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ASYMMETRIC AND HYBRID GEOPOLITICAL THREATS

Abstract:

In the paper the authors draw attention to shortcomings in understanding the complexity of the contemporary warfare. The military conflicts of a completely new type have evolved. At present, the debates are held on future threats which are often defined as a dichotomous choice between fighting terrorists or insurgents and traditional war. Nowadays, all forms of warfare are used, even simultaneously. These kinds of mixed threats are often called asymmetric or hybrid. Hybrid threats include a range of various means of warfare which refer to standard armory, conventional weaponry, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist attacks (coercive measures and violence) as well as criminal behavior used in the combat zone to achieve the political goals. Joint hybrid means are used to gain an asymmetric advantage over the enemy. These types of wars are concealed and waged mainly in political, economic and information spheres.

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Contemporary conflicts in Asia, especially the Russian invasion on Ukraine prove shortcomings in understanding the complexity of contemporary war. Traditional wars in which states or their coalitions participate on both sides are gradually losing their meaning. The armed conflicts of new type have evolved. Moreover, our culture and understanding of war do not help stabilize the situation between Russia and Ukraine and fight insurgents successfully (Wasiuta O. 2016).

At present, the debates are held on future threats which are often defined as a dichotomous choice between fighting terrorists or insurgents and traditional war. However, instead of enemies applying basically different approaches, we should expect all forms of warfare to be used, even simultaneously. These kinds of mixed threats are often called asymmetric or hybrid. Hybrid threats include a range of various means of warfare which refer to standard armory, conventional weaponry, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist attacks (coercive measures and violence) as well as criminal behavior used in the combat zone to achieve the political goals.² Joint hybrid means are used to gain an asymmetric advantage over the enemy.

² *The origins of the concept of a hybrid war*. Electronic journal «The Bell», 28 Feb. 2015

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The attention of strategists has been drawn to a new form of threat to security, an irregular, armed aggression below the open war threshold. It has become a serious challenge for state authorities, defense systems responsiveness and decision-making processes of international security institutions. It is impossible to analyze any warfare without considering political context and many areas of human interactions beyond a military area.

Warfare was, is and will be in the nearest future a sad part of states activity. The Swiss, Jean-Jacques Babel counted that since 3500 B.C. mankind has lived without wars only 292 years. Over this period there have been 14,550 big and small wars during which 3.66 billion people died of hunger, plague and other causes (Малышева 2005). Analyzing the history of warfare over this whole period of human existence it should be pointed out that the higher military art has always been about defeating the enemy, complete all military tasks without engaging the army (Сенченко 2009).

The efforts of many philosophers, since the Ancient Times (Sun Tzu, Heraclites, Appian) the Renaissance (N. Machiavelli), the Industrial Era (Carl von Clausewitz, A. Jomini) and the Modernity (B. Alexander, M. Gareev, M. Davey, M. Martin van Creveld, W. Slipchenko, A. Toffler, William H. Hofmeister), were undertaken to

identify, describe and justify crucial features of war and its changing content and shapes.

In geopolitics the nature of controlled chaos warfare is about geopolitical destruction of a state – prey, neutralization its geopolitical features – the size of its territory, number of population, a status on the international stage, economic capacity, military power, complete capacity.

The result of the Russian Federation activities, during 2014 the global and regional security system as well as present international legal system was completely distorted. The terms antiterrorist operation (ATO) and “hybrid warfare” are not the answer to a question what is happening in Ukraine – considering the annexation of Crimea and acts of war in Donbas with all possible weapon used except nuclear one. Thus, there is no answer also to other important questions: What should Ukraine do in the light of the international law and the Ukrainian Constitution? What should Ukraine expect from the international community?

From the international law perspective nobody can provide Ukraine with military support, because if there is no war on Ukrainian territory caused by aggression of another country but only the civil war or conflict, nobody is entitled to intervene from outside. That is the reason why Putin advocates the term “internal civil conflict in Ukraine”, which blocks possibility of any military support for Ukraine, including weapon.

Almost all international security warranties for Ukraine (including the Budapest Memorandum) have proved to be useless when the aggressor became one of the guarantors – the Russian Federation. Neither the leaders of the Old Continent nor their citizens are fully aware of the fact that the aggression against Ukraine is an indirect aggression against European Union and its values. Putin's regime is based on the rule of power, which is demonstrated with repressions, and outside borders – with aggression. Yet, he manages to achieve – at least for a short run- a tactic advantage over the EU and the United States, which try to avoid military confrontation by any means. Violating treaty obligations Russia took over Crimea and set up separatist enclaves in the eastern Donbas. Gaining control over strategic points on the peninsula and in the eastern Ukraine by the Russian special forces was followed by a propaganda campaign of a few years.

The sense of insecurity evoked by open and long borders strengthened an attachment to the army and its almost mythologic role. The strong connection between prestige of the state and the prestige of the army retained and the military goals were more important than any other. The difficult geopolitical position and neighboring different civilizational circles gave the syndrome of the “Siege mentality” (Гомар 2006). The traces of this policy are still present.

The European Union and the Great Britain made “catastrophic mistakes” while interpreting mood of the Moscow Kremlin before the crisis in Ukraine and entered this crisis “like sleepwalkers” announced Christopher Tugendhat, the leader of the EU Commission of the House of Lords in the Report of the British parliamentary commission published in February 2015.

The Report concludes that EU did not realize how deep is Russia’s hostility towards Brussels plans on deepening relations with Ukraine. According to the Report the EU - Moscow relations have been long since based on an “optimistic assumption” that Russia is heading towards democratic system. The Great Britain has had an exceptional commitment to Ukraine, as it was one out of four signatories of the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, which guaranteed integrity of the Ukrainian territory in exchange for renouncement of strategic nuclear weapon – the British parliamentary commission claims. In their opinion neither the Great Britain nor the European Union had any strategic plan how to deal with Russia in a long-run.

“New Ukraine” is explicitly pro-European and ready to fight for Europe, fighting for its own independence. The support for Ukraine is the most beneficial investment for the European Union. Ukraine could even help revive the spirit of unity and common welfare, which underlies the EU. To cut it short, saving Ukraine the Union could save itself.

Adam D. Rotfeld, a former minister of foreign affairs, deputy chairperson of the Polish – Russian Group for Difficult Matters emphasized that ‘Russia has been preparing itself and has been preparing the world for this conflict for at least seven years – since Putin’s speech in 2007 at the Security Conference in Munich. In spite of this, the West is confounded by these developments to which it did not elaborate an effective response. We have a problem. It amounts to the fact that the very foundation of the international political and legal order has been destroyed. The foundations on which the peace and security of Europe have stood over 70 years after the war.

The head of the British counterintelligence M15 Andrew Parker³ for the first time in the history gave an interview⁴ for “The Guardian”, in which he warned that Russia is a growing threat to the stability of the Great Britain, uses a range of means to attempt to influence the situation inside the United Kingdom. Russia has had spies and agents on the whole territory of Europe long since. “Russia uses all organs and capacity to realize its foreign policy outside the country in an

³ Andrew Parker, the head of M15 since 2013, former Deputy General.

⁴ This has been the first interview of the head of this service in the 100 year history of this service. Till 1939 the identity of secretary general of counterintelligence services was secret, later it was advisable to restrain from public activities and avoid media. The guiding principle was speak as little as possible and speak discretely (Exclusive: : ‘*There will be terrorist attacks in Britain,*’ says MI5 chief. In the first interview of its kind, Andrew Parker talks to the Guardian about the ‘enduring threat’ to the UK, surveillance and greater public understanding,

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/01/andrew-parker-mi5-director-general-there-will-be-terrorist-attacks-in-britain-exclusive?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other

[02.11.2016]

increasingly aggressive way, i.e. using propaganda, spying, subversion and cyberattacks. They operate over whole Europe and also the Great Britain – and it is our task to stand in their way – said A. Parker. Russians have had a lot of traditional spies and agents in Europe for a long time. Yet, the new phenomenon is an increasing importance of cyberwar which aims at military secrets, industrial projects and governmental information about a foreign policy. Russia stands more and more in opposition to the West. It is noticeable, for example in Russia's operation in Russia and Syria – emphasized A. Parker.⁵ Russia has been concealing its desires for decades. The relationship between Russia and the West has got worsen since the Crimea annexation, the war in Ukraine and bombing insurgents' positions in Aleppo to support president of Syria Bashar Assad.⁶

The hybrid warfare changes basic rules, creating an alternative reality, not a new border but an alternative picture. Formally, there is no war and there is no aggression. There are internal conflicts, political fight, crisis management and some cases of armed confrontation. There is no aggressor and aggression. Yet, the Russia's aim is not to

⁵ *Kremlin pours cold water on MI5 chief's claims of Russian threat.* Andrew Parker's warnings of hostile measures against the UK 'do not correspond to reality', says Kremlin, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/01/kremlin-pours-cold-water-on-mi5-chiefs-andrew-parker-claims> [02.11.2016]

⁶ *MI5 head: 'increasingly aggressive' Russia a growing threat to UK.* Exclusive: In first newspaper interview given by a serving spy chief, Andrew Parker talks of terror, espionage and balance between secrecy and privacy, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/31/andrew-parker-increasingly-aggressive-russia-a-growing-threat-to-uk-says-mi5-head> [dostęp 02.11.2016]

change the rules of a hybrid warfare but change the border. And not necessarily on the map. Simply, the formal border loses its significance and the state is not controlled by its government but outside powers. Indirectly, even without combat, but by the consequent informal occupation.

At present, the “hybrid warfare” is considered as many-sided term. Hybridity can refer, first of all, to a military situation and conditions, strategy and tactics of the adversary; to the type of forces which the state should create and maintain.⁷ Hybrid warfare differs from the typical war as it lets the adversary engage simultaneously into many stages and has different expectations of the armed forces.⁸

The main pillars of the Russian hybrid warfare are: aggressor presence, frozen or potential conflicts on the territory of a particular state, victims of the active recruitment of agents of influence and indifference of bureaucracy. At present, we can observe the shift of the borders of the democratic and civilized world from the eastern Ukrainian border to the west. Russia wages the war not against Ukraine but the whole democratic world. Actually, it is the conflict of worldviews, the conflict of scenarios for the social development. Russia failed the economic competition. There are other methods left

⁷ *The origins of the concept of a hybrid war*. Electronic journal «The Bell», 28 Feb. 2015, <http://www.thebellforum.com/showthread.php?t=130013> [28.10.2016]

⁸ А.Демидов, *Управляемый хаос*, Официальный сайт журнала „Стратегия России”, №5, Май 2015, http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/fullnews.php?subaction=showfull&id=1430428108&archive=1430773984&start_from=&ucat=14& [28.10.2016]

to apply: bribery, blackmail, terrorism, manipulation, creating internal conflicts, creating loyal groups of Russian local population and immigrants in the EU countries. Religious, ethnic and social differences are favorable foothold for speculations, recruitment and smoldering conflicts. This is what we call today “hybrid warfare”.

Russian hybrid warfare has questioned a traditional idea of unified, free and peaceful Europe and important institutions supporting this idea – NATO and the European Union. Hybrid warfare is often interpreted as something new, but most of its elements occurred and were used almost in all wars in the past. Cohesion and consolidation of these elements, their dynamics and flexibility when applied are exceptional. And additionally, the information component plays a special role, has become as important as military component. It ensures various levels of operating and creates conditions to claim the war a just war for their own society. That is the reason why Russian annexation of Crimea and aggression in the east Ukraine have become an impulse to analyze and estimate the phenomenon of the contemporary “hybrid warfare”.

The western military theories of the 20th century offered various concepts of future warfare. The so-called concept of proxy war was defined for the first time in 1964 by Karl Deutsch, who considered this war an international conflict, which is apparently an internal conflict, fought between two powers on the territory of the third party-state. In Deutsch opinion proxy war uses the social capacity,

resources and territory of the state in a civil war as the tool to achieve the strategic goals of the external parties (Deutsch 1964). The above quoted definition reflects the context of the cold war, when two superpowers with the nuclear weapon at their disposal avoided a direct confrontation transferring it to the territories of “The Third World” (Mumford 2013; Bryjka 2016).

Whereas, Andrew Mumford identifies four crucial changes in the nature of the contemporary warfare and claims that these changes indicate the potential increasing engagement of states in the proxy strategies. These kinds of wars are the logical activity on the international stage of states, which aim at achieving their strategic goals and avoiding direct, costly and bloody wars at the same time. The author defines the proxy wars as a conflict in which the third party intervenes indirectly to influence the strategic outcome for the benefit of the supported coalition. He also emphasizes that they were ubiquitous in the past but are not thoroughly studied. As one time the president Dwight David Eisenhower stated proxy warfare are “the cheapest insurance in the world”.

In spite of the rich expert literature a lot of questions are still unanswered and a dynamic political reality brings new factual material every day modifying challenges, repealing old and creating new threats. Before the term “hybrid warfare’ was coined, the terms “asymmetric threats”, “asymmetric conflict”, “asymmetric warfare” were used.

So, in December 2000 the CIA Report “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts” was released.⁹ It listed, among threats of the 21st century, “asymmetric threats” – a hidden war in which state and nonstate adversaries avoid direct engagement, methods of cyberwarfare are used by economically weak countries, well military organized communities or unconventional delivery of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The interactions between terrorists, narco-business and organized criminal groups which will have better access to information, technologies, finances and sophisticated techniques of deception and manipulation will strengthen. This asymmetric approach adapted by states or non-state actors will dominate in most of threats.

The concept of “asymmetric warfare” was introduced by American strategist in the 1970s. during the analysis of the USA war operations in Vietnam. The British researcher of international relations Andrew J.R. Mack, was the first who explained the term “asymmetric warfare” in 1975. Influenced by the results of the freshly ended Vietnam war he presented 7 types of asymmetry, which can be applied in the limited conflicts (Mack 1975).

Gradually the stress in interpretation of terms is being shifted which is reflected by usage of stable words “asymmetric threats”. The Report of the American secretary of defense in the Bill Clinton William

⁹ *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts*, <http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/globaltrends2015/> [27.10.2016]

Cohen's administration released in 1997 concludes that "the USA conventional military capacity can generate among adversaries the pursuit of asymmetric capabilities against USA forces [...] They will try to gain the advantage over the USA with nonconventional measures to minimize US strengths and exploit perceived US weaknesses. Strategically, trying to avoid a direct military confrontation with the USA an aggressor will use means like terrorism, threat to use a bacteriologic, nuclear or chemical weapon, information warfare or ecological subversion, instead. If forced to start a conventional war with the USA, the aggressor will probably use asymmetric means to prevent the USA access to strategic assets". This Report was widely quoted and in subsequent documents the definition of the asymmetric strategy of warfare which can be used by the USA adversaries, almost literary included all the issues from the Report by W. Cohen. In 1998 W. Cohen noticed a paradox that in a new strategic environment the American military advantage really increases the risk of nuclear, biological, chemical attacks in the asymmetric threats.¹⁰ In that context asymmetric conflict (asymmetric warfare) applies to blackmail when a weak actor threatens with using WMD against civilians of the adversary state. In the Review of Common Strategies of 1999 asymmetry is defined as an attempt to weaken or destroy USA strength exploiting USA weaknesses with methods that significantly

¹⁰ William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, May 1997, <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/qdr97.pdf> [11.03.2016]

vary from those the USA expects". In the report by the USA secretary of defense Robert Gates¹¹ (February 2010) the term asymmetry is applied with the same meaning. Asymmetric defines strategy and tactics chosen by the USA adversaries with poorer military and security capabilities. From this point of view asymmetric is an antonym of "conventional", "normal" or "traditional" in the definitions of threats, attacks and military operations.

The issue of asymmetric threats, military strategies and operations is actively studied in research centers at war colleges and higher education institutions in the USA¹² and in the professional magazines. One of the first works of this series "Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be defeated?" was published in 1998. The book analyses the USA military-technological successes and a changing character of warfare, terrorism, information warfare and possibilities of asymmetric warfare¹³.

The Report Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts by Institute of Strategic Studies

¹¹ R.Meinhart, *Strategic planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs Of Staff, 1990 to 2005*. April 2006, <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0604meinhart.pdf>; R.M. Meinhart, *Joint strategic planning system insights: chairmen. fs of staff 1990 to 2012*. June 2013. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/ssi_meinhart.pdf [10.03.2016]

¹² R.Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review*. February 2010, p. 80, 87. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/qdr-2010.pdf> [10.02.2016]

¹³ *Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (SSI)*, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/> [10.03.2016]

identifies two kinds of asymmetry – positive and negative. Positive asymmetry gives the USA the military advantage whereas negative symmetry is when the adversaries direct their attacks against the USA defenseless and weak points. As the Report has rightly remarked there is nothing new in this interpretation from the point of view of war theories, simply the word asymmetric has not been used to describe these situations.¹⁴

Russia attributes the creation of hybrid warfare to Americans because it matches the popularized image of the USA as the world imperialist and aggressor. However, Russia out went the United States. Following the Kremlin logic, Russia “controls American aggression” in the world, which is the mechanism of the colorful revolutions”. And the aggression against Ukraine confirms this view. From the Kremlin perspective it was not Russia which started the war with Ukraine. It is the USA and the West which use aggression against “Russian peace” (русский мир) so Russia prevents hybrid warfare by force using all possible means. Russian version of hybrid warfare is about opposing the American warfare and its variations in a form of “colorful revolutions”. However, this explanation is an aggressor camouflaging. Actually, the reality and the beginnings of hybrid technologies of warfare are a bit different.

¹⁴ *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be defeated?* Ed. by Lloyd J. Matthews. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (1998), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub230.pdf> [15.02.2016]

A lot of generals, analysts and “strategists” surprised by the Russian activity in Crimea and in the east Ukraine try to explain their previous “peaceful” analysis with the Russia implementing completely new methods and classify them as “hybrid warfare”. Meanwhile, Russia explicitly tries to prove that their tactics of 2014 have been used in the world since long – by western countries among others. “Myth of hybrid war” by a head of the Centre of Strategic Analysis and Technology, Ruslan Puchow,¹⁵ published for the first time in the magazine “Независимое военное обозрение” is an especially interesting article. R. Puchow explains various aspects of intermediate and asymmetric methods” and connects them to decisions of the updated Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. This work is interesting not only because of the presented views but also because it shows how small chances the West has, for the time being, to win Russian people’s “souls” in the propaganda war with Kremlin. The main thesis of Puchow’s analysis is that the Russian army did not use any new tactics: neither on Crimea nor later in Ukraine.¹⁶ So, for Russians the theories that “the Ukrainian crisis” is some kind of new form of intervention operations by the Russian Federation – defined in the West as “hybrid warfare”, are not true.

¹⁵ S.Metz, *Asymmetry and U.S. military strategy: definition, background, and strategic concepts*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf> [15.02.2016]

¹⁶ Р.Н.Пухов, *Миф о „гибридной войне“*, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html [dostęp 18.05.2016]

For Russians, the term “hybrid warfare” serves propaganda rather than classification purposes, because while formulating an accurate definition of that concept – the tactics which were to be new, have occurred to be known since long. Puchow noticed that this kind of hybrid warfare is a serious challenge for the NATO because it is in so called “grey area” of the NATO commitments (it is not embraced by the standard definitions of warfare). Russian realized that with adequately arranged operations can – theoretically – cause the political breakdown between NATO members when one of the member state asks for help. According to the author “hybrid wars” have been waged over past decades or even centuries many times, except that earlier they were defined as “low intensity conflicts”. “It is difficult to imagine using the military force without any communication and information systems, economic sanctions, methods of “hidden war”, an attempt to weaken the adversary or exploit conflicts (ethnic, social, economic, political) on the adversary’s territory. This has been the alphabet of every war since the ancient times”. Puchow emphasizes that using regular military force without a nationality designation in the low intensity operations or special operations has a long history and cannot be treated as a new occurrence. The history provides also many examples of using the regular troops disguised as so called “voluntaries”.

At the beginning of March 2016, the new thesis about preparations of “colorful revolutions” in different parts of the former

Soviet Union by the West, occurred in the Russian national security documents. The reasons for that was the closing conference of 27 February 2016, where the commander of the Russian General Staff, general W. Gierasimov confirmed again that the Russian army started to develop methods of hybrid warfare. The characteristics of this conference was a very intensive information campaign on the current situation in media. In his speech general W. Gerasimov talked about the hybrid nature of the contemporary wars. Their integral parts are “colorful revolutions”, cyberattacks, preparatory stages to introduce “soft power”, and using conventional forces in these cases is impossible.¹⁷

The fact that for the Russian Federation “hybrid warfare” have become a dominating way to wage wars for long years, is confirmed in the latest article by general W. Gerasimov “From Syria Experience”. This article defines the main priorities perceived by the Russian Federation as the main goals of the “hybrid warfare” (and how this war is treated – “blitzkrieg of the 21st century”) – to achieve political goals with a minimal military influence on the adversary.¹⁸ However, following the dominating Russian views, Gerasimov attributes all these elements to “the treacherous West”, in spite of the fact that it is an

¹⁷ *Представители ВЭС ВКС приняли участие в военно-научной конференции Академии военных наук*, <http://www.vesvko.ru/news/article/predstaviteli-ves-vks-prinyali-uchastie-v-voenno-n-15999> [11.06.2016]

¹⁸ *„Обычными войсками невозможно воевать”. Герасимов рассказал генералам, как противостоять „гибридным войнам” Запада*, <http://www.nakanune.ru/news/2016/3/1/22429056/#sthash.iRu4ro8r.dpuf> [15.05.2016]

obvious psychological method of projection – an unwanted (mainly negative) features are displaced onto an adversary. Gerasimov claims that the “hybrid warfare” should involve mainly destabilization of military and economic capacity of the adversary, information-psychological pressure, active support of internal opposition, subversion and guerilla. He also rightly notices that in the contemporary world what counts is the ability to act effectively and quickly especially in an unusual war environment rather than the size of the military forces, particularly, regarding fast development of non-military methods “integrated application of political, economic and information and other non-military measures with support of military forces”. It is difficult to disagree with one of the most important conclusion: “right now a combination of traditional and hybrid warfare constitutes a distinctive feature of any military conflict. Moreover, the hybrid warfare can be applied without open support of military force whereas the traditional warfare cannot”.¹⁹

It is difficult to define accurately who in Russia is an author of the theory on “hybrid warfare”. Yet, Russia has the precursors of theories on non-conventional warfare. In 1945 George Issaron in his book “New forms of combat” (An essay researching modern war)” emphasized that “War is not declared, it simply starts... Mobilization and concentration do not refer to the beginning of war... but are

¹⁹ В. Герасимов, *По опыту Сирии*, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/29579> [15.05.2016]

imperceptibly and gradually organized long before. Certainly, it is not possible to conceal these operations completely. Any size of concentration will be noticeable. However, there is always one more step between the threat of war and its beginning. This step creates doubts if the real military operations are being prepared or it is only a threat. And, until one party has any doubts, the second is concentrating the army, on the borders no military power is used".²⁰

Russia has one more modern war theorist - E. Messner, who coined the concept of future wars that would be wars for the soul of the nation rather than territories or resources and psychological agitation and propaganda will be more important than weapon. These wars will be the insurgent wars, *мятежные войны*,²¹ wars of chaos, a dominating form of military conflict in the 21st century, in his opinion (Месснер 2004). Conflicts, in which the explosives are national or social differences and disinformation are actually the psychological wars by nature, waged by fueling tension and propaganda. For "these wars" the most useful are special forces or well-trained units for nonconventional operations. These wars are not resolved by the armed forces at the battle field. In these operations the army is not to deter but threaten civilians and the armed forces of the adversary (Sykulski 2014). In his opinion traditional warfare has been

²⁰ Г.С.Иссерсон, *Новые формы борьбы*, Военгиз, Москва 1940, <http://militera.lib.ru/science/isserson/index.html> [18.02.2016]

²¹ И. Ходаков, *Неуслышанный пророк*, http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2010-07-02/15_isserson.html [18.02.2016]

exhausted:” In the past the wars were waged in two-dimensions – in the sea and on the land, later evolved to the third dimension – the air. Now the most important is the fourth dimension – the psyche of the adversaries. The world already lives in this dimension. We talk about the information warfare, but this is actually a psychological warfare because the information flow should give effects in the people’s minds. This is just the aim of the information warfare.

This warfare would be completely different from those known so far – without huge armies, front lines, bombing and mobilization. Small insurgent groups, radical organizations, terrorists, criminal groups, corporations, agents, journalists, non-governmental organizations, propaganda experts, diplomats, financiers and businessmen should play the main role. The aim is to imprison the adversary mentally rather than physically who, when defeated, will realize our goals by themselves.

At war agitation is full of double standards: half of the truth for our people and another half for the adversary. These double standards are not enough – a lot of truths are necessary: on every level of awareness, for every specific practices and customs, inclinations, habits and interests – the special logic, honesty or hypocrisy, knowledgeability and sentimentality.

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries there are a lot of studies on the nature of future military conflicts and wars (Петухов 2004; Панарин 2006; Филатов 2006) - the fourth-generation wars

(sometimes the term *the fifth-generation wars* is used). Describing these wars, the authors drew attention to joining military, information, terrorist and other aggressive operations coordinated from one command and control center and designed to achieve the strategic goal. “The new type of world wars” – wrote Petuchow – use disinformation, i.e. – “war against international terrorism, war against proliferation of WMD, chemical and bacteriological weapon” ...” policy of destroying totalitarian regimes and democratization of the former Eastern Bloc and the Third World countries. Information propaganda causes that the vast majority of the world population does not understand what is really happening. To understand the fourth world war, it is worth referring to E. Messner’s methodological instruction:²² “To understand the insurgent wars (*мятежные войны*), that *мятежные войны* are the modern way of warfare it is necessary to dismiss the concepts of warfare defined centuries ago. It is necessary to stop thinking that there is a war when the adversaries are fighting and there is peace – when they are not fighting” (Месснер 2013).

Practically, along with these trends the studies on “asymmetric threats”, “asymmetric wars” and “asymmetric conflicts” are

²² Eugenij E. Messner (1891-1974) - professional soldier and military theorist. A [Russian German](#), an officer of the Imperial Russian Army. During the Russian Civil War he sided with the White Movement, notably as the last chief of staff of Kornilov Division of the Army of General Wrangler, professor at Military College in Belgrad, during the WWII collaborated with Nazi Germany. In Russia gained popularity in spite of his hostility towards USSR. (И.В.Домнин, А. Е. Савинкин, *Асимметричное воевание*. В: „Отечественные записки”: журнал, 2005, Nr 5; А.Федорович, *Любимый стратег Путина*, http://www.inoforum.ru/inostrannaya_pressa/lyubimyj_strateg_putina/ [11.01.2016])

commenced. In most cases there are scientific articles and a few monographs.

Larisa Deriglazova has provided the thorough analysis of the nature of the asymmetric conflict in her numerous studies starting from 2005 (Дериглазова 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011). She emphasizes that asymmetry defines paradoxical conflict situations in which the strong adversary is not able to protect themselves and defeat the weak. The author draws attention to main characteristics of asymmetric conflicts:

- Unpredictability of the outcome in spite of the open differences in military capacity and status of adversaries,
- A weak actor applying the strategy of identifying “weaknesses of a strong actor”,
- A weak actor applying the forbidden warfare,
- “Indirect” tactics of a weak actor,
- Inability of a strong actor to defend their position and definitely crush a weak actor (2005).

Military theoreticians S. Czekinov and S. Bogdanov considering L. Deriglazova’s studies presented their own concept of the new generation war (Чекинов, Богданов 2013, 2011, 2010). Their model of war consists of eight subsequent phases:

- The first phase: non-military asymmetric warfare including information, morality, psychology, ideology, diplomacy and

- economic measures used to create favorable political, economic and military configuration;
- The second phase: special operations to mislead political and military leaders carried out by coordinated actions via diplomatic channels, media and governments, military agencies, false data, orders and instructions;
 - The third phase: threatening, deceiving, bribing governments and officers to give up their duties;
 - The fourth phase: destabilizing the situation with propaganda, increasing social discontent strengthen by sabotage and subversive operations of various military organizations and paramilitaries;
 - The fifth phase: demarcating the no-fly zone over the invaded country, blockade of roads, bridges and transportation hubs, using private military organizations, opponents of social and political order of the attacked country;
 - The sixth phase: starting the military operations followed by thorough reconnaissance and intelligence actions with various technologies, means and forces including special forces, signal units, diplomacy and secret service and industrial espionage;
 - The seventh phase: combination of targeted information operations, military operations of signal units, operations in cyberspace of air forces, using various weapon systems and platforms (far-reaching artillery, new physical principles

weapon (beam, geophysical, wave, non-lethal biological weapon);

- The eighth phase: gaining control over the remaining adversary resistance points and destroying hostile elements with special forces, operations carried out by reconnaissance units to identify hostile forces that survived and inform rocket and artillery units about their position (coordinates); destroy the adversary fire protection strips with advanced weapons, surround the adversary territory with land forces.

Martin van Creveld characterized new type of war – “non-trinitarian war” which does not match the trinity paradigm of government-army-society.²³ Whereas, an American expert, A. Cohen divided modern military conflicts into three categories: conflicts which use rockets, tanks and knives respectively.²⁴ According to experts’ estimations, in the last years knives were used in 90 % out of 130 military conflicts instead of missiles or tanks. However, as Martin van

²³ *Война и современное государство. Стенограмма лекции профессора истории Иерусалимского университета Мартина ван Кревельда*, <http://polit.ru/article/2006/09/26/kreveld/> [15.02.2016]

²⁴ E. Cohen, M. Eisenstadt, A. Bacevich, *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution* – Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/KnivesTanksandMissiles.pdf> [11.03.2016]

Creveld noticed “history shows that 90% of tanks does not know what to do with knives”.²⁵

The gradual dominance of the term “hybrid warfare” grew together with conception of “three block war” (Boot 2006). The thrust of the concept is that modern militaries must be trained to conduct full scale military action in one city block, peacekeeping operations in the second one and humanitarian aid in the third block, simultaneously.

Today, the “hybrid warfare” is in a center of attention, widely discussed in media, has become a subject of expertise research. The public perception of warfare has also changed. Moreover, the research was conducted by world experts: William J. Nemeth, F. Hoffman, Daniel Lasikom, George Davis, Nathan P. Freier, D. Kilcullen (USA), Frank van Kappenom (Holland). A lot of researchers and scientists indicate the “hybrid” nature of warfare, the conceptualization is to clear and full. In the western theories of 2005-2009 the term “hybrid warfare” occurs, yet, in many cases it was not unified precisely enough to avoid controversies among experts worldwide and interpretations in other terms and concepts. Today the situation is different.

²⁵ *Война и современное государство. Стенограмма лекции профессора истории Иерусалимского университета Мартина ван Кревельда, <http://polit.ru/article/2006/09/26/kreveld/> [15.02.2016]*

Carl von Clausewitz²⁶ predicted in his war book almost 180 years ago that war has its own forms and conditions in every period, so every period should have its own independent theory of war (Brown, Brown 2011).

The state which wages the hybrid war enters into transactions with non-state contractors: military groups, local people groups, the connections with which are formally denied. These contractors can conduct actions the state itself cannot as it is obliged to comply with the Geneva Convention, Hague Convention with respect to the laws and customs of war on land and agreements with other countries. The dirty work can be commissioned to non-state groups and organizations. This happens now in the east of Ukraine. Yet, the peculiarity of this conflict is information propaganda which can be treated as an information war.

In March 2015 the NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbov presented the following definition: “hybrid warfare” employs a broad mix of instruments – military force, technology, crime, terrorism, economic and financial pressures, humanitarian and religious means, intelligence, sabotage, disinformation²⁷.

²⁶ Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Prussian general and military theoretic, fought against Napoleon I in the Russian army 1812-1814 and Prussian 1814-1815. During 1818-1830 a head of Allgemeine Kriegsschule in Berlin (future Berlin War Academy).

²⁷ *ESDP and NATO: better cooperation in view of the new security challenges*. Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbov at the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, Riga, Latvia, 5 March 2015, NATO,

Contemporary changes in military art are conditioned by asymmetric conflicts, hybrid warfare, so called the fourth-generation warfare or multivariate warfare. The adversary in hybrid warfare is decentralized and resembles rather loosely connected guerilla groups, which is not organized, do not act as a conventional army but analyses all western military and technological solutions and reacts to them immediately. Hybrid war is not declared formally, is waged with unconventional means, is aggressive and complex. It is a real war which has not been declared. Aggressor does not occur openly but hides his role in a conflict by all means. There are also soldiers who are difficult to identify.²⁸ The operation can be conducted by commandos disguised as local bums, separatists, a humanitarian aid convoy. All of that is to avoid consequences partially or completely. Along these operations aggressive propaganda campaign is conducted on the territory of their own country and the international stage.²⁹ Propaganda creates the image of the imaginary aggressor and the victim.

Hybrid warfare can be defined as a non-warfare because a lot of operations are conducted between the army and civilians. Militaries

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117919.htm?selectedLocale=en

[15.02.2016]

²⁸ О.Турчинов, *Тероризм. Гібридна війна. Росія,*

<https://turchynov.com/blog/details/terorizm-gibridna-vijna-rosiya> [15.01.2016]

²⁹ В.В. Власюк, Я.В. Карман, Деякі основи поняття "гібридна війна" в міжнародному праві,

<http://lclslaw.knu.ua/index.php/item/207-deyaki-osnovy-ponyattya-hibrydna-viyna-v-mizhnarodnomu-pravi-vlasiuk-v-v-karman-ya-v> [15.02.2016]

are disguised as civilians whereas civilians hold guns in their hands. The example of this are “the little green men” on Crimea where the Russian propaganda denied accepting them as militaries for a long time because they did not have military insignias and at the same time acted as civilians disguised in uniforms, which according to W. Putin himself can be bought in a shop. Yet, they have weapon but “little green men” avoided using it. It was to serve as a deterrent.³⁰

Hybrid warfare employs non-conventional means, goes beyond the 19st century concept of traditional war based on Clausewitz’ theory, its content, nature and characteristics significantly differ from those of traditional warfare models. The typical feature is that there are no clearly marked frontline of military operations or direct fighting of big military groups, but numerous special forces operations, e.g.: of Russian Main Intelligence Directorate, separatists which are not uniformed although it is clear that they include many militaries of Russian military forces.

According to other definitions – hybrid warfare is a merge of several threats – traditional (engagement of military forces), irregular (guerilla), terrorism and the latest technologies (cyberattacks). Hybrid warfare includes also subversive actions, corruption, energy warfare, economic warfare, financial warfare and of course information

³⁰ Роль информации в гибридных войнах,
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/rol_informatsii_v_gibridnykh_voynakh/
[17.02.2016]

warfare. Generally, it is accepted that hybrid warfare includes guerilla-type operations against the adversary with non-conventional ways and means, terrorist attacks under the false flag, based on the latest technologies, using information and cyber warfare³¹.

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³¹ В.П.Горбулін, „Гібридна війна” як ключовий інструмент російської геостратегії реваншу. В: «Стратегічні пріоритети» – науково-аналітичний що кварталний збірник Національного інституту стратегічних досліджень. 2014, nr 4 (33), с.8; Про поняття «гібридна війна», <http://www.viche.info/journal/4615/> [17.02.2016]

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