideas, he created an informal movement of Polish democratic-republicans. It was called "Young Poland" and he became its leader. This organization was associated with the "Young Europe" of G. Mazzini. In addition he became a head of the Union of the Polish Emigrants Organizations in 1837. The main political achievements of Lelewel include, inter alia, a succesful organization and management of the first huge pan-Slavic Congress in Prague during the so-called Spring of Nations in 1848 (Chrzanowski, 1946).

Lelewel was also a major contributor to the development of cartography. He created more than 250 maps, primarily of historical geography of antiquity and the Middle Ages. He was the first, who collected and described geographical knowledge of ancient and medieval geographers and explorers, adding to that work his own maps. His research was a broad synthesis of the geographical horizons development in those eras. The biggest Lelewel’s work is *Geographie*
It is five volumes of research work in the field of cartography. The first one, dealing with this as single scientific discipline, and its sources, derived from antiquity, describing the evolution and regression periods in development. The main theory of this work was that that the Arabs, based on their precise astronomical observations, and the Italians and Catalans thanks to the widespread use of the magnetic needle independently reached a very high level in the art of drawing maps. The proof of this theory was mentioned above. It was the world's first collection of ancient and medieval maps and comparative analysis of influences, similarities, and borrowings. Lelewel showed the relationship between ancient Greek maps, and medieval Arabic ones. He also proved the independent development of the Catalan and Italian medieval cartographical schools (Mikoś, 1984).

3. Lelewel's ideas and their impact on geography

Joachim Lelewel was an advocate of geographical and historical research involving both, an empirical approach and philosophical interpretations. It enhanced the traditional scientific study by perceptions and awareness of the researcher. Such view was based on the contemporary theories of knowledge of Kant, Ferguson, Rousseau, Herder, and Fichte. But various forms of whole-sensory

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5 Geography of Middle Ages.

WILCZYŃSKI, P. L., Joachim Lelewel’s geographical ideas and heritage, EJG, 1, 2013, pp. 95-108.
knowledge acquiring, as a method of research, were mainly an exponent of Immanuel Kant's thoughts. Konigsberg philosopher and his theory was fiercely defended by Lelewel in a polemic with Jan Śniadecki, Polish philosopher, mathematician, astronomer and geographer. Therefore, he regarded that geographical methodology should have been based on Kant's epistemology and the idea of synopsis. Lelewel claimed that the geographical study should be based on all fields of knowledge. Analyzing regional classical literature, the religious studies, jurisprudence, and even mapping numismatics, and all other fields at the same time was the most proper way of geographical research according to Lelewel, and philosophical thought of Kant. It should also be pointed out that Lelewel did not use only geography, because there is no division between geography, history and other sciences, all treated synthetically, according to the Kantian paradigm. Kant's epistemology, which disseminated among scholars of that period, is visible in almost all Lelewel's works (Janeczek, 2005).

Joachim Lelewel - undoubtedly the most influential Polish geographer of the early nineteenth century, an erudite scholar and a noble man, was also a world-famous developer of the history of geography and historical geography. According to the above statement, there is one of the most important Lelewel's expressions that can be found in the preface to his first published work on historical geography: "the main considerations which must be
addressed in the history of the geography are not only discoveries, but any ideas and ways of describing recognizable lands” (Lelewel, 1814). He was the author of many geographical books. He made geography much more popular. And he was a famous cartographer too (Zawadzka, 2008)

Lelewel’s thought in geography is giving emphasis on the history and geography synthesis. This Lelewel-shaped concept was introduced in the first of his geographical works (Więckowska, 1980). Synthetic thinking in geographical research, which originated from Kantian epistemology, could be considered while reading his works. Lelewel didn’t despise even the poetry, often regarding it, as a geographical description. Especially when he analyzed ancient works, he must have looked for not only maps and their descriptions, but also all other possible sources of information. His publications such as *Geographie du moyen âge* is still a valuable source of knowledge not only about European geography in the period presented there, but also the geography of the Arabs. He published numerous articles in journals in German, French and Russian languages. This scientific activity caused that such personalities as Ritter, von Humboldt, Wagner, and Gallois regarded him as great man and respectable geographer, even though their views on the geography were not always the same.

Since Lelewel’s death, works on the history of geography and historical geography have progressed far forward in different
countries. Some of his theories have fallen. However large part of them still remains valid. On the eve of World War II, there was unanimously adopted resolution, during the International Geographical Union Congress held in Warsaw, to establish a scientific association of historical geographers and historians of geography, called “The Lelewel Society.” There was no surprise among those present on the proposed denomination. The war not allowed to complete the project. After the conflict, Lelewel and his heritage became increasingly forgotten (Olszewicz, 1967).

Currently, Lelewel and his works on historical geography are not too well known in the world. Although his ideas begin to experience a renaissance. The evidence of this process is advertising the Lelewel patronage for facilities devoted to science and education, as the room in the library of Vilnius University, and numerous primary and secondary schools. Besides, the pre-war International Geographical Union project is completed, and “The Lelewel Society”6 is set up (Wilczyński, 2009). This illustrates the return of the scholar and his concepts towards geography at a time when this branch of science is looking for new ways of development.

6 See: www.lelewel.pl
4. Appendix: the most influential works of Joachim Lelewel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Original title</th>
<th>English title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Place of publication</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1814</td>
<td><em>Pisma pomniejsze geograficzno-historyczne</em></td>
<td>Minor geohistorical writings</td>
<td>Karol Lelewel</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td><em>Badania starożytności we względzie geografii - część naukowa</em></td>
<td>Research on ancient geography – scientific part</td>
<td>J. Zawadzki – typograf Imperatorskiego Uniwersytetu,</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**References**


Andrej Kreutz

Russian Problem: Russia’s Place in the World – An Attempt at Historical and Geopolitical Analysis

Abstract

Despite all these internal and external challenges, the Russian Federation is still preserving its independent statehood. It has largely stabilized its borders and even achieved substantial economic progress, though this is mainly based on oil and gas exports. The present international situation of the country is undoubtedly difficult, but in my view probably more promising than ten years ago. Along with the threats and challenges, there are now some more positive and promising trends of development.

Keywords: Russia, Eurasian studies, geopolitics
I. Introduction: A Long Western Debate and Its Political Consequences

Although Russia has been part of the European system since the Westphalian Treaty of 1648, and after its victory in the Northern War with Sweden and the Nystad Treaty in 1721 started to be seen as one of the major powers on the continent, both its internal nature and its role in international politics have often suffered Western doubts and uncertainties. Along with Eastern Problem of the declining Ottoman Empire and German Problem of unification, and the political future of this country, there has also existed (though not admitted) Russian Problem which was felt in Europe for a long time, and after that also in North America. While both the Eastern and German Problems, at least in their traditional forms, belong to history, the issue of the place and role of Russia in the global international system still remains one of the major unsettled challenges of the era.

Disregarding its changing political forms and official ideologies, Russia has always been perceived by the European nations, and later by the Americans, as an “other”, strange, potentially hostile and unpredictable country. Winston Churchill expressed these things in his famous statement, calling Russia “a riddle wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”, and similar opinions have been and still are expressed by numerous Western scholars and politicians. Even now, post-Communist Russia, where previously unknown political and
economic freedom exists, and which is largely open for foreign capital activity, is still treated as a country on probation with all sorts of suspicions and condemnations. Its general picture which is usually presented to the Western public is predominantly bleak and negative, and all its prospects are viewed as really gloomy. During the last two years, especially during and after the recent Russian parliamentary and presidential elections, the media and information warfare against this country seemed to be reminiscent of a “paradigm of Russophobic rage”¹ in Britain in the time of the Spring of the People in 1848.

II. Historical Background and the Issue’s Origins

Because of its Euro-Asian location, its continental size, its rather unusual history, and its brilliant but complex culture, Russia in fact substantially differs from the other European nations. Due to its long historical development, rich cultural background and the fact that its inhabitants, including its numerous ethnic minorities, are living in their ancestral homelands, and by and large are preserving their own historical identities, it also differs greatly from the US and similar settlers’ nations, which have been built by the Europeans in the new continents. Largely because of that Russia’s relations with the West were always prone to be full of political conflicts and misunderstanding which were apparently difficult to avoid. In

addition, there were probably three major reasons for their long standing alienation.

1) The first, and from an historical point of view the oldest, was isolation from Europe and Western development of the Russian lands lasting more than three centuries. The German historian Eduard Winter argued that Muscovy had left Europe when it fell under the Mongol Tatar yoke in the first part of the 13th century, but “once again became a full partner in the European association of nations” in the second part of the 15th century. At that time, it had regained its independence and the Grand Duke Ivan III’s marriage to the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI, Zoe Paleologue, signified Moscow’s acceptance as a European power. However, Professor Winter was too optimistic in his judgement. Russia’s route to Europe and the Western community was going to be much longer and probably still has not been completed. There were at least four other obstacles to that.

2) Religion. Russia was Christian but an Eastern Orthodox nation, and in contrast to Germany and Poland, it received its religion not from Rome but from Byzantium. Relations between the two major branches of Christianity, Eastern and Western, sharply deteriorated from the 11th century and even more so after the conquest of Byzantium by Crusaders in 1204. The political and
cultural implications of that were long-lasting and also had a major impact on the development of their nations and their mutual relations.

3) The third and probably the most important reason were Russia’s geopolitics and what was related to it, the political and socio-economic situation in the country. It had always been a huge country with, relative to its size, a sparse population and a very harsh climate. Being located on the East-European lowlands, it was exposed to numerous invasions from the East and the West, and yet, in spite of all these adversities, Russia was the only non-Western and in some way non-European empire “to remain a powerful independent world historical state throughout the modern period”\(^3\). According to an American historian, “Russia accomplished this remarkable feat... because of a highly effective, durable and resourceful political system-autocracy”\(^4\) which allowed the Russian ruling class to pursue an alternative path to early modernity\(^5\). The country had not thus been a part of the West as it was established in the medieval and early modern period, and expanded after that to some other parts of Europe, such as Poland and to the newly discovered parts of the world. At the same time it was still a Christian country and in spite of its’ backwardness compared with Western nations, it had a
centralized and efficient political system which enabled it to mobilise a substantial military power if needed. For those two reasons, it was difficult to treat Russia in the same way as the Western explorers treated indigenous populations in America, Africa, India or Australia. In addition, because of its geography and extreme climate, for the most part it was not practical to think about conquest and direct subjugation in the same way as for many non-Western peoples of the era.

As an outcome of that Russia was for a long time left in somewhat grey area and lacking determined legal and political status. It was neither fully accepted or an equal partner nor rejected and submitted to a direct Western control and this situation contributed to dislike and fear of Russia in Europe. The French scholar and clergyman Chappe d’Autoroche, who travelled throughout Russia in 1760, wrote that “in France people expected her to overrun our little Europe, like Scythians and Huns. Hamburg and Lubeck trembled of her name. Poland and Germany considered Russia as one of the most formidable powers in Europe.” However, according to French visitor Western fears of Russia were unfounded. Both the country itself and its army were socially too backward and devoid of proper training and equipment to be able to present any real threat to the more developed European powers. The case of Poland and its forthcoming partition was a special one because as L’Abbe Chappe noticed “The
sovereign there was without authority and state without defence, and it was open to any invader. Nevertheless such a fear still persisted for centuries and contributed to the perception of Russia as a problem. On the Russian side, the situation of long lasting social and material backwardness in relations to the Western nations was also causing fear and mistrust of the more developed, powerful and by no means friendly nations. As a result Russian relations with the West have often been tense and unpredictable and Russian Problem has continued for centuries.

III. Post-Soviet Russia’s Challenges and Its Quest for Identity and Survival

Even after the collapse of the USSR and losing one sixth of its territory, half its economy and more than half its population, it is still the largest country in the world, covering 17,075,400 km². It spreads out from the Polish borders in North-Central Europe to China and the Pacific Ocean in the East, and from the Arctic Ocean to the Caucasus Mountains in the South. The geographical configuration of the country is unusual, as 25% of it is located in Europe and 75% in Asia. So overall the country has always been sparsely populated, and as an outcome of the bloody events of the wars and the costs of the socio-economic transformations, it is still in an unprecedented demographic crisis.
However, Russia still has about 140 million inhabitants, 78% of whom are living in its European provinces. Being located on the Eurasian lowland and devoid of any natural boundaries, the country has been invaded many times and has probably suffered more than any other nation because of its human and material destruction, the most important of which resulted from World War II, during which Russia suffered more than 20 million military and civilian casualties. The memory of that has never been forgotten and has had an indelible impact on the Russian social consciousness, and present day Russia still needs to find its way towards internal development and its proper place in the international system.

During the last two decades, all efforts in these directions have been difficult, and there are still many impediments to reaching a more promising future. In my view there are at least three main causes for that. The first and probably the most important one is the social situation in Russia itself, where the neo-capitalist reforms after the late 1980s destroyed the social safety net which had existed before and led to enormous socio-economic gaps between the small wealthy minority and the impoverished majority.¹⁰

The level of social stratification in Russia is one of the highest in the world, and at present 30% of all the wealth of Russian households belongs to the billionaires. At the same time, according to the Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat), 18 million, which is almost 13% of
Russia’s population, live below the poverty line, and the ratio of the average income of the most affluent to the least affluent 10% has grown from 4.5:1 in 1990 to 16.5:1 in 2012. Although after 2000 Vladimir Putin brought some improvements to this critical situation, and his appeal to Russian nationalism and his opposition to American encroachment made a positive impression on many people in the country, the social problems aggravated by the recent economic crisis have not been solved, and this has resulted in widespread discontent and lack of confidence in the future. It seems obvious that without more hope and mobilization of social energy by the majority, the country will not be able to move forward and stand up against its external threats.

Another important new cause of internal social tension are the political aspirations of the Russian bourgeoisie (upper middle class or creative class) which was recreated during the last 20 years and now seems to be much stronger and more self-confident than 20 or even 10 years ago. These people, who are no longer scared of a return to Communist rule and are relatively secure in their advantageous socio-economic situation, do not need as much state protection as before, and are demanding more political influence and direct access to power. Although the protests and demands of the working and impoverished population and Moscow’s creative class are different in nature and often not compatible, all of them are nevertheless critical.
or even outwardly hostile towards the present political regime, and they represent a threat to the stability of the country.

The second major source of impediments blocking Russia’s development is the shifting in its rhetoric but overall rather consistent US global policy which, as one of the leading American analysts openly admitted, “see it as their [American] best interests to slowly grind Russia into dust.”12 The collapse of the USSR has caused enormous hardship for many millions of the post-Soviet people, and in geopolitical terms has put Russia back into a similar situation to that which existed during the first part of the 17th century. The country has lost many strategically important territories, and because of the NATO enlargement that followed, has found itself in a precarious situation.

Since all the former Warsaw Pact countries have joined NATO, the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in Europe negotiated in 1990 lost its previous meaning and the European security system turned against Russia. In addition, in 2002 US President G.W. Bush’s administration abrogated the ABM Treaty, which for 30 years had provided both Moscow and Washington with certain guarantees of security and mutual survival. Keeping in mind NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe, the deployment there of anti-ballistic missiles which was approved by the Alliance’s meeting in Chicago in May 2012, and the relentless propaganda and psychological warfare against Moscow which accelerated during and after the recent Russian parliamentary
and presidential elections, one might start to believe that despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the enormous transformations in Russia itself, the Cold War against the country has not come to an end.\textsuperscript{13}

As a prominent American International Relations scholar and leading neorealist Kenneth Waltz noticed, “rather than learning from history, the United States repeats past errors by expanding NATO eastwards and extending its influence over what used to be the provinces of the vanquished. Despite much talk about the ‘globalization’ of international politics, American political leaders, to a dismaying extent, think of \textit{East or West} rather than of their interaction”.\textsuperscript{14}

However, although Russia was greatly weakened, it was neither occupied nor militarily defeated. Its’ still powerful nuclear deterrent remained in the hands of the country’s leaders, and together with the country’s geopolitical location, size and natural and human resources, represented a credible obstacle to American global hegemony. Among many American efforts to cut Moscow more down to size, one can only mention the support of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the decision of the US and the EU to separate Kosovo from Serbia. The Georgian-Russian War in August 2008 was an even bigger and a more directly bloody challenge, but it turned out to be not quite according to Western expectations. Partly because of that, and due to some other international and domestic economic causes, the then
forthcoming new President Obama’s administration initiated a brand new opening to Moscow’s “reset” policy towards its former Cold War rival. The new American policy brought some positive developments to both sides, and in 2009 and 2010 many experts believed that reset was “remarkably successful” and led to a “new era in their relations.” In 2010 both countries signed a treaty, named the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), which would reduce their long-range nuclear arsenal, and Washington achieved Moscow’s cooperation on its goals in Afghanistan and Iran. However, as the basic strategic differences between the US and the Russian Federation have remained far from being solved, the “selective cooperation” was unable to bring any major lasting results. During the last two years 2011-2012, new serious tensions have arisen between the two nations. These are now focused on the following major issues: (a). Civil war in Syria and the Western Powers’ right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the other nations under the name of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). (b). The ABM deployment in Europe and probably also in the Arctic and Asia which, disregarding even their present efficiency, might in any case undermine the existing geostrategic balance of power and change the present geopolitical situation in Europe.

The third major source of challenges for Russia comes from the difficult and even rocky relations with some of its Southern and
Northwestern neighbours, the nations and ethnic groups which used to be dominated by the Tsarist Russian Empire, and after that by the Soviet Union. In recent decades the Russian Southern frontiers have been seen as the country’s “soft underbelly”. That might explain why the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 was seen as a significant threat to the country. The unending social and political tensions in the Russian parts of Northern Caucasus represent an even more serious challenge, and the Islamic terrorist groups’ attacks emanating from there are still striking deep into ethnic Russian territories. The psychological impact of their assault on the economically depressed Russian population should not be underestimated. This is also one of the major reasons for Moscow’s interest in the Middle East and anxieties caused by the present growth of radical Islamism (Jihadism) in the region – particularly in Syria.

In the North and West, Russia faces nations such as Poland and the Baltic States, which because of their historical memories, which are now skillfully used for political reasons, perceive Moscow as their traditional enemy and a threatening power. The Americans have always used that for their own purposes, and at present NATO’s units are quite close to the Russian borders, and even to their former capital St. Petersburg (only 60 miles away). Relations with such neighbours are particularly delicate and require great tact and diplomatic skill in order to avoid further confrontations. Because of the US role in these
countries, President Obama’s reset policy had a temporarily positive impact on Russia’s Northwestern neighbours’ relations with Moscow, but their further normalization might take a long time and would not be easy. As Putin himself admitted, Russia “should scare its neighbours less, but it should work to rid itself of the imperial image which prevents even Europe from cooperating with us”.\textsuperscript{18} Though such a policy might be necessary, it does not by itself need to improve the international situation and security of Russia. Some of Russia’s Northwestern neighbours, being confident of Western support, might look for revenge against their former hegemon, or in any case do not see many reasons to look for accommodations of still existing problems and grievances with Moscow, which would be acceptable to both sides. They might even serve as the tools of Western policy in Eurasia in relation to Russia, and as in the case of their enthusiastic support for the American attack on Iraq in the Spring of 2003, some other nations, even if such a policy does not necessarily correspond to their national interests.\textsuperscript{19}

As an American analyst noticed, “Russian geography is problematic”\textsuperscript{20} and incomparably worse than that of the USA. It lacks oceans to provide the barriers its huge territory from Europe, the Middle East and China. The persistent security concern, which is additionally increased by historical experience and the present military and social weakness of the country, is quite understandable. As Thomas

Graham, who was the senior director for Russia at the US National Security Council indicates, “All of Russia’s borders are unsettled today”, and this is hardly surprising as “unsettled borders have been a constant throughout Russian history which could be written as a long struggle for stable, defensible borders.”

Because of that, according to another American expert, “Russian history is a chronicle of Russia’s steps to establish buffers, and those buffers being overwhelmed. The end of the Cold War marked the transition from Russia’s largest ever buffer to its smallest in centuries.”

It is no wonder that Moscow “is terrified of being overwhelmed militarily, economically, politically and culturally” and all its policies are geared toward rearrangement of its relations with the new neighbourhood, where the American and, to a lesser extent the EU political and military penetration are causing its fear and anxieties. Although the Russian Far East and even some parts of Siberia are also submitted to the growing Chinese demographic and economic penetration, which represent a challenge, they are not seen as currently representing a political and military threat to the Russian state.

During the more than one thousand years of the long Russian history, the first and most important concern of all its leaders has been and still remains their state security and its very survival, which have often been in danger. The present concerns of Vladimir Putin and his team thus seem quite normal and deeply rooted in the
historical traditions and national experience of the Russians. At the same time, however, all the present leaders’ efforts are probably more difficult than those of their predecessors.

In my opinion there are at least four main reasons for that:

1. The much touted need for modernization of the country is in fact quite ambiguous, and far from being a clear concept. In addition to the unquestionable need for technological innovation and more diversified economic development, it might also require a deep social transformation, which, for at least some of its proponents, means a total acceptance of the neoliberal capitalist model and rejection of both the remnants of the previous social achievements of the Soviet period and the ancient Russian Orthodox traditions of collectivism and social solidarity. Putin, in his speech to the Duma on April 20, 2011, stated that Russia “requires decades of steady, uninterrupted development ... without either unjustified economic liberalism or, on the other hand, social demagogy.”

He believes that “the main lesson to be learned from the crisis is that economic misery could be a threat to a nation’s sovereignty,” which he considers to be a nation’s highest value. Consequently, as he writes, “Russia is a welfare state” and “We have much higher social guarantees than countries with a comparable level of labour productivity and per capita
income.”26 His social policy is to largely increase state support for all needy groups of the population, including increasing pensions, assisting families with children, and significant reduction of mortgage loan rates to 2.2% by 2018. However his defense of a “social state” has been subject to severe attacks by Russian neoliberals and the influential business class which controls a large part of the wealth of the country, including the media.27 According to those people, Russia should “actively integrate into the world, not only economic but also political and military spaces, conventionally called the West, receiving at least small guarantees of the maintenance of internal stability.”28 With Western support, the business class and the other parts of the upper middle class will be secure in their advantageous positions, and it will increase their economic chances for profit, while the rest of the people will need to accept their fate and their inferior social status and impoverishment. However, Russian society has a different historical background from that of American or other Western countries and is more vocal in presenting its views and demands than it used to be in the past. The interests of oligarchs, the growing but economically and politically diversified middle class that, according to some scholars includes over 20% of the population,29 and the needs and
aspirations of the still relatively impoverished majority, are still not quite compatible.

The social tensions are not going to disappear easily, and a number of commentators even predict that, despite all Putin’s efforts, “in its present course and mode Russia has no future”\(^\text{30}\) and that a new Russian revolution is unavoidable. The fact that the Russian economy is so dependent on oil and gas exports, and thus very vulnerable to global market fluctuations, might have a negative impact on the social stability in the country.

2. One of the most negative outcomes of Russia’s domestic problems is the fact that, with the possible exception of its traditional zone of influence, the country does not now have any convincing soft power in the eyes of the world community.\(^\text{31}\) If the Russian Empire claimed to be the protector of the Slavs and Eastern Orthodoxy as well as the transmitter of European civilization on the vast expanses of Eurasia, and the Soviet Union was, at least until the mid-1960s, seen by many as the champion of socialism and the leader of an ideological alternative to the Western World,\(^\text{32}\) during the last 20 years, the Russian Federation’s foreign policy has been devoid of any deeper theoretical framework and ideological premises.\(^\text{33}\) In the time of mass media and the internet, the bare appeal to pragmatically understood self-interest, the understanding of which might often be dubious and questionable, cannot be sufficient to win international recognition and
support. The most powerful empire in history, the US, achieved its position largely because of its enormous reserve of soft power, and similar efforts could be noticed in the cases of a number of other great states of the era.\textsuperscript{34} As one of former Russian President Medvedev’s advisors, Igor Yurgens admitted, “Russia has not yet formulated a unique value-based ideology similar to the Western ideology democracy and post-industrial development. Nor has it demonstrated a success story comparable to that of other BRICS countries [such as] with China, say, which has become the world factory.”\textsuperscript{35}

Partly due to that, and partly because, typical of the early post-Soviet period, neglect and privatization and enormous theft of social properties, Moscow started looking for ways to influence the world media much later than the Americans and even some other non-Western nations.

One of the most blatant examples of the failure here was the case of the major mass-media presentation of the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008. As a prominent French scholar and a member of the board of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Jean Louis Gregorin admitted, “Everything that has been said by Georgia, the BBC and other hangers on was in fact a lie. It took a year for us, diplomats, the media, and all people who wanted to know the truth to turn the situation around.”\textsuperscript{36}
Probably even more harmful for Moscow was the Western media’s description of the last parliamentary presidential elections in Russia as a total fraud and sham, and the persistent characterization of President Putin as a “ruthless politician” who dismantled Russia’s democratic and free market reform “in order to become a “totalitarian leader”.

The extremely biased if not completely false propaganda which was supported in Russia itself by part of the pro-Western opposition in the country was in fact quite effective\(^{37}\) and very detrimental for Russian interests.\(^ {38}\)

In Russia there is now some reaction against it. Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, noticed that “Physical battles have been replaced by information wars. A battle for minds is in progress, from which we must not retreat,”\(^ {39}\) and some experts there are calling for Russia to “stop shying away from defending itself in the foreign press,”\(^ {40}\) but Moscow is still on the defensive in foreign policy matters. It does not have the strength or opportunity to formulate an international agenda; it can only participate in discussing such an agenda.\(^ {41}\) The reason for that is not that the Russian leaders do not understand the current international agenda. They simply have not enough power now at their disposal to be more proactive or effective. At present only Americans and in the Middle East Israel can do that, and even they are not always successful.
3. The third major source of present difficulties is the fact that the geographical situation in Russia, which has always been a challenge, is now getting even worse. As Thomas Graham, who has already been quoted above, indicates, “in contrast to the past, Russia is no longer the dynamic core of Eurasia ... it is surrounded beyond the former Soviet space by states and regions of greater energy. Chinese power, radical Islamic fervor, and European prosperity are penetrating into Russia’s historical space or acting as powerful poles of attraction for former Soviet states, including regions of Russia proper.”

This dramatic reversal of the former balance of power which had started during the Gorbachev era, has already lasted a generation, and a return to the traditional pattern does not seem either certain or imminent. Although in my opinion neither China in the East nor the Islamic world in the South can now create any major threat to Russian state security, it seems to be different in the West where during the last two main pillars in the European order, the EU and NATO “have moved their borders steadily eastward.”

In practice, both these organizations exclude Russia from its membership, and as even some American scholars admit, “no state would welcome the extension of an historically hostile military alliance up to its borders, no matter how often that alliance said its intentions were peaceable. In addition, NATO is led by the US, which is not a
Eurasian, but a global power, and whose strategic goals of global domination are apparently contradictory to Russian national interests.

4. The fourth reason is that, since the end of World War II, Russian-American relations have been and still remain the biggest international challenge for any of Moscow’s leaders. Even according to the report prepared by the American Carnegie Endowment Center for International Peace in Moscow, though Moscow sees its immediate threats coming from the radicalization in the Moslem world in the South, “strategically, the United States is still Russia’s de facto main political adversary.” Although the political and ideological differences of Soviet times have now become a question of the past, Moscow and Washington are still divided by major geopolitical and at least to some extent, some economic interests. As a consequence of that, as Professor Stephen Cohen notices, even in the early 1990s, Washington simultaneously conducted, under both the Democrats and Republicans, two fundamentally different policies toward post-Soviet Russia – one decorative and outwardly friendly and reassuring, the other a real one – a quite different winner-take-all exploitation of Russia’s post-1991 weakness. The American and other Western diplomats and experts might have preserved formal politeness, and especially at the beginning have not openly challenged Russian sensitivities. However, even then they started to encroach on almost all crucial issues on Russia’s vital national interests. Officially, Yeltsin
was treated kindly by President Clinton (Bill and Boris). At the same time Strobe Talbott, who was President Clinton’s “Russia hand”, recalls the President worrying about how long they could keep telling Ol’ Boris “okay, now here is what you’ve got to do next – here is more shit for your face”. Talbott also recalls how he and Clinton knew “Yeltsin’s blusters in public had almost always given way to submissiveness in private.”

In the late 1990s, as the Russian state became a bit stronger and more assertive, the attitude of the American elite, media and academia and their treatment of Russia and its problems have frequently become much harsher and more arrogant than during the old days of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s. Moscow’s apparent weakness and its lack of real means to use threats and retorts against the US provided the Americans and some of their allies with a free hand to insult and humiliate the former global competitor. As some American scholars noticed, instead of making an effort to perceive rather obvious differences of national interests between the two countries, Washington officials and the American mainstream media attributed Russian leaders’ opposition to the US policy towards their paranoia or all other forms of mental deviation which were supposed to prevent them from submitting to Western demands.

After he came to power in 2000, Putin aspired to an alliance with the US and integration with the European Union. The symbol

of that policy course was his immediate support of Washington after September 11, 2001, and its manifesto was his speech in October 2001 in the German Bundestag.\textsuperscript{51} He also made a number of strategic concessions to the US, then facilitating America’s easy victory in Afghanistan and closing Russian military bases in Cuba and Vietnam. However, all his efforts were reciprocated by further NATO expansion in Russia’s neighbourhood, the ABM deployment which represented a major threat to the Russian deterrent, and the launching by the West of a global strategy of regime change in “rogue states.”

Moscow’s present dispute with the West about the situation in Syria is not primarily about Middle Eastern geopolitics, Cold War alliances, arms sales – or even particular interests such as the Tartus naval resupply facility, which gives Russia some ability to operate in the Mediterranean, and perhaps in the Indian Ocean. All these factors might be important, but they are secondary.\textsuperscript{52} From a Russian policy perspective, the present Syrian issue is much like the former events in Libya, Iraq or Yugoslavia “primarily about the world order.”\textsuperscript{53} As Putin himself stressed in his decree issued in June 2012, one of Russia’s principal foreign policy goals is “developing friendly relations among states on the basis of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council is supporting international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{54} Consequently, Moscow
rejects foreign military intervention without a UNSC mandate, and also rejects the concept of regime change under external pressure.

Moscow does not want to allow the US to use force at will and without any external constraints, as this “might lead to foreign intervention close to Russian borders, or even within these borders.”

In fact all regimes except the democracies which are certified by Washington or its allies could theoretically be considered as lacking legitimacy, and the possible implications of that are quite obvious for Moscow. The persisting tensions in and around Syria are thus also an example of the struggle between the imperial unipolar vision and the resistance of the regional powers against the global imperial centre.

Though the invocation of the R2P (Right to Protect) and Western intervention even in Russia itself cannot be completely excluded, the threat of that until now has seemed rather unlikely because of the Russian nuclear deterrent, the existence of which has limited American hegemony and provides security for Russian integrity and survival. However, the forthcoming deployment of early warning components of the missile defenses in Europe, which is clearly aimed against Russia, and the early warning radar in Poland and the Czech Republic, will allow the system to “see” Russian ICBMs at the engine start stage and the first 30 seconds after launch, which was impossible until now.

In addition, a distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas and former US Marine Colonel, Dale Herspring recently noticing “the shooting down of four out of five incoming missiles last week [October 2012], suggests that missile defense is about to become a reality.”\textsuperscript{57} Professor Herspring understands Russian concerns, but as he said, “I can’t imagine any president being willing to give up such a system for the sake of US-Russian relations.”\textsuperscript{58}

Even though the ideological and systemic antagonism, which at least officially lay at the core of the Cold War, ended a long time ago, the hostility and various forms of tensions between Moscow and Washington have persisted for at least two reasons:

(a). Since the end of World War II, the US has followed and still follows the traditional British policy of preventing “a single European power center from dominating the rest of the continent, and even less Eurasia as a whole. As Thomas Graham admits: “The United States, as a matter of policy has sought to prevent the re-emergence of a threat of Soviet dimension in Eurasia,\textsuperscript{59} and the ideological identity of potential rivals has been of only secondary importance. That is why “since only Russia could form a core of such a renewed threat, US policy has sought to limit Russian options in the former Soviet space and enhance the independence of all former Soviet states.”\textsuperscript{60} For the same reasons, Washington has provided rigorous support to a belt of mainly newly established states across Central and Eastern Europe,
from the Baltic and the Black Sea to the Adriatic, which although formally independent, have been friendly to the United States and hostile to Russia. During the last decade, all those countries were admitted to NATO and the EU.

(b). The second reason is the fact that Russia has always been and still remains one of the richest countries in almost all natural resources, but nevertheless is still a relatively independent nation. The American and multinational corporations do not have free access to its natural resources, and whatever they had achieved during the Gorbachev-Yeltsin period was later limited and largely returned to Russian control. 61 

The present international status of the Russian Federation thus seems to be a precarious one, and its future is by no means certain. I would not like to suggest that a military invasion of the country is likely or even possible at present. This country is neither Iraq nor Libya, nor former Yugoslavia, and at the initial stage of the ABM deployment, its nuclear weapons still represent some deterrent to all such attempts. In addition, both its geopolitical size and general potential might make such an effort difficult to implement. I am certainly not willing to imply similar intentions to the present American administration, or even less to the UE leaders. However, as Otto von Bismarck once noticed, the main issues in politics are not intentions but potentials, and their inevitable impact on the existing
balance of power and the international system. Russia, whose nuclear deterrent would be emasculated or even just diminished, will find itself in a very different and most likely much worse situation than now. As any student of international relations knows, or at least should know, countries search for new weapons and arm themselves more often for political than directly military reasons. In addition, for a number of reasons such as the memory of the Cold War, the geopolitical location of the country, and the fact that the cultural proximity to the West of the Russian elites facilitates the use of soft power on them, the US and its allies’ policy towards Moscow had always been and still remains much harsher than towards other non-Western centres of power such as for instance China or Saudi Arabia, which are far from being liberal. The forthcoming ABM deployment in Europe would certainly change the geopolitical and strategic situation in Eurasia, and the consequences of that could in all likelihood be detrimental for Russia.

IV. Future Prospects and Possible Solutions

Despite all these internal and external challenges, the Russian Federation is still preserving its independent statehood. It has largely stabilized its borders and even achieved substantial economic progress, though this is mainly based on oil and gas exports. The present international situation of the country is undoubtedly difficult,
but in my view probably more promising than ten years ago. Along with the threats and challenges, there are now some more positive and promising trends of development.

First of all, although some media alarmists report that the domestic situation in Russia is still quite difficult, it has already greatly improved. The economy of the country had averaged 7% growth in the decade following the 1998 Russian financial crisis, resulting in a doubling of real disposable income and the emergence of a new middle class. Although it was hit hard by the global financial crisis of 2008-09, it is now growing at a reasonable pace (in 2012 second quarter growth 4%; 2012 projection 3.4%) and much more quickly than the economies of all new EU members, including Poland (2012 projection 2.7%).

According to some American scholars, Russia has passed through “dramatic spurts of modernization” which “have been generally accompanied by a shift in public concerns from economic survival to ‘self-expression values such as freedom of expression and ultimately political participation’.” In the decade before the global financial crisis, the real household income increased by 140%. The average monthly wage, adjusted for purchasing power parity, exceeds $1,000, and the improvement has spread throughout the population. The proportion of Russians living below the poverty threshold, which had been determined to be an income of under $10.80 per person/day, fell from 29% in 2000 to 13% in 2011. At the same time
the new technology revolution spread throughout the country, and in 2011, 60% of households, including 46% in the countryside, already have personal computers, up from 25% in 2005.66

As the demographic crisis in Russia, as in other post-Communist countries, was largely caused by economic factors, the better living conditions have brought some modest but noticeable improvement. According to the Federal Statistic Service (ROSSTAT), in 2012 Russia should achieve its first natural population growth since 1991.67 Although the mortality level there is still quite high compared to that of the Western developed nations (Russia has been officially classified as a developing nation), and the results of the catastrophic birthrate decline of the 1990s is going to be felt for many years to come, the news about a “dying bear” now seems to be premature.68 There are great differences among the regions, but in September 2012 the overall level of unemployment in the country was a rather low 5.2%, much below that in Poland or other European Union members.69 Though this favourable situation is the result of the massive stimulus efforts which had been undertaken after the catastrophic 2009 economic slump, and Russia in late 2012 needs to face many serious problems, its economy is still “arguably in better health than it has ever been.”70

The political situation in the country is also far more stable than it is sometimes presented in the Western and pro-Western media. It

KREUZ, A., Russian Problem: Russia’s Place in the World – An Attempt at Historical and Geopolitical Analysis,
is understandable that after so many violent political shocks and abrupt social transformations in its recent history, the country cannot be as stable as the well-established Western democracies and the existing regime cannot enjoy a similar level of secure institutional legitimacy. The role, position and political importance of the national leaders are therefore different there than those of their American, French or even Polish counterparts. Any serious decline in Putin’s public approval rating might thus appear to be a symptom of a real systemic crisis or, as some like to argue, a death knoll to the existing regime. Putin was in fact weakened during 2011 because he was losing the support of a substantial part of the business and middle class in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the media operated by them. However, this year his approval is no longer declining. According to the most recent public opinion poll by the respected Levada Center, currently 67% of Russians support the efforts of Vladimir Putin as president, while 32% don’t, and the rest are undecided. An absolute majority support gradual reforms and believe that there will be changes for the better in the near future. Consequently, as an American expert noticed, it is difficult to imagine how “a collapse of regime scenario could unfold in the present environment of low unemployment, modest economic growth, high oil prices, and general stability in Putin’s approval rating” Russia is perhaps going through a
difficult period of modernization and socio-political re-adjustment, but it is probably in much better shape than it was before.

Secondly, due to both US internal problem and the emergence of new rising powers in Asia and other places, a number of American leading political analysts including Zbigniew Brzezinski, now predict the decline of unipolar world order and the approaching end of the Atlantic era in history.\textsuperscript{75} Although these American predictions might be alarmist and the new rising power centres still have a long way to go in order to increase their potential, some development towards a multipolar or post-American world has been noticed.\textsuperscript{76} In its dealings with China, the Islamic World of the future, and some other rising powers, the US will need to get some form of help and cooperation from Russia, which in fact has already been established in relations with Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, Iran. Such needs might force the US leaders to relieve their political and ideological pressures on Russia. Although one might doubt the American leaders’ willingness to restrain their imperial aspirations in Eurasia, the new situation could force them to cut down their over-ambitious plans. As Thomas Graham writes: the US and Russia are no longer two hostile superpowers locked in an ideologically-driven life-death struggle. Each must advance its interests in an increasingly non-ideological multipolar world. In such a world, intense US-Russian competition tends to play out to the advantage of third countries.\textsuperscript{77} According to

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Professor Kotkin of Princeton University, “there can be no resettling of US-Russian relations without a transcending of NATO and the establishment of a new security architecture in Europe. And without such a genuine reset, China will retain the upper hand, not only in its bilateral relationship with Russia, but also in the strategic triangle comprising China, Russia and the United States”. Graham wants to believe that both countries [the US and the Russian Federation] are now reconsidering their positions. Though it is now by no means certain, if it really happens, the impact of that on Russia’s Western neighbours might be of critical importance in the country’s relations with Europe and its internal development. It would provide Russia with a chance for a more economic and cultural integration with the West, which has been one of its major goals since the end of the 17th century and the reforms of Peter the Great. Because Moscow will certainly want to preserve its own identity, and because even without American inspiration, some forces that are hostile to Russia will persist in Europe, such an alliance would not be easy, but without Washington’s opposition might still be possible. In Western Europe, especially in France and Germany, there is no lack of influential forces that would welcome the prospect of close cooperation with Russia, and even the emergence of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow continental axis. If put into practice, such an alliance might be strong enough to secure itself from the growing Chinese, and in the future perhaps.
Islamic powers, and it would be an equal partner with the great American power. Such an alliance and a level of integration would be more possible because of the fact that Russia is now much weaker than in the past. Due to the country’s demographic decline and social problems, it cannot represent any objective threat to Europe. According to some demographic forecasts, by 2050 its population could drop down to just 100 million inhabitants, and its share of the GDP, which in 2008 amounted to 2.3% of global, will only rise to 3.5% by 2020. Although Putin’s administration plans to boost annual defense spending by 59% by 2015, according to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), their present level is quite modest, 71.9 billion compared to the US’ 711 billion, or even China’s 143 billion. Even if the projected boost of expenditures were implemented, the Russian Federation’s defense budget would be less than one tenth of the US military budget. Russia’s apparent weakness makes even some traditionally suspicious Polish analysts willing to take seriously a prospect of cooperation and even some form of continental alliance with Russia. Only time will tell whether such a project can be put into practice, but in view of the myriads of challenges facing both Europe and Russia in an era of great turbulence, it would probably be both an optimal solution for all parties involved and might bring an end to the perennial Russian Problem. However, the real chances for such a
successful development are low at present. In addition to the numerous European suspicions and obstacles, the US would certainly oppose any chance of its implementation. Washington might be forced to relax some of its pressures on Moscow, but it is unlikely that it would be willing to allow Russia to get more influence in Europe.

From Moscow’s viewpoint the situations in the East and South of the country look more promising. As I have already indicated, neither China nor any Islamic power from the South is now likely to represent a major strategic challenge to Russian state security. Islamic states are too divided and overall still too backward for that. Some terrorist attacks might emanate from there and cause a lot of problems for the Russian citizens, but they cannot represent a strategic threat to the Russian state as such.

Concerning China, which is a centralized and technologically speaking relatively advanced great nation, the situation is different. China has enormous potential, but at least for the moment is too busy with its overwhelming internal problems to advance an aggressive policy towards its Northwestern neighbours. Although some parts of the present Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia used to be part of the Chinese Empire, they have never been populated by Chinese Han, and the climate in the North is quite harsh. Any such territorial change in Northeastern Asia would upset the balance of power existing there, and would probably cause a negative reaction from the other
powerful states in the neighbourhood, such as Japan and South Korea. In addition, the most important reason for the Moscow-Beijing alliance is their common fear of the American superpower, which is certainly not going to diminish.

Last but not least, after 2001 the Russian Federation started to be considered as a part of BRICS, a group of quickly developing, former peripheral nations, which also includes Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Although Russia is predominantly an old European nation, it has always been seen in the past as a backward country, and a “peripheral empire”, and now has no chance of being absorbed into the EU, or of being integrated into the West, though cooperation with it is possible and would be highly desirable. The Russian Federation needs to build itself up as a separate and independent power centre and other BRICS nations are in a similar position.

Just as in the case of other BRICS members, the Russian Federation’s economy is still predominantly based on the raw material and cheap labour supplies for the development of Western Europe, North America and Japan. In the 21st century the international status of a nation is determined not so much by its cultural achievements and historical background, and not even by its geopolitical location, as by its place in the global economic system. Moscow has thus found some at least partly adequate partners outside the Western community to improve its international image, prestige and

importance. Although BRICS is not strictly speaking an international organization with an established infrastructure and its own administrative apparatus, nevertheless it is a new and promising form of international cooperation of states with similar, though by no means the same, powers and world views. According to Dr Nicolai N. Petro, Professor of International Politics at the University of Rhode Island who served as the US State Department’s Special Assistant under President George H. Bush Sr.: “the BRICS is no longer just a random assortment of states known for their high economic growth. Largely at Russia’s initiative these nations have begun to coordinate their foreign policies and promote multipolar global initiatives.”

According to him, “in the future each will try to use its economic and political clout to promote regional stability and challenge the Western-led model of modernization.”

As the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Ivanovich Denisov noticed that when a year ago all BRICS countries were members of the UN Security Council, their reactions to Middle East events and their voting patterns were almost identical. However, both structural differences and geopolitical disparities among the BRICS partners prevent their real integration in a coherent bloc. Russia’s place in the global system and the international policy of the country still remain a subject of doubt and uncertainty. The Russian Problem is still with us and all the ways to solve it seem either risky or unrealistic. The first of
them suggested by Zbigniew Brzezinski is Western enlargement to the East under US leadership and control.\textsuperscript{92} He even wants to create a new consultative organ for that purpose to supervise that, and believes it could be located in Kiev, the ancient capital of Kievan Rus, in order to symbolize “the West’s renewed vitality and the enlarging scope”.\textsuperscript{93} However, both the present Russian political elite and the majority of the people there would probably resist that. Also it is by no means certain that the US has enough means to impose its will on Eurasia, and “because of the country’s unique history – at first separate from world power, then an overnight superpower – it has little experience of sharing power with others”\textsuperscript{94} and finding a solution which would be agreeable to all. It seems to me that it would be more practical, but from the Western viewpoint more risky, to approach Russia in the same way as China or Saudi Arabia as a different civilization and an independent power centre. Such recognition would preclude further soft power warfare against the country and would allow it to develop according to its own traditions and at its own pace. The famous American diplomat and expert on Russia, George Kennan strongly defended such an alternative approach, even at the end of his life in his final interview with the \textit{New York Times} on May 2, 1998.\textsuperscript{95} Just as in the case of China, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan, the US and its allies might and even should be able to look after their economic and security interests there, but they would let Russia go its
own way and preserve its traditional allies and zone of influence. Russian Problem for the West might thus not disappear, but become accepted as one of many challenges of the pluralistic and globalized world. It is understandable that the Americans, due to their unique history and still enormous power at their disposal, want to transform the rest of mankind to their “own image and proximity”. However, as the American scholar and journalist Paul Klebnikov noticed (he had studied post-Soviet Russia in depth and paid for that by his own life): “The American model had political, economic, social and cultural components. Could it work in a country as large and as old as Russia?”⁹⁶ According to him, “The history of the Yeltsin regime suggests that it could not”.⁹⁷

Endnotes

¹ Malia Martin, Russia Under Western Eyes: From Bronze Horsemen to Lenin’s Mausoleum (Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 147.

² Edward Winter, Russland und Papstum, vol 1, Berlin 1960, p. 179.


⁴ Op cit, p. 70.

⁵ Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Op Cit. p.134

9 According to credible estimates, the total number of premature deaths that can be attributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist system is in the order of 10 to 20 million deaths in World War II. Charles Clover, “Russia: Decline and Fall”, Financial Times, October 18, 2011.


13 The importance of propaganda and psychological warfare in international relations was indicated by the Greek-Canadian scholar Professor Dimitri Kitsikis in his masterly work: Propagande et pressions en politique international. Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1963.


16 Interview by Yevgeny Primakov in the Italian journal *Limes*, June-September 1996.

17 According to the American scholars Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, “Russian foreign policy under Putin and Medvedev has been shaped by three objectives: boosting economic growth, fostering friendly regimes in the former Soviet states, and *preventing terrorism at home*”, “Why Moscow Says No”, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2011, p. 125.


19 The example was the letter issued on February 6, 2003 from the Vilnius group comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania and Slovakia, which effectively supported US military intervention in Iraq. Even before that on January 30, 2003, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary signed the letter of the five European members which expressed their support for a regime change in Iraq in the lead-up to the American invasion of this country. To most observers it demonstrated a total division within the EU in respect to foreign policy and attitudes towards international law.

20 Zeihan, *op. cit*, p. 2.

Zeihan, op. cit.

Ibid.


Gontmakcher, op. cit.

Stephen Kotkin, “Russia under Putin; Toward democracy or dictatorship?” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Nr. 3/2007.

Voices like that are coming from different people such as the President of the Geopolitical Academy in Moscow General Leonid Ivashov. (“Revolution in Russia is inevitable”, Forum.msk.ru 29.03.2011) and the Chair of Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center Lilie Shevtsova (“The Next Russian Revolution”, Current History, October 2012). After

the recent Russian elections, the leader of the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov warned that Russia “might go
through revolution” (Interfax News, March 27, 2012.

31 Thomas Gomart, “Dva Orientira dlya Rossii”, Rossiya v
Globalnoi Politike, vol. 8, No. 6, November/December 2010, p. 121.
See also Alexandr Kramarenko, “Ideologiya Vneshnei Politiki

32 Tatiana Panfilova, “Problem Omsysleniya Mesta Rossii v

33 Igor Yurgens, “Political Analyst sets out ways to develop soft
power”, Rossiyskatya Gazeta, September 16, 2011.

34 Joseph S.N. Nye, jr., The Paradox of American Power. Why the
World’s One Superpower Can’t go it Alone (Oxford University Press,
2002, pp. 69-76.

35 Igor Yurgens, op. cit.

36 “Russia and France. A New Quality of Relations –
International Roundtable”, International Affairs, vol. 57, No. 1, 2011,
p. 43.

37 Almost all major newspapers and privately owned media in
Moscow and St. Petersburg are extremely hostile to Putin and the
existing regime. See for instance the article by Steven Korn, “New
Radio Liberty to Carry Its Old Mission”, Moscow Times, 16 October,
2012 (issue 4993) or the article by the editor of this paper Michael

Bohm, “Why the Foreign Ministry Should Keep Quiet”, *Moscow Times*, November 2, 2012. Ironically Freedom House located in Washington D.C. describes the Russian Federation as a non-free country the same as or even worse than China or Saudi Arabia.

38 According to an opinion poll in March 2012, only 15% of Americans have even a somewhat positive view of Putin.


42 Graham, *op. cit.*


45 “Russia on the Move, Policy Outlook”, June 2012, Alexei Malashenko, Maria Lipman, Dmitri Trenin, Nicolay Petrov, *Carnegie.ru*


*op. cit.*, p. 362 and various other passages in the book.

Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

“Russia on the Move”, *op. cit.* See also Dmitri Trenin, “What Putin Will Do in Foreign Policy?”

Trenin, *op. cit.*

Trenin, “For Russia, Syria is not about Syria”, *The Daily Star* (Lebanon), July 3, 2012.

*op. cit.*


Trenin, *op. cit.*


Dale Herspring, *op. cit.*


Thomas Graham, *op. cit.*


About Russia’s economic disengagement from the US, see Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, *op. cit.*


*op. cit.*

*ibid.* By the World Bank definition – an income of less than $2 a day – the corresponding number of poor people would be somewhat lower.

*ibid.*


Mark Adamanis, “Russia’s Demographics Continue to Rapidly Improve”, October 30, 2012.

“Russian Unemployment Ranges from 0.6% in Moscow to 47.3% in Ingushetia. *Interfax*, October 19, 2012.


*ibid.* See also “Two thirds of Russians Approve of Putin’s Work as President – Poll”, *Interfax, Moscow*, October 31, 2012.

*ibid., op. cit.*
75 International Herald Tribune, December 17, 2008. See also his article “Balancing the East, Upgrading the West”, Foreign Affairs, January-February, 2012.

76 Fareed Zakaria, Post-American World, Norton & Company, 2008. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (Basic Books, 2012). This book is still hostile to Russia and has been written from the American imperial viewpoint.

77 Graham, op. cit.

78 Stephen Kotkin, “The Unbalanced Triangle” Foreign Affairs, Sept/October 2012/nr 05, p.138

79 Graham, op. cit. Similarly, Ira Straus writes on the US and Russia: “sharing of most interests is is of far more value than most people realize – a sharing after the end of the ideologically hostile regime in Moscow of the most vital interests on both sides, other than the price of oil”. (irastraus@ocol.com)


The Role of BRICS as an informal mechanism of the leading nations among which Russia is able to play its role has been stressed by the director of the Department of Foreign Policy Planning Alexander Kramarenko.” Ideologiya Vneshney Politiki Sovremennoj Rossii” Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 8/9-2008. p. 4.


“How to not loose Russia” Asia Times, March 12, 2012.

Ibid.

Golos Rossii, August 19, 2011.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Balancing East, Upgrading the West. US Grand Strategy in an age of upheaval”, Foreign Affairs, Jan/February 2012, p. 99-100

op cit, p100.


Ibid. The outspoken liberal and former Russian finance minister Alexei Kudrin has recently said that “we most likely face an evolutionary path through increasing freedom. Those who take this path have better prospects.” In his view, “it’ll take from 20 to 30 years for this new system to get established”. Interfax, November 19, 2012.
REVIEW

Jakub Potulski

*Imperija prostranstwa. Chrestomatija po geopolitikie i geokulturie Rossii.* Ed. D.N. Zamyatin i A.N. Zamyatin

The Russian geographer, Dimitri Zamyatin, is one of the most intriguing representatives of the contemporary Russian geopolitical thought. He represents the critical approach to geopolitical research and focuses his scientific interests on spatial visions that dominate in the Russian public opinion. In his publications he attempts to focus his attention on presenting geographical images that are present in the Russian society, myths that are connected with Russian space and their influence on perceiving the world. By assuming that the world that surrounds the people is a social construct (created by society), his main area of interest is shaping of geographic images and their influence on social life, as well as political decisions.

The Russian geographist points at the fact that the system of geographic images that is dominant in a particular society creates a specific space for geographical representations (the meta-geographical space). This space is the basis for forming geopolitical and politico-geographic beliefs of particular social groups. Therefore, what is needed to fully grasp the ideas of the Russian foreign policy is understanding of how the Russians perceive themselves and the world that surrounds them. It is also important to be aware of the geopolitical map that functions in the minds of Russian elites and society and how the Russian „geopolitical imagination“ is shaping. Zamiatin also notes that the projections of the outside world, myths, stereotypes, fears and frustrations are substantially important in studying particular communities as they, to some extent, „mirror” the problems of the particular community.

An important work by Zamyatin is _Imperia prostranstwa. Chrestomatija po geopolitikie i geokulturie Rossii_, published in 2003 by ROSSPEN, a Moscow publishing house. It's a broad author's choice of publications on Russian space. Zamyatin has chosen from the

abundance of works on Russian cultural legacy, excerpts from those that came to him as exerting the strongest influence on Russian spatial reflection, on the image of Russia itself in its citizens's eyes, as well as the perception of foreign countries. The chosen pieces of texts present the most popular Russian spatial myths and show in what way the Russians perceive their geopolitical space.

Among the authors found in this study are such names as: Philotheus, Alexander Pushkin, Nikolai Fedotov, Nikolai Gogol, Fyodor Tyutchev, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Mikhail Lermontov, Nikolai Danilevsky, Alexy Chomakov, Konstantin Leontiev, Nikolai Berdiaev, Vladimir Nabokov, Anton Chekov, Vasyl Rozanov, Pawel Milikuov, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Vladimir Solovyov, and many others. Zamiatin's aim is to describe the diversity and specific character of Russian territory. The description and characteristic of Russian space can be found not only in geographical works but, most of all, in the works of writers, poets, philosophers and historians. It is these works that, according to the Russian geographer, were the most crucial in shaping of geographical and geopolitical images of Russia.
The author assumes that the identity of a particular country encompasses particular images and reflections on basis of which the „us – them” dichotomy is shaped. While searching for an answer to the questions of how the Russians perceive themselves and the world that surrounds them, their vision of geopolitics and the Russian geopolitical map of the world, Zamyatin reaches to works of poets, writers, historians, philosophers and politicians, but also geographers.

Political relations are determined not only by the current balance of power, but also by vision of the world, values and patterns of behavior that have been passed from generation to generation within particular cultures. The importance of the arts, including literary works, lies in the fact that values that are shaped in time do not perish with passing of the era that they had been formed in, but linger and add up to the „stock” of the available, overall human experience. Culture, therefore, is a factor that determines the identity of subjects that are active in the international space and it should not be excluded in the attempts to understand their actions. The work of various authors is the foundation for national culture, which also

includes the dominating geopolitical visions. That is why this unique review of Russian culture, along with a commentary from Dimitri Zamyatin, provides an opportunity to understand what elements of culture and traditions influenced Russian perception of the world. It also enables to understand how the Russian image of themselves and the surrounding world shaped and evolved. By referring to the literature, traditions and culture, Zamyatin presents us with such elements that are the bounds of Russian geopolitical thinking and at the same time being the basis for interpretation of the world and political choices.

By showing the Russian geopolitical visions present in the works of Russian philosophers, writers, historians, poets and geographers, Zamyatin draws from the tradition of a French geographer, Yves Lacoste. When in the 70s he founded Herodote, one of the most influential magazines on political geography and geopolitics, he focused his interests on the category of „geopolitical visions” , which according to him may be the key to understanding territorial conflicts among communities. „Geopolitical visions” are an element of our

knowledge about the world that surrounds us, supply us with a specific „world map” and therefore strongly influence our decisions and actions. Lacoste thought that in order to understand the nature of geopolitical conflicts, the key ideas and concepts underlying them have to be identified. The work of Dimitri Zamyatin provides knowledge that is necessary for understanding the very often mythologized vision of the surrounding space.

Zamyatin's work is worth special attention, as among Russian geopoliticians he is one of the few with a universal and original approach to geopolitical analyses. He goes beyond the traditional scientific schemes that were developed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, in the time of evolution of „classical” geopolitics”. His work is not only an attempt to conceptualize the geopolitical position of Russia in the world. Nor is it merely an attempt to work out a firm development strategy. Most of all, it is an attempt to present Russian spatial visions being at the base of their political activity. This approach refers to Wilhelm Dithey's concept of „empathizing” (einfehlung), Max Weber's „understanding” (verstehen) and Stanislaw

Ossowskis „empathy”. It is a strong reference to the sociological tradition of Max Weber. He pointed at the fact that when taking action, subjects ascribe a particular sense to what they are doing. This is why when conducting research it is so important to put oneself in the place of the examined subject and include this fact in the analysis.

Zamyatin's work provides an opportunity for „understanding” the Russian way of perceiving the world by showing the spatial visions that function within the culture. It provides information about Russian fears and aspirations towards the „outside” world and can be recommended to anyone interested in Russian, as well as geopolitical, studies.